

The Anti- Hitler Coalition

VICTOR ISSRAELJAN

**Diplomatic
Co-operation
Between the USSR,
USA and Britain
During the
Second World War
1941-1945**



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**Антигитлеровская коалиция
Дипломатическое сотрудничество СССР, США и Англии
в годы второй мировой войны
1941—1945**

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INTRODUCTION

During the Second World War the Soviet Union entered into military and political alliances with a number of capitalist countries. A study of the war-time co-operation between the USSR, Britain and the United States of America is important today, when the ideas of peaceful coexistence, consistently implemented by the Soviet Union, compel the approval of the peoples of the world.

The policy of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems is an inalienable part of Soviet foreign policy. Its aim is to prevent the imperialists from unleashing a new world war, to stop aggression and international provocations, to create conditions in which the peoples can exercise their natural right to self-determination and to expand economic co-operation and cultural exchanges between countries.

The idea of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems was evolved and elaborated by Lenin. It found expression in the initial foreign policy acts of the Soviet state, the Decree on Peace published in 1917, the various treaties of the Soviet Union, notably the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany in 1922, the non-aggression and neutrality treaties concluded by the USSR with capitalist states in the twenties and thirties, and the Soviet Union's efforts in the League of Nations and outside it to avert a new world war and to promote disarmament and the establishment of a system of collective security.

The principles of the policy of peaceful coexistence have been set forth in many resolutions of the UN General Assembly, which were adopted on the initiative and with the active participation of the USSR, in the decisions of international conferences, and so on.

Recent international events have once again shown the practical importance of the policy of peaceful coexistence

in the relations between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries. The Soviet Union strives to develop normal relations with these countries and to resolve controversial issues in a realistic way. That is why the experience of Soviet-Anglo-American co-operation in the war against fascism, the experience of the anti-Hitler coalition, can and should be used for developing business-like relations between countries with different social systems.

* * *

To the peoples and states of the anti-Hitler coalition the Second World War was an anti-fascist war of liberation. This contributed greatly to the formation of the Soviet-Anglo-American alliance and to its stability. The fact that fascist aggression posed a mortal threat to the very existence of Britain, the USSR and the USA, and other nations and peoples who were attacked by the fascist aggressors, led them to conclude a military and political alliance.

Defence of national independence and sovereignty against the threat of fascist tyranny became the basis of the anti-Hitler coalition and formed the basis of the Soviet-Anglo-American military and political alliance.

The popular movement in Britain and the USA for the opening of a second front and the activity of various democratic organisations aimed at strengthening allied relations were important in developing Soviet-Anglo-American co-operation during the war. This activity took many forms, such as weeks of friendship with the USSR, meetings of friendship with the USSR, exhibitions, concerts and working extra shifts at factories producing equipment and materials for the USSR.

The movement of the British and American people for strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition promoted the signing of important political agreements between the USSR and her Western Allies. There were pro-fascist circles in Britain and the USA which were not averse to entering into collusion with the enemy, but the broad movement of the British and US working people foiled their anti-Soviet plans. As early as 1920, Lenin, analysing the foreign and domestic position of the Soviet state, said: "It has thus turned out that our policy and our predictions have proved fundamentally correct in all respects and that the oppressed people

in any capitalist country have indeed shown themselves our allies. . . ."¹

British and American workers and intellectuals were the Soviet Union's most consistent allies in the Second World War.

Another factor which contributed to the setting up of the anti-Hitler coalition was that in unleashing the Second World War, nazi Germany first attacked the Western powers, even though they had connived at Germany's aggression and even supported it for many years. Germany's plan for the establishment of world domination provided first for the annihilation of her Western neighbours and then for an attack on the Soviet Union.

When Germany attacked the Soviet Union, she had already occupied several North, West, Central and Southeast European countries and inflicted serious damage on British interests in Europe. The German imperialists were also getting ready to seize the British colonies and to establish their rule in Africa and the Middle East. The offensive, launched jointly with Italy, in Libya in 1940 was a step towards the implementation of that plan. Germany engaged in widespread economic aggression against many countries in the British sphere of interests, and mortal danger threatened the British possessions in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Having overrun considerable territories in China and Indochina, the Japanese contenders for world domination were pushing forward towards Malaya, Burma, India and other British possessions.

The fascist powers threatened US interests as well. The USA realised that German, Italian and Japanese domination in Europe, Asia and Africa would push US monopolies from most of the world's sales and raw material markets. In addition, Germany's intense penetration into Latin America undermined US influence on the American continent.

Thus, fascist aggression constituted a serious danger not only to the working people in Britain and the USA and other countries, who in the event of an axis victory would have been enslaved by the fascists, but also to the ruling classes. This fact was an objective prerequisite for the formation of the military-political alliance between Britain, the USA and the USSR.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Moscow, Vol. 31, p. 412.

Finally, the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition became possible because the plan of world reaction to set up a front against the Soviet Union was wrecked on the eve of the Second World War. The foreign political activity of the Soviet state on the eve of the war—its untiring struggle against fascism and for collective security—promoted the coalition of states united in struggle against the fascist bloc. During the Second World War the Communist Party and the Soviet Government spared no efforts to expand the front of the freedom-loving peoples and to strengthen Soviet-Anglo-American co-operation. The nazis hoped that they would be able to isolate the Soviet Union politically. When they mounted their attack on the USSR they endeavoured to knock together a united anti-Soviet front of capitalist states, but their plan was frustrated. The USSR succeeded in forming an anti-Hitler coalition with the USA and Britain by using the contradictions existing between the main imperialist powers.

* * *

The Soviet-Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War was a political, economic and military alliance. Most important was their co-operation in the political sphere. It provided for a co-ordinated policy by the three powers towards enemy and neutral states and also towards the other members of the anti-Hitler coalition. Soviet-Anglo-American co-operation in the political field also had the aim of elaborating co-ordinated principles for the post-war world. In short, the political co-operation between the USSR, USA and Britain had the purpose of co-ordinating the positions of the three governments on all key questions of world policy both during and after the war.

The co-operation in the economic field was also a very important part of the development of the alliance. The economic links between the three leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition expanded considerably. They were based on the bilateral and trilateral agreements signed between the governments of the USSR, the USA and Britain during the war, and their purpose was to promote the fight against the common enemy. Particularly important were the Soviet-Anglo-American protocols on deliveries which were generally drawn up for short periods and stipulated the volume, kind and forms of mutual deliveries.

The war-time co-operation between the USSR, the USA and Britain extended also to military matters. Information on the military-strategical situation on the fronts and concerning military plans was exchanged at all important bilateral and trilateral Allied conferences. In a number of cases military operations (at the Teheran and Yalta conferences) were co-ordinated and direct contacts were established between the staffs of the Allied forces. Contacts between the high commands of the Soviet and the Allied armed forces became particularly extensive in the final stages of the war.

This is not an exhaustive list of the many forms of co-operation between the USSR, USA and Britain during the Second World War. There was also an exchange of scientific information, an extension of cultural links, and so on. The co-operation of public, trade union, youth and other organisations in the three countries did much to develop and strengthen the Soviet-Anglo-American alliance in war.

The fruitful co-operation between the USSR, USA and Britain was also developed in many other ways, such as the usual diplomatic channels, bilateral and multilateral talks, conferences and special Allied bodies.

The fact that the three countries co-operated in many, including the political, fields, does not mean that the socialist Soviet Union or the capitalist USA and Britain abandoned their ideological positions. Soviet people and their Government continued to adhere firmly to the Marxist-Leninist theory and communist ideology, and, naturally, the bourgeois British and US governments did not depart from their ideological principles. This was precisely stated by Winston Churchill, the Head of the British Government, and well-known for his anti-communist views, on June 22, 1941. Many US statesmen made no secret of their hostility towards communist ideas. Nevertheless, these ideological differences were no obstacle to co-operation between the three powers.

The development of war-time co-operation between the USSR, Britain and the USA was greatly promoted by their joint participation in various trilateral commissions, such as the European Advisory Commission, the Advisory Council for Matters Relating to Italy, the Inter-Allied Reparation Commission, various Allied control commissions and also some specific commissions (for example, the Moscow

Commission on the Polish Question, set up at the Yalta [Crimea] Conference). Representatives of the USSR, Britain and the USA considered and decided various international questions, and the work of some commissions furnished important results. The commission for securing deliveries, purchasing commissions, various special missions including military missions, repatriation commissions, and so on, took charge of the practical aspects of the co-operation between the Great Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.

* * *

As a result of the Soviet-Anglo-American co-operation during the Second World War the united front of the freedom-loving peoples, the military and political alliance between the USSR, Britain and the USA, achieved its purpose: the joint efforts of the anti-fascist coalition defeated the fascist bloc headed by Germany, Japan and Italy and brought about their unconditional surrender. It should, however, be emphasised that the contributions of the three partners in the alliance to the victory over fascism were far from equal. The Soviet Union and its armed forces played the decisive role.

Victory over the fascist powers could have been achieved sooner and at smaller cost if the USA and Britain had fulfilled their commitment under the alliance to open a second front earlier. Yet, the anti-Hitler coalition proved sound and all attempts of the fascist states to split the Soviet-Anglo-American coalition by playing on the difference in the social systems of the participants were defeated: none of the United Nations agreed to sign a separate armistice or peace with the enemy.

Another major achievement of the anti-Hitler coalition was the fact that the joint efforts of the Soviet Union, Britain and the USA succeeded in preventing an extension of the fascist bloc and the enlistment of new participants. The actions taken by the leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition prevented the fascists from carrying into effect their plans for countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Sweden.

Another important factor of Soviet-Anglo-American co-operation was the extension of political, economic, military, cultural and other links between the USSR, USA and Britain. Britain and the Soviet Union signed an agreement

on alliance in war and co-operation in the post-war period. The two countries signed also economic agreements, and economic links were established between the USSR and the states of the British Empire. The USSR and the USA also concluded important agreements during the war years.

The establishment of Soviet-Anglo-American Allied relations was a major setback for the reactionary, anti-Soviet elements in the USA and Britain who throughout the period between the wars had slandered the USSR in an attempt to influence opinion in those countries against the Soviet Union. The formation of the anti-Hitler coalition helped to bring the truth about the Soviet Union to the US and British people and to strengthen the sympathies of the British and American working people for the socialist state.

The development of Allied relations between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain during the war laid the basis for their co-operation in the post-war period. True, this co-operation did not assume the scale it might have because the British and US rulers unleashed the "cold war" soon after the end of hostilities.

During the war the governments of the USSR, USA and Britain succeeded in adopting co-ordinated decisions and took joint political action. Thus, they worked out the basic principles for their common policy towards Germany both in the final stages of the war and in the post-war period. The Allies agreed on occupation zones in Germany and on the functions of the occupation authorities. Many decisions on the German question were adopted at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, in the European Advisory Commission and the Control Council for Germany. There can be no doubt about the positive role of these co-ordinated decisions on Germany. Had the decisions providing for the democratisation and demilitarisation of Germany, and for her restoration as a single democratic and peace-loving state been implemented in the post-war period, and had the US and British governments not ignored them, the peace treaty with Germany would have been signed long ago and no neo-nazi revanchist forces could have reared their head in West Germany.

The Soviet, US and British governments agreed on the main principles of the policy to be implemented in the liberated European countries. In the Declaration on Liberated Europe, the decisions on a number of definite questions

(Poland, Yugoslavia, etc.) the governments of the three powers achieved compromises as regards the composition of the governments, and also on some other issues.

Armistice agreements were also signed with allies of Hitler Germany who had dropped out of the war. These agreements expressed the Soviet Union's desire to create conditions which would favour the free, democratic development of the countries freed from fascist oppression.

The co-operation of the USSR, USA and Britain during the Second World War helped in the establishment of a new organisation for the maintenance of peace and security. The governments of the Soviet Union, the USA and Great Britain worked out realistic formulae for the Charter of the United Nations Organisation—they guaranteed equal rights to the Great Powers on the Security Council, although the socialist countries were then a minority in the world. The Soviet, US and British governments convened a conference which opened on April 25, 1945 in San Francisco, and there the United Nations Organisation was inaugurated. These three powers also reached an agreement on Far Eastern issues. In order to establish peace as quickly as possible, the Soviet Government, in keeping with the interests of the Soviet state and at the request of the US and British governments, joined in the war against Japan. The agreement between the three powers on questions of the Far East, reached at the Yalta Conference, solved the key questions connected with the post-war settlement in this part of the globe. In strict keeping with its commitments, the Soviet Union joined in the war against militarist Japan in August 1945 and contributed greatly to her defeat.

The extensive exchange of political information between the Soviet, British and US governments, through normal diplomatic channels and also at various talks and conferences, was proof of the effectiveness of their co-operation as were their joint political actions. These included first and foremost the trilateral declarations of the Soviet, US and British governments, which expressed their common point of view on questions of world policy. The three governments also issued identical or similar statements on certain matters; their joint representations to other governments proved highly effective too.

Soviet-Anglo-American economic co-operation, which led to the joint utilisation of part of the resources of the Great

Powers for the victory over the Hitler coalition, was also of great importance.

These examples of the results of the war-time co-operation between the Soviet Union, Britain and the USA illustrate its effectiveness.

* * *

Although important positive results were achieved in developing relations between the main states of the anti-Hitler alliance, a great many difficulties had to be overcome. The discussion of some military and political questions often revealed that there were fundamental differences between the positions of the USSR and those of Britain and the USA. These differences came sharply to the fore when overall military strategy was discussed. The Soviet Government's main concern was to make the coalition a highly efficient and effective weapon in the war against Hitler and his allies. This could be best achieved by opening a second front at the earliest possible date, which would not only have lightened the grim and bloody struggle of the Soviet Union and of its armed forces fighting against the common enemy but would also have hastened the victory over the fascist invaders. As early as in the summer of 1941 the Soviet Government advocated the opening of a second front as quickly as possible and the adoption of a co-ordinated military strategy. However, the views of the Soviet Union were not supported by Churchill's and Roosevelt's Governments.

Although the British and US governments had committed themselves to open a second front in Europe in 1942, they failed to do so.

In addition to the direct refusal by the British and US governments to carry out their allied commitments, the Soviet Union had to counter all sorts of manoeuvres on their part which served the ultimate purpose of prolonging the war. These included the proposals to open a second front in North Africa, in the Balkans and so on, although it was clear that only military operations near Germany's vital centres would divert a substantial part of the German armed forces from the Soviet-German front. Western France was such a place. A landing in that part of the European continent would have split the German armed forces. Germany would have found herself grasped in a vice from the east

and west. This was a prospect German military and political leaders had feared ever since Bismarck and Moltke.

The implementation of the programme of mutual deliveries was also fraught with many difficulties. Even though the US and British governments had assumed concrete commitments in this respect, deliveries schedules to the Soviet Union were often not fulfilled in time (especially in the early stages of the war) and did not always meet the needs of the moment. These failures to deliver the right things at the right time were particularly frequent when the fiercest battles were raging on the Soviet-German front (for example, in the autumn of 1941, summer of 1942 and summer of 1943).

Serious differences arose between the USSR, Britain and the USA in the concluding stages of the war. The Soviet, US and British governments generally succeeded in reaching agreement on the principles of a common policy on particular questions but implementation of that policy invariably ran into serious difficulties. The British and US ruling circles distorted the democratic essence of the decisions adopted by the three powers. In the interests of the monopolies they endeavoured to revive and consolidate the positions of the exploiter classes in the countries liberated from fascist occupation and to paralyse the national liberation movement there. They shrank at nothing to gain their ends and even openly resorted to the physical destruction of democratic, patriotic forces. Greece was a case in point. The imperialist circles of the Western powers vainly strove to prevent the development of revolutionary, democratic processes. These processes could not be stopped for they were an objective manifestation of the laws governing the development of human society.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, strictly adhered to the letter and spirit of jointly adopted decisions and endeavoured to ensure freedom and democracy for the people of the liberated countries. As the end of the war approached, the fundamental changes in the alignment of the forces in the world resulting from the war became ever more apparent.

These and other differences and difficulties in the relations between the Allies were due first and foremost to the different war aims pursued by the USSR, Britain and the United States. These differences were due to their different social systems. The chief aim of the Soviet Union was to

route fascism, to liberate the enslaved peoples from the fascist invaders as quickly as possible, and to create conditions favouring the development of democracy throughout the world. In addition, the USSR strove to prevent the possibility of Germany resorting to new aggression after the war. The British and US governments pursued different aims. True, they also strove to crush Germany and her allies and for this reason entered into an alliance with the USSR. But in so doing they only wanted to weaken Germany as an imperialist competitor and did not intend to destroy the power of the monopolists and militarists there. The British and US ruling circles endeavoured to use the war to extend their influence to as many countries as possible in all parts of the globe. They wanted to establish British-US domination in the post-war world. In pursuing this aim certain circles in London and Washington deliberately prolonged the war and delayed the opening of a second front. They thought that the longer the war lasted, the easier it would be for Britain and the USA to dictate conditions after the war. In other words, political interests of the ruling, exploiting classes dictated the war policy of Britain and the USA. These interests demanded the removal of imperialist competitors and the establishment of their own undivided US-British domination in the world. The Second World War endorsed with new force the view Lenin had expressed in 1917: "The policy which a given state, a given class within this state, pursued for a long time before the war is inevitably continued by that same class during the war, the form of action alone being changed."¹

It was also due to the bourgeois nature of the British and US governments that despite the Soviet Union's decisive role in the war against world fascism the British and US ruling circles tried to implement a separate British-US policy on many political issues. This became apparent as early as August 1941 at the Atlantic Conference, when the Atlantic Charter was drawn up, and at other British-US conferences.

True, there were also differences between the USA and Britain because each was striving to establish its own domination, and particularly because of their different assessments of the prospects of the war.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 400.

The efforts of certain circles in London and Washington to act "from a position of strength" towards the Soviet Union was an expression of the imperialist line aimed at establishing British-US domination in the world. This anti-Soviet trend asserted itself increasingly at all Soviet-Anglo-American talks in the final stages of the war.

The revival of the bankrupt anti-Soviet policy can be explained partly by the fact that the imperialist contradictions between the two capitalist groupings (the Western powers and the fascist bloc), which were one of the elements responsible for the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition between states with different systems, had greatly diminished by the end of the war. British and US ruling monopoly circles no longer regarded nazi Germany and militaristic Japan as dangerous competitors in the struggle for world domination. Both Germany and Japan were on the verge of defeat.

During the Second World War the British and US ruling circles again made a wrong assessment of the Soviet Union's potential. The Soviet Union not only succeeded in resisting the onslaught of the combined forces of the fascist bloc but in smashing that bloc. That gigantic struggle did not weaken the Soviet Union, as the British and US monopolistic circles expected, but strengthened it militarily, economically and politically and gave it a much greater say in world affairs. This naturally went against the grain of the British and US ruling circles who regarded the Soviet Union as the main obstacle to the establishment of Anglo-Saxon global domination. At the end of the war these circles were even willing to risk an open break with the USSR.

However, the character of the anti-Hitler coalition was not determined by the US and British bourgeois governments. It was the aims of the anti-fascist states and peoples in the Second World War, the Soviet Union's decisive role, and the actions of the masses that determined its character. In spite of the intrigues of anti-Soviet elements in Britain and the USA, the Soviet-Anglo-American alliance lasted to the end of the war. This was due also to the Soviet Union's increased military might, which had a sobering effect on some hotheads in Washington and London.

* * *

Despite these contradictions the anti-Hitler coalition—the Soviet-Anglo-American alliance—was a major victory

for the freedom-loving peoples, who had united to fight fascist aggression. The existence of that alliance was an extremely important factor in routing the fascist bloc. At the same time the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition was a major success of Soviet foreign policy. The historical significance of the anti-Hitler coalition can be summarised in four points.

First, the formation of a coalition between the USSR, USA and Britain and other anti-fascist states upset the policy aimed at isolating the USSR and at setting up a single anti-Soviet front of capitalist powers, a policy that had been pursued by the capitalist countries ever since the Soviet state came into existence. In 1941 the USA and Britain, the leading powers of the capitalist world, were compelled to enter into a military and political alliance with the Soviet Union.

Then, the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition, which helped to strengthen and extend mutual understanding and co-operation between the peoples of the USSR, USA, Britain, France and China, the biggest anti-fascist powers in the world, broadened considerably the social basis of the anti-fascist front and promoted the consolidation of the anti-fascist forces in all countries.

Also, the existence of the anti-fascist coalition promoted the efforts of the Soviet Union to assert democratic principles in the post-war organisation of the world. It helped the Soviet Government bring about a solution of many international questions in keeping with the interests of the peoples.

Finally, the history of Soviet-Anglo-American relations during the Second World War confirms the correctness of Lenin's thesis about the possibility of the coexistence and co-operation between the two systems—socialist and capitalist. This shows once again that Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence between the two systems is not subjective but is based on the objective laws governing social development. "There is a force more powerful than the wishes, the will and the decisions of any of the governments or classes that are hostile to us," Lenin said at the Ninth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. "That force is world general economic relations, which compel them to make contact with us."¹

Objective developments prompted the bourgeois governments of Britain and the USA to form an alliance with the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 155.

USSR during the Second World War. Long before the war broke out the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, which were guided by Marxist-Leninist theory, had foreseen the course of events and had campaigned for a system of collective security and for giving a collective rebuff to fascist aggression. On the eve of the war the Soviet Government repeatedly drew attention to the fact that the Soviet, Chinese, French, British, American and other freedom-loving peoples had common interests in the struggle against the threat of war.

* * *

The Soviet Union worked for close co-operation between the states of the anti-Hitler coalition. But the preservation of Allied relations within the coalition, naturally, depended not only on the wishes of the Soviet Union.

With the approach of victory the Western powers, and notably the USA, adopted a policy aimed at breaking the alliance with the USSR, and after the war they began to conduct a "hard line", a policy "from a position of strength", and so on. The results of that policy are too well known—the arms race, the aggravation of international tensions, the "cold war" and various military adventures.

The champions of the "hard line" with respect to the Soviet Union and of the policy "from a position of strength" continue to obstruct the development of mutual understanding between the Soviet Union, the USA and Britain. This policy bore no fruit in the past and is even less likely to do so now that the Soviet Union has become much stronger and there is a world socialist system.

If co-operation between countries with different social systems was possible during the war and the peoples were able to unite in the face of fascist enslavement, this is the more possible at present, when a new world war involving the use of nuclear weapons would take a toll of millions of human lives, destroy material and spiritual values on an unprecedented scale, and annihilate all that human genius has created over the ages. In the face of this danger all people of good-will, irrespective of race or nationality, political and religious allegiance and all peace-loving states irrespective of their social system, can and must unite to safeguard peace and human progress.

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNING OF ANGLO-SOVIET CO-OPERATION

Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, thereby treacherously violating the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty of 1939. As soon as Churchill heard about this new act of aggression by Hitler, he assembled his closest colleagues—cabinet members Anthony Eden, Lord Beaverbrook, Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Sir Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador to the USSR who was in England at the time—at Chequers to discuss this development. Although there were few among the British ruling circles who believed that the Soviet Union would be able to resist Nazi Germany for any length of time, the conference decided to pledge Britain's support for the USSR in the war against Germany.

In a broadcast Churchill qualified the Nazi attack as a new act of aggression and treachery and said that it marked a turning point in the war. Reaffirming his anti-communist views and declaring that he did not intend to retract a single word he, an enemy of communism, had pronounced in the past twenty-five years, Churchill said: "We have but one aim and one single, irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime. From this nothing will turn us—nothing. . . . Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe. . . . That is our policy and that is our declaration. It follows, therefore, that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people."¹

The German invasion of Russia was debated in Parliament on June 24, 1941. Anthony Eden, the Foreign Minister,

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *War Speeches. 1940-1945*, London, 1946, pp. 67-68.

made a statement on behalf of the government in which he outlined Anglo-Soviet relations on the eve of the war and in its initial stages, and informed the House of the government's decision to support the Soviet Union. Eden also informed the members of the first steps taken by the British Government to establish direct contacts with the Soviet Government.

The members taking part in the debate approved of the government's decision and expressed their support for an alliance with the USSR.

At the end of June 1941 the Soviet Government sent a military mission to Britain. The mission, headed by General Golikov, was to establish direct contacts with the British High Command. At the same time the Soviet Government agreed to receive a British military and economic mission in Moscow. It arrived on June 27. Sir Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador to the USSR, returned to Moscow with the mission. The British military mission was headed by General Mason MacFarlane, the economic mission by Laurence John Cadbury. During its talk with Sir Stafford the Soviet Government proposed that a joint declaration be drawn up which would include two points—mutual aid and a pledge by both sides not to sign a separate peace. The Moscow talks proceeded in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and co-operation and led to the signing on July 12, 1941 of the Agreement for Joint Action by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the War Against Germany. This agreement was the first serious step on the way to the formation of the anti-Hitler alliance. The agreement was short. In the first article both governments committed themselves to render each other every assistance and support in the war against nazi Germany; in the second, both governments solemnly declared that they would not negotiate with the enemy while the war lasted, except by mutual consent, and would not conclude an armistice or peace treaty with him.

The signing of the Anglo-Soviet agreement was of enormous international significance. It demonstrated the complete futility of Hitler's attempts to draw Britain into a war against the USSR, which had become particularly determined on the eve of the treacherous invasion of the USSR (the Rudolph Hess mission). While the Moscow talks did not

eliminate the differences in the views of the Soviet and British governments on some questions, and did not result in the drawing up of a concrete programme of mutual assistance, the agreement opened the door to the establishment of friendly, allied relations between the two powers. The agreement was of major significance in the establishment of the alliance of nations fighting fascism. It marked a turning point in Anglo-Soviet relations.

The signing of the Anglo-Soviet agreement for joint action in the war against Germany predetermined also the success of the Soviet-British talks on economic questions, which led to the signing of a new trade agreement. True, many difficulties had to be overcome, notably in connection with the terms for the clearing of British credits to the Soviet Union. However, the mutual desire to develop Allied relations helped to overcome these difficulties and the British-Soviet agreement on trade, credits and clearing was signed on August 16, 1941. This agreement provided for the delivery of British goods to the USSR and also for the delivery of some Soviet goods to Britain.

These were the first documents reflecting the Allied relations between the USSR and Great Britain. The British Government was willing to establish these relations because they substantially strengthened Britain's international status and improved her prospects in the war against Nazi Germany.

Another factor contributing greatly to the formation of the Anglo-Soviet alliance was the friendly feelings of the British public towards the Soviet Union.

Immediately after Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union meetings were held all over Britain in support of the Soviet people's liberation struggle and Anglo-Soviet Friendship committees were set up throughout the country. The British workers headed this campaign for rendering immediate and effective aid to the USSR.

The Communist Party of Great Britain consistently campaigned for support of the Soviet Union. In its Manifesto published early in July it demanded all-out co-operation with the Soviet Union based on a treaty of mutual assistance, the dismissal of fascist supporters from British Government positions, organisation of production and the mobilisation of the entire nation for victory.

Support for the Soviet Union was also pledged by the

British Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party in a special declaration on Anglo-Soviet co-operation published on August 1, 1941. In particular, it expressed the deep appreciation of the British Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party for the Soviet Union's titanic efforts in the common fight against Hitlerism. It approved of the extensive co-operation developing between Great Britain and the USSR. The conviction was voiced that the growth of this co-operation would result in the defeat of Hitlerism and the achievement of a mutual understanding between the British and Soviet peoples which would become an essential condition of an enduring peace.

Under pressure from the British working class the British trade union leaders established friendly relations with Soviet trade unions. Numerous voluntary organisations, dedicated to the development of friendly relations between the USSR and Britain, were indicative of the British people's growing interest in the Soviet Union and their desire to strengthen Anglo-Soviet friendship. Among them were such organisations as the National Committee of Anglo-Soviet Unity, the Russia Today society, the Joint Committee for Aid to the Soviet Union, the Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, the Anglo-Soviet Women's Committee, the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, the Anglo-Russian Youth Committee and a number of others. The Aid to Russia fund, functioning under government auspices, was headed by Mrs. Winston Churchill. Local Anglo-Soviet friendship societies were set up in practically every English town. The National Committee of Anglo-Soviet Unity had 400 registered local branches.

Anglo-Soviet Friendship Weeks, which were designed to acquaint the British public with the life of the Soviet people, were enormously popular. The programme of these "weeks" included performances of the works of Soviet and Russian composers, lectures, and films. These "weeks" played a positive role in strengthening the co-operation of the peoples and states of the anti-Hitler coalition and helped to expose the slander about the USSR which for many years had been spread by bourgeois propaganda.

The heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the fascist invaders won the sympathy and aroused the admiration of the man in the street in Britain. Yet, even after the outbreak of the war the anti-Soviet diehards in Britain continued to

exert an influence on that country's policy. There were British politicians who did not believe that the Soviet Union would be able to resist the Germans for any length of time. This point of view was expressed by many British military men and by some members of the government. In his memoirs Winston Churchill indirectly admits that he himself doubted that the Soviet Union would be able to withstand the German onslaught for long. In the first days of the war Sir Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, said that "he did not think the Russians could hold out, in organised resistance to the Germans, for more than a few weeks".¹ However, among the British leaders there were also people who had faith in the Soviet Union's ability to resist the Germans. Among them were Lord Beaverbrook, Hugh Dalton, Ernest Bevin and some others.

The sceptical view on the Soviet Union's ability to withstand Nazi Germany was due to the doubt many British political leaders entertained as to the stability of the Soviet social and state system and to their anti-communist and anti-Soviet convictions. This probably explains why, in the days immediately following the German invasion, some British newspapers were very reserved in their comments about the Soviet-German war and the prospects of British-Soviet relations.

Some newspapers which echoed the feelings of enemies of the USSR in Britain engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda. Thus, for example, the reactionary *Catholic Herald* called on the British people to refuse to co-operate with the Soviet Union in any way. However, these views and trends were not decisive in the development of British politics at that time. The people's movement in support of the Soviet Union, the ardent striving of the British people to defeat fascism together with all of progressive mankind, the community of interests in the war—all this had a major impact on British foreign policy. The alliance with the Soviet Union was vital to British national interests. Therefore, no matter how hard the enemies of the Soviet Union in Britain endeavoured to belittle the importance of military co-operation and to defame the Soviet Union, the time was certainly most inopportune for that. All anti-Soviet moves were given a

¹ Hugh Dalton, *The Fateful Years. Memoirs 1931-1945*, London, 1957, p. 365.

decisive rebuff by the British public and this forced those in Britain who would have prevented co-operation with the Soviet Union off the political stage.

* * *

Military and political co-operation between the Soviet Union and Britain began immediately after nazi Germany invaded the USSR. The British and the Soviet governments began to consult each other on questions of European policy.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war did not weaken her international position, as the rulers of nazi Germany had expected but, on the contrary, strengthened and expanded the international contacts of the Soviet state. The efforts made by the Soviet Union to draw all forces opposing fascist tyranny into the anti-Hitler coalition proved successful. Thus, early in July 1941, the Soviet Government declared that it was willing to normalise relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and to give the peoples of those countries every assistance in the fight against fascism. However, serious difficulties had to be overcome before this normalisation could be carried out. For example, General Sikorski, head of the Polish Emigré Government in London, in a statement on the Soviet-German war made on June 23, 1941, stressed that the Polish Government was unwilling to consider the wishes expressed by the populations of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia and demanded that Poland's pre-war borders be re-established. He declared that relations between the Soviet Union and Poland should be regulated by the treaty concluded in Riga on March 18, 1921.¹ Sikorski's stand naturally did not promote the success of the Soviet-Polish talks which began on July 5, 1941 in London and continued throughout July. The British Government acted as intermediary in these negotiations.

From the very beginning of these talks, which proceeded in a rather strained atmosphere, the Polish Government demanded that the Soviet Union should renounce its claims to Byelorussian and Ukrainian lands as a precondition for the signing of a Soviet-Polish treaty. Ambassador Ivan Maisky, the Soviet representative, said that the Soviet Government "stands for the establishment of an independent

¹ R. Uniastowski, *Poland, Russia and Britain, 1941-1945*, London, 1946, p. 13.

Polish state and that it considers that the question of the form of government to be set up in Poland is a matter to be decided fully by the Poles themselves. . .". On the question of Poland's borders, the Soviet ambassador reaffirmed his government's view that these should be based on the ethnic principle.

The Polish representatives adopted an uncompromising stand and refused to recognise the ethnic principle as the basis for a solution of the border problem. The negotiations were reaching an impasse. The British, who were acting as intermediaries, suggested that the question of Poland's borders be left open until the end of the war. They considered the Soviet proposals acceptable on the whole and advised the Polish Emigré Government to accept them.

On July 30, 1945 a treaty was signed between the USSR and Poland. In it the two sides assumed the commitment to render each other assistance, and the Soviet Government agreed to the formation of a Polish Army in the Soviet Union.

Simultaneously with the signing of the Soviet-Polish treaty, Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, directed a note to Sikorski. In it he enumerated the points upon which accord had been reached between Sikorski and the British Government prior to the signing of the treaty. Yet, on the following day, Eden said in the Commons that "the exchange of Notes [with the Polish Government.—*Ed.*] . . . does not involve any guarantees of frontiers by His Majesty's Government."¹

Thus, the Soviet-Polish treaty was signed even though the Soviet Government and the Polish émigrés in London held different views on the question of Poland's post-war borders.

By the signing of a treaty with the Polish Emigré Government the Soviet Union strove first and foremost to strengthen and enlarge the anti-Hitler coalition, to restore the sovereignty of Poland and to demonstrate her sincere wish to render the Polish people every assistance in their struggle for freedom.

Some Polish émigrés, however, pursued entirely different aims. Some arch-reactionaries held deep anti-Soviet feel-

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. III, London, 1950, p. 350.

ings and were against the signing of the Soviet-Polish treaty. Among them were Sosnkowski and his followers, who in July 1941 left the government in protest against the signing of the treaty. Sikorski and the Ministers supporting him endeavoured to use the Soviet-Polish treaty to boost the international prestige of the Emigré Government. Sikorski also strove to build up a strong Polish Army, which was to participate in the joint struggle against the fascists and then be at his command when Germany was crushed.

Britain's attitude in the Soviet-Polish talks was prompted by her desire to have Soviet-Polish relations normalised in order to strengthen the positions of the pro-British Emigré Government, and what was even more decisive, so that she would have a greater say in East-European affairs herself. British mediation in the Soviet-Polish talks appeared to open up such prospects.

As regards the border question, the British Government believed this could be decided after the war, when the balance of power would change in favour of the Western powers.

Besides, the British Government was also interested in strengthening and enlarging the anti-Hitler coalition, and in enlisting new participants into the war against Germany. Speaking of Britain's stand during the Soviet-Polish negotiations, Churchill wrote: "In the clash of battle at this vital point in the war all must be subordinated to strengthening the common military effort."¹

Czechoslovakia affected the development of Anglo-Soviet relations in a somewhat different way. Soon after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union the Soviet Government informed President Benes of Czechoslovakia that

a) the political programme of the Soviet Government provides for an independent Czechoslovakia with a Czechoslovak national government;

b) the Soviet Government does not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia and the question of her internal affairs will be resolved by the Czechoslovak people themselves;

c) if the Czechoslovakian Government wishes to send an envoy to Moscow, the Soviet Government will be glad to receive him;

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol III, p. 349.

d) the Soviet Government is willing to assist in the organisation of a Czechoslovak military unit in Russia. In that case it considers that a special national Czechoslovakian Committee could presumably be set up to help in organising the army. The only condition is that in tactical and military-technical questions this unit would be under Soviet Supreme Command. In all other respects the command and officers would be Czechoslovakian.”¹

On July 16, 1941 Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to the Court of St. James, submitted to Benes the Soviet draft for a treaty of mutual assistance between the USSR and Czechoslovakia in the war against nazi Germany. The treaty was signed on July 18. It provided for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries and affirmed the Soviet Government's consent to the formation of national Czechoslovak units on Soviet territory.

The Soviet-Czechoslovakian treaty was crucially important for strengthening Czechoslovakia's international position. Eduard Benes admitted this. “In the interrelations between our two countries,” he wrote in his memoirs, “we have returned to the pre-Munich state of affairs. The Soviet Union, which from the very beginning so strongly opposed Munich and equally strongly opposed the events of March 15, 1939, struck at that *decisive minute a mortal blow to Munich and all its consequences, since it fully and decisively, without reservations and conditions, once again recognised the Republic and its pre-Munich status*”² (my italics.—U. I.). Thus, direct Soviet-Czechoslovakian negotiations led to the two states signing this historic treaty and to the establishment of an alliance between them.

Anglo-Czechoslovakian relations developed in a different way. Even though the Czechoslovak Government in exile had its seat in London, the English did not maintain normal diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia. Being directly responsible for the Munich sell-out, the British ruling circles did not wish to condemn and to renounce Munich openly.

¹ *Sovietsko-Chekhoslovatskiye otnosheniya vo vremya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945. Dokumenty i materialy* (Soviet-Czechoslovakian Relations During the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Documents and Materials), Moscow, 1960, p. 11. Further *Soviet-Czechoslovakian Relations*. . . .

² E. Benes, *Paměti. Od Mnichova k nové válce a k novému vítězství*, Prague, 1948, p. 244.

As soon as it became known in London that the Soviet Union had signed a treaty with the Czechoslovak Government, the British Government also took steps to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak Government. On July 18, a few hours after the signing of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, the British Government recognised Czechoslovakia. However, the British recognition contained an important proviso. Eden's letter to Massaryk, confirming Czechoslovakia's recognition by the British Government, said: "To avoid possible misunderstandings I wish to inform you that as regards territorial questions, His Majesty's Government adheres to its point of view, expressed in the letter of my predecessor, i.e., . . . does not assume the obligation to recognise or support the establishment of any future borders in Central Europe."¹ This proviso demonstrates that the British rulers did not wish to renounce the territorial decisions of the Munich Conference and endeavoured to preserve their freedom of action in the post-war regulation of territorial questions.

However, even though it contained a proviso, Britain's recognition of Czechoslovakia played a positive role because it strengthened Czechoslovakia's international prestige and expanded the anti-Hitler coalition.

Klement Gottwald, the leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, said that owing to the initiative shown by the Soviet Union in establishing diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak Government, the Republic "had once again emerged on the international stage as a legally recognised state entity with all the attributes of state sovereignty".²

The governments of the Soviet Union and Great Britain also consulted each other on their attitude towards the French Committee of National Liberation. On June 24, 1941 General Charles de Gaulle, the head of the Committee, instructed his representatives in London to call on Ambassador Maisky and to inform him on his behalf that "the French people are with the Russian people against Germany

¹ Quoted according to S. Grachov, *Pomoshch SSSR narodam Chekhoslovakiï v ikh borbe za svobodu i nezavisimost (1941-1945)* (Soviet Assistance to the Peoples of Czechoslovakia in Their Struggle for Freedom and Independence), Gospolitizdat, 1953, p. 58.

² Ibid.

and in consequence wish to establish military co-operation with Moscow".¹

Simultaneously Géraud Jouve, de Gaulle's representative in Ankara, informed Vinogradov, the Soviet ambassador to Turkey, of de Gaulle's wish to establish direct contacts with the Soviet Government and to send several representatives to Moscow.² When asked by Vinogradov why the General wished to establish such contacts, Jouve replied: "General de Gaulle thinks that it will be useful, considering that the Soviet Union and France are continental powers and for that reason have aims and tasks that differ from those of the Anglo-Saxon states, who are first and foremost sea powers."³

Apparently aware of the General's initiative, the British hurriedly informed the Soviet Government of their point of view on that question. "... The British Government," said the British note to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of July 7, 1941, "has not yet recognised de Gaulle's organisation as a government and it would therefore be embarrassing for the British Government if the Soviet Government were to adopt towards the de Gaulle Government an attitude in the question of recognition more favourable than that of the British Government." During a conversation the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs informed the British ambassador to Moscow that the Soviet Government would take note of the British position.⁴

Early in August 1941 direct talks opened between the Soviet Embassy in London and the French Committee of National Liberation during which Maisky told the French representatives that "the Soviet Government has no objections to establishing official relations with de Gaulle in the form being maintained between de Gaulle and the British Government". The British Government expressed its satisfaction and gratitude to the Soviet Government for its attitude.⁵

¹ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de guerre. L'Appel. 1940-1942*, Paris, 1954, p. 541.

² *Sovietsko-frantsuzskiy otnosheniya vo vremya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945. Dokumenty i materialy* (Soviet-French Relations During the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Documents and Materials), Gospolitizdat, 1959, p. 44. Further *Soviet-French Relations...*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

Notes were exchanged between the Soviet Government and the French Committee of National Liberation on September 27, which was an official recognition of the Committee by the USSR.

In its note the Soviet Government expressed its willingness to render the French patriots every assistance and support in the common fight against nazi Germany and her allies. The Soviet Government expressed the firm resolve "to ensure a full restoration of the independence and grandeur of France"¹ after the joint victory over the common enemy. This step of the Soviet Government demonstrated its willingness to establish direct contacts with the French Committee of National Liberation and to develop Soviet-French relations in every way.

* * *

The establishment of the Soviet-British alliance made it possible for the British and Soviet governments to take a number of joint actions in the summer and autumn of 1941 in the then strategically important Middle East.

Nazi Germany intended to use some states bordering on the Soviet Union as a springboard for attack. In the summer of 1941 the Hitlerites intensified their subversive anti-Soviet activities in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Even though these states had declared their neutrality immediately after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, the stand adopted by their ruling circles gave cause for grave concern. For example, Turkey's political and commercial relations with the countries in the fascist bloc expanded rapidly in the first half of 1941. She supplied the Germans with wool, leather, foodstuffs, and somewhat later, with chromium ore which was badly needed by Germany's war industry. Favourable conditions were created in Turkey for the activity of nazi agents of every description. A few days before the nazis invaded the Soviet Union the Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression was signed in Ankara. In the then prevailing world situation the signing of this treaty was to all intents and purposes an open declaration of Turkey's support for nazi Germany's anti-Soviet policy. Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, Franz von Papen said, was approved by the Turkish Government. Certain

¹ *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 47.

Turkish circles endeavoured to take advantage of the Soviet Union's difficult position in the summer of 1941 to further their aggressive aims. Referring to these people, von Papen reported on August 5, 1941 to Berlin that they seemed to be disposed "to annex . . . the most valuable Baku oilfields".¹

In the summer of 1941 there was a marked increase in the activity of Hitler's agents in Iran. By that time there were about 4,000 secret agents of the Nazi espionage and propaganda apparatus and of the Gestapo in Iran. They were particularly numerous in Teheran and in other towns near the Soviet border, where preparations were under way to send groups of wreckers to the Baku oilfields and to Soviet Turkmenistan.²

In accordance with their plan to use Northern Iran for their aggressive purposes, in the course of several months in 1941 the Hitlerites transferred 11,000 tons of munitions to Iran. In July and August 1941 hundreds of German officers went to Iran as "tourists". Admiral W. W. Kanaris, head of the Abwehr, also visited Iran at that time. Relying on the support of Iran's reactionary rulers, the Hitlerites were getting ready to open a new front against the Soviet Union.

A great many German and Italian agents infested also various government departments and institutions in Afghanistan. The activity of the German and Italian fascist groups became particularly active in Afghanistan after Germany's invasion of the USSR. All sorts of German "experts" and "economic advisers", working in the Afghanistan's War Ministry and Ministry of Public Works, engaged in subversive activities, notably in organising bands of terrorists, who attacked Soviet border posts and attempted to smuggle spies and saboteurs into Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

As a result of the subversive activities of the Hitlerites and the attitude of their sympathisers the situation shaping in the Middle East, an area of great strategic importance, was far from favourable for the anti-fascist states. It was

¹ *Dokumenty ministerstva inostrannikh del Germanii*, Vyp. II, *Germaneskaya Politika v Turtsii (1941-1943)* (Documents of Germany's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Issue II, German Policy in Turkey [1941-1943]), Moscow, 1946, p. 34.

² *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoi voyny* (The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy During the Great Patriotic War), Vol. I, pp. 154-55. Further *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy*. . .

particularly dangerous for the Soviet Union which bordered on Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. The Soviet Government's policy towards these countries was two-pronged: on the one hand, it unmasked the anti-Soviet smear campaigns being carried on in those countries and condemned the anti-national line of the pro-fascist, anti-Soviet circles in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan and, on the other hand, constantly emphasised its respect for the sovereignty of those states and did everything possible to keep them from being drawn into the fascist bloc.

The measures the Soviet Union took to prevent Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan from being drawn into the fascist bloc were approved of by Britain, who watched the events developing in those countries with serious misgivings. In the summer of 1941 the Soviet and the British governments took a number of co-ordinated steps in the Middle East. In July 1941 the British Foreign Minister and the Soviet ambassador to London discussed the question of a joint policy towards Turkey. They decided to take joint diplomatic action in the Turkish capital. On August 10, 1941 Vinogradov, the Soviet ambassador in Turkey, sent the following statement to the Turkish Government: "The Soviet Government reaffirms its faithfulness to the Montreux Convention and assures the Turkish Government that it has no aggressive intents and claims with respect to the Straits. The Soviet Government, as also the British Government, is willing scrupulously to respect the territorial inviolability of the Turkish Republic. Fully appreciating the wish of the Turkish Government not to be drawn into the war, the Soviet Government, as also the British Government, would nevertheless be willing to render Turkey every assistance and support if she should be subjected to an attack by any European power."¹

This was one of the first joint diplomatic actions taken by the USSR and Great Britain. It was significant because it weakened the positions of the pro-fascist circles in Turkey, who were alleging that the anti-fascist states had aggressive intentions towards Turkey.

Joint steps were also taken by the Soviet and British governments with respect to Iran. In July 1941 at the initiative of the Soviet Government the British Government agreed to adopt a joint policy towards Iran.

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. I, p. 146.

On July 19, 1941 the governments of the USSR and Britain demanded that the Iranian Government put a stop to the hostile activities being carried on by the Germans in Iran, which threatened Iran itself and the neighbouring states. The Soviet Union and Britain insisted on the banishment from Iran of all Hitlerites because their stay in Iran was incompatible with the interests of Iran, and also of the Soviet Union and Great Britain. A new joint Soviet-British note to Iran was issued on August 16, 1941. The Soviet and the British governments again demanded that the Iranian Government take urgent steps to stop the subversive activity of German agents in Iran and that it immediately expel all nazi agents. However, the Iranian Government did not take any steps to curtail the activity of the Hitlerite agents. On August 25, 1941 the Soviet Government directed a new note to the Iranian Government in which it drew the attention of the latter to the fact that the anti-Soviet activity of clandestine German fascist conspirational groups on Iranian territory had assumed threatening proportions. "This," the note pointed out, "demands that Soviet Government immediately take all the measures it is not only entitled but is obliged to take in self-defence, in strict compliance with Article 6 of the Treaty of 1921."¹ In accordance with this treaty the Soviet Government moved its troops on August 26, 1941 into Iran to avert the threat to the national interests of Iran and the Soviet Union.

Simultaneously with the Soviet note of August 25, 1941, Sir Reader Bullard, the British ambassador to Iran, handed

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. I, pp. 155-56. Article 6 of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 reads: "Both High Contracting Parties agree that in case there are attempts on the part of third countries by armed intervention to implement a policy of expansion on Persian territory or to transform Persian territory into a bridgehead for an attack against Russia, if this should threaten the frontiers of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic or powers allied to it, and if the Persian Government after a warning from the Russian Soviet Government should be unable to avert this danger itself, the Russian Soviet Government shall be entitled to move its troops to Persian territory in order to take the necessary military measures in the interests of self-defence. After having removed this danger the Soviet Government pledges immediately to withdraw its troops from Persia." (*Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konventsii, zaklyuchonnikh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami* [Collection of Valid Treaties, Agreements and Conventions Signed Between the USSR and Foreign States], Issues I-II, 1935, p. 39.)

to the Iranian Government a note setting out the reasons that had prompted the British Government to introduce troops into Iran.

On September 8 an agreement was signed in Teheran which laid the foundation for the war-time collaboration between Britain, the Soviet Union and Iran. Under the terms of the agreement the Iranian Government committed itself to expel the German, Italian, Rumanian and Hungarian missions, and also not to tolerate any actions which could harm the USSR and Britain in their war against nazi Germany. The Iranian Government undertook to assist in the transportation over Iranian territory of allied military cargoes by road, rail and air. The USSR and Britain on their part undertook to render Iran economic assistance. On September 9 the Majlis, the Iranian parliament, endorsed the agreement. Its terms were subsequently elaborated in the Treaty of Alliance between the USSR, Great Britain and Iran, signed on January 29, 1942.¹

Despite the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian agreement Riza Khan persisted in following a pro-Hitler course, and refused to banish the fascist agents. This compelled the Soviet and British governments to order their troops to move deeper into Iran. At the British Government's initiative it was decided to move British and Soviet troops to Teheran. This was done in the beginning of September 1941. Riza Khan Pahlavi abdicated on September 16 and was succeeded by his son Mohammed Riza Pahlavi. The ex-shah fled from Iran.

The stationing of Soviet and British troops in Iran and the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian agreement put a stop to the activity of Hitler's agents in Iran. Germany's plan of creating a new hotbed of war in the Middle East was thwarted. The links between Iran and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, notably the co-operation between the Soviet Union and Iran were strengthened, the necessary communications between the Allies ensured; this action illustrated the effectiveness of co-operation between the Great Powers allied in war against the fascist coalition.

Joint Anglo-Soviet action in Afghanistan also had positive results. According to a preliminary agreement between them, both the Soviet and the British representatives in Afghanistan handed notes to the Afghan Government on

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. I, pp. 217-33.

October 11, 1941. The Soviet note said that the Soviet Government, moved by feelings of friendship for the Afghan people and respect for Afghanistan's national independence, had previously expressed its willingness to give every assistance and to promote the further flourishing of the Afghan state and also to strengthen and develop economic relations between the USSR and Afghanistan.¹ The note reaffirmed that "the Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions in relation to Afghanistan's political and territorial inviolability and constantly endeavours to implement a policy of friendship and co-operation with Afghanistan in the interests of both countries." The note also pointed out that the development of Soviet-Afghan friendship was endangered by the subversive activities of German and Italian agents in Afghanistan. On behalf of the Soviet Government the ambassador of the USSR stated that "the criminal activity of German and Italian agents, unfortunately, does not receive the necessary rebuttal by the Afghan Government". The ambassador reminded the Afghan Government that the treaty on neutrality and mutual non-aggression between the USSR and Afghanistan of June 24, 1931 provided that the "contracting sides will not allow and will impede the organisation and functioning on their territories of groupings, and also will impede the activity of individual persons, which harm the other contracting side".²

In view of the prevailing international situation and relying on the Soviet-Afghanistan treaty of 1931, the Soviet Government considered it necessary to advise the Afghanistan Government that it should evict members of the German and Italian colonies from Afghanistan and strictly supervise the activities of the German and Italian missions in Kabul.

The statements made by the Soviet and British representatives were considered by the Government of Afghanistan and on October 16 Afghanistan's Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Soviet ambassador in Kabul that the Afghan Government, "proceeding from the friendly relations between Afghanistan and the USSR and desiring once more to prove to the Soviet Government that the friendship

¹ *Uneshnaya politika SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov (iyun 1941-sentyabr 1945 g.)* (Soviet Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents [June 1941-September 1945]), Vol. V, pp. 111-12; hereinafter referred to as *Soviet Foreign Policy*....

² *Soviet Foreign Policy*..., Vol. V, pp. 111-12.

of Afghanistan for its neighbours and notably for the USSR is sincere, has decided to take the advice of the Soviet Government and to expel Germans and Italians from Afghanistan".¹ The eviction of German and Italian agents from Afghanistan began at the end of October.

The joint actions of the USSR and Britain quickly improved the political climate in the Middle East. A decisive blow was delivered to Hitler's agents in Iran and Afghanistan. The activity of pro-German circles in Turkey was also curtailed to some extent. The main result of joint Anglo-Soviet actions in the Middle East in the summer of 1941 was the strengthening of the political co-operation between the two anti-fascist states—USSR and Britain

* * *

Decisive to Anglo-Soviet relations was the solution of the second front question, which was later to become the main issue in the relations between the Soviet Union, Britain and the USA.

It should be noted that this question evolved naturally from the establishment of Allied relations between the USSR and Britain. Obviously, in times of war the efforts of all Allies must be directed towards effective mutual assistance. The Soviet Union gave Britain invaluable assistance by its heroic resistance to the German onslaught, which did much to ease Britain's military position. It was only logical to expect that Britain too would dedicate the maximum military effort to ease the Soviet Union's position.

A second front was also urgently necessary because a war on two fronts had always been and continued to be a serious danger to German militarism.

The Soviet people believed that the signing of the Soviet-British treaty of July 12, 1941 presaged opening a second front.

The British public too thought that the establishment of Allied relations with the Soviet Union would lead to the opening of a second front. During the parliamentary debates on June 24, 1941, A. Bevan, a prominent Labour Party MP, said that "... to try to effect a second land front is an urgent necessity".²

¹ *Soviet Foreign Policy...*, Vol. V, p. 112.

² *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, London, 1941, Vol. 372, col. 993.

The talks between Maisky and Eden held in London at the end of June 1941 dealt among other things with the opening of a second front in Europe. For obvious reasons this question held an important place in the correspondence between the Soviet and British Heads of Government. In his first letter to Churchill Stalin emphasised that the organisation of new large-scale military operations by the Allies against Nazi Germany was a matter of extraordinary importance. His message of July 18, 1941 noted "that the military position of the Soviet Union, and by the same token that of Great Britain, would improve substantially if a front were established against Hitler in the West (Northern France) and the North (the Arctic)".¹

The Soviet Government proposed to land a task force in the North, in co-operation with the British. "This would call for action only by British naval and air forces, without landing troops or artillery. Soviet land, naval and air forces could take part in the operation."²

Undeniably, the launching of large-scale military operations in the West in 1941 would have involved considerable difficulties. However, in the view of the Soviet Government, the great change in the military-strategic situation (the transfer of the bulk of the German armed forces from the West to the East), on the one hand, and the protracted fighting on the Soviet-German front, on the other, created favourable conditions for an offensive against Germany from the West or the North. In the above message the Soviet Government acknowledged the difficulties connected with the opening of a new front, but at the same time it considered that it should nevertheless be opened, since this would serve not only the common cause but would promote British interests as well. "The best time," Stalin's message read, "to open this front is now, seeing that Hitler's forces have been switched to the East and that he has not yet been able to consolidate the positions he has taken in the East."³

The British Government, however, did not take advantage of the favourable situation for a landing on the European

¹ *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945*, Moscow, Vol. I, 1957, Vol. II, 1957. Further Correspondence. . . .

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., Vol. I, p. 11.

continent, created by the weakening of the fascist forces in the West. "...There is in fact no possibility of any British action in the West, except air action, which would draw the German forces from the East before the winter sets in,"¹ the British Prime Minister wrote early in September 1941.

The British failed to comment on the Soviet proposal to carry out a joint Anglo-Soviet operation in the North, saying only in very vague terms that they were planning an operation in the North which, they alleged, would ease the position of the Soviet troops by preventing the enemy from moving his troops by sea for an attack against the northern flank of the Soviet armed forces.² Soon the British launched this operation. On July 30 British planes taking off from aircraft carriers bombed enemy bases in Kirkenes and Petsamo. However, the effect of that British action was negligible.

In 1941 the British confined themselves to such episodic and ineffective actions and not only did not organise major military operations on the European continent on their own but also refused the Soviet offer of joint military action.

Anglo-Soviet co-operation extended and consolidated despite the great difficulties the British ruling circles created in the summer of 1941 in connection with fixing a date for the opening of a second front.

A consistent champion of a united anti-fascist front of all peoples and states, the Soviet Union warmly greeted the establishment of Anglo-Soviet Allied relations. The national interests of Great Britain also called for the consolidation of these relations. The first positive results of that co-operation were already in evidence. Joint Soviet and British diplomatic actions had foiled the fascist plans in the Middle East, and joint consultations and co-operation had helped the Soviet and the British governments to extend and strengthen the European front of anti-fascist states. The Anglo-Soviet agreements created favourable conditions for the further development of political, military and economic co-operation. These first steps on the road of co-operation crushed the Hitlerites' hope of organising a "crusade" of all of Europe against the USSR.

¹ *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. I, p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

CHAPTER II

THE USA, AND NAZI GERMANY'S INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION

Hitler's new act of aggression aroused the indignation and protest of progressive people all over the world, including the USA. Many political, public and trade union organisations in the United States immediately published declarations in support of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people. Among these organisations were the American Council for Questions of Relations with the USSR, the Students' Union, Americans for Democratic Action, the Communist Party of the USA, and many trade unions, the Council of Trade Unions in Chicago, the Miners' Union of Pennsylvania, the Executive Council of the National Maritime Union of America, the United Automobile Workers of Indiana, the Coal Miners' Union of Illinois and many others.

Prominent American intellectuals and public figures also campaigned for support of the Soviet Union. Nothing is more important to liberal and democratic America, Theodore Dreiser, the progressive American writer, wrote at the time, than Russia's success against Hitler. The cause of the Russians has always and everywhere been the true cause of democracy, for Russia has already done more for the common people than any other country in history. Henry E. Sigerist, the well-known physician, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, the prominent Polar explorer, Clifford Odets, the playwright, writers Upton Sinclair and Ernest Hemingway, artist Rockwell Kent, the singer Paul Robeson and many others came out in support of the Soviet Union.

Over ten thousand Americans took part in a mass meeting held on July 2, 1941 at Madison Square Garden in New York. The meeting enthusiastically adopted a resolution to "render unlimited support to the Soviet Union in its endeavour to defend its lands, its people and liberty". The

participants in the meeting appealed to the entire American people to strengthen co-operation with the Soviet Union in every way and to help her rout fascism. A wave of meetings in defence of the Soviet Union swept the USA.

The Soviet embassy in Washington received stacks of telegrams and letters expressing solidarity with the USSR every day.

A poll conducted by an American broadcasting company asked its listeners to state their attitude to co-operation between the USA and USSR. Eighty-seven per cent of those polled were in favour, 12 per cent opposed such co-operation and only one per cent of those questioned gave no reply. The results of the poll conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion as early as 1939 also told volumes. Eighty-three per cent said, in reply to the question "Whose side would you be on in the event of a war between Germany and the Soviet Union?", that they would support the USSR.

Many prominent American political leaders correctly assessed the importance of Soviet-American co-operation and favoured an alliance between the two countries. They campaigned for the quickest possible establishment of contacts with the Soviet Government and for rendering extensive assistance to the Soviet Union. Among them were President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, Joseph E. Davies, the former ambassador to the USSR, and many congressmen.

The debates in the House of Representatives and in the Senate on August 5, 1941 were indicative of this. Sabath and Alben W. Barkley, well-known functionaries of the Democratic Party, also spoke in favour of co-operation with the USSR. Sabath said that "because at this time they happen to have a form of government that we do not approve is no reason why we should take an unfriendly attitude".¹ Senator Barkley said that "the overwhelming majority of the American people hope that Russia will defeat the present effort of Hitler to overrun it".² Most participants in the debate supported this view.

There were American statesmen and politicians who

¹ *Congressional Record. Proceedings and Debates of the 77th Congress*, Vol. 87, Part 6, p. 6772.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6751.

maintained that the United States should immediately join the war when Germany attacked the USSR. This opinion was held by Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes and others. However, isolationists and people such as Herbert Hoover, Harry S. Truman, Robert A. Taft, Hamilton Fish, Charles Lindbergh, John L. Lewis and others who held anti-Soviet views exerted a major influence on the position of the USA in the Soviet-German war. They did not conceal their hostility towards the Soviet Union. The cynical statement made by Senator Truman, later US President, about the mutual destruction of Germany and the USSR being favourable for the USA has become notorious. "The victory of Communism in the world would be far more dangerous to the United States than a victory of Fascism," Senator Taft said on the radio two days after Germany's invasion of the USSR.¹ Former President Hoover supported Truman's view and also spoke against America's entry into the war, proposing to wait until the warring countries were so exhausted that they would yield to the military, economic and moral might of the United States.² Lindbergh demanded that the Soviet-German war be turned into a "crusade" against the Soviet Union. The pro-isolationist press—the *New York Journal American*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Catholic World*, mouthpiece of the American Catholic Church—wrote in a similar vein.³

It should be noted that anti-Soviet tendencies also held sway in the State Department. On June 22, 1941 Sumner Welles, acting Secretary of State, summoned Lord Halifax, the British ambassador in Washington, and "recommended that Britain, like the United States, adopt a policy of pure expediency, based on the recognition of the simple fact that both Britain and Soviet Russia were at war with Germany, but for the present going no farther".⁴ Welles said that otherwise Britain would be drawn into a war against Japan which, he believed, would sooner or later join the war against the USSR.

The first official statement of the US Government in

¹ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, New York, 1953, p. 542.

² *Congressional Record*, 77th Congress, Vol. 87, p. A3396.

³ W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, *op. cit.*, p. 541.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 540.

connection with Germany's invasion of the USSR was published on June 23.

The statement of the State Department simply noted that the USSR was in a state of war with Germany and that in the opinion of the US Government "... any defence against Hitlerism, any rallying of the forces opposing Hitlerism, from whatever source these forces may spring, will hasten the eventual downfall of the present German leaders, and will therefore redound to the benefit of our own defence and security.

Hitler's armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas."¹

At the same time the US Government intimated that the general attitude of the USA towards the war had not changed in the least and would not lead to its active participation in the war at the time. President Roosevelt, however, went a bit further by announcing at his regular press conference held at the White House on the following day that the USA would render the Soviet Union every possible help. True, he added that the chief attention and the bulk of deliveries would as heretofore go to Britain and that US assistance to the Soviet Union could be effective only in the event of a long war.

Two days after the President's statement a new statement was made by the White House which declared that "... the President would not invoke the Neutrality Law against Soviet Russia, on the plea that, though Hitler had declared war against the Soviet Union, the war did not imperil the United States or American citizens".² This statement was intended chiefly for the isolationists and reflected the differences and internal struggle in the USA on foreign policy issues.

On June 27, 1941 K. Umansky, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, visited Welles and officially informed the US Government of Hitler's aggression against the USSR. In reply Welles said that all facts arising from it "will be considered by the US Government immediately and in a friendly spirit".³

¹ *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. III, July 1940-June 1941, Boston, 1941, p. 365.

² W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, op. cit., p. 541.

³ *Soviet Foreign Policy* . . . , Vol. V, p. 6.

Thus, the US Government stated that it was willing to render assistance to the Soviet Union in connection with Hitler's invasion. At the same time it should be emphasised that the majority of the US political and military leaders believed the Soviet armed forces would be unable to resist the German legions for any length of time. In determining US policy toward the USSR, Henry L. Stimson, American Secretary of War, advised President Roosevelt in his Memorandum of June 23, 1941 to proceed from the following:

"1. That Germany's action seemed almost like a providential occurrence.

"2. That the Germans would be thoroughly occupied in beating the Soviet Union for a minimum of one month and a possible maximum of three months.

"3. That the time should be used to push our movements in the Atlantic Theater of Operations with the utmost vigor".¹

A similar view was held by Secretary of the Navy Knox, who on the same date wrote to Roosevelt the following: "The best opinion I can get is that it will take anywhere from six weeks to two months for Hitler to clean up on Russia."²

American statesmen, such as Ickes, Knox, Stark, Stimson and others, recommending the immediate entry of the USA into the war proceeded from the false assumption that the USSR would not be able to resist Germany for long. They assumed that under the circumstances the best US policy would be to take advantage of the fact that Hitler had turned east, consolidate the defences of the west and help Britain to strengthen her military potential against Germany.

Roosevelt and some of his followers held a different view. Thus, for example, as reported by Langer and Gleason, President Roosevelt had much more faith in "the strength of Russian resistance" than the military leaders. Since, however, in the summer of 1941 those who believed in the ability of the Soviet Union to resist formed a minority in US government circles, no practical steps were taken in the beginning to realise Roosevelt's promise of June 24, 1941 to support the Soviet Union. In the initial period of the Soviet-German war the US Lend-Lease was not extended to the Soviet

¹ Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*, Princeton, New Jersey, London, 1957, p. 10.

² Ibid.

Union. The initial US supplies to the USSR were small and delivered against cash payments in accordance with the US-Soviet trade agreement of 1937.

At the end of June the Soviet ambassador in Washington handed to the US Government a list in which the Soviet Government enumerated the supplies it needed. At the same time the USA was asked to grant the Soviet Union credits for five years. The US Government proposed to deliver supplies to the USSR in exchange for Soviet raw material deliveries.

On July 11, 1941 Ambassador Umansky discussed the question of US supplies to the Soviet Union with Roosevelt and Welles. The President said that the US Government would take urgent steps to deliver to the Soviet Union the supplies for which orders had been placed in the USA and which were ready for shipment. Umansky noted the US Government's willingness to send supplies to the Soviet Union and expressed the Soviet Government's appreciation of the position taken by Roosevelt and the US Government "with respect to the prevailing situation and our struggle against Hitler's aggression".¹

On August 2, 1941 the Soviet ambassador to the USA and the US State Department exchanged notes on the prolongation for one year of the Soviet-American trade agreement and on US economic assistance to the Soviet Union. The two sides agreed to prolong the trade agreement in force as of August 6, 1937 up to August 6, 1942. In its note the State Department informed the Soviet ambassador that "the Government of the United States has decided to give all economic assistance practicable for the purpose of strengthening the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed aggression. This decision has been prompted by the conviction of the Government of the United States that the strengthening of the armed resistance of the Soviet Union to the predatory attack of an aggressor who is threatening the security and independence not only of the Soviet Union but also of all other nations, is in the interests of the national defence of the United States."² The letter further said that the US Government would consider the relevant Soviet orders in a friendly way. However, the document mentioned

¹ *Soviet Foreign Policy* . . . , Vol. V, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 142-43.

neither the form in which these military supplies would be sent nor any dates.

The reply of the Soviet Government stressed the need for extensive assistance, and expressed the conviction that "... the economic assistance (you refer to in your note) will be of such scope and carried out with such expedition as to correspond to the magnitude of the military operations in which the Soviet Union is engaging, in offering armed resistance to the aggressor. . . ."¹

However, despite the agreement and the many assurances given by the United States Government, in practical respects the assistance given to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 left much to be desired. The United States marked time and the dispatch of the necessary materials to the Soviet Union was delayed.

The delay in the delivery of supplies to the Soviet Union was criticised by those who were for Soviet-American co-operation, including President Roosevelt. At the government meeting on August 1 he censured various boards for delaying deliveries to the USSR.

The anti-Soviet policy and the disbelief of many American statesmen in the ability of the Soviet Union to withstand the onslaught of the fascist hordes was at the bottom of the delay in the dispatch of supplies. For the same reason Soviet-American co-operation developed at a snail's pace at the beginning of the war.

To pump life into Soviet-American relations and to obtain more complete information on the USSR, Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins, one of his closest colleagues, as his personal envoy to the Soviet Union. Officially Hopkins's mission was to establish the requirements of the USSR for US supplies; however, seeing that the Soviet Government had already placed such orders through its representatives in Washington, it seems more likely that Hopkins was sent by Roosevelt to Moscow mainly to convince himself of the Soviet Union's ability to resist the Germans.

Harry Hopkins also represented the British Government in the Moscow talks held on July 30 and 31. He was received by the Soviet Head of State, talked with functionaries of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the People's

¹ *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. IV, July 1941—June 1942, Boston, 1942, p. 601.

Commissariat for Defence, and met many Soviet leaders. Hopkins reported on his Moscow talks to Roosevelt. The text of his report has been published in Robert E. Sherwood's book.¹

In the course of his talks with Stalin, Hopkins obtained extensive information on the position at the Soviet-German front, on the prospects of Soviet Army's military operations during the winter, and of the Soviet Union's firm resolve to fight to the victorious end. The Soviet Government expressed its willingness to establish extensive military co-operation with the United States.

On instruction from the President, Hopkins said that the USA regarded those fighting Hitler as Allies of the United States and that it would give such countries every assistance. Questions of supplies, including the types and amount of materials the USA could deliver to the Soviet Union were also discussed. The Soviet Government gave Hopkins a list of military supplies in which the USSR was extremely interested.

The Soviet Government attached great importance to the talks with Hopkins. One talk with Stalin, for example, lasted for four hours. Hopkins left Moscow satisfied with the results of his mission—he had obtained information on the Soviet Union from the most authoritative sources.

Sherwood regards Hopkins's mission to Moscow and the results of his negotiations as a real "turning point in the war-time relations of Britain and the United States with the Soviet Union".² The same view was held by John Gilbert Winant, the US ambassador to London, who participated in the preparations for Hopkins's mission.³

Hopkins's mission was undoubtedly extremely important for the development of Soviet-American co-operation and testified to the willingness of the US Government to give the Soviet Union economic assistance in its war against Nazi Germany.

At the same time it should be emphasised that Hopkins's mission did not directly influence the nature, volume and terms of US deliveries to the Soviet Union. For a long time

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins. An Intimate History*, New York, 1948, pp. 333-43.

² *Ibid.*, p. 343.

³ John G. Winant, *A Letter from Grosvenor Square; An Account of a Stewardship*, London, 1947, p. 149.

to come the volume of the economic assistance given by the USA to the Soviet Union did not correspond to the enormous contribution the Soviet people were making in the war against nazi Germany. For the entire month of July 1941, US exports to the Soviet Union totalled only 6,521,912 dollars in value and for the period to October 1 they were estimated to reach only 29,000,000 dollars.¹ The delays in the war material deliveries were due mainly to the unwillingness of some US monopoly circles to help strengthen the Soviet Union's war potential and their endeavour to prolong the war and to weaken both the Soviet Union and Germany. This was also responsible for all the organisational muddle. At least half a dozen different US government organisations were engaged in filling the programme of deliveries to the Soviet Union, and their activities were not co-ordinated. As a result the plans for deliveries to the USSR were passed from one organisation to the other, each studied the requirements from its own viewpoint, and practically always refused to fill them.

It was only when it became clear to all that the Hitlerites had not succeeded in their blitzkrieg and that the Soviet Army had stopped the nazi advance, and was prepared for a counter-offensive in the winter of 1941, that the positions of the doubting Thomases in Washington became untenable and the volume of US assistance gradually increased. On October 30, 1941, i.e., over four and a half months after the German invasion of the USSR, the President informed Moscow that the US Government had decided to grant the Soviet Union an interest-free loan of 1,000 million dollars under the Lend-Lease bill. However, even then the influx of US assistance was exceedingly slow. Thus, up to the end of 1941 the Soviet Union received 545,000 dollars worth of goods out of the total of 741 million dollars of US Lend-Lease exports, that is, the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the war, received less than 0.1 per cent of the total US aid.²

While there were definite shortcomings and difficulties in the development of Soviet-American relations, it should not be thought that they determined the co-operation be-

¹ W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, op. cit., p. 560.

² *Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States for the Calendar Year 1941*, US Department of Commerce, Washington, 1944, p. XXXVI.

tween the two countries throughout the Second World War. The community of national interests in the struggle against fascism united the Soviet and the American people. A correct appraisal of American national interests made the Roosevelt Administration adopt the decision to support the USSR and to develop Soviet-American co-operation.

Thus, despite the different ideologies and social systems, the USSR and USA united for joint struggle against fascism, the common enemy, and thereby demonstrated to all of mankind that differences in social system do not prevent close co-operation in all spheres—military, political, and economic—if there is a mutual wish for such co-operation.

CHAPTER III

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND THE FIRST THREE-POWER CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW (1941)

The efforts of the Soviet Union to set up a single front of freedom-loving peoples and states against fascism and war strengthened its international prestige. As its foreign political activity developed, its international relations too expanded steadily. The demand for the complete extermination of world fascism, which had been advanced by the Soviet Union, was supported by all progressive mankind. It was clear that unless fascism was wiped out there could be no social, political and cultural advance, no human progress. The fact that the Soviet Union had become the main military power in the war against Hitler Germany and her allies had a decisive influence on the nature of the war and also on the political aims of the states and peoples united in the fight against fascism.

In a situation where the anti-fascist and liberating character of the Second World War was promoted by the Soviet Union's entry, the British and US governments were compelled to state their attitude to the cardinal issues of war and peace.

The first Anglo-American summit conference was held at sea in the Atlantic between August 9 and 12, 1941.

To the British the main issue at that conference was to ensure US participation in the war. At the first meeting Churchill described the course of the war in great detail. He spoke of Britain's position, of her difficulties and frankly admitted how close she had been to defeat. In his speech he advocated that the United States enter the war. The British overall strategic conception was expounded in detail.

The British Government proposed to maintain a tight naval blockade of the European Axis countries, intensive aerial bombing and amphibious landings which were, in the British view, to slowly weaken the enemy. The British

Roundup plan envisaged "a full-powered strike into Germany itself, after Hitler's Reich had been so weakened that the invasion would be a push-over".¹

Thus, the British strategic conception provided for an extremely protracted war.

American sources show that the US military leaders were very unenthusiastic about the strategic plans of their British colleagues. They were doubtful as to the possibility of winning the war by aerial bombing and naval blockade alone, and they did not believe that Hitler's regime could be overthrown by the German people themselves. As regards the possible entry of the United States into the war, the Americans warned the British that should they do so they would have to make large cuts in military supplies to other states, including Britain.

No concrete agreement on military strategy was reached at the talks.

Decisions on Allied strategy were naturally linked with an appraisal by the British and US governments of the possibilities of the Soviet armed forces and the course of the battles on the Soviet-German front, in other words, of the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War.

Robert E. Sherwood holds that "... as a result of Hopkins's encouraging reports"² the growing conviction that the USSR would be able to withstand the fascist armies determined the course of the conference. Langer and Gleason express an identical view and quote Hopkins's report on the results of his Moscow talks, and also the report of Laurence A. Steinhardt, the US ambassador to the USSR, to substantiate it. Langer and Gleason write that after a talk at the Kremlin in summer 1941 Steinhardt reported to Washington his conviction that the Kremlin would not make peace with Hitler "regardless of the course which military developments may take".³

Churchill, who held different views, exerted a decisive influence on the discussion of vital issues at the conference. He had little or no faith in the Soviet Union's ability to resist.

¹ Samuel E. Morison, *American Contributions to the Strategy of World War II*, London, 1958, p. 14.

² Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

³ W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, *op. cit.*, p. 668.

Naturally, at the Atlantic Conference there were also people (Roosevelt, Hopkins and others) who assessed the power of the Soviet Union realistically, but on the whole in the summer of 1941 the British and US ruling circles did not yet believe in the ability of the Soviet Union to resist Nazi Germany for long. This can be seen from the documents of the conference. Take, for example, the strategic plans and the views on the prospects of the war which were outlined in great detail by the British. These plans completely discounted the Soviet Union as a factor of resistance to the German armed forces. The fact that the British expected to conduct a protracted war and believed that it could be won by aerial bombings and a naval blockade, or as a result of an overthrow of the fascist regime by the German people, shows that the authors of the British strategic conception considered the Soviet-German war as no more than a short episode. The US military leaders were also very reserved as regards the prospects of the Soviet-German war. They too did not exclude the possibility of the USSR being defeated in the war.

Finally, the fact that the Anglo-American conference in the Atlantic reached no definite decisions on rendering urgent, effective military and material assistance to the Soviet Union, although Hopkins, who also attended the conference, had with him information on the Soviet Union's needs, also shows that the US and British governments adopted a wait-and-see attitude with respect to the USSR. The British and US leaders exchanged views on the most vital strategic and political issues, proceeding from an erroneous and unrealistic assessment of the Soviet Union's role and importance in the Second World War.

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At the Atlantic Conference great attention was given to Far Eastern problems. The invasion of Southern Indochina by Japanese armed forces and the signing by the Japanese and Vichy governments of the Protocol on the Joint Defence of Indochina in the summer of 1941 aggravated the danger of a military conflict between Japan and the United States and Britain. This had a telling effect on the talks the US and Japanese governments were holding early in 1941.

In August the US Under-Secretary of State Welles informed the Japanese ambassador in Washington officially that the agreement between Japan and the French puppet

Government in Vichy affected US security. Simultaneously Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden warned Tokyo in identical notes that Japan's intervention in Thailand's internal affairs would have serious consequences. On August 6 the Japanese Government handed a reply to the US Government containing a draft agreement between Japan and the United States. This document not only essentially rejected the US proposal on the neutralisation of Indochina but even contained a demand for the recognition of Japan's sole authority in French Indochina and of her right to station Japanese troops in French Indochina. While preparing to attack British and US possessions in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia, the Japanese Government demanded that the USA, Britain and the Netherlands sign an agreement undertaking to stop all military action in the Southwestern area of the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese draft completely bypassed the question of withdrawing Japanese troops from China. It was becoming clear that the Japanese imperialists did not intend to share their booty with their competitors in the Pacific. The Japanese rulers endeavoured to make China their colony by military and diplomatic means. All this showed that Japanese-American imperialist contradictions had been aggravated to the limit.

The British Government was particularly worried about Japan's position. The British ruling circles feared an attack by the Japanese on the British naval base at Singapore and also a disruption of communications between the British dominions and Britain. Britain's attempt to secure a promise from the USA that it would come to her assistance in the event of a Japanese attack failed. During the British-American talks in the Atlantic, Welles informed Cadogan, the British Under-Secretary of State, that the US did not favour any action that could provoke a military conflict in the Pacific at that time.

At the conference the British Government insisted that the most resolute steps should be taken to exert pressure on Japan. Churchill, in particular, proposed to submit a joint ultimatum to Japan saying that "... if Japan went south into the Malay Peninsula, or into the Dutch East Indies, the United States, Britain, and Russia would use such means as necessary to make her withdraw".¹

¹ Henry H. Arnold, *Global Mission*, New York, 1949, p. 252.

The Americans, however, did not accept the proposal of the British and refused to do anything that could aggravate relations with Japan.

The only thing to which the Americans agreed was to issue one more warning to the Japanese Government against taking further aggressive action. This warning was made by the State Department on August 17 but in terms much milder than those insisted on by the British.

Thus, on the one hand, the discussion of Far Eastern problems at the Atlantic Conference demonstrated that there were points of agreement between the US and the British governments (for example, both sides considered the terms of the Japanese draft agreement unacceptable); on the other hand it revealed that there were also differences between the two on questions of Far Eastern policy. The British Government strove to draw the United States into the war against Japan at the earliest possible date because, in Britain's view, this would seriously hamper Japan's further aggression against British strategic bases and colonies in Southeast Asia. The British Government believed that the entry of the USA into the war against Japan would consolidate the Anglo-American alliance and ease the position of the British in the European theatre of military operations. As regards the USA, it tried in every possible way to avoid assuming any definite commitment to participate actively in the war at that time. The isolationists and champions of a peaceful settlement with Japan exerted a strong influence on the position of the United States.

* * *

One of the most important results of the Atlantic Conference was the publication of the Atlantic Charter—a declaration by the USA and Britain on the aims of the war and the principles underlying the post-war settlement of the world.

The entry of the USSR into the Second World War compelled the US and the British governments to make an official declaration of their war aims. At one of his first meetings with Churchill, Roosevelt expressed the view that it was necessary to publish a joint declaration. The British Prime Minister supported this view and proposed a draft five-point programme. This draft was supplemented by a number of American proposals. The Americans did not raise

objections to some of the points contained in the British draft; however, on other points there were serious differences.

The question of future international economic relations, for example, gave rise to serious differences between Britain and the USA. The American proposal on this point was: "...to further the enjoyment of all peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the world."¹ The British representatives were worried that the words "without discrimination" might cast doubt on the Ottawa Agreement on Imperial Preferences, and for that reason they did not agree to this wording. The President describing to the Prime Minister his plan for the post-war reconstruction specifically declared that the most extensive freedom of trade should be established in the post-war world, abrogating the trade agreements of the British Empire. The Prime Minister rejected the President's idea with indignation, saying that Britain did not intend for a minute to renounce its predominant position in the British dominions.

Doing her utmost to prolong the validity of the Ottawa agreement Britain wanted to include in the US formula the words—"observing duly their respective commitments". In addition the British representatives categorically objected to the words "without discrimination". In the compromise formula the wishes of the British delegation were taken into consideration to a high degree.

Sharp Anglo-American differences arose also in connection with the question of the future international organisation. One of the points in the British draft of the Atlantic Charter provided for a declaration by the USA and Britain that "...they seek a peace which will not only cast down for ever the Nazi tyranny, but by effective international organisation will afford to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own bounds...".² The proposed wording met with objections from the US delegation. The President insisted that the words "by effective international organisation" be omitted.

This position of the President was explained first of all by his fear that the US public would not support the idea

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

² Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 386.

of restoring the discredited League of Nations, secondly, by his unwillingness to give the isolationists cause to criticise the US Government, and finally by the US Government's unwillingness to enter into any definite commitments on the post-war international organisation at that time, since it was not sure how the war would develop and what would be its results.

At this conference the President advanced for the first time his idea of setting up international Anglo-American police forces after the war with a view to establishing the world domination of the United States. This shows once more that at the time of the Atlantic Conference the US and British ruling circles did not believe in the strength of the Soviet Union and did not consider her an important factor in international affairs. It also proves that the US and British rulers had made false appraisals of the role and importance of the Soviet Union during and after the war. This can also be seen from the fact that the Atlantic Charter, which was to become one of the basic documents of the United Nations, was drafted without the participation of the Soviet Union, which was carrying the main burden of the war against the fascist aggressors. Even though the British and US representatives arrived at the conference with prepared drafts for the Charter, the Soviet Government had not been informed in advance of their intention to publish it. This could hardly promote better understanding between the USSR, USA and Britain.

The democratic nature of some of the points in the Atlantic Charter was due to the wide scope the liberation movement had assumed during the Second World War throughout the world. The liberation movement helped to consolidate the forces fighting fascism. The programme of the post-war order of the world, proclaimed by Britain and the USA, however, had substantial shortcomings. Chief among them was that while the British and the US governments proclaimed the basic principles of the post-war settlement, they failed to mention how they intended to translate their hope "for a better future of the world" into reality. The Anglo-American document did not mention any concrete methods for eliminating the fascist system or for restoring the independence and sovereignty of the peoples and it failed to declare that it was essential to mobilise to the maximum all forces for the struggle against fascist tyranny.

The wording of article 3 of the Atlantic Charter was also vague. It said that the USA and Britain "...wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them...".¹

Was this intended to mean that the British and US governments were ready to renounce all conquests effected in the past and that they had in mind the restoration of the sovereign rights and self-government of all peoples? Or did it mean that the Western powers, notably Britain, the largest colonial power in the world, wanted to preserve her colonial possessions and to revise only the status of the countries seized by the enemy? The answers to these questions were contained in the official comments to the Atlantic Charter, from which it became clear that its authors, notably the British Government, were willing to consider as seizures only acts of aggression by the fascist powers without revising the status of the numerous colonial peoples, who had been deprived of their independence in various ways. Speaking in the House of Commons on September 9, 1941, Churchill interpreted the above point in the following way:

"At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the States and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke, and the principles governing any alterations in the territorial boundaries which may have to be made." In his speech the Prime Minister particularly stressed that this problem differed from the one facing the "peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown".²

Many actions of the US and British governments in the countries liberated from the fascist invaders during and after the war proved that the declaration contained in article 3 of the Atlantic Charter was full of hypocrisy. The authors completely evaded the issue of the destiny of the numerous colonial peoples.

The attitude of the Soviet Government to the Atlantic Charter was set forth in a special declaration read by the Soviet ambassador to Great Britain at the Inter-Allied Meeting held in London on September 24, 1941.³ The Soviet

¹ Roger W. Shugg and H. A. De Weerd, *World War II, A Concise History*, Washington, 1947, p. 102.

² *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, London, 1941, Vol. 374, col. 69.

³ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. I, pp. 161-66.

declaration first defined the character of the war and threw light on the aggressive aims of the fascist bloc. "This war the Hitlerite fascists have imposed on the democratic countries decides the fate of Europe and of all of mankind for many decades to come," the declaration read. "It must not be tolerated that freedom-loving peoples be threatened with the yoke of nazism, that the gang of heavily armed Hitlerite thugs, who imagine and declare themselves a superior race, be allowed impudently to annihilate towns and villages, to lay waste lands, to destroy thousands and hundreds of thousands of peaceful people in order to implement their mad idea of the domination of the Hitlerite gang over the entire world."

Further the declaration clearly formulated the main task facing the freedom-loving peoples, the implementation of which would ensure a post-war organisation of the world on democratic principles. The declaration said that the task imposed on all peoples and all states forced to conduct the war against Germany and her allies, was to attain the quickest and most decisive rout of the aggressors, to mobilise all their resources for the achievement of this task, and to determine the most effective means and methods for the realisation of this aim. The Soviet Government emphasised that this task united the countries and governments of the states fighting the Hitler coalition.

It expressed the firm conviction that the task of destroying the aggressors would be achieved successfully and declared that the complete and final victory over Hitlerism would lay the foundation of proper relations of international co-operation and friendship which would meet with the aspirations and ideals of the freedom-loving peoples.

Touching upon the question of the post-war settlement, notably upon the crucial question of restoring the sovereign rights of the peoples, the Soviet Government declared: "In its foreign policy the Soviet Union has implemented and continues to implement the lofty principle of respect for the sovereign rights of the peoples. It was guided and continues to be guided by the principle of the self-determination of nations. . . . Proceeding from this principle the Soviet Union defends the right of *every* [my italics—*U.I.*] people to state independence and the territorial integrity of their country, the right to set up a social system and to choose a form of government they consider expedient and

essential to ensure the economic and cultural flourishing of the whole country.”

This position of the Soviet Government was based on Lenin's well-known definition of the conditions of a just peace, chief among which “is the renunciation of annexations (seizures) . . . in the only correct sense that *every* nationality without any exception, both in Europe and in the colonies, shall obtain its freedom”.¹

In its declaration the Soviet Government not only expressed opposition to a recarving of the world by the fascists but also established itself as a firm advocate of the recognition of the right of all peoples to state independence and autonomy. Thus, the questions of the post-war world were set forth in the Soviet declaration much more extensively than in the relevant paragraphs of the Atlantic Charter.

In order to secure effective means of struggle for the triumph of peace on democratic principles the Soviet Government advocated collective action against the aggressors. The idea of collective security to which the Soviet Union had firmly subscribed before the war was once again advanced by the Soviet Government as one of the main conditions for an enduring and lasting peace. Recalling its struggle for complete and general disarmament, the Soviet Government emphasised the importance of that problem in post-war international relations.

In conclusion the declaration of the Soviet Government stated that it agreed with the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter, mentioning however that their practical application “will inevitably have to conform to the circumstances, requirements and historical features of every given country”.

The declaration of the Soviet Government was of great international importance since the support by the Soviet Union of the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter was an important guarantee that the democratic aims set forth in that document would be implemented.

The declaration of the Soviet Union of July 3, 1941 on the aims and tasks of the war, the Atlantic Charter, and the Soviet declaration at the Inter-Allied Conference in London were important documents which determined the aims and tasks of the major powers fighting against the fascist bloc.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 62.

Despite the substantial differences in the positions of the USSR and Britain and the USA on a number of questions which were reflected in the above documents, they were essentially based on the community of interests of the Soviet, British and American peoples in their fight against fascist tyranny.

At the Atlantic Conference the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the text of a joint message to be sent to the Head of the Soviet Government. In this message they declared their willingness to render to the Soviet Union assistance by sending a maximum amount of the most urgently needed materials to the USSR. At the same time they said that "our resources [those of the USA and Britain—*U.I.*], though immense, are limited and it must become a question of where and when these resources can best be used to further to the greatest extent our common effort".¹

To discuss the question of the joint utilisation of the economic resources of the powers in the anti-Hitler coalition, Roosevelt and Churchill proposed an Anglo-Soviet-American conference. This proposal was accepted by the Soviet Government and Moscow was chosen as the site of the conference.

* * *

The vast majority of people in the US and Britain received the news that a Soviet-Anglo-American conference would be held with approval. The decision to hold such a conference was regarded as an endeavour to strengthen and expand the military and political co-operation between the USSR, the USA and Britain. Many English and American newspapers—*The Times*, *News Chronicle*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Washington Post*, *New York Herald Tribune*, *PM* and others—spoke out in favour of extensive economic assistance to the Soviet Union.

A clear evidence of the sincere wish of the British working people to give broad assistance to the Soviet people was the Tanks for Russia week in Britain from September 21 to 28, 1941. All workers manufacturing and transporting tanks showed great enthusiasm and energy—something generally characteristic of all workers engaged in the production of supplies for the Soviet Union—and truly remarkable results

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 18.

were achieved. A *News Chronicle* correspondent said that statisticians at the Ministry for Supplies were amazed when they heard of the results of the Tanks for Russia week. It appeared that over a period of one week the workers of the industry had broken all records and produced 20 per cent more than in the preceding record week.¹

Yet, there were quite a number of people both in the USA and Britain hostile to any co-operation with the Soviet Union. This can be seen from the statement made by John Moore-Brabazon, the British Minister for the Aircraft Industry, in August 1941. The gist of it was that he wanted Germany and the USSR to exhaust each other, after which Britain would be able to dictate both to Germany and the USSR peace terms favourable to the British ruling circles. Moore-Brabazon's statement provoked so much indignation in Britain that Churchill was forced to dismiss him from the Cabinet early in 1942. The organs of the isolationists in the USA—the *New York Journal American* and the *Chicago Tribune*—also adopted an anti-Soviet position. "There is not much sense in giving Russia the tools with which to surrender. . .", the *New York Journal American* wrote in the issue of September 29.²

On September 28, 1943 the US and British missions arrived in Moscow.

The Moscow talks continued for several days. The Soviet delegation informed its Allies of the situation on the Soviet-German front, of the respective strength of the men and equipment of the USSR and Germany, and advanced proposals on the question of urgent war material deliveries to the Soviet Union.

At first the US and British representatives did not agree to satisfy the modest demands of the Soviet Government for aluminium, jeeps, armoured steel plate and some other essential items. Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook attempted to make deliveries dependent on the extensive supply of classified information. They endeavoured in every way to decrease the volume of deliveries to the USSR, alleging that insuperable difficulties obstructed such deliveries.

At the Moscow talks the Soviet Government tabled the important issues: it expressed the wish to expand the Anglo-

¹ *News Chronicle*, Sept. 29, 1941.

² W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, op. cit., p. 813.

Soviet agreement into a treaty of alliance which was to be valid during the war and after it, suggested that some contingents of British troops be deployed on the Soviet-German front, and made a number of other proposals. Yet, even though these questions were highly important the conference only aired them and did not take any practical decisions.

Despite some differences the participants reached agreement on the main question on the agenda—the question of supplies. Representatives of the USSR, USA and Britain made a detailed study of the lists of goods subject to mutual deliveries.

The first war-time three-power agreement—the protocol on deliveries—was signed on October 1, 1941. The US and the British governments abandoned their demand for classified information.

The Soviet-British-American protocol provided for mutual deliveries for the period from October 1, 1941 to July 1, 1942. In accordance with this protocol the USA and Britain undertook the monthly supply to the Soviet Union of 400 planes, 500 tanks, 8,000 tons of aluminium, 1,250 tons of TNT, lead, tin and other armaments and war materials. These deliveries only partially filled the Soviet orders.

The American and British representatives assured the Soviet Government that they would deliver these supplies as quickly as possible. At the insistence of the Western representatives a proviso was included which stated that in the event of a change in the military situation or of a shift of the focus of the war to other theatres of operations the agreements reached at the conference would be subject to revision.

The Moscow Conference adopted also decisions on the delivery of Soviet raw materials to Britain and the USA. Despite the difficult military and economic position in which the USSR found itself due to the occupation of part of its territory, the Soviet Government delivered to the USA and Britain large consignments of raw materials needed for war production.

At the Moscow Conference Harriman, on behalf of the US and British governments, confirmed “the receipt from the Soviet Government of large deliveries of Russian raw materials, which will considerably assist armaments produc-

tion in our countries".¹ The conference considered the transport question and drew up a plan for increasing the volume of the freight flow. The protocol said that "the USA and Britain will assist in transporting the materials to the Soviet Union".

On the whole the conference accomplished the tasks assigned to it successfully but the volume of the Anglo-American supplies laid down by it comprised only a small portion of the Soviet Union's requirements. A message sent by the Soviet Government to London soon after the Moscow Conference mentioned this. Early in October the London *Times* wrote: "The visiting missions were greatly impressed with the moderation of the Russian requirements, a fact which would apparently demonstrate the success with which the country's economy has been able to withstand and absorb the shock of the initial German impact. This modesty in the Russian requests was one of the chief contributing factors to the swiftness with which the meetings were able to conclude their work."²

The members of the British and US delegations were also greatly impressed by the fact that they saw good factories with a big output in the Soviet Union, and that their capacity was on a high level.³

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. V, p. 175.

² *The Times*, October 3, 1941, p. 4.

³ *Manchester Guardian*, October 13, 1941, p. 5.

CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE FOR MOSCOW AND INTER-ALLIED RELATIONS

Nazi Germany wanted to occupy Moscow, Leningrad and the Donets basin at no matter what cost and to end the war before winter. At the close of September 1941 at the cost of staggering losses the enemy armies broke into the Moscow Region. The Nazi High Command was so convinced of its victory that on October 10 the Chief Quartermaster of the German Army issued an order on the billeting of the German troops in Moscow. On October 3, 1941 Hitler said: "The Russian enemy is defeated and will never recover."

At this time, when mortal danger was threatening Moscow, the Communist Party and Soviet Government called upon the Soviet people to defend every inch of land to the last drop of blood, to stop the enemy at any price, to inflict a smashing blow to him at the approaches to Moscow and to destroy the strike force of the fascist army.

In the autumn of 1941 it became obvious that the plans of the Hitlerites to end the war with the USSR within one and a half or two months had miscarried. The battles on the Soviet-German front were growing ever more violent. The Hitlerites were compelled to throw fresh reserves into battle.

As the Soviet Union was bearing the chief burden of the war, the Soviet Government reminded the British Government of the need to open a second front. In his message to the British Prime Minister, dated September 3, 1941, the Head of the Soviet Government wrote of the difficulties resulting from the German offensive in the autumn of 1941 and pointed out that "... the only way is to open a second front this year somewhere in the Balkans or in France, one that would divert 30-40 divisions from the Eastern Front...".¹

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 21.

The British Government rejected all Soviet proposals. Once again it missed the chance to strengthen the Anglo-Soviet military alliance through joint military action and to show not in word but in deed that it was willing to fight nazi Germany, as the British people insistently demanded.

The main reason that prompted the British Government to reject the Soviet proposals was its unwillingness to undertake major military operations on the European continent at that time. The situation has been correctly summed up by Trumbull Higgins, who said: "What was really missing in Mr. Churchill's Britain . . . was any determination on the part of the British Government to undertake large-scale warfare on land."¹

The British Government's position on the second front issue could not but disappoint the Soviet Government and cause concern. In one of its messages, sent in the middle of September 1941, the Soviet Government wrote that the absence of a second front played into the hands of the common enemy.

Many prominent British statesmen, including Lord Beaverbrook, Ernest Bevan and others, understood only too well how important a second front in Europe was to the Allied cause and could not but agree that conditions favoured its opening at the time. Thus, returning from Moscow in mid-October 1941, Lord Beaverbrook wrote a memorandum in which he recommended to open a second front in Europe without delay. However, the British Government as a whole did not share Lord Beaverbrook's views and the question of the second front remained open.

Thus, despite the Allied agreements and the commitments assumed by the governments of the USSR, Britain and the USA, the assistance given by Britain and the USA to the Soviet Union was not commensurate with the enormous contribution to the joint fight against fascism being made by the USSR. Moreover, it was becoming clear that the United States and Britain were in no hurry to participate actively in the war against the nazi invaders.

* * *

There were also other obstacles to the strengthening of Allied relations between the USSR, Britain and the USA.

¹ Trumbull Higgins, *Winston Churchill and the Second Front 1940-1943*, New York, 1957, p. 77.

One of them was the question of nazi Germany's satellites. It will be remembered that in addition to Germany and Italy, Hungary, Rumania and Finland also took part in the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union. The participation of the Rumanian, Hungarian and Finnish fascist rulers in the war against the USSR was an act of aggression, similar to that committed by the Hitlerites. Nevertheless, the USA continued to maintain normal diplomatic relations with all these countries, and Britain maintained such relations with Finland.¹

The attitude adopted by Britain and the USA towards Finland was in direct contradiction to Allied Soviet-British relations. It will be remembered that during the Soviet-Finnish war (1939-40) the Finnish rulers were supported and encouraged by the Western powers. This benevolent attitude towards the Finnish rulers by the British and US ruling circles was also kept up to some degree after Finland's aggression against the USSR in 1941. Thus, speaking on behalf of the government on July 22, 1941, Labour member Henry Snell said that the British Government intended to maintain friendly relations with Finland. The Finnish Government, however, under pressure from the Hitlerites, broke off diplomatic relations with Britain on July 30, 1941.

On August 7, 1941 Anthony Eden made a statement on Anglo-Finnish relations in the House of Commons. In it he noted that the British Government deeply regretted that the Finnish Government, acting obviously under German pressure, had considered it necessary to take the initiative in breaking off diplomatic relations.

To all intents and purposes the British rulers indirectly approved of the actions of nazi Germany's Finnish allies aimed at restoring the Finnish borders of 1939. This is confirmed also by a statement made by Eden in the House of Commons on October 1, and the British memorandum sent to the Finnish Government on September 19, which said:

"If, therefore, the Finnish Government persist in invading purely Russian territory, a situation will arise in which Great Britain will be forced to treat Finland as an open enemy,

¹ Britain broke off diplomatic relations with Hungary on April 7, 1941 following the joint attack by Germany and Hungary on Yugoslavia, and with Rumania on February 10, 1941.

not only while the war lasts but also when peace comes to be made.

"His Majesty's Government would greatly regret such a development in view of the friendship which has always existed between Great Britain and Finland. Although the Finnish Government have expelled the British Minister from Helsingfors, His Majesty's Government are ready to overlook this act of discourtesy, and would welcome an early restoration of normal diplomatic intercourse between the two countries. But the Finnish Government will realise that for this to be possible the first essential is that Finland should terminate her war against Russia *and evacuate all territories beyond her frontiers of 1939.*" (My italics.—U.I.) Thus, the British Government favoured the restoration of the Soviet-Finnish border that had existed before 1940 and had, as is commonly known, created a serious threat to Leningrad, one of the Soviet Union's vital centres.

The Finnish Government rejected the British proposal and thereby once again demonstrated that it was waging an aggressive war and that it was a faithful ally of the Germans. Yet, the British Government did not want to declare war on Finland.

The US Government, too, did not condemn Finland for her entry into the war on nazi Germany's side. The State Department wanted to avoid any action that could be interpreted as pressure on the Finns. What is more, the State Department did not discuss what pressure could be exerted on Finland to dissuade her from taking action against the Soviet Union but discussed what measures of assistance could be given to Finland in the war against the USSR "should there be occasion to render such assistance".¹

When President Ryti of Finland informed the US Government that "Finland ... was seeking to achieve purely Finnish aims",² the USA was fully satisfied with that statement.

Ignoring the request of the Soviet Government, the US Government did not take any serious and effective steps to force Finland out of the war.

All this did nothing to help to strengthen the unity of the anti-Hitler coalition; on the contrary, the policy of

¹ W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, op. cit., p. 549.

² Ibid., p. 550.

Britain and the USA towards nazi Germany's satellites consolidated the position of the anti-Soviet elements in them. That is why in the autumn of 1941 the Soviet Government requested that the British Government declare war on Rumania, Hungary and Finland. It was premature to ask the US Government to do the same since the USA had not yet joined the war.

London was extremely reserved regarding the Soviet request.

However, the Soviet Government continued to insist that it was necessary for Britain to declare war on nazi Germany's satellites. The Soviet Government believed that such a step by Britain would inflict a heavy moral blow to the Hitler coalition and undermine the position of nazi sympathisers in the satellite countries. A British declaration of war on Germany's satellites would also testify to the unity among the Allies.

The Soviet Government's stand found understanding among some British political leaders. Thus, for example, Conservative member Henry George Strauss, criticising the government for its policy towards Germany's satellites in Parliament on November 25, 1941, said: "Co-operation, to be really effective, must be on a common policy, diplomatic as well as strategic, and it is in this vital realm that, I maintain, the Government are letting down our Russian Ally and our common cause. It is not only Germany who is fighting Russia, but Finland, Hungary and Rumania. Those countries are full allies of the Nazis. They are all trying to do their utmost to smash the Russian Armies and destroy the Russian people, and thereby bring about Nazi rule throughout Europe, including this country. . . .

"(This inaction) of the British Government is so incomprehensible and so dangerous that there have been very strong protests from Conservative quarters in this country against this attitude of the British Government."¹

Many British newspapers called for an immediate declaration of war on nazi Germany's satellites. *The Times*, *Daily Mail*, *Manchester Guardian* and other papers demanded decisive action from the government.²

¹ *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, London, 1942, Vol. 376, col. 656-57.

² See *Daily Mail*, Nov. 24, 1941; *The Times*, Dec. 1, 1941; *Manchester Guardian*, Nov. 27, 1941.

The British Government could no longer ignore public opinion and on December 6, 1941 declared war on Rumania, Hungary and Finland, and on December 12, on Bulgaria.

The British Government's position on this question was decisively influenced by the staunch and courageous struggle of the Soviet people against the fascist hordes, especially in the defence of Moscow, which added enormously to the Soviet Union's prestige.

The growing importance of the Soviet-German front to the fate of the Second World War prompted the British Government's decision to declare war on Hitler Germany's satellites and thus to take an important step towards the consolidation of the anti-Hitler coalition and the strengthening of Anglo-Soviet military and political co-operation.

* * *

In the winter of 1941, despite inclement weather, the Soviet High Command succeeded in launching an offensive at Rostov, Tikhvin and in the Crimea. On December 6 the Soviet armies on the Central front also mounted a counter-offensive and smashed the German fascists on the approaches to Moscow. The victory of the Soviet Army near Moscow was the first large-scale counter-offensive of the Soviet Army and the first serious defeat suffered by Hitler's Army in the Second World War. The Soviet armed forces foiled the enemy's blitzkrieg plan and shattered Hitler's legend of the invincibility of the German Army.

As a result of the successful Soviet offensive near Rostov-on-Don and Tikhvin, and later near Moscow, the Hitlerite armies suffered enormous losses in manpower and equipment, especially near Moscow. Between January and April 1942 the Soviet Army annihilated 30 enemy divisions. During the winter offensive the Soviet Army advanced from 100 to 350 kilometres to the west. The German fascists had been stripped of the initiative in military operations.

The defeat of the Germans near Moscow and the winter counter-offensive were of enormous international significance. They exerted a major impact on the entire course of the Second World War. The international significance of the defeat of the Germans near Moscow found expression first and foremost in the consolidation of the anti-fascist front of the peoples fighting fascist tyranny. The destruction of the fascist hordes near Moscow gave the peoples fighting fascism

faith in their powers. The successes of the Soviet Army in the summer of 1941-42 created also favourable conditions for expanding and strengthening the Soviet-Anglo-American alliance. However, there were still many matters to be resolved. There was no joint co-ordinated programme of military operations against the common enemy. Some political issues had not yet been defined and decided. Thus, for example, the British and US governments did not recognise the Soviet Union's western borders as they were at the time of Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. Moreover, they indirectly justified the territorial claims on the Soviet Union by Germany's satellites.

All this was naturally regarded with concern by the Soviet Government and it therefore addressed a message to the British Government saying: "...We need clarity, which at the moment is lacking in relations between the USSR and Great Britain. The unclarity is due to two circumstances: first, there is no definite understanding between our two countries concerning war aims and plans for the post-war organisation of peace; secondly, there is no treaty between the USSR and Great Britain on mutual military aid in Europe against Hitler. Until understanding is reached on these two main points, not only will there be no clarity in Anglo-Soviet relations, but, if we are to speak frankly, there will be no mutual trust."¹

In the autumn of 1941 the Soviet Government once again posed the question of the need to adopt and carry out a coalition strategy and to co-ordinate views on various matters pertaining to the post-war order in the world.

This frank and direct statement about Soviet-British relations aroused indignation in London. Eden writes that Churchill was extremely displeased with the Soviet message and in a talk with his Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the Soviet Union needed Britain more than Britain needed the Soviet Union, and so on. Churchill was also extremely dissatisfied with the views held by Sir Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow, who in many respects appreciated the justness of the Soviet point of view.²

Yet, the British Government agreed with the Soviet Government that it was necessary to get rid of the ambiguity

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 33.

² *The Eden Memoirs, The Reckoning*, London, 1965, p. 282.

in Anglo-Soviet relations. In the second half of November Churchill addressed a message to Stalin in which he outlined the prospects of Anglo-Soviet relations. The British Prime Minister expressed the hope that after victory the USSR, Great Britain and the USA would meet at the peace conference as its three main participants. The primary task of the Great Powers, Churchill said, would be to prevent Germany from unleashing a third world war. "The fact that Russia is a Communist State and that Britain and the USA are not and do not intend to be is not any obstacle to our making a good plan for our mutual safety and rightful interests,"¹ his message read.

In that message the Prime Minister said that the British Government was ready to send its Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Union to give all-round consideration to war problems. It also contained the important statement that Eden would be able to discuss any problem concerning the war.²

On the eve of his departure for Moscow the British Minister for Foreign Affairs informed Winant, the US ambassador in London, of the aims of his mission. Speaking of the difficulties and ambiguities in Anglo-Soviet relations, Eden declared that the aim of his mission would be "as far as possible to allay the suspicions and resentment" in Moscow and to give Moscow "as much satisfaction as possible without entering into commitments".³ Among the questions Eden expected to pose to the Soviet Government were the following: Anglo-Soviet relations, the future disarmament of Germany; the formation of federal states in Europe, and some others. Winant reports that Eden showed him a draft Anglo-Soviet memorandum on war aims and plans for the post-war organisation of the world which he intended to submit to the Soviet Government.⁴

The report on Eden's forthcoming visit to Moscow excited apprehension in the State Department. Washington feared that the Soviet and the British governments would agree on European and world policy without US participation. Winant received a cable instructing him to see Eden imme-

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 35.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1941, Vol. I, General. Soviet Union*, Washington, 1958, p. 193.

⁴ J. G. Winant, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

diately and to tell him that in the considered opinion of the US Government "it would be unfortunate were any of the three governments . . . to enter into commitments regarding specific terms of the post-war settlement".¹

Eden held talks in Moscow from December 16 to 18, 1941. Views were exchanged on key political and military problems. First to be considered was the question of signing two Anglo-Soviet agreements: a military one—on the alliance and mutual assistance in the war, and a political one—on co-operation after the war. The latter was to resolve the controversial frontier question; it was to contain Britain's post-war recognition of the Soviet Union's frontiers that had existed at the time of Germany's invasion on June 22, 1941. It also envisaged the restoration of Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Greece within their pre-war boundaries, the transfer to Poland of East Prussia, and the solution of other problems of Europe's post-war organisation. Saying that the matter needed additional study Eden refused to sign the agreement because the British Government was supposed to have given commitments to the USA not to sign any agreements on territorial issues. The reference to the USA was a pretext since the British Government did not wish to recognise the Soviet Union's western borders as they had been before Germany's treacherous attack. The British Government's position was due not so much to its commitment to the USA as to the conviction that the Soviet Union would come out of the war much weakened, and that the new balance of power, favourable to Britain, would enable the Western powers to impose on the Soviet Union post-war frontiers in keeping with their wishes.

In a memorandum for the members of the British cabinet drawn up by Eden in January 1942, he wrote that it would be better to accept the proposal made by the Soviet Government. "We did not want to recognise any Soviet position in the Baltic States," he said, "but it seemed inescapable that, if Hitler were overthrown, Russian forces would end the war much deeper into Europe than they began it in 1941. It therefore seemed prudent to tie the Soviet Government to agreements as early as possible. The United States Government were not, at this stage of the war, so convinced."²

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States*. . . , p. 194.

² *The Eden Memoirs, The Reckoning*, London, 1965, p. 319.

Britain referred to the Atlantic Charter to motivate her refusal to recognise the Soviet Union's western frontiers as they were before Germany's treacherous invasion. However, this stand was untenable since the territorial changes referred to had been made in keeping with the wishes expressed by the populations of these territories. Besides, stating the question in this light created the impression that the Atlantic Charter was directed against the USSR and that the British Government advocated the dismemberment of the Soviet state. Naturally, the Soviet Government could not agree to this posing of the question and it was decided that the talks on the Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance would be continued through normal diplomatic channels.

At the Moscow talks views were also exchanged on some other aspects of international relations and the post-war organisation of the world. As early as this the Soviet Government submitted for discussion some important problems connected with the liquidation of the consequences of the fascist recarving of the map of Europe.

The question of the material responsibility of the aggressors for the damages caused to the Allies was also touched upon. Long before the Moscow talks the Soviet Government had declared that the Hitlerites would have to pay for the damages inflicted by their aggression against peace-loving peoples.

The second front came up for discussion again. The British Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that Britain was exerting efforts to open a second front in the nearest future.

Although the Moscow talks did not overcome all the problems in Anglo-Soviet relations, Eden's arrival helped to establish direct contacts between the two governments and to clarify their points of view on important international issues and it testified to the strengthening of Allied relations.

* * *

The Soviet-Polish talks, held early in December 1941, also played an important role in the development of Allied relations between the main participants of the anti-Hitler coalition. From the first days of the Soviet-German war the Soviet Government attached great importance to its relations with Poland. The policy of the USSR towards Poland was

determined by the socialist nature of the Soviet state, which had in its time granted independence to Poland.

In accordance with the Soviet-Polish treaty of July 30, 1941 the Soviet and the Polish High Commands signed a military agreement in Moscow on August 14 of the same year. It provided for the formation of a Polish Army in the Soviet Union. General Anders was appointed its commander-in-chief. By agreement between the Soviet and the Polish High Commands the Polish Army was to have 30,000 men, and in keeping with a proposal made by the Polish side Polish divisions were to be sent to the Soviet-German front as soon as their training and equipment was completed.

With a view to developing and strengthening the Soviet-Polish military union, the Soviet Government took steps to facilitate the formation of this Polish Army.

To finance the various measures connected with the formation of the Polish Army on Soviet territory, the Soviet Government granted the Polish Emigré Government an interest-free loan of 65 million rubles in 1941, which was subsequently increased to 300 million rubles, and it gave the representatives of the Polish Government every conceivable help to expedite the formation of Polish units.

Thus the Soviet Government did everything possible to promote and develop friendly relations between Poland and the USSR. Yet, the Polish émigré circles in London raised artificial obstacles to the normalisation of Soviet-Polish relations. The differences between the Soviet Government and the Polish Emigré Government about Poland's eastern border have already been mentioned. The Polish Emigré Government adopted an unfriendly attitude towards the USSR also in connection with some other issues affecting Soviet-Polish relations. Instead of concentrating all their attention on delivering blows to Hitler Germany, the common enemy, and to cementing the Soviet-Polish military alliance in this way, the Polish Government focussed attention on various secondary matters.

In view of the obstacles being raised by the Polish Emigré Government it was necessary to arrange new Soviet-Polish talks. On December 3 and 4, 1941 talks were held in Moscow between the Soviet Government and a Polish delegation to the USSR, headed by Sikorski.

Even though the Polish side had initially asked for the formation of a Polish Army numbering 30,000 officers and

men, the Soviet side accepted General Sikorski's proposal to enlarge it to 96,000 men.

During the discussions the Polish representatives made many complaints about the difficulties involved in the training of the Polish troops. Undeniably, the Polish Army was being formed in the Soviet Union in extremely adverse conditions; many problems had to be overcome in connection with supplies, the Poles were unaccustomed to the severe climatic conditions and so on.

Despite the extremely tense situation on the Soviet-German front in the autumn of 1941, the Polish Emigré Government, with the consent of Britain and the USA, raised with the Soviet Government the question of withdrawing the entire Polish Army from the USSR. The excuse for this request was the difficulties connected with its formation.

The Soviet Government had hoped that the Polish armed forces would soon join in the battles on the Soviet-German front and was therefore naturally disappointed and displeased with the position taken by the Polish Emigré Government. However, wishing to improve relations with Poland, the Soviet Government agreed to transfer the entire Polish Army to the southern part of the USSR, where large-scale construction of camps, military schools, and so on, had commenced.

During Sikorski's stay in Moscow the Soviet Government made a new attempt to resolve controversial territorial issues in an amicable way. However, the Polish delegation categorically refused to even discuss that question—it did not consider such discussion necessary because it held the view that the Polish-Soviet frontier had been established in 1921 once and for all.

Even though serious differences on a number of issues arose during the Soviet-Polish talks, the desire of both sides to defeat Hitler prompted the signing on December 4, 1941 of a Soviet-Polish declaration of friendship and mutual assistance.

This declaration, consisting of three points, stated that both sides would fight to the victorious end and the utter destruction of the German fascist invaders, that they "will give each other every military assistance during the war and the troops of the Polish Republic deployed on Soviet territory will fight the German bandits side by side with the Soviet troops".

Unfortunately, the Soviet-Polish declaration of 1941 did not become a landmark in the development of friendly relations between the USSR and Poland. Yet, it was important in defining the position of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition on one of the main political issues—the nature of the future international organisation for ensuring universal peace. The declaration contained the following statement: “After the victorious end of the war and the corresponding punishment of the Hitlerite criminals the Allied States will face the task of ensuring an enduring and just peace. This can be achieved only by a new organisation of international relations, based on the alliance of the democratic countries in a firm union. Respect for international law, backed by the collective armed strength of all Allied States, must become the decisive force in the setting up of this organisation.”¹ This declaration shows that the Soviet Union was the first of the Great Powers to speak during the war years of the setting up of a new international organisation whose task it would be to establish a system of universal security.

As is commonly known, the Western powers, notably the USA, held different views on that issue. They believed that the role of the preserver of international order would belong to two “policemen”—the USA and Britain.

Thus, there were already two conceptions on post-war international security in the early stages of the Second World War: one, advocated by the Soviet Union and formulated in the Soviet-Polish declaration of 1941, provided for the setting up after the war of an international organisation of equal states, in which all members would be collectively responsible for peace; the other, advanced by the US and British ruling circles, envisaged the establishment of Anglo-American domination in the post-war world.

The Soviet-Polish agreement of 1941 pursued very clear and definite aims—to unite the efforts of two friendly nations in the common war against Hitlerism and to ensure a stable and enduring peace after the war. In this sense it did much to strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition as a whole and in the then prevailing situation helped to improve mutual understanding between the USSR, Britain and the USA.

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy* . . , Vol. I, pp. 191-92.

* * *

The battle for Moscow and the counter-offensive of the Soviet Army launched in the winter of 1941 delivered a major blow to Hitler's war plans and forced him to wage a protracted war, one destructive to Germany. The Soviet victories also disproved the hasty and misconceived pessimistic forecasts about the prospects of military operations on the Soviet-German front, made by some statesmen both in London and Washington. Sceptics and ill-wishers who had prophesied that the USSR would be defeated in two or three months after Hitler Germany's attack had been proved wrong. The position of those in England and America who had made a realistic estimate of the Soviet Union's potential and who stood for co-operation with it grew much stronger. This could not but improve the Allied relations between the USSR, Britain and the USA. The decision of the British Government to declare war on Hitler Germany's satellites who participated in aggression against the USSR, the Anglo-Soviet talks, during which an extensive range of world political issues had been discussed, and other diplomatic actions taken at that time should also be viewed in this light. Finally, the victory of the Soviet armed forces paved the way for the extension of economic links and helped to fulfil the programme of supplies to the Soviet Union. The winter counter-offensive of the Soviet Army undermined nazi Germany's prestige and helped to strengthen the front of anti-fascist states.

CHAPTER V

THE USA ENTERS THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CONSOLIDATION OF THE ANTI-HITLER COALITION

The Soviet Army's success in the historical battle for Moscow and the winter offensive wrecked Hitler's blitzkrieg plan and exerted a major influence on the course of events in the Far East. It made the Japanese decide to direct their aggression to the south. This, in turn, affected the relations between the USSR, the USA and Britain, the main states in the anti-Hitler coalition. In particular, it helped to draw the United States into the anti-fascist coalition.

For a long time the Japanese imperialists had nurtured the plan of attacking the Soviet Union and annexing its Far Eastern territories. To the Japanese militarists the outbreak of the Soviet-German war was a signal for accelerating the preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union. The Japanese Government concentrated numerous crack divisions of the Kwantung army in northeastern China regardless of the Pact of Neutrality Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan of April 13, 1941.

When Matsuoka, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, was told of Germany's invasion of the USSR, he visited the Emperor and told him: "... Now that the German-Soviet war had started Japan, too, must co-operate with Germany and attack Russia. To do this, it was better for the time being to refrain from action in the south. Sooner or later Japan would have to fight there. Ultimately Japan would be fighting the Soviets, America and England simultaneously."¹

¹ *Pearl Harbour Attack*. Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbour Attack. Congress of the United States. Seventy-Ninth Congress. Second Session, Part 20, Washington, 1946, p. 3993.

The new international situation resulting from Germany's invasion of the USSR prompted the Japanese rulers to outline a new programme—"the policy of the imperial government". At a conference held on July 2, 1941 political and military leaders approved the "main points" of this new programme. The question of Japan's attitude towards the Soviet-German war held a central place in the adopted document. "Our attitude with reference to the Soviet-German war," the document stated, "will be based on the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact. However, we will not enter the conflict for some time but will steadily proceed with military preparations against the Soviets and decide our final attitude independently. At the same time, we will continue carefully correlated activities in the diplomatic field.

"In case the German-Soviet war should develop to our advantage, we will make use of our military strength, settle the Soviet question and guarantee the safety of our northern borders."¹

Another section of the decisions of the conference said that if it should prove impossible to prevent the USA from joining the war, that is, if it should be impossible to carry out Japan's plans in Asia by making a deal with America, Japan would act in accordance with the Tri-Partite Pact.

The main strategic line, approved by the conference, was that advantage should be taken of the new situation to prepare quickly for war against the USSR and also against the USA and Britain. The question of when, where and against whom the blow would be delivered, was to be decided in the light of the general development of international events, and the military operations on the Soviet-German front, in particular.

The decisions adopted by the conference on July 2, 1941 were urgently implemented. Reservists were feverishly mobilised, the transport system was made ready and the necessary war materials accumulated. There was only one thing the Japanese were afraid of, that is, "of missing the bus", i.e., not to be ready when the disintegration of the Soviet state, which Hitler had promised, occurred.

The General Staff of the Japanese army and the Staff of the Kwantung army drew up a secret plan for the preparation of the war, known as the Kan-Toku-En, according to

¹ *Pearl Harbour Attack...*, Part 20, p. 4019.

which Japan intended to seize the maritime provinces and a considerable portion of Siberia, and obtain control of the Trans-Siberian railway.

At the Tokyo trial of the principal Japanese war criminals it became known that several plans had been made for Japan's invasion of the USSR. "The war plans of the Japanese general staff for 1939-41 were directed at seizing Soviet territories," said the documents read at the trial, "the war plan for 1939 was based on the concentration of the main Japanese forces in eastern Manchuria in order to begin offensive operations and the Kwantung army was to occupy the Soviet towns of Voroshilov, Vladivostok, Iman and then Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk and Kuibyshevka. The 1941 plan, made before Germany's invasion of Russia, provided for the implementation of the same aims." It was proposed to seize the towns of Voroshilov, Vladivostok, Blagoveshchensk, Iman and Kuibyshevka in the first stage of the war and to occupy northern Sakhalin, Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka, Nikolayevsk-on-the-Amur, Komsomolsk and Sovietskaya Gavan in the next stage.

K. Inoue, S. Okonogi and S. Suzuki, progressive Japanese historians, wrote that the Japanese Government, ignoring the neutrality pact, "discussed the plan of attacking the Soviet Union and under the pretext of holding manoeuvres of the Kwantung army (Kan-Toku-En plan), increased the number of Japanese troops stationed in Manchuria from 400,000 to 700,000. This was a measure in preparation for the war against the Soviet Union, which Japan was to begin if the situation on the Soviet-German front were to become favourable for Germany."¹

The plans of the Japanese militarists were based on a withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Far East to the western front, in which case, they hoped, it would be easy for them to seize the Soviet Far Eastern territories. War Minister Hideki Tojo planned to invade the USSR when the Soviet state was at its weakest. Tojo said that Japan would win enormous prestige by attacking the Soviet Union when she is ready to drop like a ripe plum. Elaboration of plans for the administration of Soviet territory, occupied by the Japanese, was undertaken in 1941 by special committees

¹ K. Inoue, S. Okonogi, S. Suzuki, *The History of Modern Japan*, Moscow, 1955, p. 239.

formed at the Staff of the Kwantung army and also by committees set up by semi-official societies, for example, the Society for the Study of National Policy, and others.

In the summer of 1941 the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs was looking for a suitable pretext to begin the war against the USSR. On August 1, Eugen Ott, the German Ambassador to Tokyo, sent a cable to Berlin, in which he reported that Yamamoto, the Japanese Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, had told him that he himself was in favour of making decisive demands, especially territorial demands, on the Soviet Government, which it would be unable to accept.

The timing of Japan's invasion of the USSR was highly important to the Japanese militarists and their Hitlerite partners. At the German-Japanese talks held on this subject in the summer of 1941 Japan committed herself to attack the Soviet Union as soon as the German army occupied Kiev, Leningrad and Moscow.

The heroic resistance to the Germans by the Soviet Army foiled the plans of the Japanese imperialists. Therefore, in October 1941 the Japanese ruling circles decided to postpone the invasion of the USSR until the spring of 1942.

Thus, the Soviet Army's staunch resistance on the Soviet-German front created serious obstacles to the implementation of the "Northern" variant of the war in the autumn of 1941. In parallel with the preparations for the war against the Soviet Union, Japan was hurriedly preparing for the "Southern" variant of the war against her principal imperialist opponents in the Pacific—the USA and Britain. Striving to conceal preparations for an attack on the Pacific possessions of Britain and the USA, the Japanese Government conducted long-drawn-out negotiations with the US Government in Washington. In these talks the Japanese militarists pursued two aims: either to obtain an agreement favourable for Japan from the USA by relying on the great influence wielded by pro-Munich circles in Washington and by capitalising on the fact that the US armed forces were not yet prepared for war, or else to use the respite provided by the negotiations in Washington to complete her own war preparations and to deliver a sudden effective blow on key American and British positions in the Pacific.

The US position at the Washington talks was determined by the following circumstances. Some prominent statesmen

in Washington believed that despite the seemingly irreconcilable and adamant stand adopted by Tokyo in the Japanese-American negotiations, Japan would not risk attacking the USA and Britain and would be willing to reach a compromise. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was one who held this point of view. It was based on the supposition that Japan would not risk a new adventure while she had her hands full in China and that lack of the necessary military and strategic raw materials would not permit her to wage a long war.

Another line of thought was that Japan would inevitably begin military action against the Soviet Union. This conviction became even stronger after Germany's attack of the USSR. One of the most convinced proponents of this view was Joseph C. Grew, the US Ambassador in Tokyo who, on July 23, 1941, wrote in his diary: "... This is the time, if ever, for Japan to adopt a new orientation of conciliation with the United States, which might well be possible if Japan would take certain steps of constructive statesmanship. It is a moment pregnant with possibilities for a new turn in the road."¹

The champions of this point of view therefore endeavoured to bring about a Far Eastern Munich—a compromise deal with Japan at the expense of the Soviet Union and China. They wanted the USSR to clash with Japan, to weaken both and to establish their sway in that part of the world. "There was always the possibility," Langer and Gleason wrote, "that the Japanese inspired by the triumphant surge of the German armies toward Moscow, would fall upon the Soviet Far East whence, Tokyo estimated, the Soviet command had been obliged to withdraw a third of its forces."²

Finally, more realistic statesmen reckoned with the possibility of Japan directing her aggression against the USA, but they too insisted on conducting negotiations with the Japanese to the very last, because in view of the serious influence of the isolationists and of the champions of a Far Eastern Munich, they wanted the Japanese themselves to break off negotiations and thereby reveal their aggressive

¹ Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan*, New York, 1944, p. 395.

² W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, *The Undeclared War 1940-1941*, p. 838.

intentions for all to see. For example, on November 27, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt speaking to a narrow group of leading US officials said, "if hostilities cannot be avoided, the US desires that Japan commit the first overt act".¹

During the long drawn-out Japanese-American talks the irreconcilable positions of the two sides became increasingly evident. The violent struggle for domination in Asia and the Pacific between the USA and Japan inevitably pushed them towards war. As early as in 1920 Lenin had pointed out that "a most stubborn struggle has been going on for many decades between Japan and America over the Pacific Ocean and the mastery of its shores, and the entire diplomatic, economic and trade history of the Pacific Ocean and its shores is full of quite definite indications that the struggle is developing and making war between America and Japan inevitable".²

On October 18, 1941 a new Japanese Government was formed by Tojo, who demanded immediate action. Trying to deceive the American ruling circles, however, the Japanese Government sent Saburo Kurusu to Washington to continue negotiations.

While conducting talks in Washington the Tojo Government hurriedly completed its preparations for war against the USA. Operational plans for an attack on Pearl Harbour, Singapore and other US, British and Dutch possessions were completed by November 1941. While feverishly preparing for the war in the southerly direction, the Japanese militarists also considered the possibility of beginning the war in the north—against the USSR. Tokyo was impatiently waiting for reports on decisive victories by the Germans on the Soviet-German front and of the seizure of Moscow and Leningrad, in order to give marching orders to the Kwantung army.

Hitler's failure to occupy Moscow and the Soviet counter-offensive at the end of November, as well as the failure to make a deal with the US at the Washington negotiations, prompted the Japanese Government to begin its aggression south.

The US Government was aware of Japan's military

¹ Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*, New Haven, 1948, p. 12.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 465.

preparations. US intelligence had deciphered the Japanese code and Tokyo's secret correspondence with Nomura and Kurusu and other Japanese envoys was known to Washington. In particular, the USA knew that the terms Cordell Hull had submitted to Nomura and Kurusu on November 26, 1941 were considered entirely unacceptable in Tokyo, and that in spite of that the Japanese ambassadors were given instructions to continue negotiations in order to mask Japan's war preparations.

Roosevelt and Hull knew that Japan was continuing the negotiations only to divert the attention of the Americans from her war preparations. On December 2 the Japanese embassy in Washington was ordered to destroy all secret documents. The outbreak of war in the Pacific had become a question of days or even hours. Even then, just before Japan attacked US possessions, isolationists in the USA still wanted to induce Roosevelt to mediate between Japan and China, hoping that this would lead to a deal with the Japanese militarists. A few hours before Japan attacked Pearl Harbour the State Department and the Government were still discussing a draft for a 90 days armistice in China and the establishment of a *modus vivendi*.

Thus, at a time when the Japanese-American contradictions had reached a critical stage, part of the US ruling circles still hoped to make a deal with the Japanese at the eleventh hour. They still expected that Japan would attack the Soviet Union and not US possessions.

The turning point came on December 7, 1941. At 2.30 p.m. the current meeting in the round of negotiations with the Japanese representatives was under way in the State Department in Washington. Nomura and Kurusu handed the US Government a new memorandum which made no mention of the imminence of a military attack. But, just before the meeting, all ships of the US Navy in Hawaii received urgent radio advice of an air raid on Pearl Harbour. Japanese aircraft and submarines had attacked Pearl Harbour, the largest US military and naval base in the Pacific. On the same day the Japanese attacked other American bases too—Wake and Midway islands, and some British possessions in the Pacific. Japan officially declared war on the USA and Britain only on December 8, 1941, after she had gained definite advantages by her surprise attack. Japan's treachery was the price the USA and Britain paid

for their connivance at Japanese aggression. The treacherous attack on US and British bases enabled the Japanese armed forces to occupy enormous territories in Southeast Asia with a population of about 150 million people over and above the parts of China they had seized before in the first five months of the war.

The fact that Japan had unleashed the war against the USA and Britain did not mean that she had stopped preparing for an attack on the USSR. "We will not relax our pressure on the Soviets," a cable of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in Germany said, "but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north."¹

Even after the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, the Japanese continued to systematically infringe the Soviet-Japanese Pact of Neutrality of April 13, 1941. They attempted to interfere by force with US-Soviet trade, which was important to the Soviet Union. The Japanese strafed and bombed Soviet vessels, detained them as they were passing through straits, and so on. The Japanese Government closed the Tsugaru Strait to Soviet ships and forced them to use the less accessible and more dangerous Korean Strait.

Japanese submarines sank many Soviet ships. Between August 1941 and 1944 the Japanese detained 178 Soviet merchant vessels, three by armed force. In December 1941 Japanese planes sank two Soviet ships—the *Perekop* and the *Maikop*.

In December 1941 various boards in Japan continued to work on programmes of administrative measures which were to be implemented in territories annexed from the USSR.

The Plan for the Administration of the Territories of Great East Asia, drawn up by the War Ministry and the Ministry for Colonies, provided for the complete destruction of the Soviet state and the division of Soviet territory between Japan and Germany. The border between the two parts was to pass through the Omsk Region. The Soviet maritime provinces and all of Siberia east of Lake Baikal were to become part of Japan or be handed over to the Japanese puppets in northeast China. The plan envisaged the future division of Soviet territory in accordance with the Japanese-German pact. "Under any circumstances, how-

¹ *Pearl Harbour Attack...*, Part 16, p. 2390.

ever," the document reads, "the maritime provinces must be incorporated into Japan; the areas adjacent to the Manchurian Empire must become a sphere of influence of that country, and the Trans-Siberian railway must be placed under complete control of Japan and Germany, whereby Omsk is to be the delimitation point."

Japan was perturbed by the large-scale evacuation of Soviet factories to the East and planned measures to prevent "the concentration in Siberia of Slavs who are evicted from the European part of Russia".

Plans for the administration of occupied territories drawn up by the Institute for Total War envisaged a set of measures to transform the Soviet Far East into a Japanese colony.¹

On December 5, two days before a Japanese fleet attacked Pearl Harbour, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung army, speaking at a conference of the commanders of its units, demanded that preparations for military operations against the Soviet Union be completed and told them to continue to watch Soviet troop movements in the Far East in connection with developments in the Soviet-German war "in order to use the turning point in the military situation opportunely".

Thus, even after the Japanese rulers had chosen to expand southward initially, they continued military preparations for an attack against the Soviet Union.

* * *

The Soviet Union pursued a clear-cut and unambiguous policy in the Far East. It observed the Pact of Neutrality between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan to the letter and wanted to maintain peaceful relations with Japan.

However, the strict observance of the Neutrality Pact did not mean that the Soviet Union remained indifferent to Tokyo's sabre-rattling. The Soviet Government watched the dangerous game of the Japanese militarists and repeatedly warned them that they were playing with fire.

The Soviet Government decisively rebuked all attempts by the Japanese to infringe upon the Soviet Union's lawful

¹ L. N. Kutakov, *Soviet-Japanese Diplomatic Relations*, Moscow, pp. 374-75.

interests and rights. For example, when Teijiro Toyoda, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on August 23, 1941, and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, at a later date, informed the Soviet Government that the transportation of goods bought in the USA on Soviet vessels in the vicinity of Japanese territory "creates for Japan a very delicate and difficult position" and asked the Soviet Government that it "should give serious attention to that matter, especially to the question of the ways and methods of these shipments", the Soviet Government decisively rejected the Japanese note, qualifying it as an endeavour "to obstruct the implementation of normal trade relations between the Soviet Union and the USA" and "as an unfriendly act towards the USSR".¹

During that period there was no extensive and systematic exchange of views on matters connected with the situation in the Far East between the Soviet Government and the governments of the US and Britain. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government informed its Allies of its attitude towards Far Eastern affairs.

"The Soviet Union, like Britain," a message sent by Stalin to Churchill read, "does not want war with Japan. The Soviet Union does not deem it possible to violate treaties, including the treaty of neutrality with Japan. But should Japan violate that treaty and attack the Soviet Union, she will be properly rebuffed by Soviet troops."² A similar statement was made by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to Harry Hopkins during his visit to Moscow in 1941. "... Since the Soviet Government is by no means clear as to the policy which the Japanese Government intends to pursue, it is watching the situation with the utmost care," the Soviet representative said. He also proposed that the US Government should adopt a firm position with respect to Japan. Hopkins replied that the Americans were carefully watching the development of events in the Far East and were considering Japan's threatening position with respect to the South as well as to the North with concern and anxiety. "... Our attitude towards Japan," Hopkins said, "was a reasonable one and we had no desire to be provocative in our relations with Japan."³

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. I, p. 158.

² *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, pp. 21-22.

³ Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

When Japan unleashed the war against Britain and the USA, the governments of the Western powers, notably the British Government, were very anxious to have the USSR join the war against Japan. This question was touched upon by Eden during the Anglo-Soviet talks in December 1941.

The Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan at that moment would have been an unjustifiable step and, moreover, contrary to the neutrality pact between the two countries. It would have compelled the USSR to wage a war on two fronts at a time when the position at the Soviet-German front was extremely tense. The Soviet Government, therefore, adopted no commitments in this respect.

Japan was heavily censured in the Soviet Union for unleashing the war in the Pacific. On December 12, 1941 the editorial in *Pravda* noted that "the Japanese aggressor has engaged in a very risky adventure which forebodes nothing but destruction. And if he relies on the possibility of achieving a blitz victory he is in for disappointment no less bitter than that experienced by bloody Hitler as a result of his treacherous attack on the Soviet Union."¹ The subsequent course of events showed that this was a correct estimate.

Even though the Soviet Union did not join in the war against Japan at that time as subsequent events showed, the struggle of the Soviet people and its armed forces against nazi Germany and her European allies had a decisive influence on military developments in the Pacific. The staunch, consistent and uncompromising position of the Soviet Union in the Far East pinned down considerable forces of the Japanese aggressor and in this way greatly helped the Allies.

* * *

The entry of the USA into the Second World War considerably strengthened the anti-Hitler coalition. In the new conditions America's powerful industrial potential could be used to maximum capacity for the war against the fascist states. To characterise the economic might of the USA it is enough to point out that it produced about 50 per cent of the total industrial output of the capitalist world. Computations made by S. Chase, a well-known US economist, based on average data for 1935-38, show that as regards key

¹ *Pravda*, December 12, 1941

items the United States produced more than twice as much as Germany, Italy, Japan and France taken together.

After Japan's surprise attack, the USA and Britain in their turn declared war on Japan. The USA and Britain were joined in the war against Japan by Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Union of South Africa, India, the Netherlands and several Latin American countries. The National Committee of Free France, the governments of Poland, Greece, Iraq, Egypt, Czechoslovakia and China¹ either declared war on Japan and her allies or broke off diplomatic relations with them.

Thus, by the end of 1941 the two warring coalitions had taken final shape: on the one hand, there was the fascist bloc headed by Germany, Japan and Italy, on the other, the anti-Hitler coalition headed by the Soviet Union, the USA and Britain.

The entry of the USA and a number of other states into the Second World War made it necessary to give the military alliance of the states fighting the fascist aggressors legal form. The Washington Declaration, which later became known as the Declaration of the United Nations, was signed on January 1, 1942 by 26 states including the USSR, the USA, Britain, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, India and Yugoslavia.

In the introductory part the participants declared their adherence to the Atlantic Charter. Although the declaration does not contain references to reservations made by some states, notably by the Soviet Union, in connection with the adherence to the Atlantic Charter, the wording of the declaration's introductory part and its content show that these reservations were taken into account and recognised by the participants.

The introductory part of the United Nations Declaration contains the crucially important point that in order to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, to preserve human rights and justice there must be complete victory over the enemy. Without doubt, the position of the USSR on this question had a major influence on the wording of this part of the declaration. In its declaration of September

¹ A state of war existed between China and Japan actually from the moment of Japan's invasion of China, i.e., as of July 7, 1937; however, the Chiang Kai-shek Government declared war on Japan only on December 9, 1941.

24,1941, the Soviet Government had stressed that it was necessary to bring about the rapid and decisive defeat of all aggressors and to achieve complete and final victory over Hitlerism. The position of the Soviet Union was reflected also in the part of the United Nations Declaration speaking of the need to mobilise all resources—military and economic—for the war against fascism.

The declaration contained two commitments by its participants. In accordance with section I of the declaration each government committed itself to use all its resources against those members of the Tri-Partite Pact (Germany, Japan, Italy) and the states allied with it (Rumania, Hungary, Finland and Bulgaria) with which the said government was in a state of war.

The other section committed all governments of the United Nations to co-operate and not to conclude a separate armistice or peace. This commitment was one of the most important elements of the coalition, since the essence of any coalition is to ensure extensive military, political and economic co-operation between the states participating in it, that is, collective action by its participants.

Thus, the United Nations Declaration put a legal seal to the military-political alliance of the anti-fascist states.

Nineteen forty-one was on the way out. It had been a difficult year for the Soviet Union and for many other peoples who suffered from fascist oppression, from the hated New Order. In 1941 the states of the fascist bloc scored certain temporary successes. The most important feature of 1941, however, was the gross mistake the enemies made in underestimating the might of the Soviet state, which led to the final collapse of the blitzkrieg plan. The idea of organising a crusade of the whole capitalist world against the Soviet Union had miscarried. All freedom-loving peoples of the world had rallied around the USSR. The establishment of the military and political alliance between the USSR, the USA and Britain was one of the most important results of 1941.

CHAPTER VI

ANGLO-AMERICAN STRATEGY

The entry of the USA into the war was unanimously approved by all the states of the anti-Hitler coalition. Intense relief was felt in Britain and the British people hoped that the enormous potential of the United States would tip the scale even further in favour of the anti-Hitler coalition. At the same time it was feared in London that as a result of the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific the United States would decrease its assistance to Britain and concentrate all its attention on the Far Eastern theatre of operations. This prompted the British Prime Minister to ask the US President for an immediate meeting in order to work out a common strategy. The British proposal was accepted by the Americans and a meeting under the code name Arcadia was held in Washington between December 22, 1941 and January 14, 1942. This Anglo-American conference holds a special place in US-British relations during the Second World War. For the first time British and American leaders met as partners in the war against the fascist bloc. The question of a joint Anglo-American strategy headed the agenda.

The British delegation had thoroughly prepared for this discussion. On their way to the USA aboard a British man-of-war, Winston Churchill and his advisers had drawn up three documents bearing on strategy. The first analysed the situation on the European theatre of operations and outlined the tasks of the British and US armed forces in Europe in 1942. The second dealt with proposed measures in the Pacific, and the third studied the prospects of military operations in 1943.

The first document recognised the enormous effect the successful Soviet counter-offensive was exerting on the course of the war. "Hitler's failure and losses in Russia are

the prime fact in the war at this time. We cannot tell how great the disaster to the German Army and Nazi régime will be,"¹ the document stated. It also contained a detailed analysis of the operations of British troops in Libya and expressed the conviction that the British armies would in the nearest future gain a victory in Cyrenaica. Proceeding from these two premises—the miscarriage of Hitler's plans on the Soviet-German front and the expected British victory in Libya, the authors of the document proposed to concentrate the main attention of the Anglo-American armed forces on North Africa.

"To sum up," the document presented by the British to the conference concluded, "the war in the West in 1942 comprises, as its main offensive effort, the occupation and control by Great Britain and the United States of the whole of the North and West African possessions of France, and the further control by Britain of the whole North African shore from Tunis to Egypt, thus giving, if the naval situation allows, free passage through the Mediterranean to the Levant and the Suez Canal."²

The British proposed to carry out the North African operation, first called *Gymnast*, later *Supergymnast* and finally *Torch*, at the beginning of March 1942. Owing to the failure of the British offensive in Libya, however, the operation was considerably delayed.

The second document provided for a set of joint measures aimed at restoring Anglo-American domination in the Pacific. The date set for the achievement of that aim was May 1942.

The third document said that if the operations scheduled by the British in 1942 were successful, preparations could be launched for a landing on the European continent in the summer of 1943.

"We have therefore to prepare," the document read, "for the liberation of the captive countries of Western and Southern Europe by the landing at suitable points, successively or simultaneously, of British and American armies strong enough to enable the conquered population to revolt."³

The British document contained no further details on a massive Allied landing on the European continent in 1943.

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. III, p. 574.

² *Ibid.*, p. 578.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 582.

The proposals made by the British Government at the Washington Conference showed that the British endeavoured, first, to stop the Americans from flinging all their forces against Japan and, secondly, to delay major military operations in Europe.

The fears the British had of possible changes in the Soviet position in connection with the outbreak of the war in the Pacific dissipated quickly. At one of the first meetings at the conference, General Marshall said that as heretofore the Atlantic area and Europe should be considered the decisive theatres of military operations.

The US document stated that "...notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow."¹ The Americans agreed with the British proposal to mount a major operation in North Africa and to postpone the landing in Europe.

Even though the offensive of the Soviet Army demonstrated clearly that a relatively quick victory could be obtained over fascist Germany if all states of the anti-Hitler coalition would carry out their Allied commitments to the full, the Washington Conference decided to carry out a series of essentially defensive operations.

Trumbull Higgins, an American historian, justly characterises Churchill's proposals and the strategic plan adopted by the conference as a "reiteration of the defensive Anglo-French basic plan of 1939..."² That is the plan followed during the "phoney" war. The defensive strategy, adopted by the British and US governments for 1942, mainly comprised bombing raids and the enforcement of a naval blockade.

The conference drew up plans for landing operations in North Africa, which were scheduled for the spring of 1942. This laid the foundations of the strategy of "minor operations", "indirect action" and the "final blow", which was aimed at drawing out the war and provided for the active participation of the Western powers in the war only in its final stage, when the main forces of the USSR and Germany would have mutually exhausted themselves.

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

² Trumbull Higgins, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

The conference adopted a decision on the setting up of an Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff.

"Its task was to formulate and execute, under the direction of the heads of the countries concerned, policies and plans relating to the strategic conduct of the war, allocation of munitions, broad war requirements, and transportation requirements."¹ The members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were the President of the USA, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and top officers of the US and British air forces, navies and land forces. The US President was represented in the Combined Chiefs of Staff by Admiral William Leahy, and the British Prime Minister by Field-Marshal Dill. During the war the Combined Chiefs of Staff held eight conferences with the participation of the President and the Prime Minister. In the period between conferences the Combined Chiefs were located in Washington.

The Washington Conference considered also the Declaration of the United Nations, on which details were given in the preceding chapter.

The American and British delegations exchanged views on many other questions, including the French and the German problems. Philip E. Mosely, an expert of the US State Department, said that "during his first visit to Roosevelt in December 1941, Churchill raised the question of Germany's partitioning". Noting that the State Department took up the matter, Mosely writes: "Plans were drawn up [by the State Department—*U.I.*] for the division of Germany after the war into three, five or seven separate states and an analysis was made of the political, economic and demographic problems arising in this connection."²

The chief result of the Washington Conference was the adoption of a co-ordinated Anglo-American strategy and the setting up of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The "strategy of minor operations" adopted in Washington was quite consistently followed by the US and British governments throughout the war.

The Washington decisions strengthened co-operation be-

¹ Forrest C. Pogue, *The European Theater of Operations*, Vol. IV, *The Supreme Command*, Washington, 1954, p. 37.

² Quoted acc. to *Pravda o politike zapadnykh derzhav v german-skom voprose (Istoricheskaya spravka)* (The Truth about the Policy of the Western Powers on the German Problem [A Historical Reference]), Moscow, 1959, p. 8.

tween Britain and the United States but did not consolidate the anti-Hitler coalition as a whole. It should be noted that the British and US governments adopted important decisions on the course of the entire Second World War without co-ordinating them with the Soviet Union, although the latter bore the main burden of the war against nazi Germany and her European allies. Setting up the Combined Chiefs of Staff the British and US governments did not even ask a Soviet representative to participate in it at least as an observer. These actions by Britain and the USA greatly reduced the chances of adopting a single coalition strategy.

The Soviet Government consistently advocated close military co-operation. As is commonly known, at the beginning of the war the Soviet Government proposed that British and US troops should take part in the battles at the Soviet-German front and expressed its willingness to join the British in a landing operation in Europe. Finally, at the initiative of the Soviet Government some foreign units—Polish, Czechoslovak and French—took part in the battles on the Soviet-German front. This demonstrated that the USSR stood firmly for extensive military co-operation and the implementation of a coalition strategy. The establishment of an Anglo-American combined staff did not promote military contacts with the Soviet Union but, on the contrary, served to set up Anglo-American strategy against Soviet strategy.

* * *

The decisions of the Arcadia Conference on strategy did not change the course of military operations on the various theatres of war. The position of the Allies in the Pacific continued to deteriorate. The Japanese waged offensive operations in all directions. In the second half of January they crossed the Burma-Thailand frontier and encountering no organised resistance advanced towards the Burmese capital. In less than five months of fighting the Japanese occupied all of Burma and approached the Indian frontier. At the end of January the Japanese occupied the Malacca Peninsula and prepared to capture Singapore, Britain's biggest military and naval base. On February 14, Singapore was cut off and the next day its garrison, numbering 70,000, surrendered. The Japanese captured not only the military and naval base and the port but also the Singapore Strait, one of the world's most important waterways.

While fighting in Malaya, the Japanese seized the Indonesian Islands of Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Timor and Sumatra in February 1942. In the naval battles at the end of February they completely smashed the US and Dutch navies in Asian waters. Immediately following this success the Japanese landed on the island of Java and by the beginning of March they practically completed its occupation. The very important islands of Indonesia with their rich reserves of strategic raw materials thus fell into the hands of the Japanese.

In the Southwestern Pacific the Japanese offensive was also developing successfully. Here, in January 1942, the Japanese armed forces captured the Western and Central parts of the island of New Guinea, the Admiralty Islands, New Britain, New Ireland and the Gilbert Islands and a large part of the Solomons. The landing operations of the Japanese in the Pacific area created a threat of a Japanese invasion of Australia and the severing of the vital marine communications between the West coast of the USA and Australia.

The British offensive in North Africa, on which the British had placed such high hopes, bogged down in January 1942. By January 10, 1942 the Italian and German troops had evacuated North Africa in an orderly manner and taken up positions south of El Agheila; but on January 21 these troops launched a counter-offensive. They destroyed the advance units of the British, moved forward in a northeastern direction, occupied Benghazi and reached the El Gazala line at the end of January.

Because of the further deterioration of the strategic position of Britain and the USA the US Government advanced new proposals on strategy in the spring of 1942, which were outlined in Roosevelt's message to the British Prime Minister.¹ In his message the President proposed that the USA take full responsibility for all operations in the Pacific area.

The US Government's proposal recognised the need for the organisation of massive blows against Germany and the Americans considered West Europe the most suitable place for such blows. The President said that he was "... more and more interested in plans for the establishment of a new front on the European continent this summer".²

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 509-10.

² *Ibid.*, p. 510.

A concrete plan for an invasion of Northwest France was worked out by Operations, US Army Headquarters, headed by General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The plan envisaged crossing the British Channel in its narrowest spot and a landing on the French coast between Calais and Le Havre.

In conclusion the document noted that "the bulk of the combat forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia can be applied simultaneously only against Germany...".¹

The American plan envisaged preparations for a major landing operation in France, which was to be carried out not later than on April 1, 1943 (operation Bolero). The United States was to provide 30 divisions and 3,000 fighter aircraft for that operation. Britain was to provide 18 divisions and over 2,500 aircraft. Preparations for the realisation of that plan were to be carried out in a way that would make it possible to launch a smaller attack on the European continent as early as 1942 (operation Sledgehammer).

The plan was adopted after a detailed study of the possibilities of carrying out other operations including a landing in Norway, an offensive over the Pyrenean Peninsula, the organisation of military operations in the Mediterranean area and massive aerial bombing of Germany. The American strategy was undoubtedly prompted by the desire of the USA to play the decisive role in the victory over Germany and to ensure a dominant position in Europe after the war.

American plans for the early opening of a second front were greatly affected by the fact that there were still many officials in the US Government, and especially among the military leaders, who doubted the Soviet Union's ability to resist the fascist onslaught. For this reason they thought that major military operations in Europe should not be postponed for otherwise the Soviet Union would be defeated, and the Hitlerite bloc would then be able to fling all its forces against the West.

Public opinion in the USA and Britain also influenced strategic plans. People demanded effective assistance for the Soviet Union. At many meetings and conferences, in appeals and petitions, Englishmen and Americans asked their governments to take decisive measures. These demands could not be ignored in London and Washington. "Your people and mine," Roosevelt wrote to Churchill in April

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, op. cit., p. 520.

1942, "demand the establishment of a front to draw off pressure on the Russians, and these peoples are wise enough to see that the Russians are today killing more Germans and destroying more equipment than you and I put together."¹ Roosevelt expressed the same thought in his letter to Douglas MacArthur, in which he admitted that the efforts of the Soviet Union exceeded those made by the other 25 United Nations taken together. "Therefore," the President noted, "it has seemed wholly logical to support the great Russian effort in 1942 by seeking to get all munitions to them that we possibly can, and also to develop plans aimed at diverting German land and air forces from the Russian front."² Finally, US decisions were undoubtedly affected by the Soviet Union's view on coalition strategy, which provided for the speediest opening of a second front in Europe. All these factors taken together made Roosevelt send Hopkins and Marshall to London to discuss with the British Government the American plan, which had been finally approved by the USA on April 1, 1942.

On April 8 Hopkins and Marshall arrived in London and had a series of meetings with the British leaders. They gained the impression that the British fully supported the plan of the US Staff for an Allied landing in Europe in 1943, and if necessary, in 1942. At a meeting of the British Supreme Command, held on April 14, all those present approved the American proposal in its entirety. Nobody objected when Marshall said that "they might be compelled to launch the emergency operation, known as Sledgehammer, sometime before the autumn of 1942".³

Satisfied with the outcome of the talks, Hopkins and Marshall returned to the United States. Actually, however, the consent of the British Government was merely formal. Alan Brooke says that the British General Staff never seriously considered opening a second front in 1942. This was confirmed a few months later by the British Prime Minister who bluntly asserted that "he had not been able to find . . . a single responsible member of his staff who thought a landing in the northwest could be achieved in 1942".⁴

¹ H. Feis, op. cit., p. 58.

² Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942*, Washington, 1953, p. 2147.

³ Robert E. Sherwood, op. cit., p. 535.

⁴ Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*, London, 1957, p. 52.

In his memoirs Churchill to all intents and purposes admits that he was double-dealing at the London negotiations in the spring of 1942. "But," he says, "I had to work by influence and diplomacy in order to secure agreed and harmonious action with our cherished Ally, without whose aid nothing but ruin faced the world. I did not therefore open any of these alternatives [the landing in North France or North Norway—*U.I.*] at our meeting on the 14th."¹

The British Government and its leader continued to defend the "minor operations" strategy and to draw out the war, endeavouring to steer a course that would provide the greatest political advantages to British imperialism.

In the spring of 1942 it turned out that there were certain differences in the strategic plans of the USA and Britain. Both wanted to dominate the post-war world but they made different appraisals of the Soviet Union's ability to resist the Germans, that is, of the outcome of the war. At the back of these differences were the different imperialist aims of the British and US monopolists. At the same time it should be noted that despite their differences the British and US governments succeeded in working out a common strategy at the beginning of 1942. It was aimed not at speeding the victory but, on the contrary, at delaying it. The British Government was the main opponent of a second front in Europe, but basically, the US held similar views and made the landing in France in 1942 dependent on unrealistic conditions. The Soviet Union continued its grim resistance to the Hitlerites.

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 289-90.

CHAPTER VII

ANGLO-SOVIET AND SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SPRING OF 1942

The victories of the Soviet Army in 1941-42 and the first positive results of Anglo-Soviet co-operation favoured the further development of co-operation between the two countries. At the beginning of 1942 a treaty of alliance was signed between the USSR, Great Britain and Iran, and the political and economic links of the Soviet Union with some British dominions grew,¹ as did also co-operation and exchange of information in a number of fields, including the scientific. At the end of January, for example, the Soviet embassy in London began to publish the *Soviet War News Weekly* which informed the British public about the situation on the Soviet-German front and about the life and heroic labour of the Soviet people and so on. By mid-1942 some 50 inquiries were received from various British scientific organisations and men of science asking for information on the achievements of Soviet science and technology in various fields.²

The activity of the various Anglo-Soviet friendship societies grew constantly. British-Soviet Friendship Fort-nights were held in many English towns at the initiative of the friends of the Soviet Union.

During 1942 deliveries to the Soviet Union in accordance with the British-Soviet trade agreement and the first protocol on deliveries gradually began to increase. From February 1942 a larger convoy of merchant ships under naval escort was sent to the USSR. The convoy from Britain to

¹ An agreement on the establishment of consular relations between the USSR and Canada was signed on February 5, 1942 and a similar agreement was signed between the USSR and the Union of South Africa on February 21.

² *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, Vol. 382, col. 725.

the Soviet Union in May, for example, consisted of 35 ships. Soviet and British navies and air forces co-operated to protect these convoys against enemy attacks.

Yet, though Soviet-British co-operation developed successfully on the whole, the enormous contribution made by the Soviet Union to the fight against fascism, compared to the relatively smaller burden shouldered by the Western powers, made urgent the substantial increase in the assistance Britain and the USA were giving to the USSR. But, above all, the British public demanded an effective military alliance with the USSR.

A new powerful campaign for the immediate opening of a second front swept Britain in the spring and summer of 1942. Every day British newspapers reported meetings, conferences and demonstrations demanding the opening of a second front. Few speeches of public and political leaders did not touch on this burning issue.

The movement for solidarity with the USSR assumed such a scale in Britain that many political leaders made political capital out of speaking in favour of Anglo-Soviet co-operation. At the beginning of 1942 Stafford Cripps was recalled from his post as British ambassador to the Soviet Union. On returning to London he launched a vigorous campaign to strengthen the alliance between Britain and the USSR and to intensify British military efforts. Cripps held a speech on the radio early in February in which he compared the military efforts of Britain and the USSR. In his speech, which made an enormous impression on the British public, Cripps insistently demanded more efficient British military preparations and an increased output of military production and called for an end to complacency and the "comfortable" conduct of the war. "We must send more to Russia!"¹ he demanded. Eric Estorick, Stafford Cripps's biographer, writes: "That speech swept Stafford Cripps to heights of popularity such as he had never before experienced. The feeling toward him was comparable only to that toward Churchill after Dunkirk. People talked of him as the 'alternative to Churchill'. . . . Overnight he had won the support of millions of his fellow men, belonging to all parties or to none."²

¹ *Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 9, 1942.

² Eric Estorick, *Stafford Cripps: Master Statesman*, New York, 1949, pp. 265-66.

Lord Beaverbrook's speech in New York at the end of April was also met with the approval of the British public. Touching briefly on the military operations during the preceding war years, Beaverbrook said that things had changed:

"Now the day has come when in almost every quarter of Britain the cry goes up, 'Attack!' 'Attack in support of Russia!' For the passion to set up a Western Fighting Front in aid of the Russians is deep in the hearts of our people."¹

Public opinion polls conducted in the spring of 1942 by various British newspapers and organisations also demonstrated that the majority of the British people favoured active warfare against the fascist powers.

More than three years of war had not broken the fighting spirit of the British people. On the contrary, they were ready for decisive battles against the enemy, they understood that it was in their national interest to wage an active war and that only in this way would they be able to win in the shortest time and with least losses.

In a speech delivered on May 10, 1942 Churchill said: "We are urged from many quarters to invade the Continent of Europe and form a second front. Naturally I shall not disclose what our intentions are. But there is one thing I will say. I welcome the militant, aggressive spirit of the British nation, so strongly shared across the Atlantic Ocean."²

The defeat of the nazi hordes near Moscow and the success of the Soviet Army in the 1941-42 winter offensive pushed the Germans back on a wide front. However, the position of the Soviet Union continued to be very critical. Since there was no second front in Europe, nazi Germany was able to concentrate her main forces on the Soviet-German front.

It was particularly important under these conditions for all members of the anti-Hitler coalition to take concerted action, and discussions of the possibility of opening a second front in Europe in 1942 therefore ranked high on the agenda of Anglo-Soviet talks. The Soviet Government had repeatedly expressed the view that it was necessary to grip Germany and her European allies into a vice by making them fight on two fronts—Eastern and Western. The Soviet

¹ *The New York Times*, September 11, 1943, p. 5.

² *International Conciliation*, No. 381, June 1942, New York, p. 366.

Government considered it essential to open a second front in Europe close to Germany's vital centres, regarding it as the most effective tool in the struggle against nazi Germany. Western France was the most suitable place, since a landing of Anglo-American troops there would threaten the Ruhr, the arsenal of the fascist war machine. The Soviet Government felt the scale of the landing in Western France should be sufficiently large to divert at least 70 to 80 divisions of the Hitlerite bloc from the East to the West. No other measures could affect the military and political position of Germany and her allies quickly and effectively.

At the Anglo-Soviet talks, held in the spring of 1942 in London, the British Government attempted to evade the issue of opening the second front in 1942. In his talks with Soviet representatives Churchill greatly exaggerated the technical difficulties which, he alleged, hampered the organisation of a major landing operation on the European continent and refused to give any guarantees. He suggested that the matter be discussed after the return of the Soviet delegation from Washington.

The British Government conducted a double-faced policy on the question of the Soviet Union's borders. In its correspondence with the Soviet Government it said that in the treaty of alliance it was willing to recognise the Soviet Union's western frontiers as they were when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. However, the draft treaty submitted by the British did not mention this recognition. In fact, referring to the British Government's commitments under the Anglo-Polish treaty, the British representatives refused to recognise the incorporation of the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics. This stand of the British Government, which had the support of the US Government, complicated the problem of the Soviet Union's western frontiers and the British draft was, therefore, rejected by the Soviet delegation.

However, recognising how vastly important it was to strengthen the Soviet-British-American alliance and to solve quickly the problems involved in the joint fight against fascism, the Soviet Government accepted the new British draft which made no mention of territorial issues. This, naturally, did not imply any change in the Soviet Union's position on the question of its western frontiers. During the

London talks and later the Soviet Government repeatedly stressed that the borders of the Soviet Union violated by Germany's treacherous invasion were immutable.

As a result it was agreed at the Anglo-Soviet talks to sign, instead of the two previously proposed treaties (on the alliance and mutual assistance during the war and, separately, on post-war co-operation), a single treaty, containing both war-time and post-war commitments.

The Treaty of Alliance in the War Against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe and of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter Concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, signed at London on May 26, 1942, consisted of two parts. The first part concerned the mutual relations between the USSR and Great Britain during the war. Article I of the treaty read: "... the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe".¹ According to Article II of the treaty, the High Contracting Parties committed themselves not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitler Government or any other government allied with nazi Germany without the consent of the Contracting Parties.

The second part of the treaty set out the relations between the USSR and Britain in the post-war period. The Parties agreed to co-operate in the post-war period to safeguard peace and to counter aggression. They committed themselves to take all necessary measures to prevent a breaking of the peace by Germany. Article IV speaks of the mutual assistance of the Contracting Parties in the event of an attack on them by Germany or any other country.

At the insistence of the British Government Article IV contained a proviso the gist of which was that mutual assistance commitments would remain in force until, by mutual consent, they were considered superfluous in connection with the setting up of an international organisation for safeguarding peace and security. Article V said that both Parties would co-operate in safeguarding the security and

¹ *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. IV, July 1941-June 1942, Boston, 1942, p. 255.

economic well-being of Europe and would not strive for territorial conquest. In Article VII the Contracting Parties committed themselves to render each other economic assistance. Finally, Article VII read: "Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party."¹ This treaty of alliance was a political landmark in the development of Anglo-Soviet relations at that time.

The question of improving British military supplies to the Soviet Union was also discussed at the London talks, and this led to the signing of the agreement between the USSR and Great Britain on the financing of British military deliveries in Moscow on June 27, 1942. The credit of 10 million pounds sterling granted under the Anglo-Soviet agreement of August 16, 1941 was nearly exhausted and the British Government therefore decided to grant the Soviet Union new credits to the amount of 25 million pounds sterling on identical terms.

The signing on May 26 of the Treaty of Alliance marked the end of the first stage of the Anglo-Soviet talks. They continued after the Soviet delegation's return from Washington.

* * *

After the London talks the Soviet delegation headed by Molotov went to Washington to discuss Soviet-American relations. On the whole these relations developed satisfactorily in the first half of 1942. As a result of mutual consultations between the governments of the USSR, the USA and Britain the important United Nations Declaration had been adopted and published at the beginning of the year. The US and Soviet governments regularly exchanged views on problems of world policy, contacts were established between various Soviet and American organisations, and mutual exchange of information was expanded.

Deliveries held an important place in the relations between the USSR and the USA. American deliveries were of some help to the Soviet armed forces in their lone combat against the fascist hordes. However, the realisation of the programme of US deliveries was beset by many difficulties.

¹ *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. IV, p. 256.

First, Soviet representatives in the USA encountered great difficulties in placing orders—many contractors refused to deal with them. Secondly, there were difficulties in transporting war materials bought in the USA to the Soviet Union. Because of this the agreed programme of American deliveries was not being fulfilled.

In the first two months after the Moscow protocol was signed on October 1, 1941, twenty-eight ships sailed from the United States, carrying a little over 130,000 tons of cargo for Russia. This was less than one-tenth of the tonnage promised in the nine months covered by the first protocol.¹ In the winter months US deliveries to the Soviet Union also lagged considerably behind the volume envisaged by the programme. The volume grew in December 1941 but it dropped again in January and February 1942.

At the end of January the US Government assured the Soviet Government that the materials promised in the Moscow protocol would be delivered to the Soviet Union with the exception of a few items whose supply position had been changed with the entry of the United States into the war.

The US Government was compelled to admit that the violation of the programme of deliveries was not normal and promised to take measures to ensure the delivery of US cargoes to the Soviet Union in time.

When Admiral William H. Standley, the new US ambassador to the Soviet Union, made his first visit to the Kremlin, he conveyed to the Head of the Soviet Government the President's regrets in connection with the delays in the delivery of Lend-Lease supplies and informed him that the President had "issued instructions, that the highest priority be given to the production of supplies for Russia".²

As a result of the measures taken by Roosevelt the tonnage of deliveries from the USA to the Soviet Union grew from 91,000 tons in February to 214,000 tons in March. Not all cargoes leaving the USA arrived in the Soviet Union. According to Stettinius, 25 per cent of all vessels taking the northern route were sunk by the Germans.

By February 1942 the Soviet Government had placed

¹ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease. Weapon for Victory*, New York, 1944, p. 203.

² William H. Standley, Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, Chicago, 1955, p. 153.

orders for goods and arms in the USA for a sum exceeding 1,000 million dollars. This amount was granted by the United States to the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1941 under the Lend-Lease Act. In this connection the US President informed Moscow of his decision to put at the disposal of the Soviet Government further credits to the amount of 1,000 million dollars on the same terms.

Although US supplies were important they naturally could not exert a serious influence on the course of the Second World War. Only the joint military efforts of the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition could change its course. That is why the US public, like the British, in thousands of resolutions, letters and petitions demanded the opening of a second front in order to hasten Germany's defeat.

In view of the feelings of the American people, the President asked Moscow in April 1942 to send a delegation to Washington for negotiations during which he intended to make "a very important military proposal involving the utilisation of our armed forces in a manner to relieve your critical Western Front".¹ Asked precisely what question he wished to discuss during his talks with Soviet representatives, Roosevelt replied that he and his advisers had arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary to open a new front against Germany by a landing in France, that the plan had not yet been finally approved by the British and that he wanted the Soviet Government to help him "reinforce the plan".

On April 20, 1942 the Soviet Government informed President Roosevelt that it was willing to send its representatives to Washington "for an exchange of views on the organisation of a second front in Europe in the near future".² When Maxim Litvinov gave him the message, Roosevelt told him about the mission on which Marshall and Hopkins had been sent to England. Roosevelt said that the British supported the second front idea only "in principle" but endeavoured in fact to postpone its opening to 1943, whereas he insisted that it be opened immediately. Roosevelt also advised the Soviet representatives to stop over in London on their way back from Washington in order to

¹ *Correspondence*... , Vol. II, p. 23.

² *Ibid.*

exert double pressure on the British Government, that is, on his and on their own behalf.¹

Molotov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and his party arrived in Washington on May 29. Although the US Government had said that serious military problems would be discussed, in actual fact the United States placed only secondary issues on the agenda. The State Department proposed to discuss with the Soviet representatives the following questions:

"A. The Establishment of an Airplane Ferrying Service from the United States to the Soviet Union Through Alaska and Siberia.

"B. Establishment of a Civil Air Service Between the United States and Vladivostok or Some Other Railway Point in Siberia Through Alaska.

"C. The Establishment of a Civilian Air Service Between the United States and the Soviet Union Through Africa and the Middle East.

"D. The Supply Route Over the Soviet Union to China.

"E. Finland.

"F. Economic Matters.

"G. Iran.

"H. Turkey.

"I. Prisoners of War Convention—1929 Geneva."²

Describing this programme Hopkins correctly remarked that "... none of these things has anything to do with the war on the Russian front, although the first four are matters of considerable importance to us but very little to the Russians unless we really mean business".³

The US representatives took a lot of time to outline the State Department programme. However, not all these problems received equal attention at the talks. There was a wide exchange of views on general problems of world policy. Roosevelt expressed his ideas on the future disarmament of Germany and Japan, on control of their war industries, and on the future actions of the Big Four (the USSR, the USA, Britain and China) to safeguard peace and security. The Washington talks were held at a time when

¹ *Istoriya vneshnei politiki SSSR* (History of Soviet Foreign Policy), Part 1, 1917-1945, Moscow, 1966, pp. 399-400.

² Robert F. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 560.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 559.

the term of the first protocol on deliveries was drawing to a close. Soviet and American representatives therefore reviewed the results of that programme and discussed a second protocol which was to cover the period from July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943. It was established that the USA had delivered to the Soviet Union only 29.7 per cent of the bombers, 30.9 per cent of the fighter planes, 32.3 per cent of medium gun tanks, 37.3 per cent of light gun tanks and 19 per cent of the lorries provided for by the first protocol. It was decided that US military deliveries and supplies for the USSR would be improved and accelerated in the second half of 1942. The new programme provided for US deliveries to the value of 3,000 million dollars.¹ The US representatives refused, however, to satisfy the Soviet Union's orders in full both as regards tonnage and assortment. They blamed shipping problems due to the preparations being made for the opening of a second front in Europe for the cut in tonnage.

After the Soviet delegation's departure, on June 11, 1942, Cordell Hull and Maxim Litvinov signed the Agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Mutual Aid Pursuant to the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, which in its main clauses repeated the usual Lend-Lease agreements signed by the USA during the war. Although this agreement related mainly to mutual deliveries, its signing contributed to the development of friendly, Allied relations between the USSR and USA. The agreement was based on the principle of mutually advantageous assistance.

The terms for rendering mutual aid and the grant of a loan of 1,000 million dollars by the USA to the Soviet Union had been co-ordinated by an exchange of messages between the Soviet and US governments in November 1941 and February 1942. The Soviet Union was to begin making payments for US deliveries five years after the end of the war and final settlement was to be made within a period of ten years.

The new agreement cancelled the above clause and postponed the term of the final settlement for deliveries. It also gave some particulars to be taken into account in the final draft of the agreement. As regards the future mutual claims,

¹ *Soviet Foreign Policy* . . . , Vol. V, p. 222.

Article VII stated that "... the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations".¹

These terms were to promote co-ordinated action by the USSR and the USA to expand production, better to utilise the labour force, increase the exchange and consumption of commodities, and abolish all forms of discrimination in international trade. The Soviet-American agreement was particularly important because it provided not only for military co-operation between the two countries in the war against nazi Germany but also for co-ordinated action after the war. However, this was not to happen because after the war the advocates of the "hard line" and the "from a position of strength" policy among the US ruling circles flagrantly violated the spirit and the letter of the agreement. They embarked on the "cold war" and have for many years now pursued a discriminatory trade policy towards the USSR and other socialist countries.

The question of nazi Germany's allies also came up for discussion at the Washington Conference. The Soviet delegation characterised the role played by Hitler's satellites in the war against the USSR and, as a result of this exchange of views, on June 5, 1942 the US Government adopted a decision to declare war on Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria.

The central problem in the Anglo-Soviet and American-Soviet negotiations in the spring of 1942 was the second front. At the London talks the British Government stubbornly refused to assume any concrete commitments in this connection.

The problem received more favourable consideration in Washington. After the Soviet representatives had described the situation on the Soviet-German front in detail, and after they had shown the enormous difficulties the Soviet armed forces were facing and explained that it was essential to create a new theatre of operations on the European continent, the US Government committed itself to open a second front in Europe in 1942.

The communiqué on the Soviet-English and Soviet-Amer-

¹ *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. IV, July 1941-June 1942, Boston, 1942, p. 237.

ican talks pointed out that "full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942".¹ True, after its return from Washington the Soviet delegation received an aide-mémoire in London that contained the following proviso:

"It is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such as to make this operation [a landing in Europe—U.I.] feasible when the time comes. *We can therefore give no promise in the matter*, but provided that it appears sound and sensible we shall not hesitate to put our plans into effect."² However, since Washington had consented to open a second front in 1942, and the British Government itself had during the first stage of the Anglo-Soviet talks attached decisive importance to Washington's position on that issue and, finally, since it consented to publish the communiqué containing the clause on the second front worded according to the proposals of the Soviet delegation, the British proviso could not be regarded as particularly important. The Soviet Government, and world opinion at large, considered that full agreement to open a second front in 1942 had been reached as a result of the Soviet-English and Soviet-American talks.

This proved that the anti-Hitler coalition, the military alliance between the USSR, USA and Britain had been further consolidated. The main result of these talks were the political agreements concluded between the USSR and Britain and the USSR and the USA, which defined the relations between them not only during the war but after it too. The exchange of views in London and Washington on many problems of world policy did much to strengthen the unity of the United Nations. Finally, the most important outcome of the London and Washington talks was the agreement to open a second front in 1942.

The results of the London and Washington talks should above all be regarded as an international recognition of the Soviet Union's success in its war against nazi Germany and her vassals.

¹ *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. IV, July 1941-June 1942, Boston, 1942, p. 243.

² Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. IV, London, 1951, p. 305.

CHAPTER VIII

NO SECOND FRONT IN 1942

In the summer of 1942 the Hitlerite command concentrated superior forces, both as regards manpower and equipment, on the southwestern sector of the Soviet-German front and mounted a major offensive. Germany succeeded temporarily in recapturing the initiative because her West European rear was not threatened and the German command could fling all its reserves against the Soviet Union. Between March and November 1942 an additional 80 divisions were dispatched to the Soviet-German front, and by the autumn of 1942 the enemy had built up to 262 divisions and 16 brigades.

As before, the Soviet Union continued the war against nazi Germany and her satellites all by herself. In the summer of 1942 gigantic battles were fought on the Soviet-German front. It would have been logical for the Allies to make an immediate landing in Europe at that time. All necessary requisites for it were there—the English and American people favoured an active, offensive war; the morale of the officers and men of the US and British armed forces was sufficiently high; the economy of the Allies had been switched over to war production for quite some time; the US and British command had had more than ample time to draw up detailed strategic plans and to do everything necessary to mobilise for large-scale military operations; and, finally, agreement had been reached between the governments of the USSR, Britain and the United States of America on the opening of a second front in 1942.

However, time passed and the landing of Allied troops on the European continent kept being postponed.

What was happening at that time behind the political scene in the USA and Britain? Immediately after the departure of the Soviet delegation from the United States, Admiral

Lord Louis Mountbatten, a highly placed member of the British ruling circles, arrived in Washington as Churchill's emissary. In his talks with the American Chiefs of Staff he spoke of the "practical difficulties" which, he alleged, the British military command was encountering in planning a second front. Lord Mountbatten did not tell the Americans of the British decision not to carry out a landing in Europe in 1942, he left that to Churchill. As a result of Mountbatten's visit the conviction grew in Washington that the British Government refused to entertain the thought of any serious land or air action against Germany in 1942.

On June 18, 1942, the British Prime Minister arrived in the USA. The main purpose of his Washington trip, as he later himself admitted, was to get the consent of the US Government not to open a second front in Europe in 1942. Churchill handed to the Americans a memorandum which stated that the British were preparing for a landing on the coast of Northern France of six to eight divisions in September 1942; however, the document decisively rejected any large-scale landing operations in Europe. This British memorandum nailed the lie of former statements by the British Government that it had been making preparations for a landing in Northern France early in September 1942. Obviously, the British Government did not want to open a second front.

On the pretext that the British and American High Commands were not ready for a landing in Europe, the British proposed to take up their old plan, that of a landing in North Africa. The American representatives did not formally consent to the British proposal and the Washington talks reached an impasse. Instead of taking urgent and effective measures to open a second front the British and American military and political leaders engaged in general talk about a second front, and this was a logical upshot of the Anglo-American strategic conception. While the USSR and Germany were mutually exhausting each other, the USA and Britain were unhurriedly building up their military strength and preparing to occupy important strategic positions and to take action only when the war would be in its final stages.

Another question discussed at the Washington talks was joint research into the production of the atom bomb. The exchange of information between Britain and the USA on this matter began as early as September 1940, when the

British sent a group of scientists working on problems of atomic energy to the United States. Since October 1941, in keeping with Roosevelt's proposal, British and American institutions had co-operated closely in a research programme on the production of the atom bomb. During Churchill's visit to Washington he was told by Roosevelt that the advances made by American scientists gave grounds for hope that the first atom bomb would be ready by July 1944.

* * *

Time passed and the fruitless Anglo-American discussions on further military operations continued. The group of American generals in London engaged in tedious arguments with their British opposite numbers. These generals immediately discovered that Mountbatten's Staff was not planning a cross-Channel attack but, instead, was considering the possibility of an operation in Norway.¹

On July 5 the American generals were received by the Prime Minister who again spoke in favour of the North African operation and described a landing in France as simply "nonsensical".

While talking with the American officers, Churchill bombarded Washington with telegrams in which he stressed the unwillingness of the British to open a second front in 1942. The pressure exerted by London induced Washington to accept the British proposal on a landing in North Africa.

Roosevelt sent Hopkins, Marshall and King to London to co-ordinate plans for action in the second half of 1942. The US representatives arrived in England in mid-July. They had with them an instruction from the President outlining the US Government's views on Allied military strategy in 1942. This important document contained a sober appraisal of the significance of a second front both to the Soviet-German front and to the entire course of the Second World War.

Upon their arrival in London, the US representatives met the British Chief of Staff, who refused to consider the Sledgehammer operation in any form whatever. A new meeting, in which members of the war cabinet participated, also furnished no results. The talks threatened to break down. On July 22 the US representatives, in accordance with

¹ Trumbull Higgins, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

instructions given to them, informed the President of the turn of events. Roosevelt told them that he was "not particularly surprised at the disappointing outcome of the London talks" and essentially agreed to the North African operation proposed by the British. The talks were resumed and Torch—the British plan of landing mainly US troops in North Africa—was co-ordinated.

On July 25 the US Government approved the decision reached in London and on August 14 appointed the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces for the Torch operation.

Thus, in violation of their commitment to carry out a landing in Europe in 1942, Britain and the USA began to prepare for the Torch operation. The Soviet Government was not informed about these important Anglo-American negotiations at the time. The unilateral actions of Britain and the US were a serious infringement of their Allied commitments to the USSR.

The attitude of the Soviet Government to its commitments was quite different as can be seen from the following example. In the summer of 1942 the British sustained a heavy defeat in North Africa. On June 20 the Italian and German armies occupied Tobruk and took over 30,000 British prisoners. Italian and German units pursuing the hurriedly retreating British troops entered Egypt. On June 28 they took Mersa Matruh and early in July reached a line south of El Alamein. "This was one of the heaviest blows I can recall during the war,"¹ Churchill later wrote.

Because of the critical situation in Egypt the British asked Washington to deliver 40 US bombers, at that time in Iraq en route to the USSR, to England. The US Government informed Moscow of this request and despite the critical position on the Soviet-German front, the Soviet Government agreed to grant the British request. When the British Prime Minister learned about it he expressed his deep gratitude to the Soviet Government for its swift and generous decision. This small episode is typical of the attitude of the Soviet Union towards its partners in the war. The USSR was always willing to help its Allies, especially when they were in a difficult position.

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¹ Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 343.

Only after they had adopted a separate decision on important strategic issues affecting the entire course of the Second World War did the British and American governments inform the Soviet Government that no second front would be opened in 1942. The telegram addressed by the British Prime Minister to the Head of the Soviet Government on July 18, 1942 gave no reasons for the decision and did not mention Anglo-American plans for either 1942 or 1943. This message naturally evoked serious dissatisfaction on the part of the Soviet Government. In one of its messages to the British Government it said that the matter of opening a second front in Europe was taking an improper turn. In view of the situation on the Soviet-German front the Soviet Government stated most emphatically that it could not tolerate the second front in Europe being postponed till 1943.¹

Wishing to weaken the unfavourable impression created by his message, Churchill decided to go to Moscow to explain his stand to the Soviet Government.

The British Prime Minister arrived in Moscow in the middle of August 1942, accompanied by Averell Harriman, representing the US President, and a group of military advisers.

The British delegation had a series of meetings with the Soviet leaders at which they discussed the course of military operations and the international situation in general. Informing the Soviet Government of the Anglo-American decision not to open a second front in Europe in 1942, Churchill assured the Soviet Government on behalf of the British Government that a second front in Europe would definitely be opened in 1943 and said that 48 divisions would be concentrated in England for that purpose by the spring of 1943.

Churchill spoke of the Anglo-American landing in North Africa, which was planned for 1942, and explained in detail the advantages it was supposed to have over a landing in West Europe in 1942. At the same time the Prime Minister assured his Soviet partners that the Allies were preparing a "very big operation in 1943".

The Soviet Government expressed its complete disagreement with the views of the Allies on the second front issue. On the day following the beginning of the talks a Soviet

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 56.

memorandum was handed to the British Prime Minister which said that the organisation of a second front in Europe in 1942, which had been agreed upon at the Anglo-Soviet and American-Soviet negotiations, would have served to divert German forces from the Eastern front to the west and established a base of serious resistance to the German fascist forces in the west, thereby easing the position of the Soviet Army on the Soviet-German front in 1942.

"It will be readily understood that the British Government's refusal to open a second front in Europe in 1942 delivers a moral blow to Soviet public opinion which had hoped that the second front would be opened, complicates the position of the Red Army at the front and injures the plans of the Soviet High Command,"¹ the document stated.

The Soviet delegation proved to the British delegation that conditions were favourable in 1942 for opening a second front, since practically all German forces, especially all crack units, were deployed on the Eastern front while only small and badly trained units were stationed in Western Europe. "It is hard to say," the Soviet delegation stated, "whether 1943 will offer as favourable conditions for opening a second front as 1942. For this reason we think that it is possible and necessary to open a second front in Europe in 1942."²

The British reply to the Soviet memorandum said that "the best second front in 1942, and the only large-scale operation possible from the Atlantic, is 'Torch'".³ Other operations, including a landing in Europe, they considered risky and fruitless. Churchill said that neither Great Britain nor the United States had violated any promises in connection with the second front, referring to the proviso made by the British Government during the Anglo-Soviet talks in July 1942.

The British Prime Minister tried very hard to prove that the Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American negotiations about a second front had been no more than preliminary talks and that the declaration that agreement had been reached had played a positive role by confusing the enemy.

Can the British Prime Minister's version be considered

¹ *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. I, p. 61.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

convincing? Had the joint Anglo-Soviet-American communiqué really played a positive role by forcing the German command to transfer troops from the East to the West in expectation of a cross-Channel landing? The answer to these questions must be an emphatic "No". It is generally acknowledged that in the summer of 1942 the German fascist command concentrated an unprecedentedly large number of troops on the Soviet-German front. In January 1942 seventy per cent of Hitler's total land forces were in action on the Soviet-German front, but by July 1, 1942, 76.3 per cent were deployed in the East. Never before or after was the proportion of troops on the Soviet-German front as high as it was in the summer of 1942. These figures provide the unassailable counter to Churchill's argument that the statement on the opening of a second front in 1942 had helped to decrease the pressure of the Hitlerites on the Soviet-German front and thereby eased the position of the Soviet Union.

Also, Churchill handles the truth very carelessly when he attempts to picture the agreement that was achieved on the second front as a sort of camouflage, and his proviso—as the real truth. The agreement on the second front was the result of long Anglo-American, Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American talks from April to June 1942 and during these talks neither the Soviet nor the American government made any reservations, and the British Government too, having made its proviso, was a full signatory to the joint communiqué. It should also be remembered that the British aide mémoire contained the assurance that preparations were being made for a landing on the continent in August or September 1942. Actually, however, the British Government and the High Command of the British armed forces did not make any preparations for a large-scale landing operation in Western Europe in the summer of 1942.

The efforts of the British political and military leaders were directed not at opening a second front in 1942 but at preventing such an operation. All this leads to the conclusion that the stand of the British Government on the second front in 1942, which had the support of the US Government, was a flagrant violation of the letter and the spirit of the joint Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American communiqué. Attention should also be given to one more detail—in his protestations of his faithfulness to his Allied duties and his commitment to the Allied cause, Churchill "forgets" to men-

tion in his memoirs that the notorious aide mémoire of June 10, 1942 contained the following:

"Finally, and most important of all, we are concentrating our maximum effort on the organisation and preparation of a large-scale invasion of the Continent of Europe by British and American forces in 1943. We are setting no limit to the scope and objectives of this campaign, which will be carried out in the first instance by over a million men, British and American, with air forces of appropriate strength."¹ By analogy with Churchill's former argument this statement should also be regarded as an attempt to misinform the enemy, for in 1943 as in 1942, no second front was opened in Europe.

The Anglo-Soviet talks in Moscow were held in an atmosphere of tension. The Allies continued their old strategy of "minor operations". Although the proposed Allied landing in North Africa, of which the British informed the Soviet Government, undeniably had some positive aspects, it could not be compared with a large-scale amphibious operation in Western Europe. Nevertheless, wishing to avoid strained relations with its Allies, the Soviet Government merely took note of the information of the Allies.

Some aspects of the international situation and of the relations between Britain and the Soviet Union were also frankly discussed at Moscow.

The talks were instrumental in establishing personal contacts between the leaders of the Soviet and British governments and in bringing about a frank exchange of views on many important issues. Both sides reaffirmed their staunch resolve to continue the war to the complete annihilation of Hitlerism. In this sense the outcome of the Soviet-British talks in Moscow can be considered positive.

* * *

In summer 1942, with staggering losses of men and equipment, the Hitlerites advanced eastward and reached Stalingrad, where they were stopped in the battle that was to mark a turning point in the entire course of the Second World War. Simultaneously, the German fascist armies strained every effort to take the Caucasus and seize the Soviet Union's main oil source. Disregarding heavy losses, the

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 385.

fascist invaders succeeded in occupying more Soviet territory. The single-handed struggle with the fascist bloc taxed the Soviet Union to the utmost. That is why the Soviet Union attached such enormous importance to American and British deliveries.

But here, too, serious difficulties arose in the summer of 1942. It all began with the PQ-17 convoy. This convoy left Iceland for Arkhangelsk at the end of June 1942. Its 34 cargo boats were escorted by 28 British and American naval vessels, including four cruisers under the command of British Vice-Admiral Hamilton. Besides, Soviet and British submarines and aircraft stood by to beat off enemy attacks. On July 1 the convoy was attacked by the Hitlerites and four escort ships were sunk. At that time the convoy was about 200 kilometres east of Bear Island. Having received the inaccurate information that a large German naval force, headed by the battleship *Tirpitz*, would attack the convoy, the British Admiralty instructed Hamilton to order the cruisers to abandon the merchant ships and to retreat to the west. At the same time the merchant ships were told to scatter and to endeavour to make their own way to Arkhangelsk. The escort retired and the merchant vessels, left without protection, became easy prey for German submarines and aircraft. According to British information 23 of the 34 vessels that had left Iceland were sunk. Of the 200,000 tons of cargoes destined for Arkhangelsk only 70,000 tons arrived. Many human lives were lost.

The main reason for the heavy losses of the PQ-17 convoy was the wrong order given by the British Admiralty. This has been admitted by many naval experts, and many years later Churchill admitted it too. "In the light of later knowledge, however, the decision to scatter was precipitate," he wrote in his memoirs.¹

The conclusion drawn by the British Government from this coarse error of the Admiralty was a very strange one, to say the least. Instead of providing better escort for future convoys the British Government decided to stop the supply of war materials to the Soviet Union by the northern route. The British Government informed Moscow of its decision in mid-July 1942. The British message gave the reasons for this decision and stated that by way of partial compensation

¹ Winston S. Churchill, op. cit Vol. IV, p. 236.

it would substantially increase the freight stream via Iran. Naturally, the Soviet Government strongly objected to this decision.

Despite the weighty arguments advanced by the Soviet Government, supplies of war materials by the northern route were stopped in July and August 1942, although 75 per cent of all cargoes was to have been delivered by this route. Realisation of the programme of Anglo-American deliveries to the Soviet Union was fraught with other difficulties too. The second protocol on deliveries covering the period from July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943 had been co-ordinated at the talks the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs held in London and Washington. Several months had passed since these talks but the British and the US governments had not yet signed the protocol. Although the range of deliveries had been co-ordinated with the relevant governments, some items were not being delivered. Thus, the Americans had promised to supply 3,000 lorries a month but time passed and no deliveries were made. Although the Allies had promised to increase the stream of supplies via Iran, they actually reduced it. By mid-August 1942 some 35,000 tons of military cargoes en route to the USSR were stockpiled in the ports of the Persian Gulf.

Finally, some of the vital equipment, including aircraft, was of poor quality. The Soviet Government repeatedly drew the attention of the Allies to all this.

To make it easier for the Allies to fulfil the programme of deliveries and in the light of some of the objective difficulties to which they referred, the Soviet Government agreed in the autumn of 1942 to a decrease in the volume of US and British arms deliveries. In particular, it informed the Allies that it could do without Allied tanks, artillery, munitions, small arms, etc. Instead it asked that the supply of new types of fighter planes be increased.

The northern route was reopened in the autumn of 1942 and the PQ-18 convoy of 39 ships sailed for the Soviet Union at the beginning of September. It was escorted by 16 destroyers, one aircraft carrier and other warships. The Soviet Command ordered 48 long-range bombers, 10 torpedo planes and 200 fighters to protect the convoy against air attacks, and despite the new attempt of the Germans to intercept, more than two-thirds of the ships reached Soviet ports. The Germans suffered heavy losses in the air and sea battles.

The experience gained in PQ-18 convoy was of great importance. In 1942 a few more small groups of ships carrying military cargoes reached the Soviet Union by the northern route and in 1943 large convoys began to use that route regularly.

In keeping with the Soviet Government's wishes concerning certain kinds of supplies, the US President informed Moscow in mid-October that the United States was able to supply to the USSR two million short tons of wheat before the end of June 1943 (in equal monthly portions), and some 8,000-10,000 lorries, 15,000 tons of fresh and 10,000 tons of tinned meat, 12,000 tons of lard, each month. The President also promised to increase the output of the USA fighter aircraft of the Aerocobra type to satisfy Soviet orders.

The British Prime Minister informed the Soviet Government in October that 150 Spitfire fighter planes and spare parts equivalent to another 50 aircraft would soon be supplied to the Soviet Government over and above the number envisaged in the protocol on deliveries.

After a lot of procrastination the second protocol on deliveries was finally signed on October 6, 1942.

Thus, the supply of the Soviet Union with war materials in accordance with the commitments adopted by the British and US governments, which had seriously decreased in the summer of 1942, was by the end of the year gradually becoming normal again.

Why were all these obstacles to the fulfilment of the programme of deliveries to the Soviet Union raised precisely at the moment when murderous battles were being waged on the Soviet-German front? There were undoubtedly some objective factors that made it difficult to fulfil the programme of deliveries such as the operations of the German fleet and air force in northern waters, the heavy defeat suffered by the British in Egypt and the preparations for a landing in North Africa, etc., but these were not the main reasons. The main reason for the breakdown of the deliveries to the USSR was that the temporary success of the Hitlerites in the summer of 1942 had led London and Washington to once again lose faith in the Soviet Union's ability to resist nazi aggression. Many prominent statesmen in the USA and Britain, who were unable to understand what sustained the socialist state, voiced the opinion that it was inadvisable to send war materials to a country which they believed to be on the verge of defeat.

The anti-Soviet posture of a number of responsible US and British leaders also interfered with the fulfilment of the programme of deliveries to the Soviet Union. The anti-Soviet views of Admiral Standley, then the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, and of others like him naturally could not promote Soviet-American co-operation.

British and American statesmen who made a realistic appraisal of the Soviet Union's role in world politics, played an important role in strengthening Allied relations and in ensuring the fulfilment of the programme of deliveries. However, of decisive importance was the heroic resistance of the Soviet Army at Stalingrad, which demonstrated the strength and stability of the Soviet state for all the world to see. The prestige of the USSR had grown, and the military and political situation resulting from the failure of Hitler's summer offensive strengthened the Allied relations between the USSR, USA and Britain.

CHAPTER IX

THE ALLIED LANDING IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE "FRENCH PROBLEM"

The Anglo-American command launched operation Torch in the autumn of 1942 according to plan. At that time there was a temporary lull in North Africa. Even though the Italian and German armies were in the direct vicinity of Suez and Alexandria they were unable to seize these important strategic points. The main reason for the temporary lull in North Africa was that the Hitlerites had to concentrate all their attention and resources on the Eastern Front. The position of the fascist troops in Africa was also complicated by the fact that their vital Mediterranean communications were within the effective reach of British planes. On the whole, the strategic situation in North Africa in the autumn of 1942 was not in Germany's favour. This enabled the British 8th Army to mount an offensive on the Egyptian front; it started in the night of October 23, 1942. For ten days desperate battles between the British and the Italo-German units raged near El Alamein. At last the enemy front was broken and the fascists had to retreat west. On November 8, 1942, American, and later also British troops, landed in Algiers, Oran and Casablanca. These were the first major successes of the Allies in the Second World War.

The US and British military leaders, thus taking advantage of the colossal tension on the Soviet-German front and the inability of the Hitlerite command to reinforce its troops, succeeded in undertaking a successful offensive against the enemy in Africa.

Some US and British political and military leaders attempted to exaggerate the importance of the Allied North African campaign out of all proportion and at the same time to belittle the impact of the Stalingrad battle on the entire course of the Second World War.

The US and British public, however, understood only too well that the effect of the action on the African continent could not be compared with that of a landing in West Europe. "Africa is no second front," wrote *Reynold's News*.¹

Without overestimating the importance of the Allied North African campaign, it must be admitted that this difficult military operation was well organised and it showed not only that the Anglo-American leaders were capable of organising a large-scale military campaign, but also that they were prepared to do so. Thus, the facts contradicted the Allies' argument that they were unable to carry out large-scale military operations.

* * *

The preparations for the North African operation and the campaign itself were attended by much behind-the-scene diplomatic activity. Britain and the USA were less concerned with preparing for their military operations than with strengthening their political positions in the occupied territories. Study of the French Problem is useful for an understanding of the aims pursued by American and British diplomatic activity.

The British Government recognised the French Committee of National Liberation, while Washington maintained diplomatic relations with the Vichy regime.

Even though the US ruling circles had befriended the Petain regime they could not fail to see that the French people hated it. An American correspondent in France wrote at that time: "De Gaulle by his continued opposition to Germany has the moral support of 90 per cent of the French."² As regards the American public, it clamoured for the breaking of relations with Vichy. Articles in many American newspapers criticised the government's policy and demanded the establishment of contacts with the French Committee of National Liberation. "Why do we recognise fascism when it is called Hitler and do not see it when it is called Petain?" asked the *New York Post* on May 21, 1941.

The criticism of US policy towards France, on the one hand, and the strengthening of the international position of the French Committee of National Liberation (mainly owing to the recognition of the Committee by the Soviet Union), on

¹ *Reynold's News*, November 1, 1942.

² William L. Langer, *Our Uichy Gamble*, New York, 1947, p. 166.

the other, worked certain changes in the US Government's position. In October 1941, René Pleven, the representative of the Free French, was for the first time officially received by the State Department.

But all this did not mean that the US Government intended to give serious consideration to the interests of the Free French movement.

The British Government followed a somewhat different line with respect to the French Committee of National Liberation. It allowed the Committee to carry on its activities in Britain and supported it in some questions. At the same time the British Government did not break off relations with the Vichy Government. According to J.-B. Duroselle, a French historian, the British Government wanted to establish a *modus vivendi* with the Petain Government and with this aim in view held a series of semi-official talks with it, the subjects of which are still hidden in diplomatic archives.¹

Essentially British policy was directed towards weakening France's position as a world power and making Britain heir to the French colonies. The Western powers ignored it so flagrantly that the Free French Committee was considering the possibility of breaking off relations with Britain and the USA. On June 6, 1942, in a talk with Bogomolov, the Soviet ambassador to the Allied governments in London, de Gaulle asked him to enquire if the Soviet Government would agree to receive him and his troops in the Soviet Union in the event of his breaking with the British.²

The contradictions between the USA and Britain on the French problem were of an imperialist nature. Since the Committee maintained certain contacts with the British, the US Government, wishing to strengthen its positions in France and especially in her colonies, maintained relations with Vichy for a long time. The US Government did not take it upon itself to break with the Petain clique. Diplomatic relations between the two were broken off in November 1942 at Petain's initiative. At the same time those in power in the USA recognised that nothing more was to be gained from backing Petain and his followers and therefore feverishly started to look around for some obedient creature. In the

¹ J.-B. Duroselle, *Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours*, Paris, 1957, p. 306.

² *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 82.

end their choice fell on General Henri Honoré Giraud, a reactionary and a comrade-in-arms of General Petain. Shortly before the landing in North Africa the USA decided to prepare the ground for handing the power in the French colonies to Giraud and with this aim in view General Mark Wayne Clark arrived on a secret mission in North Africa in October 1942. He and Robert Murphy, the US Consul-General in Algiers, negotiated with the French,¹ and as a result the commanders of the French units in Africa agreed to join the Allies with Giraud as commander-in-chief.

As regards US plans with respect to France, Roger Garreau, the representative of the French Committee of National Liberation in Moscow, reported to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR that the US State Department intended to preserve the Vichy regime's administrative and propaganda machine and to hand it over to Giraud, whose army was to land in France first, and who, with US support, was to seize the government in order to "interfere with the free expression of the will of the French people".²

However, Giraud made difficulties. A few days before the landing in Casablanca, Algiers and Oran, Giraud was secretly transported by submarine from France to Gibraltar, where he was to meet General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander of the landing operation, to make final arrangements. Giraud suddenly began to insist that he should be assigned a greater role than had been apportioned to him.

"Now," he said formally to Eisenhower and Mark W. Clark, Eisenhower's assistant, "let's get it clear as to my part. As I understand it, when I land in North Africa I am to assume command of all Allied forces and become the Supreme Allied Commander in North Africa."

"I gasped," Clark recalls, "and I thought Ike had probably never been so shocked and showed it so little. It was rather like a bomb explosion."

"'There must be some misunderstanding,' Ike said cautiously."³

But this was only the beginning of a chain of misadventures of US diplomacy in North Africa. Admiral Darlan,

¹ Robert Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors*, New York, 1964.

² *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 108.

³ Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk*, New York, 1950, p. 96.

Pétain's right-hand man, who after the successful Allied operation in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers had gone over to the Allies, arrived in North Africa shortly before the landing. Besides, by that time it turned out that Giraud, who had finally taken the responsible post of commander-in-chief of the French troops, possessed neither sufficient authority nor the organisational talent to run the colonial administration. The USA therefore decided to give its support to Darlan, who seemed a suitable candidate because he was "incurably anti-British".¹ The deal between Washington and Vichy was sharply criticised in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. This step of the American Government was justly regarded as a violation of the solemn commitment to fight fascism in all its forms. The deal with Darlan and his henchmen had been made with people who represented the fascist régime in France.

The intensive activities of Darlan and his followers in North Africa, which had the support of the Americans, were sharply criticised in London. Darlan most certainly was not to the taste of the British Government.

Darlan's career stopped suddenly and tragically—on December 24, 1942 he was assassinated in his official residence in Algiers. Darlan's murderer was caught and shot with suspicious haste. The diplomatic struggle between the USA and Britain over the French problem continued.

* * *

The Soviet Union adopted a very different attitude towards the Free French. The recognition by the USSR in September 1941 of the French Committee of National Liberation meant that the Free French had become an Ally of the Soviet Union in the struggle against the common enemy—the fascist bloc. In the USSR the patriotic forces in France had a firm and reliable Ally in their efforts to defend the interests of the French people. The establishment of direct contacts between the Soviet Government and the French Committee laid the foundation for the development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and France in the future and for restoring France's international prestige.

De Gaulle endeavoured to use the relations with the USSR to strengthen his position vis-à-vis Britain and especially

¹ William L. Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

the USA. This, as well as a correct appraisal by the Committee of the decisive importance of the Soviet-German front in the common struggle against the fascist coalition, probably prompted him to offer to send Free French military units to the Soviet-German front. The French proposal was approved by the Soviet Government and at the end of December 1941, Bogomolov, the Soviet ambassador to the Allied governments in London, informed de Gaulle that the Soviet Government was willing to accept a French division stationed in Syria into the ranks of its armies.¹ The Committee then decided to co-ordinate the question of sending French units to the USSR with the British Government. The latter took a negative view of the French proposal. Nevertheless, in February 1942 de Gaulle instructed General Georges Catroux, the representative of the Committee in the Middle East, to prepare to transfer one division to Iran and one to the Caucasus which "pleased the Russians and worried the English".²

However, de Gaulle did not carry out this move. After the English had sanctioned the participation of French units in the Allied operations in the Near East, de Gaulle reversed his initial decision and sent only the Normandie group of fighter pilots (later the Normandie-Niemen squadron) to the USSR. This group became the only military unit of the Western powers on the Soviet-German front.

The news of the Soviet Army's successes in the winter of 1941-42 was received with enormous enthusiasm by all French patriots. "The French people," the January 1942 statement of the Head of the French Committee read, "enthusiastically hail the success and growing strength of the Russian people. This is because these successes draw France closer to her cherished aim—liberty and vengeance. The death of every German soldier . . . the destruction of each German gun, each plane, each German tank at Leningrad, Moscow or Sevastopol, gives France an additional chance to rise again and win. . . ."³ Further de Gaulle admitted that "to our common misfortune too often, during the centuries, has the Franco-Russian alliance been impeded or miscarried by intrigue or misunderstanding. Nevertheless the need

¹ *Soviet-French Relations*. . . , p. 52.

² Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de guerre. L'Appel, 1940-1942*, p. 196.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 546.

for such an alliance becomes evident at every turn in history".¹

In March 1942 Garreau, Petit and Schmittlein arrived in the USSR as representatives of the Free French. During their talks at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs they informed the Soviet Government of the activities of the Committee of National Liberation, the situation in France, and other matters. The participants in the talks affirmed their mutual interest in annihilating nazi Germany as quickly as possible and in establishing close co-operation between the USSR and Fighting France.

Again, during the Soviet-French negotiations, held on May 24 in London, where Molotov, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was on an official visit, the head of the French Committee complained about the policies pursued by London and Washington. He spoke of the obstacles raised to the Free French movement by Britain and the USA "who reduce the significance of the Free French movement to the level of a purely military organisation, avoiding in every way a political qualification of the movement".²

De Gaulle told the Soviet representatives about the controversy between the National Committee and the Western powers over France's overseas possessions and also of the difficulties that could arise out of "the imperialist tendencies being manifested in America".³ The Soviet representatives reaffirmed the wish of the Soviet Government to see France free and once again able to occupy her place in Europe and in the world as a great democratic anti-fascist power.

Touching on the French people's sovereignty, the Soviet representative said that "the Soviet Government would like to see this sovereignty fully restored and France reborn in all its former grandeur and magnificence". He stressed the role of the French National Committee in the growing resistance of the French people and in the assertion of the French people's right to victory by their participation in the common struggle.⁴

The Soviet-French talks once again demonstrated that the Soviet Union was willing to help restore France as an in-

¹ Ibid., pp. 546-47.

² *Soviet-French Relations*. . . , p. 79.

³ Charles de Gaulle, *op. cit.*, p. 550.

⁴ See *Soviet-French Relations*. . . , pp. 80-81.

dependent, strong and free power. The appraisal of the results of the London talks made by the French also emphasised this. "The Soviet Government considers it essential to restore a strong France, linked by an alliance with Russia."¹

Further proof of the Soviet Union's friendship for France was provided by its approach to the question of the French liberation movement's status. As early as in the spring of 1942 the French Committee asked the Allies to recognise it as a provisional government since this would enable it to take a proper place in the anti-Hitler coalition and better defend the interests of Fighting France. The strictly negative attitude taken by Washington and London compelled the Committee to give up this idea.

In June 1942 the National Committee submitted to Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union formulae defining the concept of Fighting France (this is how the Free French movement was to be called henceforth). The French wanted the concept Fighting France (*France Combattante*) to include the aggregate of French territories and citizens who did not recognise the capitulation and actively fought for the liberation of France and the common Allied cause. "The French National Committee is the leading body of Fighting France," the Committee's formula read, "which alone has the right to organise the participation of Frenchmen in the war and to represent French interests with the Allies, especially insofar as these interests affect the conduct of the war."²

The British Government suggested amendments to the Committee's draft, which considerably changed the French formula. Britain did not want to go beyond the concept of "Free French" regarding "Fighting France" as a symbol of French resistance to the Axis powers. The British Government did not want to preclude the establishment of relations with other French government bodies which might be set up in future.³

The US Government also introduced a formula into the French draft which was even more radical than the British. The American document made no mention of Fighting France at all. The Americans stubbornly used the old term "Free French" and the French National Committee was de-

¹ Charles de Gaulle, op. cit., p. 551.

² *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 83.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 469-70.

fined as "a symbol of French resistance in general against the Axis powers".¹

Only the Soviet Government accepted the formula proposed by the French in full. On September 24, 1942, Ambassador Bogomolov informed Maurice Dejean, the Committee's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of the Soviet Government's decision. It was greatly appreciated by the French who regarded it "as an important landmark on the road leading to an ever closer union between France and Soviet Russia in their common striving to destroy aggression and fascism and jointly to work for the restoration of peace in conditions of military security and economic prosperity."²

A year of co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Fighting France movement convincingly demonstrated that the French had a faithful and reliable ally in the Soviet Union. In its policy towards France, the main aim of the Soviet Union was to promote in every way the consolidation of all anti-fascist forces of the French people, to support their struggle for the liberation of their country from the fascist invaders and their allies within France, and to ensure the development of friendly, Allied relations between the USSR and France.

¹ *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. V, July 1942-June 1943, Boston, 1944, p. 542.

² *Soviet-French Relations*. . . , p. 97.

CHAPTER X

THE TURNING POINT IN THE WAR AND ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

On November 19, 1942 the Soviet Army launched a counter-offensive in the area of Stalingrad as a result of which the fascist armies were taken in a ring and destroyed. By November 23, the ring closed in the vicinity of Kalach. Soviet troops had encircled 22 German divisions numbering 330,000 men. All enemy attempts to save this army failed and on January 10, 1943, after the Hitlerites had refused to capitulate, the Soviet armies launched an all-out offensive to annihilate the German fascist units at Stalingrad.

On January 27, 1943 the enemy grouping was split in two. A few days later the southern grouping was destroyed and the annihilation of the enemy's northern grouping on February 2 ended the historic battle on the Volga. During their counter-offensive between November 19, 1942 and February 2, 1943 the Soviet armies defeated five enemy armies. The enemy lost 32 divisions and three brigades. Another 16 divisions suffered heavy losses. Between January 10 and February 2 alone the troops of the Don Front took 91,000 enemy prisoners. A large group of generals, headed by Field-Marshal von Paulus, was also taken prisoner.

Millions of people the world over congratulated the Soviet people and its Army on this outstanding victory. The military operations of the Soviet armed forces in the winter of 1942-43 were regarded as a turn of the tide in the war. In its telegram to the Soviet Government the US Government noted that the epic struggle at the approaches to Stalingrad and the victory achieved by the Soviet Army would be one of the most brilliant chapters in the history of the Second World War. The telegram said that the commanders and fighters of the Soviet armies at the front and the men and women who supported them in factory and field combined not only to cover with glory their country's arms but

“to inspire by their example fresh determination among all the United Nations to bend every energy to bring about the final defeat and unconditional surrender of the common enemy”.¹

The victory of the Soviet armed forces at Stalingrad raised the international and military prestige of the Soviet Government to new heights. It changed the entire course of the world war. The victory of the Soviet armed forces had its impact also on international relations. It decisively tipped the scales in favour of the United Nations. It led to a deep crisis within the fascist coalition and seriously undermined the influence of Hitler Germany and the other fascist states in the neutral countries. It weakened the political and trade links of the neutrals with the fascist coalition, foiled the plan for a military attack of the Soviet Union's southern and Far Eastern borders and, finally, created highly favourable conditions for the further expansion and strengthening of inter-Allied relations and for speedy victory in Europe and the Pacific.

One of the most important international consequences of the battle on the Volga was the powerful upsurge of the peoples' national liberation movement against fascist tyranny.

The successes of the Soviet Army increased the authority of Communists in all countries. With the outbreak of the Second World War the world communist movement rose to a new and higher stage. The working class and its vanguard—the Communist and Workers' Parties—headed a popular struggle unequalled in history, the struggle against fascism, for national independence and democracy. The Communist Party was better prepared than any other party to mobilise the mass of the people for that struggle. The Communists had shown that they were really expressing the interests of the working class and that they were the most consistent defenders of their peoples' national interests.

The world situation and the conditions that had shaped in the various countries after the formation there of broad anti-fascist fronts, which united not only members of the working class and the peasantry, but also of the small and medium bourgeoisie, demanded of the Communist Parties great flexibility and the ability to manoeuvre. Leadership of

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. II, p. 53.

the international communist movement by a single centre such as the Communist International became impossible. The organisational form for the union of workers adopted by the First Congress of the Communist International had been satisfactory in the initial stages of the Communist Parties' activity. Gradually, however, it became obsolete and finally it hampered the further development of the world communist movement. Under the guidance of the Comintern proletarian parties of a new type had formed in a number of capitalist, colonial and dependent countries. They had amassed experience in revolutionary struggle and were themselves able to guide the working-class struggle. In view of the new historical conditions and of the growth in the political maturity of the Communist Parties and their leading bodies, the Presidium of the Comintern's Executive Committee adopted the decision to dissolve the Communist International on May 15, 1943. This was approved by all Communist Parties.

The leading role of the working class and its vanguard—the Communist Parties—made the resistance movement a broad popular movement. The aim of the progressive resistance forces was not only to eject the invaders and to punish traitors but also to bring about fundamental changes in the political and social structure of their countries. The freedom fighters fought for the establishment of a genuinely democratic system, since they regarded it as the best guarantee against any possible restoration of fascism in future. Thus, the resistance movement during the Second World War fought not only for national liberation but also for social and class aims.

The attitude of the US and British governments to the national liberation movement was essentially a hostile one.

Western ruling circles wanted to make sure that bourgeois governments looking to the USA and Britain for guidance would be re-established in the European countries after their liberation. To realise these plans many projects were nurtured in the West for setting up various federations and confederations of European states after the war. Thus, for example, the formation of East European federations was part of Churchill's political plans, which envisaged a "United Europe" under British leadership.

Early in 1942 the British Government set up a special group which was to work towards that aim with the émigré

governments in London. Bohuslav Lastovicka, a Czechoslovak émigré in London, wrote in his memoirs: "During the second German offensive against Moscow London was busily dividing the map of Europe into various confederations and blocs. The émigré governments aided by British experts were feverishly preparing a new organisation of Europe, a new European system."¹

The upshot of all these efforts was the signing in January 1942 of a treaty of alliance between the Greek and Yugoslavian émigré governments. This treaty was intended as a first step towards the setting up of the Balkan Federation masterminded by Winston Churchill. Some time later a Polish-Czechoslovakian declaration was signed, which declared that the confederation of the two countries aimed at pursuing a common policy on questions of international relations, armed forces, economics, finance and communications. It was intended to set up a joint general staff (and during the war a single high command), to co-ordinate foreign trade, taxation, customs and cultural policies, and other important aspects of the state and social structure.

The proposed Polish-Czechoslovakian confederation was intended to have a pronounced anti-Soviet character. This can be readily seen from the agreement between the Polish and Czechoslovakian émigré governments, reached as early as 1941, not to permit any form of Soviet participation in the confederation.²

In 1942, Churchill advanced a draft plan for the creation of the "United States of Europe", i.e., of a union which was to serve as a barrier against the Soviet Union. In a special memorandum, distributed among the members of the cabinet, he insisted on enlisting all European countries, including Spain and Turkey, in the anti-Soviet bloc.³ He demanded that Europe should act as a "single whole" under the leadership of a European Council in which Britain would naturally have the decisive say.

Churchill's plans were directed primarily against the Soviet Union but at the same time they also had an anti-American tinge. They were an expression of the covert, and

¹ B. Laštovička, *U Londone za valky* (London During the War), Moscow, 1966, p. 65.

² Ibid., p. 63.

³ *Conservative and Unionist Central Office. All Answers for the Election*, London, 1950, p. 154.

sometimes overt struggle between Britain and the USA for domination in Europe.

As opposed to the British plans for the organisation of a Central Europe, headed by the émigré governments in London, the USA was hatching its own plans.

The quantitative and qualitative changes that had taken place in the national liberation movement under the impact of the Soviet victories affected the entire course of the Second World War. They further enhanced the role and authority of the people fighting fascism.

The expansion and intensification of the national liberation struggle strengthened the position of the Soviet Union and that of the people in Britain and the USA who wanted the further development of Allied relations between the states of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The intensive struggle of the peoples against the fascist invaders greatly assisted the Soviet Union—it was particularly important because there was no second front in Europe. The working people everywhere continued to support the Soviet Union and on its part, the Soviet Union selflessly assisted the forces of the national liberation movement. Despite the intrigues of international reactionaries and their many agents, the resistance movement, inspired by Soviet victories, continued to grow. The victory of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1943 changed the international situation as a whole and created extremely favourable conditions for the further consolidation of the front of freedom-loving peoples and states.

* * *

In 1943 the Soviet-German front continued to be the decisive front of the Second World War. Despite the Allied landing in North Africa and the successful advance of the Allied Army in October-December 1942, these operations did not substantially change the balance of forces of the warring coalitions.

Further developments proved that the Allied campaign in North Africa did practically nothing to relieve pressure on the Soviet Union. While the Soviet armies counterattacked in the Stalingrad area, the Allies, who had successfully carried out their operations in Morocco and Algiers, suddenly reduced their offensive in Tunisia and soon suspended military operations in North Africa almost completely. This gave the Germans time to send reinforcements

to North Africa, and at the beginning of December 1942, some five German divisions attempted to throw the Allies back from Tunisia to Bizerta. Simultaneously with the Tunisian operation the Hitlerites occupied all of France to counter the Allied landing in North Africa.

From the beginning of December 1942 to mid-February 1943 the Allies did not engage in any serious battles in Africa. The Germans took advantage of that lull to transfer part of their army and air force to the Soviet-German front. This evoked justified dissatisfaction in Moscow.

The Soviet Government informed London in February 1943 that according to reliable information at its disposal, "since the end of December, when for some reason the Anglo-American operations in Tunisia were suspended, the Germans have moved 27 divisions, including five armoured divisions, to the Soviet-German front from France, the Low Countries and Germany". The message drew the attention of the Allies to the fact that "instead of the Soviet Union being aided by diverting German forces from the Soviet-German front, what we get is relief for Hitler, who, because of the let-up in Anglo-American operations in Tunisia, was able to move additional troops against the Russians".¹

German official circles later confirmed that the Germans had had to transfer troops from South and West Europe to the Eastern front.

The Soviet Army's sweeping offensive and the growing clamour for more energetic action by the British and American armed forces, prompted the British and American leaders to convoke a joint conference early in 1943, which was to work out a strategic plan for 1943. Stalin was invited but refused to participate because the command of military operations would prevent him from attending the conference.

The meeting between the President of the USA and the Prime Minister of Great Britain was held in Casablanca between January 14 and 23, 1943.

Future Allied military action was the main question discussed in Casablanca. All the participants in the conference understood that a cross-Channel invasion of Europe was expected of them. Yet, once again they evaded a decision on that problem.

Meetings between the military leaders were held at Casa-

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 95.

blanca even before the conference was officially opened (the Americans arrived two days later than the English). At these meetings Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, Rhodes, the Dodecanese Islands and finally Greece were named as targets for the next attack.

The military conference provided additional evidence of serious differences among the Allies on the further planning of the war. For example, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King of the United States, who was supported by other top US officers, insisted that attention be focussed on the Pacific theatre.¹ General Marshall, however, according to various sources, favoured operations in Europe (the Roundup plan).² However, the entire set of strategic problems connected with the European theatre of operations was based on the programme formulated by the British, which said: "The paramount task before us is, first, to conquer the African shores of the Mediterranean and set up there the naval and air installations which are necessary to open an effective passage through it for military traffic; and, secondly, using the bases on the African shore, to strike at the under-belly of the Axis in effective strength and in the shortest time."³

Details on the British point of view were contained in two memoranda submitted on the eve of the conference—on November 25 and December 3, 1942. The British proposed to direct the main blow of the Allies against Sicily and follow it up with an invasion of Italy. This action was to be carried out by the Allied forces stationed in North Africa. A second thrust was to be made in the Eastern Mediterranean. The British wanted to enlist Turkey to launch military action in the Balkans. British troops from Iran were to be transferred to this theatre of operations. The landing on the West Coast of Europe received the least attention. The British Government made the landing dependent on several conditions: it was to be undertaken after the successful outcome of operations in the Mediterranean and an effective step-up of the bombing offensive.⁴ All this showed

¹ Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehall, *Fleet Admiral King. A Naval Record*, New York, 1952, pp. 416-17.

² Arthur Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide, 1939-1943*, London, 1957, p. 540.

³ Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 586.

⁴ William Hardy McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia. Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946*, London, 1953, p. 265.

beyond doubt that London was not in favour of organising major military operations in West Europe in 1943.

At Casablanca the Americans gave their overall support to the British strategic conception.

The question of the cross-Channel invasion in 1943 was not resolved at Casablanca. The US military leaders, not to mention the British ones, agreed once again to postpone the opening of a second front in Europe.

The decisions on strategic issues were the logical continuation of the line followed by the US and British leaders at previous meetings. Instead of massive strikes against Germany's vital centres they confined themselves to separate distracting manoeuvres which, as Marshall later said, were mainly intended to show that the Allies were constantly doing something.¹

As regards its effect, the landing in Sicily and the subsequent invasion of Italy, the Allies were planning, could not be compared with the opening of military operations in West Europe.

Although the participants in the conference agreed that no second front would be opened in 1943, they did not risk putting this decision on paper. Moreover, for almost six months they did not inform the Soviet Government of their decision.

The conference also adopted the Anakim plan, which provided for an attack against the Japanese in North Burma in 1943 and the capture of Rangoon.

The conference also considered problems connected with the war in the Pacific.

Even though discussions at Casablanca were supposed to be confined to purely military matters, Roosevelt and Churchill gave a lot of attention to political problems too. As before, the French problem ranked high. The documents of the conference show that it was not a matter of assistance to the French patriots in their grim battle against the invaders that absorbed the attention of the participants. No, the participants in the conference were interested in very different matters. Each of them wanted his candidate to head the French Administration. The USA backed General Giraud and Britain—de Gaulle. There were serious differences

¹ Samuel E. Morison, *American Contributions to the Strategy of World War II*, p. 23.

on this issue. After Darlan's assassination ruling circles in the US were feverishly looking for candidates for the various administrative positions in the French colonial possessions in Africa. Roosevelt's correspondence with Hull mentions Jean Monnet, Jules Martin Cambon, Alexis Leger and others. On January 19 it was announced that Marcel Peyrouton, who had become notorious while holding the post of Minister of the Interior in the Vichy Government, had been appointed Governor-General of Algiers. The USA pinned its main hopes on Giraud, and while the Casablanca talks were in progress Roosevelt had a separate meeting with Giraud, at which Giraud outlined his plan for the organisation of a new French administration and raised a number of questions. Giraud proposed that he himself head the administration while de Gaulle take second place. According to Hopkins, who attended the meeting, Roosevelt and Giraud settled most things to their complete satisfaction "but on the sovereignty point he [the President—*U. I.*] was adamant, and insisted that Giraud, at the moment, act only as a representative in North Africa. . . . Giraud and the President have mutual confidence in each other."¹ The attitude of the Americans towards de Gaulle was very different.

Knowing that the US ruling circles were against him and considering that the occupation by the Americans and British of France's colonial possessions in Africa weakens the authority of the French Committee of National Liberation, General de Gaulle at first refused to go to Casablanca; Roosevelt and Churchill had to wait several days for him.

The British were particularly interested in bringing about a compromise between de Gaulle and Giraud, for they feared that in the event of de Gaulle's refusal to co-operate, the administration of the French colonial possessions would be taken over by American creatures. They therefore exerted pressure on de Gaulle to make him rethink his position. The British Prime Minister warned the leader of the Free French that he would lose British support if he persisted in his point of view. "The position of His Majesty's Government," Churchill wrote to de Gaulle from Casablanca, "towards your Movement while you remain at its head will also require to be reviewed. If with your eyes open you reject this unique

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 684.

opportunity we shall endeavour to act on as well as we can without you. The door is still open.”¹

De Gaulle arrived in Casablanca on January 22. In his talks with Roosevelt and Churchill he gave his view on the French leadership, in which he was to play the leading role. He did not refuse to co-operate with Giraud.

Finally, temporary conciliation was achieved and it was agreed that a single French administration would be set up in future.

Turkey's position also came under discussion at Casablanca. Turkey held an important place in British-American strategic plans. The US and Britain intended to invade the Balkan countries with the help of the Turkish Army. With this aim in view it was decided to prevail on Turkey to join the war against the Hitlerite bloc, and the British were to conduct negotiations with Turkey towards this end.

Particularly sharp differences arose between the participants in the conference in connection with the post-war status of the colonies. In his many talks with Churchill, Roosevelt criticised the British colonial system and expressed the hope that in the post-war period everything would be “revised”, that life would be reorganised in the colonial countries with the economic help of the USA. The ideas expressed by the President clearly showed that the American monopolists were striving to oust their British competitors from the colonies and to establish their own domination there. Churchill understood only too well what Roosevelt was after and indignantly rejected the American plans.

The conference considered several other questions, including organisational ones. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed commander-in-chief of the Allied armed forces in North Africa and British General Alexander became his assistant.

At the press conference in Casablanca on January 24, 1943, Roosevelt said “that the United Nations were determined that peace could only come to the world by the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers”. The Casablanca conference “was signalled by the formulation of the aim of ‘unconditional surrender’ made known by President Roosevelt. . . .”²

¹ Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 610.

² *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, Ed. by Louise W. Holborn, Boston, 1943, p. 2.

Many politicians and research workers in the post-war period, and even during the war, criticised the President for advancing the unconditional surrender formula. They said that the formula gave an important trump to fascist propaganda, which interpreted it as the intent of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition to destroy Germany, Japan and Italy. This interpretation of the unconditional surrender formula, its critics thought, helped the fascists continue the war.

However, this point of view is erroneous. Neither before, during, or after the Casablanca Conference had any leader of a state in the anti-fascist coalition ever expressed the intent to annihilate Germany, Japan and Italy, or their populations. The position of the anti-Hitler coalition with respect to Germany and her future was most clearly expressed by the Soviet Government, which repeatedly emphasised its intent to destroy only the fascist system and its organisers. Thus, Stalin's report on the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution defined the tasks facing the Soviet armed forces as follows: the prime task of the Soviet Army was to destroy the Hitlerite state and those inspiring it, the second—to destroy Hitler's Army and its leaders, and the third—to destroy the hated New Order in Europe and to punish its creators. The Soviet Government's statement on history showing that Hitlers come and go while the German people and their state remain is widely known.

The written text read by President Roosevelt at the Casablanca press conference stated:

"The elimination of German, Japanese, and Italian war power means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan. That means a reasonable assurance of future world peace. It does not mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean the destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and the subjugation of all the others."¹

Thus the unconditional surrender formula envisaged the complete extermination of fascism, the liquidation of its consequences and the refusal of any talks or deals with the main fascist powers. That is why it was supported by the Soviet Union.

¹ *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1943*, Ed. by Samuel I. Rosenman, New York, 1950, p. 39.

After the Casablanca Conference its participants sent a joint message to Moscow in which they informed the Soviet Government of some of the results of the talks. The message did not contain any information on the political talks but only mentioned the plans of the American and British armed forces for 1943. Inter alia it said: "We believe that these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943."¹

The wordy Anglo-American message completely bypassed the crucial issue in inter-Allied relations—the opening of a second front. This compelled the Soviet Government to ask for additional information on the decisions adopted at Casablanca. "Assuming that your decisions on Germany are designed to defeat her by opening a second front in Europe in 1943," the Head of the Soviet Government wrote to the Allies in 1943, "I should be grateful if you would inform me of the concrete operations planned and of their timing."²

This compelled the British and US governments to explain their military plans in greater detail and to answer the question about the second front. However, instead of giving the Soviet Government frank information they attempted to mislead it. Thus, the reply sent by the British Prime Minister on February 9, 1943 concerning the second front read:

"We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross-Channel operation in August, in which British and United States units would participate. Here again shipping and assault-landing craft will be the limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by the weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing of this attack must, of course, be dependent upon the condition of German defensive possibilities across the Channel at that time."³

At the same time no concrete decision was adopted at the Casablanca Conference on a landing in West Europe in 1943. On the contrary, the steps outlined in the decisions practically excluded such an operation. William D. Leahy, for example, frankly admits that "the American plan to invade France by way of the Channel in 1943 was not accepted by the British and *in its place* [author's italics—*U. I.*] was

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 86.

² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

substituted a decision for combined action against the Mediterranean islands, principally Sicily".¹

The results of the Casablanca Conference demonstrated first and foremost that the US and British leaders had once again postponed the organisation of military operations which could have struck a decisive blow against the Hitler coalition in the immediate future. The strategic line adopted at Casablanca drew the war out and practically struck the question of a US and British landing in West Europe from the agenda in 1943.

* * *

Turkey's position in the war was a matter of major concern to the Western powers, notably to Britain.

Although Turkey had proclaimed her neutrality in the war, her sympathies were obviously with Hitler Germany, with whom she maintained extensive political and economic ties. On the other hand, despite the Soviet-Turkish treaty on friendship and neutrality, Turkey's attitude towards the Soviet Union was one of unconcealed hostility. Some statesmen in Ankara approved of Hitler's plan to destroy the Soviet Union and to annihilate its peoples.

Sücrü Saracoglu, the Turkish Prime Minister, told von Papen in August 1942 that he "passionately wishes the destruction of Russia. The destruction of Russia is a heroic deed of the Führer. . . . The Russian problem can be resolved by Germany only if at least half of the Russians in Russia are killed. . . ." ² Numan Menemencioglu, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed similar views. "Now as before," he said to the German ambassador in the summer of 1942, "Turkey is interested in the most complete defeat of bolshevist Russia." ³

After Hitler Germany's temporary successes on the Soviet-German front in the summer of 1942 the Soviet Union's most outspoken enemies in Turkey became particularly active, and hasty preparations were begun for war against the So-

¹ William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, New York, London, Toronto, 1950, p. 145.

² *Dokumenty ministerstva inostrannykh del Germanii*, vyp. II, *Germaneskaya politika v Turtsii* (Documents of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Issue II, German Policy in Turkey), Moscow, 1946, p. 98.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

viet Union. The Turkish Government concentrated a large part of its Army on the Soviet-Turkish border and provoked various border incidents.

A document of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs of June 1942 states that the Turks planned to invade the USSR through the Iranian plateau and to advance towards Baku.

Among other things the document states that conviction was ripe in Turkey that "the British in Iran would not offer substantial resistance".¹

Some source materials even mention October 17, 1942 as the date of Turkey's proposed entry into the war against the USSR.

In March 1947 the American newspaper *PM* published several articles by a former member of the Turkish Government, which told of Turkey's mobilisation in the summer of 1942 and of her intent to declare war on the USSR as soon as Berlin announced the fall of Stalingrad. "Everything was ready," the article read. "Turkey was preparing for entry in the war against the Soviet Union. . . ."²

The pro-German policy of the Turkish Government was in sharp contrast to the appraisal given to it by the British Government. A British memorandum sent to the Soviet Government in 1942 said that the Turks wished for the victory of the Allies and not of the Germans, that they were aware that there would be no future for modern Turkey in a German-dominated Europe. The Turkish Government, the memorandum said, reckons with the possibility of a German attack and is taking measures to resist it."³

It is difficult to believe that the British were so misinformed on the intentions of the Turkish rulers.

The failure of the German plans on the Soviet-German front in 1942 and the successful counter-offensive of the Soviet Army made Turkey strongly reaffirm her neutrality.

The British Government decided to use the new situation favourable to the anti-Hitler coalition, that had set in at the end of 1942, to bring pressure to bear on Turkey, which held an important place in Churchill's plans. Churchill wanted Turkey to be one of the main bridgeheads for the realisation

¹ Ibid., pp. 82-83.

² Quoted from the newspaper *Red Star*, Moscow, March 27, 1947.

³ Ibid.

of his notorious Balkan variant of the second front, with all its political consequences, so he was extremely active in Turkish affairs.

In the autumn of 1942 he proposed to the Soviet and US governments that a more active Allied policy with respect to Turkey be adopted.

Turkey's position in the war had been discussed at the Casablanca Conference. Later Churchill was to write: "It was agreed that we played the hand in Turkey, whether in munitions or diplomacy."¹ Churchill said that he was willing to meet Turkish statesmen to carry out these decisions.

The meeting of British and Turkish representatives was held in Adana on January 30 and 31, 1943. The British Prime Minister aired his views on Turkey's position in the war and on her future policy in a wordy memorandum, which was handed to Ismet Inönü, the Turkish President. The British document gave a very detailed analysis of the various aspects connected with possible British and American arms deliveries to Turkey, with communications, the activity of British and American advisers, and so on.

In this document the British informed the Turkish Government that the Allies wanted to see Turkey a strong power and closely linked with Britain and the USA. This was particularly "essential", according to Churchill, because "a state of anarchy" might arise in the Balkans "needing the Turkish Government to intervene to protect its own interests".²

The Anglo-Turkish talks centred on political problems. According to Churchill's own narrative they turned largely on "two questions, the structure of the post-war world... and the future relations of Turkey and Russia".³

The future of the Balkans held a special place in the Adana talks. The British document hinted to the Turkish leaders that great events would shortly come to pass in the Balkans. Churchill called upon the Turkish leaders to co-operate extensively with Britain and the United States and to pursue a common Balkan policy with them.

The opinions expressed by the British Prime Minister revealed to the Turks that London wanted Turkey to co-operate in preventing the development of revolutionary

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 626.

² *Correspondence*... , Vol. I, p. 386.

³ Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 635.

movements in the Balkan countries and their liberation by the Soviet Army.

The point of view of the British Prime Minister had the approval and understanding of the Turkish politicians and they decided to use this opportunity to offer to mediate between Britain and Germany. Von Papen, the German ambassador to Ankara, reports that the President of Turkey told the British Prime Minister that a complete defeat of Germany would give Russia the chance of becoming "a great danger to Turkey and Europe". He even asked Churchill whether he would not meet von Papen to discuss the possibility of an Anglo-German peace, however, von Papen reports, Churchill declined.¹

As regards the "fears" of the Turkish representatives of the "Soviet danger", the British replied "that things did not always turn out as bad as was expected". Essentially, the British Prime Minister expressed his solidarity with the Turkish Government's anti-Soviet posture, saying: "If they did so it was better that Turkey should be strong and closely associated with the United Kingdom and the United States."²

The official result of the Adana meeting were the Agreed Conclusions of the Anglo-Turkish Military Conference, according to which Turkey was to submit to Britain a list of arms and equipment required to equip the Turkish armed forces. The list was to be studied by the British. Official British representatives were also to consider the possibility of transferring English vessels to the Turks which were to be used for deliveries to Turkey. The documents said that British staff officers would be sent to Ankara to confer with the Turkish General Staff and that Britain would undertake to train a certain number of Turkish service personnel.³

After the end of the conference the British Prime Minister informed Moscow of some of the results of the talks. In particular he wrote that he had not asked the Turkish leaders to assume concrete political commitments or to make promises about joining the war on the Allied side. However, in Churchill's opinion, Turkey could be induced to join the war before the end of 1943. He considered that by "straining her neutrality", in the way the United States did before its entry

¹ Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, London, 1952, p. 495.

² Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 635-36.

³ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 392.

into the war, it would be possible for Turkey to make part of her territory available for the military aims of the Allies.

As regards his talks with the Turkish representatives about Soviet-Turkish relations, Churchill said: "They [the Turks—*U. I.*] are, of course, apprehensive of their position after the war in view of the great strength of the Soviet Union. I told them that in my experience the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had never broken an engagement or treaty; that the time for them to make a good arrangement was now, and that the safest place for Turkey was to have a seat with the victors as a belligerent at the peace table. All this I said in our common interest in accordance with our alliance. . . ."¹

Further the British Prime Minister recommended that the Soviet Union should make some friendly gesture towards Turkey.

The Soviet Government's reply to the British message on the Turkish question contained an analysis of Soviet-Turkish relations and of Turkey's position in the war, and noted that a few months before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war and also during it the Soviet side had given Turkey friendly assurances. The Turks, however, had not reacted in any way, probably because they were afraid of antagonising Germany. In this connection the Soviet Government expressed the apprehension that actions in accordance with the British suggestion would encounter a similar reception by the Turks.

The Soviet Government said that Turkey occupied a somewhat dubious position. "On the one hand, she is linked to the USSR by a treaty of friendship and neutrality, and to Great Britain by a treaty of mutual aid in resisting aggression; on the other hand, she is linked with Germany by a treaty of friendship concluded three days before Germany attacked the USSR."²

This raised doubts as to whether Turkey would be able to reconcile her commitments to the USSR and Great Britain to her commitments to Germany. Further, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its willingness to improve relations with Turkey, if the Turks on their part should express this desire.³ It should be noted that the Soviet-Turkish talks begun in the spring of

¹ *Correspondence*. . . , pp. 90-91.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 92.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

1943 did not lead to an appreciable improvement in the relations between the two countries, since the Turkish Government continued to follow an anti-Soviet line.

The Adana talks thus did not bring Turkey into the war on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition. Moreover, the Turkish leaders did not assume any commitments on this account at the conference. This was due to the unwillingness of the Turkish political leaders to commence hostilities against Germany at the time and to the British Government's failure to exert any real pressure on the Turks to bring about their immediate participation in the anti-Hitler coalition. Analysis of the Anglo-Turkish negotiations leads to the conclusion that the British Prime Minister was interested not so much in persuading Turkey to join the war against Nazi Germany as in strengthening British positions in that country and in preparing Turkey for future political and military actions in the Balkans. Neither the proceedings of the Adana Conference nor Churchill's memoirs reveal that the British Prime Minister asked Turkey to declare war on Germany in the near future. Moreover, Churchill's memoirs show that he did not really believe that Turkey would take action against the fascist bloc in 1943.

From all the above it is clear that in the autumn of 1942, even though the British Government wrote that efforts should be taken to make Turkey join the war in the spring of 1943, it really did nothing to bring this about. All the British Government did was to inform the Turks of its plans, notably in the Balkans, and to promise them some military supplies. Concerning the military negotiations at Adana between the British and Turkish military leaders, Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke notes that they were no more than an exchange of information.¹

The Turks themselves decisively refuted all statements that the Adana Conference had led to a rapprochement between Turkey and the anti-Hitler coalition. In his report to Sofia, Kirov, the Bulgarian Minister, characterised the position of the official circles in Ankara as follows: "The Turks do not cease emphasising that they have assumed no commitments at Adana and that the arming of Turkey by Britain has the aim to make Turkey a factor, which in the event of a German

¹ Brooke says that the Turks were quite unprepared for these talks (see Arthur Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide*, pp. 570-74).

defeat would be able to prevent the bolshevisation of Turkey and the Balkans."

* * *

One of the chief results of the Soviet victory in the summer of 1943 and of the first Allied successes in North Africa was that questions of the post-war order of the world were given a greater place on the agendas of the various conferences and talks of the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition. In the first war years these questions held only a minor place in Soviet-Anglo-American relations, but now the problems of the future order in Europe, the Far East, those of an international security organisation, and so on, were given increasing attention by the governments of the USSR, Britain and the USA. Post-war planning was the subject of the negotiations conducted by Anthony Eden, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Washington. Eden arrived in Washington on March 12, 1943 and spent more than a fortnight there. During his stay he had numerous meetings with the President, Harry Hopkins, Cordell Hull and other US statesmen.

According to a memorandum John G. Winant, the US ambassador to London, wrote before his departure for Washington, it was assumed that initially Eden's mission was to be "limited to the most effective method of preparing for meetings between the governments of all the United Nations to consider questions arising out of the war".¹ Actually, however, the discussions centred on a wide range of issues pertaining to the post-war order of the world.

The question of setting up an international organisation to safeguard peace and security ranked high on the agenda of the talks. Even though the various State Department committees especially set up to submit proposals on the establishment of such an organisation had not yet completed their work and had not submitted relevant drafts, the US representatives expounded their views on this organisation to Eden in great detail. They said in particular that they wanted the new organisation to be world-wide and to consist of three main bodies—a General Assembly at which all the United Nations would be represented, several advisory councils composed of the representatives of the Four Powers and of six or eight other representatives, and finally an executive com-

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 707.

mittee composed of representatives of the USA, USSR, Great Britain and China.¹

This committee, the US representative maintained, was to be vested with great authority and considerable power. In his talks with Eden the US President also proposed that a system of strategic bases should be set up all over the globe which were to "ensure peace and order throughout the world". Roosevelt mentioned Dakar, the tip of Tunisia, and Taiwan as examples of suitable places for them. From the minutes of Eden's talks in Washington it is difficult to understand whether the Americans referred to the setting up of international armed forces subordinated to the United Nations or whether they wanted only Britain and the United States to act as "policemen". The latter is the more likely since in one of his later talks with Eden, Roosevelt said: "We should split our troops—the British, for instance, would be in Tunisia or Bizerta and we would be in Dakar and, probably, Formosa."²

During the talks the Americans also touched on the problem of international navigation, which they considered to be closely linked with the future United Nations Organisation.

Eden was reserved about the American plan for setting up an international organisation and even though he agreed that this organisation should be a global one, the British Government exhibited no particular enthusiasm for the American plan. It is noteworthy that the British Prime Minister advanced his own ideas on the post-war order of the world precisely at this moment. As distinct from President Roosevelt, he favoured the setting up of regional councils. Instead of a world-wide organisation Churchill proposed to set up at least three organisations: one for the Pacific, another for the Americas and a third for Europe.³

It was not the idea of international co-operation of all states, notably of the Great Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, that underlay Churchill's proposal, but "the inescapable reality and necessity of a balance of power". McNeill says that "he [Churchill—*U.I.*] conceived the idea of establishing an instrument of European government which would bind

¹ *The Eden Memoirs, The Reckoning*, London, 1965, p. 377.

² Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 716.

³ Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 717-18.

together the European nations into an economic, political, and military unit capable of meeting the continent-nations of the east and of the west on more or less equal terms. He visualised something like a United States of Europe, whose constituent parts would be the major European Powers (including Great Britain) and regional federations of the smaller Powers—for example, in Scandinavia, the Danubian area, and the Balkans.”¹

In a speech on March 21, 1943 the British Prime Minister proposed to set up a European and an Asian councils. In addition to his proposal to set up several councils, whose supposed aim it would be to maintain a balance of power, Churchill also wanted to develop wide co-operation between Great Britain and the United States of America. He even nurtured the idea of common citizenship, of the continued existence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, of systematic consultations in order to follow a common international policy and so on.²

The idea at the back of all of Churchill’s plans was not so much one of a balance of power as one of setting up a “cordon sanitaire” against the Soviet Union in Europe. The main aim of the federation of small states on the Soviet Union’s western borders which he wanted to establish under the aegis of Britain, was to have outposts of anti-Soviet policy on the Soviet Union’s doorstep. He wanted Anglo-American co-operation in the post-war period to serve the same aim.

However, Churchill’s plan was not well received in Washington, for the Americans apparently thought that the British Prime Minister was thinking up all these designs only with a view to continuing the traditional British policy of a balance of power. During his talks in the White House Eden was even told that Churchill’s speech “in which he advocated a purely European Council of Nations, had a very unfortunate effect over here”.³ The United States continued to defend its idea of a world organisation, in which the USA expected to play the leading role.

A number of other questions were discussed at Washington, notably relations between Britain, the USA and the

¹ W. H. McNeill, *op. cit.*, pp. 320, 321.

² He was particularly emphatic about it during his visit to the USA in May 1943 (Winston S. Churchill, *Onwards to Victory*, London, 1944, pp. 181-86).

³ Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 718.

Soviet Union. Eden said that he did not believe the Soviet Government intended to dominate the whole of Europe with the help of its armed forces or by propaganda.

In his memoirs Eden gives a somewhat different interpretation of his point of view, but essentially confirms that he did not share the fears over the intentions ascribed to the Soviet Union.¹

Roosevelt and Eden discussed also the Soviet Union's western borders. They could not but agree that the new western borders of the Soviet Union established in 1939-40 were just.

In spite of this admission the participants in the talks thought it necessary to make the international recognition of the Soviet Union's borders depend on a number of conditions. For example, they considered that the Soviet Union should be persuaded to renounce the Baltic Republics or, in any case, as the President said, the consent of the USA and Britain to their incorporation in the USSR should be used by them "as a bargaining instrument in getting other concessions from Russia".² True, later the US and British governments had to renounce most of these conditions.

The participants in the talks also touched on the Polish problem. The British Foreign Minister said that in his opinion the Soviet Union would demand "very little territory of Poland, possibly up to the 'Curzon line'".³ It was difficult for the US President not to agree that this line was a just and logical one. As regards Poland's western border, the general consensus was that East Prussia should be given to Poland.⁴

Touching on the future of the Balkan states, President Roosevelt advocated the partitioning of Yugoslavia.

The future of Germany was discussed in great detail. Both the American and British representatives decisively favoured the partitioning of Germany.

The American historian, H. Feis, notes that "the talk recorded agreement that it would be well for the world if Germany were partitioned, but did not decide whether partition ought, if necessary, to be imposed by force".⁵ During the talks it also became clear that while Britain opposed the recognition of China as a Great Power and the granting to

¹ *The Eden Memoirs, The Reckoning*, p. 273.

² Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 709.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 709.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 710.

⁵ H. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

her of a relevant place in the future world organisation, the US Government attempted in every way to belittle France's role in international affairs. It was noted above that the President did not consider it necessary to include France in the envisaged executive committee of the international organisation. While Eden was in Washington the Americans also spoke out in favour of France's disarmament, saying that there was no reason for her to build up military strength.¹

"It seemed to me that Roosevelt," Eden wrote, "wanted to hold the strings of France's future in his own hands so that he could decide that country's fate."²

It cannot be said that the Washington talks contributed greatly to the solution of post-war problems. The main reason that prevented the adoption of concrete decisions was the absence of the Soviet Union. It became obvious that it was a waste of time to decide or even discuss questions of the post-war order in Europe and in the world without the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's victories on the fronts of the world war determined the extremely important role the Soviet Union would play in the post-war world too. The results of the Anglo-American talks should be assessed from this point of view.

¹ W. H. McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

² *The Eden Memoirs, The Reckoning*, p. 372.

CHAPTER XI

STILL NO SECOND FRONT IN 1943

By the end of March 1943 the Soviet troops successfully completed their winter campaign against the German fascist troops during which they inflicted a series of major defeats on the enemy. For four months and twenty days the Soviet troops had advanced, despite extremely adverse weather conditions, pushing the enemy back in some sectors by as much as 600 to 700 kilometres to the west. An area of 480,000 kilometres had been swept clear.

On March 21, the Allied troops in North Africa mounted an offensive after a long pause. They succeeded in resistance of the German and Italian troops in Tunisia. On May 12, the commander-in-chief of the Italo-German troops in Africa, Marshal Messe, announced the capitulation of the Italian troops and Lieutenant-General von Arnim, that of the Germans.

Thus, in a comparatively short time the German fascist bloc had suffered heavy defeat on all fronts; besides, the Germans had lost the supremacy in equipment they had enjoyed in the early stages of the war. It was becoming increasingly difficult for London and Washington to persist in their refusal to carry out their Allied commitments, that is, to open a second front in West Europe.

The American and British armed forces were quite ready to open a second front in the spring of 1943. This can be seen from many statements made by British and American military and political leaders. Speaking on May 23, 1943, Oliver Littleton, the British Minister for War Production, declared that there was every possibility for choosing an object of attack and that there were reliable strategic bases from which extensive military operations could be launched. This view was apparently held also by US Vice-President Wallace, who in February 1943 said the following: "Informed people believe

that if the peoples of the United States and Britain take joint efforts, similar to the magnificent efforts of the Russians, Germany will be beaten in 1943."¹ Political and military leaders in the USA, such as Hopkins and Marshall, were convinced that a landing in Europe could be effected in 1943.

The debate of the second front problem in the House of Lords also showed the great interest in this problem. On February 23, 1943 Lord Beaverbrook delivered a major speech on that subject. He first characterised the military situation that had shaped as a result of the Soviet victories and the Allied landing in North Africa, and then went on to say that it was extremely necessary to open a second front in Europe in the immediate future. He pointed out that despite the successes that had been achieved by the anti-Hitler coalition, the decisive battles were still to come. "Germany," he said, "was calling up a million soldiers and no one knew where they would attack. . . . Wherever it might be, we should strike, and strike now, before the Germans had regrouped their formations. We should strike before they recovered from the Russian offensive. . . .

"If we lost a moment now," he continued, "we should have lost something more precious. Time was the presiding body."² Lord Beaverbrook's view was supported by several other members of the House of Lords.

The situation was so favourable for an Allied landing in 1943 that the Hitlerite leaders themselves daily dreaded this invasion.

After discussing the military situation with Hermann Göhring, Göbbels made the following entry in his diary in March 1943: "He [Göhring—*U.I.*] is also somewhat worried about our having pretty much stripped the West in order to bring things to a standstill in the East. One dreads to think what would happen if the English and the Americans were suddenly to attempt a landing."³

However, the Allies did not make that attempt; moreover, they did not make any preparation for a cross-Channel landing and the opening of a second front in 1943, even though they had made endless promises to do so.

In 1943 the Soviet Government repeatedly reminded its

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy* . . . , Vol. I, p. 654.

² *The Times*, February 24, 1943, p. 8.

³ *The Göbbels Diaries, 1942-1943*, New York, 1948, p. 262.

Allies of the need to open a second front. As we mentioned above, immediately after receiving information on the Casablanca Conference Moscow asked for precise information as to the date when the second front would be opened in 1943. The Allies then said that it would be opened not later than in August-September of that year. However, the Soviet Government asked that the early autumn should be the absolutely latest opening date and that it should be advanced as much as possible. The Soviet Government thought it extremely important not to postpone the blow against the enemy to the second half of the year but to deliver it in spring or early summer in order not to give the enemy a chance to recover.¹ The reply of the British Government of March 11 once again assured the Soviet Government that a second front would be opened in 1943, and added that "... in case the enemy should weaken sufficiently we are preparing to strike earlier than August and plans are kept alive from week to week".²

Documents published after the war show that this statement did not tally with the facts. Actually in the spring of 1943 the British General Staff was making no plans for a landing in France that year. Alan Brooke, Churchill's chief military adviser and head of the Imperial General Staff, also decisively opposed the opening of a second front in 1943. An examination of his diaries and records characterising the everyday work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff makes it perfectly clear that nobody in the British military command seriously considered a cross-Channel landing in 1943.

Neither were preparations for a landing in Western Europe in 1943 made in the USA.

Thus, all the efforts of the Allies and particularly of the British, were directed at the further development of the so-called Mediterranean strategy, that is, the landing in Italy and the consequent extension of military operations to the Balkans. This was the continuation of the "minor operations", "drawing out the war" strategy. At the same time the military conceptions adopted by the Allies had far-reaching political aims, chief among which was the occupation of the East European countries and the preservation of bourgeois and landowner governments there.

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 95.

² *Ibid.*, p. 102.

Time went by and the Soviet Union was not receiving the effective support it had every right to expect after two years of bloody war. The aerial bombings by which the Allies expected to destroy all or most of the German war industry and thereby to lessen the German onslaught on the Eastern front, and by which some military strategists even expected to win the war without opening a second front at all,¹ had little effect. This can be seen from data on the effects of the strategic bombing raids on Germany's war economy.

As a result of the raids by the Anglo-American air forces in 1943, Germany lost only two per cent of her coal output, three per cent of her coke output and about six per cent of the steel output. Data on the output of key products between 1940 and 1943 prove that these losses were quickly compensated for and not only did the bombing fail to undermine Germany's war economy, but it even failed to prevent a substantial growth of production. In 1943, as compared with 1940, Germany produced 71 per cent more synthetic fuel, 192 per cent more rubber, 135 per cent more aircraft, and 389 per cent more 75 mm guns. It should be emphasised that the primary targets of the Anglo-American air strikes were enterprises producing the submarines and aircraft which were used against Britain and the British and American fleet, and not factories producing tanks and artillery, which the Hitlerite High Command used mainly on the Soviet-German front.

The question of the second front was a matter of deep concern to the world public. The British and American people continued to demand the opening of a second front in West Europe and were firmly convinced that this long-expected operation would finally be carried out in 1943. Revealing in this respect was the poll conducted in the spring of 1943 by the British Institute of Public Opinion. The question: "Do you expect the Allies to land on the European continent this year?" was answered by 67 per cent of those questioned in the affirmative. Only 14 per cent gave a negative reply. This shows that two-thirds of England's adult population believed that the Allies would launch large-scale military operations against Germany in Europe in 1943.²

At the May Day meeting in New York, which was attended

¹ See F. Morgan, *Overture to Overlord*, New York, 1950, p. 73; H. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower*, London, 1946, p. 447; A. Harris, *Bomber Offensive*, London, 1947, p. 192.

² *News Chronicle*, May 3, 1943.

by more than 50,000 people, speakers demanded that international unity be strengthened and that the Allied countries consolidate. Joseph E. Curran, the Chairman of the Maritime Trade Union, warned against the plots of "political wreckers" in the USA who were attempting to delay the opening of the second front.¹

* * *

Washington and London attempted to divert the attention of the American and British public from the second front issue and to focus it on Lend-Lease deliveries. This probably was the reason why some political leaders and newspapers in Britain and the USA greatly exaggerated the importance of Lend-Lease deliveries to the common struggle against fascism.

At this juncture Admiral Standley, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, made his notorious statement at a press conference at the US Embassy in Moscow on March 8, 1943. Touching upon the debate in the US Congress on the second protocol of deliveries, he said that he believed that the Soviet people were not given full information on the assistance Russia was receiving from the United States.

Many political leaders in London and Washington approved of Standley's statements. However, the American and British public at large, friends of the Soviet Union, condemned Standley's statement because they correctly regarded it as an unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union which was untrue into the bargain. The Soviet people and its government gave due recognition to the importance of Lend-Lease deliveries. The Soviet Government admitted that these deliveries were playing a positive role and expressed its gratitude for the help it was given.² Soviet newspapers systematically published the speeches of responsible officials in the USA and Britain containing figures on deliveries.

Many foreign correspondents, including Americans, such as Cassidy, the Moscow correspondent of Associated Press, who published an article on March 5 on his observations in the Soviet Union, said that the size of US aid to the Soviet Union was known to the Soviet people "because all statements by Roosevelt and Churchill on this question and all

¹ *Pravda*, May 5, 1943.

² Study of the correspondence between the Soviet Head of State and the US President and the British Prime Minister shows that the Soviet Government gave due recognition to the importance of Lend-Lease deliveries.

the relevant figures are published in the Soviet press, and the Russians are regular newspaper readers".¹ Some American officials also confirmed this. For example, in March 1943, Sol Blum, Chairman of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, declared in the House of Representatives: "Studying Russian papers we have established that they have published full information on US military aid to Russia. On January 23 the Soviet press published in full the statement made by Stettinius, the Lend-Lease administrator, on US aid to the Soviet Union. I believe that statements on our assistance to Russia are published in Russia in full." John Connolly, Chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, also said that the Russian people were informed on US aid.²

The fact that in March 1943 alone *Izvestia* published information on US deliveries to the Soviet Union in four of its issues shows how groundless Standley's assertion about the Soviet people's "lack of information" really was. In the middle of March Standley was invited to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and given facts contradicting his statement.

Fearing that Standley's statement would have an adverse effect on Soviet-American relations and bearing in mind the reaction of the American public, the State Department quickly dissociated itself from that statement. Acting US Secretary of State Sumner Welles said at a press conference that Standley's statement had been made without preliminary consultations with the US Government and did not involve the latter. The American press regarded Welles's statement as a repudiation of the one made by Standley.³

The volume of US deliveries the Soviet Union had received by March 1943 can be seen from the detailed report on the Lend-Lease Act, made by Stettinius in March 1943 to mark the second anniversary of the passing of that act.⁴ Stettinius's report was published by the Soviet press almost without abbreviations. It said that by March 1, 1942, i.e., during the year the Act had been in effect, 68 per cent of the total had gone to England, 13 per cent to Africa and the Middle East, six per cent to the Soviet Union, nine per cent to India, Chi-

¹ *Izvestia*, March 11, 1943.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Izvestia*, March 11, 1943.

⁴ The Lend-Lease Act was passed in March 1941.

na, Australia and New Zealand, and four per cent to other countries. In the second year Britain's share decreased although the volume being sent there was still considerable. From March 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, the Soviet Union received 29 per cent of the Lend-Lease supplies to the value of 1,553,000 dollars.

Out of the total of materials shipped to the various countries under the Lend-Lease Act between March 1941 and March 1943, Britain received 46 per cent of the total to the value of 4,430,000 dollars, the Soviet Union 19 per cent to the value of 1,826,000 dollars, Africa and the Middle East 16 per cent to the value of 1,573,000 dollars, China, India, Australia and New Zealand 14 per cent to the value of 1,344,000 dollars and other countries five per cent to the value of 459 million dollars.¹

For obvious reasons no information was published on losses and damage caused by enemy action during the shipment of these goods. Stettinius touched on this question later in his book *Lend-Lease Weapon for Victory*. He said:

"During the second Protocol period—from July 1942 through June 1943—we shipped over 3,000,000 tons of supplies to Iran and over the other routes to Russia. Besides this, many hundreds of airplanes were delivered under their own power. . . . Back in the first nine months of our Soviet program, when most of the cargo had to go around the North Cape, fifteen per cent of everything we sent to Russia by all routes ended up on the bottom of the ocean. In the year that followed, we cut the losses from fifteen per cent to two."²

Lend-Lease deliveries played a positive role. However, these deliveries were very small in comparison with the output of the Soviet Union's war industry, and this was admitted by Stettinius, whose report said that "the people of the Soviet Union have so far waged their magnificent battle against the Nazis principally with their own arms".³

Stettinius was right. In 1943 alone the Soviet iron and steel industry produced 5.6 million tons of pig iron, 8.5 million tons of steel and 5.7 million tons of rolled metal. During that year the Soviet Union mined 93.1 million tons of coal,

¹ *Izvestia*, March 16, 1943.

² E. R. Stettinius, *Lend-Lease Weapon for Victory*, New York, 1944, p. 221.

³ *Congressional Record*, 78th Congress, Vol. 89, Part 2, Washington 1943, p. 1700.

produced 32,300 million kwh of electric power and built 35,000 aircraft and 24,000 tanks.

* * *

In the spring of 1943 the Soviet Army completed the large-scale military operations that liberated a big part of the Soviet Union's territory and the Allies completed their operation in North Africa. The vital question now was the further course of military operations: where the next blow against the fascist bloc would be delivered and which operations were to be given priority. How soon the war would end depended to a high degree on the co-ordinated action of the three main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition—the USSR, the USA and Britain. Yet, the new planning conference called in Washington was again a bilateral one.

The conference, given the code name Trident, was called on the initiative of the British. The Soviet Government was not even asked to send its representatives, although the USSR was vitally concerned in the planning of future military operations.

The conference opened on May 12. On the first day Churchill made an explicit statement on the advantages of the so-called Balkan variant of the second front. He said that military operations in Sicily would prove most effective. Recalling Germany's capitulation in 1918 and the collapse of the Triple Alliance soon after Bulgaria's withdrawal, the Prime Minister expressed the view that Italy's forced retirement from the war might have the same effect in 1943. He also believed that the capture of the Italian navy in accordance with his plan would improve the situation in the Pacific, since the British would be able to transfer their navy to that area after the Mediterranean operation had been completed. In short, Churchill exaggerated and embellished the prospects of the Mediterranean or Balkan variant in every way and decisively objected to a cross-Channel operation in 1943.

Roosevelt did not object to the postponement of the second front to 1944—he could not object to it since it was the logical consequence of Casablanca and subsequent events.

The Washington Conference once again showed that there were substantial differences between the British and American viewpoints. Although they agreed to postpone the opening of a second front, there were fierce debates on other strategic issues. The Americans felt that the British were attempt-

ing to draw them into actions which would have political results only of secondary importance to the United States. At that time the Balkans—Greece, Turkey and the islands in the Mediterranean—where Britain had held firm positions for centuries, were of far less interest to the American rulers than West European problems. Besides, the USA was afraid that the adoption of British strategy might divert its attention from the Pacific theatre of operations, which it considered more important. Therefore, when the British proposed that the relevant decision should state that the operations in Sicily would be followed by a landing in Italy and an extension of military operations to Yugoslavia and Greece, the American representatives were against it. Anglo-American differences were revealed even more clearly when the situation in the Pacific came up for discussion. The Americans endeavoured to push forward decisions which would restore the position of US imperialism in the Far East and in the Pacific as quickly as possible. The British representatives opposed this in every way. This gave rise to diplomatic battles between the British and the Americans.

However, despite these differences, at all war-time conferences, the British and the Americans always succeeded in achieving understanding and agreement on all cardinal issues. In this case too a co-ordinated decision on future Allied operations was adopted on May 25. This time the date for the opening of a second front in West Europe was set for May 1, 1944. The participants in the Washington talks agreed to organise a landing operation in Sicily in order to knock Italy out of the war. The plans for military operations in the Pacific theatre, for aerial bombings, and so on, were also co-ordinated.

The participants also exchanged views on some political problems. The British Prime Minister re-stated his ideas on the post-war order of the world and again developed his plan of setting up a series of anti-Soviet federations—the Balkan, Danube and other federations.

After the conference the US President informed Moscow of the decisions adopted at the talks. The Soviet Government was officially informed for the first time of the decision to once again postpone the Allied landing in West Europe, although this decision had actually been adopted in January 1943.

In its reply the Soviet Government said:

"Your decision creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which, straining all its resources, for the past two years has been engaged against the main forces of Germany and her satellites, and leaves the Soviet Army, which is fighting not only for its country, but also for its Allies, to do the job alone, almost single-handed, against an enemy that is still very strong and formidable."¹

The letter to the President stated emphatically that the Soviet Government "cannot align itself with this decision, which, moreover, was adopted without its participation and without any attempt at a joint discussion of this highly important matter. . .".²

The letters sent subsequently to Churchill were worded even more strongly. In his letter of June 24 Stalin reminded Churchill of all the promises the Allies had made to open a second front first in 1942 and then in 1943, quoting relevant passages from Churchill's messages. Stalin's message said that as a result of the position of the Allies on the second front issue it was not only a question of the Soviet Government's disappointment but of preserving faith in the Allies, which was being subjected to serious tests.

... "One should not forget," Stalin's message noted, "that it is a question of saving millions of lives in the occupied areas of Western Europe and Russia and of reducing the enormous sacrifices of the Soviet armies, compared with which the sacrifices of the Anglo-American armies are insignificant."³

The new postponement of the second front enabled the Hitlerites to launch their third summer offensive against the Soviet Army without being forced to divide their forces appreciably.

The above warrants the conclusion that London and Washington did not take advantage of the extraordinarily favourable conditions created by the historical victory of the Soviet armed forces in the summer of 1943 and the first Allied successes in the North Africa for a further extension and consolidation of the anti-Hitler coalition. The US and British governments broke all their promises to open a second front. All this, naturally, exerted a negative effect on the relations of the three main powers in the anti-Hitler coalition.

¹ *Correspondence. . .*, Vol. II, p. 70.

² *Ibid.*, p. 71.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

The Soviet-American talks on the Finnish question and the further aggravation of the so-called Polish problem, resulting from the policy of provocations pursued by the reactionary Polish émigrés and their patrons in London and Washington had a major impact on Soviet-Anglo-American relations in the first half of 1943.

The US Government had declared war on Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania on June 5, 1942. On that day Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, announced that this step did not affect the relations between the USA and Finland. This singling out of Finland from among Hitler Germany's satellites could not be explained solely by the fact that the Finnish Government had not followed the example of Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, who had declared war on the USA as early as December 1941; the main thing was Washington's perennial policy of support for Finland's reactionary rulers.

Official US circles endeavoured to justify the policy of the Finnish government in every way.

In connection with the sharp deterioration of the position of the fascist troops on the Soviet-German front, the Finnish reactionary rulers decided to take advantage of their connections in Washington to secure favourable peace terms.

In December 1943 President Ryti of Finland informed the US ambassador to Helsinki of Finland's intention to withdraw from the war. The US Government immediately decided to act as mediator between the Soviet Union and Finland, and on January 29, 1943 Standley, the US ambassador to Moscow, informed Molotov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, of the US position on the Finnish problem. He claimed that the US Government had to give great attention to American-Finnish relations because a large number of Finnish émigrés lived in the United States. Standley emphasised that the USA continued to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Finland because it endeavoured to use them to influence the Finnish Government's policy. "There are indications. . .," the US ambassador noted, "that the Finnish Government believes that it might be advisable to end the war with Russia before the collapse of Germany."¹ The Soviet answer was that the entire responsibility for the Soviet-

¹ W. H. Standley and A. A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*. . . , pp. 445-46.

Finnish war lay with the Finnish Government which had attacked the USSR in violation of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of 1940. At the same time the Soviet Government studied the American statement attentively and inquired how the Finnish rulers conceived a peaceful settlement with the USSR. When the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs asked if the US Government had any information as to the terms on which the Finns would end the war against the USSR, the American Ambassador stated that he did not possess such information.

In a talk at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on March 12, 1942 Standley returned to the question of Finland in the war and submitted a memorandum in which the US Government officially offered to act as mediator in negotiations between the USSR and Finland. However, this document pointed out that the US Government did not wish to negotiate with the Finnish Government before it was informed on the Soviet Government's position on that matter.

Having received the American offer to mediate, the Soviet Government, in strict compliance with the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 26, 1942, asked the British Government about its view on Finland's possible withdrawal from the war.

After the British Government had informed the Soviet Government that it did not object to negotiations on Finland's withdrawal from the war, the Soviet Government submitted to the US Government its terms for an armistice with Finland. The terms provided that Finland should immediately break with Germany and that German troops should be withdrawn from Finland; that the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of 1940 should be restored; that the Finnish Army be demobilised and reduced to a peace-time strength; and that Finland should make reparations for at least 50 per cent of the damages she had inflicted on the Soviet Union in the war. At the same time the Soviet Government emphasised that the Soviet Union did not wish to take the initiative in the talks with Finland and submitted the above armistice terms only for the information of the US Government.

When it forwarded the armistice terms to the US Government, the Soviet Government did not really believe that an agreement could be reached with the Finnish Government then in power. The Soviet Government's doubts as to the sincerity of the Finnish rulers proved well-founded. Helsinki

soon withdrew its offer and Washington approved of this decision of the Finnish rulers.

The talks about Finland's withdrawal from the war, begun at the initiative of the US Government, ended in the most unexpected way. On April 12, 1943, during his regular meeting with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Standley said that the US Government would not pursue its initiative and would not take any steps to facilitate the establishment of direct contacts between the Soviet and the Finnish governments.¹

In reply to Molotov's question as to what had caused this sudden change in the US Government's position, Ambassador Standley handed him a note addressed by the US Government to the Soviet Government and said: "I know only what's written there; my Government feels that it can be more helpful if it can bring about direct contact between the Russian and Finnish governments, instead of having a third party as an intermediary."²

What explained the US Government's change of heart? The main reason for it was apparently Washington's unwillingness to support the Soviet terms for an armistice with Finland. This is confirmed by a statement made by Standley, who during a discussion at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said: "...if my Government feels that the Soviet terms are completely impossible, it will not pursue the matter further. My Government must feel that there is a possible basis for successful negotiations before it undertakes them."³

Thus, the US Government's initiative in the Finnish question, taken at the beginning of 1943, was not crowned with success. This was not only because the "peace probe" of the Finnish rulers was insincere from the very start but also because the American ruling circles were essentially solidary behind the demands of the Finnish rulers. The American initiative was a probe and not a serious attempt to establish

¹ On April 10, 1943 the Finnish Government submitted to the US mission in Helsinki a note in which it informed the US Government that it refused to carry on the proposed negotiations because they supposedly "could not achieve sound guarantees for Finland's future". (For particulars see Toivo T. Kaila, *Sotaansyylisemme Süütyttaoiossa*, Pervoo, siv. 167-86).

² W. H. Standley and A. A. Ageton, op. cit., p. 462.

³ Ibid., p. 460.

peace between the USSR and Finland. Naturally, if as a result of the Soviet-American talks in 1943 Finland had ended the war this would have greatly improved Soviet-Finnish relations. But this was precisely what Finland's reactionary rulers and their patrons in Washington wanted to avoid.

Although during the Soviet-American negotiations the Americans had declared that they intended to break off diplomatic relations with Finland, the USA did not change its policy with respect to Finland in 1943 and US diplomatic relations with Finland were broken off only in June 1944.

This attitude of the USA did not benefit the Finnish people. On the contrary, it was instrumental in extending Finland's ruinous participation in the fascist bloc.

* * *

The victory of the Soviet armed forces in the winter of 1943 raised the international prestige of the USSR and created favourable conditions for Soviet diplomacy. During that period diplomatic relations were established or re-established between the USSR and the Netherlands, Australia, Cuba, Luxemburg, Canada, Mexico, Uruguay, Columbia and other countries. Agreements were reached between the Soviet Government and the governments of some countries to reorganise their diplomatic missions into embassies. The contacts of the USSR with the other United Nations expanded substantially. The entire democratic world expressed its admiration for the Soviet people's heroism in the struggle against fascism.

The Polish Emigré Government's policy with respect to the Soviet Union was out of tune with the general trend towards the improvement and strengthening of the links between the Western powers and the USSR. Although it had concluded a number of Allied agreements with the Soviet Union, the Polish Government repeatedly refused to carry out its commitments. It adopted an irreconcilable position on the question of the border between the USSR and Poland and made this issue the cornerstone of its entire foreign policy. At a time when the Soviet state was in mortal danger, when the Hitlerite troops had reached the banks of the Volga and the Soviet Army had to exert titanic efforts to hold back the enemy's onslaught, the Polish troops which

had been formed in the Soviet Union with the assistance of the Soviet Government were transferred to Iran.

This obviated the need to continue the formation of Polish military units in the Soviet Union, and nullified the qualifications in the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 29, 1939. The Soviet Government saw no reason for considering people of Polish nationality residing in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia as Polish citizens or why Soviet legislation should not apply to them. The Polish Government was informed of this on January 16, 1943. The Soviet note triggered off a new anti-Soviet campaign in the Polish reactionary press. This campaign showed that the émigré circles in London still refused to recognise the historical right of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples to be incorporated in their national states, and that they were continuing to pursue the annexationist policy the Polish rulers had followed after the First World War.

A special statement of the Polish Government in February 1943 declared: "... From the moment the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 30, 1941 was signed, the Polish Government has consistently defended the view that the status quo existing up to September 1, 1939 will be preserved in the question of the borders between Poland and Soviet Russia. . . ." The Polish Government alleged that its stand complied with the Atlantic Charter. The statement falsely assessed Poland's policy towards the Soviet Union on the eve of the Second World War. The authors of the statement asserted that Poland had "constantly expressed willingness to co-operate with the Soviet Union". It is, however, common knowledge that Poland, part of the "cordon sanitaire" before the Second World War, was one of the main tools of the capitalist world's anti-Soviet policy.

The publication of the above statement was paralleled by an intensification of the Polish Emigré Government's diplomatic activity in the USA and Britain. The Polish representatives asked Washington and London to exert pressure on the Soviet Government to induce the Soviet Union to hand over some Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands to Poland.

This shows that the Polish Government in London was guided not by the desire to establish friendly neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union, not by the desire to rectify the historical injustice that had been committed after the

First World War when the fate of the West Ukrainians and Byelorussians was decided, and not by the will to develop genuinely Allied relations between the USSR and Poland, but that it pursued only one aim—to keep the Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian lands at any cost. Besides, there were many cases when various Polish officials in the USSR were apprehended for espionage, anti-Soviet propaganda and profiteering. All this shows that Soviet-Polish relations were not normal at the time and that the Polish émigré circles were to blame for it.

In reply to the above statement of the Polish Government the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) stated on March 3, 1943: "Soviet leading circles consider that the denial to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples of the right to reunite with their brothers proves the presence of imperialist trends, while the reference of the Polish Government to the Atlantic Charter is entirely groundless. The Atlantic Charter does not entitle anybody to encroach upon the national rights of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians but, on the contrary, proceeds from the principles of recognition of the national rights of peoples, including those of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples.

Even Lord Curzon, a British Minister known for his unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet Union, understood that Poland could not lay claim to Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands and "the Polish ruling circles do not want to show understanding in this issue to this day".¹

It would seem that after the decisive battles waged by the Soviet armed forces in the winter of 1942-43, when the Soviet Army began its victorious advance to the West and every day drew closer to the borders of Poland, bringing liberation to its people, the Polish Government would seriously revise its position and look for ways to improve Soviet-Polish relations. Actually, however, the opposite was the case. In the spring of 1943 the Polish Government immediately joined in the smear campaign unleashed by fascist propaganda in connection with the "Katyn affair", which was let loose with the intent of undermining the unity of the Allies. The Polish Government did all it could to fan up anti-Soviet passions. It not only failed to refute the fascist slander against the USSR but did not even consider it

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. I, pp. 449-50.

necessary to ask the Soviet Government for explanations in this connection. This position of the Polish émigré circles aroused just indignation in the Soviet Union.

The anti-Soviet campaign launched by the Polish press in unison with the Hitlerite press was condemned not only in the USSR but also in England where most Polish newspapers were printed.

In view of the Polish Government's constant hostility towards the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government decided to break off diplomatic relations. On April 25, 1943 the Polish ambassador to Moscow was handed a note to that effect. In this note the Soviet Government expressed the conviction that the "hostile campaign against the Soviet Union has been launched by the Polish Government with the intent of using Hitlerite slanderous falsifications to exert pressure on the Soviet Government in order to force it to make territorial concessions impairing the interests of Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Byelorussia and Soviet Lithuania". A few days before this the Soviet Government had informed London and Washington of its decision.

The USSR acted in strict compliance with its principles. Its stand was determined by the bitter experience it had gained in its relations with the Polish Emigré Government over a period of almost two years. To the very end that government did not understand that Poland's liberation and her revival as a strong and independent state could be achieved only by strengthening the mutual trust and friendship between the fraternal peoples of Poland and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government's decision to break off diplomatic relations with the Polish Emigré Government revealed the true face of that government for all the world to see. At the same time it cleared the air between the people of the Soviet Union and Poland and laid sound foundations for the indestructible friendship between the two peoples.

A Union of Polish Patriots was set up in the Soviet Union in the spring of 1943. Soon it began to form the *Kosciuszko* Division from among Polish patriots. In a telegram to the Soviet Government the Congress of the Union of Polish Patriots assured it that the Polish patriots "would fulfil their duty to the United Front of the Peoples fighting Hitlerite tyranny, especially by fulfilling their duty as soldiers and by fighting shoulder to shoulder with the heroic Red Army

against the German invaders, and would cement with their blood the fighting brotherhood and friendship between the Polish people and the peoples of the Soviet Union".¹

* * *

Having refused to carry out their principal Allied commitment—to open a second front—Washington and London essentially rejected the idea of a coalition strategy. The plans of military operations adopted by the American and British leaders did not correspond to the scale and the character of the battles on the Soviet-German front and were not co-ordinated with the Soviet Government. The separate discussion of the key problems of the world war and the separate diplomatic actions taken by the USA and Britain demonstrated that London and Washington underestimated the importance of the Soviet victories and the growing international prestige of the Soviet Union and failed to recognise it a decisive force in the coalition.

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy*. . . , Vol. I, p. 398.

CHAPTER XII

ITALY'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FASCIST BLOC AND INTER-ALLIED RELATIONS IN THE SUMMER OF 1943

In the summer of 1943 the Hitlerites, disregarding the heavy defeats and the losses in men and equipment they had sustained during the winter campaign of 1942-43, launched a new offensive in the area of the Kursk Bulge, which had been formed during the 1942 winter offensive of the Soviet Army.

The German armies began their offensive on July 5 and in places succeeded in penetrating Soviet defences to a depth of 15-30 km. However, the German troops met fierce resistance by the Soviet troops and on July 12 the Soviet armed forces, having first exhausted the enemy in defensive battles, launched a decisive counterattack.

Within three months the Soviet Army had in places driven the enemy back 400 to 450 km to the west.

Since an enormous number of men and a mass of fighting equipment had been concentrated by both sides on the Soviet-German front, the victories of the Soviet armed forces greatly promoted the success of Allied military operations in the Mediterranean area.

On July 10, 1943 the Anglo-American troops landed in Sicily in accordance with the Casablanca decision. The Italian garrison in Sicily offered practically no resistance and was taken prisoner, and the two German divisions on the island were able to evacuate to the Italian mainland practically unhindered and with few losses. Even though conditions were extremely favourable, the Allies needed no less than 38 days for the Sicilian operation. Many authors writing on military affairs blame tactical mistakes made by the Allies for the slow development of military operations. On August 18 Sicily was finally cleared of fascist troops.

By that time historical events had unfolded in Italy. Mussolini's fascist regime had been delivered a mortal blow. The

main role in this event was played by the Italian people. At the beginning of the war a number of anti-fascist, anti-war demonstrations had already occurred in Italy and at the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 these demonstrations became more frequent. The Italian people demanded ever more insistently that Italy withdraw from the war. On the initiative of the Italian Communist Party a National Front Committee was formed in Torino in October-November 1942. It incorporated all anti-fascist parties. The first big strikes broke out in Italy: during the first two months of 1943 there were 11 strikes in industrial centres in Northern Italy. The strike movement swept all over the country in March 1943. The people wanted peace. "By the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 peace became the cherished dream of all Italians, the only means of saving the Motherland,"¹ wrote Luigi Longo, a leader of the anti-fascist liberation movement.

By the spring of 1943 the country's economic position was also extremely aggravated. As it had no raw material base, Italian industry could not provide the supplies necessary to continue the war. Italy's economy came to depend fully on German coal and raw materials. Inflation hit the country and food rations were constantly decreasing. The internal state debt exceeded 500,000 million liras.

The Italian Army was also passing through a serious crisis. During the three years of Italy's participation in the Second World War her troops had taken part in the invasion of several countries. The unjust, aggressive nature of Italy's part in the war and her insufficient economic preparedness were responsible for the defeats of the Italian armies and for the heavy losses they sustained. By the summer of 1943 Italy had lost all her African possessions. An Italian army had been heavily defeated on the Soviet-German front and ten entire divisions utterly routed. Their total losses on the Soviet-German front amounted to about 150,000 officers and men.

The landing of the Anglo-American troops in Sicily made it clear that military operations would soon extend to continental Italy. Germany, whose forces were concentrated on the Soviet-German front, was unable to give Italy's fascist

¹ Luigi Longo, *Un Popolo alla macchia*, Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1947, p. 40.

rulers effective military assistance. All this plunged Italy into a deep political and military crisis by the spring of 1943.

Mussolini's complete inability to understand that there was no way out of the position into which the fascist government had fallen made some of his former supporters reach the conclusion that he would have to be removed. The various groups of conspirators among Italy's ruling circles were out to preserve the system in the country and to remove from office only those who had seriously compromised themselves.

One of the groups was headed by Count Dino Grandi, Ciano and other top officials of the fascist party. Another group, formed among the military and royal circles, was headed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, General Ambrosio and the Duke of Acquarone.

The conspirators decided to dissociate themselves from Mussolini and attempt to reach a direct agreement with Britain and the USA. Of great importance were the talks held between the Vatican and functionaries of the Catholic Church of the USA. In spring 1943 the American Cardinal Francis J. Spellman visited the Vatican where he discussed the possibility of Italy's withdrawal from the war with Cardinal Luigi Maglione, the State Secretary of the Vatican. Count Ciano, who in February 1943 was appointed ambassador to the Vatican, met his British opposite, who spoke in favour of a rapid coup to remove Mussolini from office.

On July 24, 1943 a meeting of the leaders of the fascist party criticised Mussolini and a majority vote of non-confidence in him was passed. Mussolini could not understand the true reason for Italy's deep political crisis—a result of the complete bankruptcy of Italian fascism's domestic and foreign policy.

The next afternoon, July 25, Mussolini was summoned by the King and asked to resign. Marshal Pietro Badoglio was appointed Prime Minister.

The Italian people expected that the overthrow of the Mussolini's dictatorship would put an end to the war he had started and that peace would be restored. However, in its very first proclamation the new government declared that it intended to continue the war.

On the home front the Badoglio Government considered its main duty the suppression of the revolutionary, anti-fascist movement of the Italian people.

The events in Italy forced the US and British Governments to accelerate the preparations for the landing of Allied forces on the Italian mainland and to work out a common Anglo-American policy towards Italy. This policy question had been discussed as early as March 1943 during Eden's talks at Washington.

Now it was being crystallised, the American Government gave formal recognition to the predominant interests of Britain in the Mediterranean area. The principal aims were to preserve the capitalist system in Italy, to support the political and social establishments which had existed in the country under fascism and to suppress the Italian people's national liberation movement.

The special proclamation to the Italian people, issued by Roosevelt and Churchill in mid-July 1943, did level some criticism at the fascist regime but stressed mainly Mussolini's personal responsibility. The section touching on Italy's prospects made practically no mention of the need for serious democratic changes in the country's political and economic life. It was therefore only logical that the formation of the new government headed by Badoglio, a member of Italy's ruling elite, and the preservation of the House of Savoy were approved by London and Washington.

In view of the fluid conditions in Italy, Churchill proposed to do everything to preserve and strengthen the extant political system. He expressed his intents frankly in the British Parliament, saying that Britain and the USA should not act in any way which would "break down the whole structure and expression of the Italian state".¹ The preservation of the monarchy was one of the main conditions for the realisation of the British plans for Italy. "In the British view of the post-war world, then, a monarchist Italy was a definite feature," wrote Norman Kogan, an American scholar.² In Britain and the USA plans were discussed to deprive Italy of some of her islands in the Mediterranean and of her colonial possessions.

Even though British statesmen at that time did not openly speak of their intention to establish British overlordship in the Italian colonial possessions, the propaganda campaign

¹ H. Feis, op. cit., p. 157.

² Norman Kogan, *Italy and the Allies*, Cambridge, 1956, p. 19.

in the British press and the increased attention to that problem of the British ruling circles left no doubt as to their intentions.

From a military point of view the imminent Allied operation in Italy was an important part of the general strategic conception of the British and US governments. It will be remembered that delay of major military operations in Western Europe and the intention to apply the main forces of the Allies only in the final stages of the Second World War was basic in that conception. Besides, the landing in Italy was regarded by many British and American officials as a first step in the organisation of Allied military operations on the Balkan Peninsula. The Italian campaign was a convenient springboard for their penetration into the Balkans.

The US and British governments endeavoured to use Italy for the realisation of their notorious Balkan strategy. This apparently explains also the fact that Calabria, and not Central or North Italy, was chosen for the landing.

* * *

Although conditions favoured Italy's withdrawal from the war, the Badoglio Government did not break with Germany. This had fateful consequences for the country. The inaction of the Italians enabled the Hitlerites to transfer 11 new major military formations to Italy in August 1943. This also led to intensified Anglo-American aerial bombing, by which the Allies endeavoured to hasten Italy's unconditional surrender.

The Badoglio Government's policy was dictated by the class interests of Italy's ruling elite, who wanted to keep the reactionaries in power and to prevent a people's revolution.

It expected that by delaying the break with Hitler, it would be able to extort the best possible terms for Italy's withdrawal from the war and that England and America could be made to give up their demand for Italy's unconditional surrender.

Early in August 1943 Badoglio sent out a peace feeler. On August 4 the Marchese D'Ajeta, Counselor of the Italian Legation at Lisbon, met Sir Ronald Campbell, the British ambassador to Portugal, and told him that the Italian Government wished to withdraw from the war and break with Germany.

As it feared the consequences of an open break with Germany, the Italian Government asked for the co-operation and assistance of the Allied troops. Reporting on the meeting, Campbell wrote to London: "D'Ajeta never from start to finish made any mention of peace terms and his whole story . . . was no more than a plea that we should save Italy from the Germans (as well as from herself), and do it as quickly as possible."¹ Since the Lisbon feeler ended in failure, the Badoglio Government sent a new mission to the Allies. This time the talks were held in Tangiers. Here Alberto Berio, an Italian diplomat, said that Italy was ready to discuss armistice terms and asked the Allies to attack the Balkan Peninsula in order to compel the German troops to evacuate Italy and thereby to facilitate Italy's withdrawal from the Hitler coalition.

While London and Washington studied the information about the Lisbon and Tangiers peace feelers, General Giuseppe Castellano arrived in Madrid as Badoglio's emissary. He presented letters of recommendation from the British mission to the Vatican to Sir Samuel Hoare, the British ambassador to Madrid. Castellano said that he was authorised to inform the Allies that Italy was willing to surrender unconditionally if she were allowed to join the Allies. A few days later, on August 18, Castellano met representatives of Eisenhower's Staff, who informed him that Italy's unconditional surrender would be accepted on the basis of the so-called short terms.

The "short terms" for Italy's capitulation, as well as the "exhaustive" or "long" terms, were worked out by the Allies in the summer of 1943, in connection with the military operations shortly to be launched on the Italian mainland. The "short terms" contained 11 items and concerned mainly military affairs. Among them were such conditions as the immediate cessation of hostilities by the Italian armed forces, the immediate transfer of the Italian Fleet and Italian Air Force to points designated by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval bases on Italian territory and the immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all the fronts of the Second World War.²

¹ H. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

² *United States and Italy. 1936-1946. Documentary Record*, Washington, 1946, pp. 51-52.

The "long terms" for the capitulation of Italy contained 44 items and stated not only the military but also the political, economic and financial conditions for Italy's withdrawal from the war.¹

After he had received the text of the "short terms", Castellano prepared to return to Italy for a report to his Government. However, before he left General Zanussi, another emissary from Badoglio, arrived in Lisbon.

The dispatch of numerous missions to the Allies, often with contradictory instructions, the continued co-operation with the Germans and the manoeuvring of the Badoglio Government showed that its policy was inconsistent. Its main aim was to prevent the further development of the democratic movement in the country. Being afraid of the growing authority of the Italian Communist Party, the government was willing to arrange any deal.

On August 31 Castellano had a new meeting with representatives of the Allied Command in Sicily. He said that the Badoglio Government was willing to accept the "short terms" for the capitulation but that it urgently requested that the announcement of its capitulation be postponed until the Allies had secured decisive supremacy in Italy and their troops were near Rome or to the north of it and able to defend the Badoglio Government. The Allies considered this proviso unacceptable and demanded that the capitulation be signed, agreeing only to postpone its proclamation until the main Allied forces landed in Italy. On September 3, 1943, in Sicily, Castellano signed the "short terms" on behalf of Italy and General Walter Bedell Smith, on behalf of the United Nations. The landing of Allied forces in Calabria, Southern Italy, began on that day.

The text of the "short terms" was published on September 8 and Badoglio had to issue an order over the radio to the Italian troops to cease all military action on all fronts. The King and the Head of Government and their retinue fled from the capital to an area occupied by the Anglo-American troops and soon established themselves in Brindisi. On September 12, the Committee of National Liberation published a declaration condemning the Head of Government and the King for dereliction of duty at this responsible moment in the fight against the German invader.²

¹ Ibid., pp. 55-64.

² N. Kogan, *Italy and the Allies*, p. 38.

In its policy towards Italy the Soviet Government was guided by the desire to give the Italian people every possible help in ending the aggressive, criminal war that had been unleashed by the Mussolini clique, and in exterminating the fascist system in the country. The news about Mussolini's overthrow was approved throughout the Soviet Union. At the same time the Soviet public understood that the change of government in Italy had not resulted in the political and social changes the Italian people so much desired.

Although the Soviet Government was very much interested in the peaceful settlement with Italy, especially since Italy was a participant in the war against the USSR, the Allies did not inform the Soviet Government about their political and military plans concerning Italy for a long time.

The Soviet Government was given some information on Italian matters only at the end of July 1943. On July 30, 1943 Eden handed the Soviet embassy in London a document addressed to the Soviet Government outlining the "comprehensive terms" for Italy's capitulation. A few days later, on August 3, Alexander Clark Kerr, the British ambassador to Moscow, communicated the "short terms" to the Soviet Government and on August 26 a document setting forth the full text of the "comprehensive terms" was transmitted to it. The Soviet Government studied these documents and approved of them in principle. A note addressed to General Eisenhower on August 27, 1943 empowered him to sign the surrender terms on behalf of the Soviet Government.¹ Generally, the Allies informed the Soviet Government after the event, or else gave it insufficient information. A Soviet message to London and Washington read: "To date it has been like this: the USA and Britain reach agreement between themselves while the USSR is informed of the agreement between the two powers as a third party looking passively on."²

With this situation in mind the Soviet Government proposed the establishment of a military and political commission of the representatives of the Three Powers to consider all questions concerning talks with the governments of countries severing their ties with Germany.

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 389.

² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

First of all it was proposed that the commission consider questions linked with the armistice terms for Italy and then check that these terms were observed and discuss other matters pertaining to the pursuit of a co-ordinated policy in Italy.

In the Soviet note to the American Government of September 25, 1943 the tasks of the military and political commission were described as follows: In the view of the Soviet Government the tasks of the military and political commission should include the co-ordination and guidance of the activity of all military bodies being organised on enemy territory and of all civilian authorities of the Allies dealing with questions of the armistice and control over the observance of the armistice terms and, hence, the functions of the military and political commission should include the issue from time to time of instructions and directives on military, political and administrative matters to the Badoglio Government, while all military and operational questions should be fully within the province of the Allied commander-in-chief.

The need for such a commission was most pressing because this was the first time that one of Germany's allies was deserting the sinking fascist ship. The separate talks of the representatives of the Anglo-American command with various missions of the Badoglio Government showed once again that it was essential to set up a political body that would ensure the pursuit of a co-ordinated policy by the main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.

It should be particularly noted that the proposal to set up a military and political commission was made by the Soviet Union. It proves that the Soviet Union strove for close co-operation with the Allies on all questions connected with the withdrawal of Germany's allies from the fascist bloc. At the same time it demonstrated that the USSR stood for a co-ordinated policy on matters relating to peace settlements with former enemy states. Finally, the proposal to set up a military and political commission proved the Soviet Government's firm intention to participate actively in international life after the war.

Although it was urgently necessary to reach a co-ordinated decision on the establishment of a military and political commission, the British and US governments were in no hurry to reply. Ignoring the Soviet proposal, the US Pres-

ident in his message to Moscow early in September 1943 recommended that the Soviet Government send a military representative to General Eisenhower's staff. This answer naturally did not satisfy the Soviet Government which insisted on more extensive co-operation of the Three Powers in the Italian question.

As before, the Soviet Government considered the setting up of a military and political commission of the Three Powers a matter of prime importance. It proposed that the commission should initially have its seat in Sicily or in Algiers. In its message to the US Government of September 8, 1943 it noted that the sending of a Soviet officer to General Eisenhower's staff could in no way substitute for a military and political commission, which was necessary to give on the spot guidance in the talks with Italy.

While delaying the establishment of a military and political commission, the Allies set up an Allied Control Commission on the basis of item 37 of the "comprehensive terms" for the capitulation of Italy. This was subordinated to General Eisenhower, and was entrusted with the functions of the so-called Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT), an Anglo-American body administering Italian territories liberated from the enemy troops between 1943 and 1945. AMGOT had very wide powers and its activity embraced all fields of government in Italy.

Thus, the Supreme Commander of the British-American armed forces and the bodies subordinated to him took charge of the functions which the Soviet Government had proposed should be concentrated in the hands of an Allied military and political commission.

This unilateral action taken by the British and US governments was designed to curtail the functions of the military and political commission and to make it, in fact, no more than an information service. At the end of September agreement was finally reached on the setting up of a military and political commission which, in addition to representatives from the governments of the USSR, USA and Great Britain, was to ensure the participation of the French Committee of National Liberation. The ultimate structure and functions of that commission were defined somewhat later by the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Britain and the USA held in Moscow in October 1943.

The Allied offensive in Italy developed very slowly. The

inactivity of the Anglo-American troops in Italy revived the hopes of the Italian fascists that they would be able to regain power. Mussolini, who on July 26 had been interned by the Badoglio Government, was released on September 12 by the Germans and taken by plane to Munich. Some time later he proclaimed an "Italian Social Republic" in the village of Salo, on the shore of Lake Garda, and headed a "government" which relied completely on nazi support.

The fate of the Berlin-Rome Axis was foredoomed even though the Allied offensive in Italy developed slowly. Eisenhower and Badoglio signed the "exhaustive terms" for Italy's capitulation on September 29, 1943 in Malta. In compliance with the insistent demands of the Italian people the Badoglio Government declared war on Germany on October 13, 1943. The Joint Statement of the governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, recognising Italy as a co-belligerent in the war, said: "The three Governments acknowledge the Italian Government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have."¹ Italy, Nazi Germany's chief ally in Europe, thus dropped out of the Hitlerite bloc, joined the United Nations and declared war on Germany. The very fact of Italy's withdrawal from the fascist bloc was of great international importance. It proved the weakness of the Hitler coalition and showed that it was unstable and that its inevitable disintegration had set in. Italy's withdrawal from the fascist bloc worsened also Hitler Germany's military and political situation.

The victories of the Soviet Army in the summer of 1943 decisively changed the military-strategic situation in favour of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition. They created favourable conditions for the struggle of the Italian people against fascism and helped the Anglo-American troops in their military operations in Italy.

"Anybody who has even the faintest understanding of politics", *Izvestia* wrote on September 9, 1943, "realises that

¹ *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. VI, July 1943-June 1944, Boston, 1944, p. 178.

the blows of the Red Army are struck at the chest, head, heart and brain of the fascist monster, and that if its left hand is paralysed today this is because it has been wounded in the head. It is precisely because Hitler is suffering defeat on the Soviet front, because the Red Army has beaten the 'trumps' the German command played in summer, that Italy's fate has been decided, and that Italy's fate will overtake also Germany's other accomplices."

Italy's withdrawal from the fascist bloc was not only an event of international importance but also one that opened a new chapter in the history of the Italian people and state.

* * *

While the summer operations of 1943 were in full swing Churchill and Roosevelt agreed on a new meeting. The Anglo-American conference held in Quebec (Canada) between August 14 and 24, dealt mainly with problems of strategy in the European and Pacific theatres of operations. The developments on the Soviet-German front in the summer of 1943 made it necessary for the Allies to revise many of their plans.

A series of consultations between British and American military advisers and the Foreign Ministers were arranged at Quebec, and their results were considered at plenary sessions with the participation of the President and the Prime Minister.

Controversy on questions of military strategy broke out almost immediately after the conference opened. Churchill again proposed an invasion through the Balkans instead of a cross-Channel landing in Europe. He thought that the conditions in the summer of 1943 were particularly favourable for the implementation of his "Balkan variant". The successful completion of the Allied operation in Sicily and the concentration of large Anglo-American forces and military equipment in the Mediterranean area created, in his view, favourable prospects for successful military operations on the Balkan Peninsula. One of the arguments of the British Prime Minister was that as a result of Italy's withdrawal from the fascist bloc, Italian troops would cease their resistance on the Balkan Peninsula and would be withdrawn from the Balkans, and this would facilitate the task of the Allied forces and enable them to land in Greece, Yugoslavia and the islands in the Aegean Sea.

Churchill maintained that a landing in Western Europe might involve frightful casualties. He argued that a victory under such conditions would be barren for Britain, for "she could never recover from it and would be so weakened that the Soviet Union would inevitably dominate the European continent".¹

In addition to being openly anti-Soviet, Churchill's notorious Balkan variant was an obvious attempt to preserve Britain's dominant position in Europe.

Many American politicians who essentially shared the British Prime Minister's anti-Soviet plans for Eastern Europe, nevertheless favoured the opening of a second front in France. They believed that this would, first, lead to a relatively quick end of military operations in Europe and enable the Americans to transfer their forces to the Pacific, which they considered particularly important and, secondly, would strengthen US influence in Western Europe and considerably weaken Britain's position in Europe.

The overall strategic concept of the Allies was given at the Quebec Conference as follows:

"... In co-operation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

"... Simultaneously, in co-operation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be enforced.

"... Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in co-operation with other Pacific Powers, and if possible with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan."²

After lengthy consideration of the prospects of various military operations, the participants in the Quebec Conference adopted a decision to continue the Italian campaign and to begin practical preparations for the opening of a second front in Europe on May 1, 1944 (the Overlord operation). The concluding report made by the Combined Chiefs

¹ *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II, New York, 1948, p. 1291.

² John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, Vol. V, August 1943-September 1944, London, 1956, p. 1.

of Staff at Quebec on August 24, 1943 outlined the importance and order of all intended Allied operations.

A decision was taken at Quebec to supplement the invasion in the north of France by a landing in the Toulon-Marseilles area in the south of France. Considering that it would weaken the military efforts in the East Mediterranean, the British Government objected to this operation (first called Anvil and then Dragoon) right up to the moment when it was finally carried out on August 15, 1944.

The conference devoted a lot of time to discussing operations in the Pacific. At the time the Quebec Conference was opened, the Allies were preparing to mount military operations against the Japanese in northern Burma. Thirteen thousand Chinese troops were transferred to India for that purpose. Since only air communications linked China and India at the time these troops were flown across by the US air force. The US Government decided to build the Burma Road between Burma and India while the offensive in Burma was in progress. In the winter of 1942-43 the builders blazed the road through the jungle at the cost of enormous effort. The building of the Burma Road, like all other operations in Burma, did not meet with the approval of the British Government, which considered it to be an attempt by the Americans to penetrate into Burma. Prompted by the desire to divert the attention of the Americans to places remote from their possessions, the British proposed at Quebec to effect a landing on Sumatra instead of the offensive in Burma.

Even though the British command had about 15 divisions in India it did not want to apply them in Burma. These troops were designed to keep the national liberation movement in India at bay. The British Government wanted its main forces in the Pacific area to be intact when the war ended to enable them to foil all attempts of the peoples in the British colonies to win freedom and independence, and thus to preserve the British colonial Empire.

The Quebec Conference approved in principle the plan of operations against the Gilberts, Marshalls, Ponape and Eastern Carolines in the Central Pacific area and against eastern New Guinea, the Admiralty Islands, the Bismarcks, the Palaus and Guam in southwest Pacific.¹

¹ See J. Ehrman, *op. cit.*, p. 581.

After the Quebec Conference the President and Prime Minister informed Moscow of the decisions reached at the talks in connection with military operations in 1943-44. The message read:

"... We shall continue the bomber offensive against Germany from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy on a rapidly increasing scale. The objectives of this air attack will be to destroy the air combat strength of Germany, to dislocate her military, economic and industrial system and to prepare the way for an invasion across the Channel. A large-scale building-up of American forces in the United Kingdom is now under way. It will provide an assemblage force of American and British divisions for operations across the Channel. Once a bridgehead on the Continent has been secured it will be reinforced steadily by additional American troops at the rate of from three to five divisions a month. This operation will be the primary American and British air and ground effort against the Axis. The war in the Mediterranean is to be pressed vigorously. In that area our objectives will be the elimination of Italy from the Axis alliance and the occupation of Italy, as well as of Corsica and Sardinia, as bases for operations against Germany. In the Balkans operations will be limited to the supply by air and sea transport of the Balkan guerrillas, minor commando raids and the bombarding of strategic objectives. In the Pacific and in Southeast Asia we shall accelerate our operations against Japan. Our purposes are to exhaust the air, naval and shipping resources of Japan, to cut her communications and to secure bases from which Japan proper may be bombed."¹

Among the political questions discussed in Quebec the so-called "French problem" aroused particularly hot controversy. After long drawn out negotiations the French Committee of National Liberation, headed by generals Giraud and de Gaulle, was finally set up early in June 1943 in Algiers. It proclaimed itself the central French government and asked the Allies to recognise it as such. The Soviet Government took a favourable view of the Committee's request. The Americans, however, and the British after them, adopted an unfriendly attitude towards the Committee and refused to recognise it, saying that the Allied command was not

¹ *Correspondence...* Vol. I, pp. 150-51.

certain "... what action General de Gaulle may undertake or of his friendly feelings for the Allies".¹

In its message to London on June 27, 1943 the Soviet Government pointed out that it had the impression that the British Government "had thus far supported General de Gaulle, which seemed only natural, since from the moment of the French surrender General de Gaulle had headed the anti-Hitler forces of France and the struggle of the French patriots united around Fighting France. Subsequent developments in North Africa, beginning with November 1942, and the part played by French armed forces under generals Giraud and de Gaulle in the operations carried out by the Anglo-American troops provided the conditions for their union. All the Allies concurred that this union was advisable, and there were no doubts as to this point. Recognition of the existing united agency in the form of the French National Committee of Liberation was to be a result of the aspirations displayed and the efforts made in this matter. All the more so because, after the French National Committee in the persons of Giraud and de Gaulle officially requested Allied recognition of the Committee, the Soviet Government felt that refusal to grant the request would be incomprehensible to French public opinion".²

However, since the British Government had asked that the recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation be postponed and promised that it would not take any separate action in this connection, the Soviet Government agreed to put off its recognition of the Committee. In the meantime the British Government endeavoured to work out a general formula for the recognition of the French Committee and in 1943 submitted two variants of that formula to the Soviet Government (in the notes of July 26 and August 5, 1943). Both these formulas sidetracked the question of recognising the French Committee as the representative of the state interests of the French Republic. The second formula (August 5) differed from the first in its introduction, which said that the British were ready to recognise the French Committee not as the sole body representing the French people but as one of such bodies. It should be noted also that instead of speaking of the restoration of the prin-

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 138.

² *Ibid.*, p. 139.

cial freedoms, laws of the republic and the republican régime, as mentioned in the declaration of the French Committee of National Liberation, the introduction simply said that "the French people must themselves decide the question of their system and set up their own government".¹ This formula reflected the wish of the English not to assume any commitments with respect to the French Committee but to keep the position open after the landing of Allied forces. It is also interesting to note that the first English formula for the Committee's recognition said that the Committee will provide "such opportunities in the military and economic fields in the territories under its control as may be required by the governments of the *United Nations* [my italics—*U. I.*],"² while the second formula worded this as follows: "The Committee will naturally provide any military and economic opportunities and guarantees on the territories governed by it that will be required by the *Government of the United States and the Government of His Majesty in the United Kingdom...*" (my italics—*U.I.*).³

All these documents proved that the British and American governments endeavoured to limit the authority and competency of the French Committee of National Liberation in every way. Attempting to impose their will on the French Committee, the US Government demanded, even in the form of an ultimatum, that General Giraud be appointed commander-in-chief of the French armed forces and there was talk of de Gaulle's possible retirement.⁴

The stand taken by Britain and the USA evoked much criticism by the world public. The refusal to recognise the French Committee of National Liberation was not conducive to uniting the efforts of all French patriots in the struggle against nazism. The Anglo-American talks therefore turned once again to the French problem. At Quebec the Americans maintained their attitude of hostility toward de Gaulle and refused to recognise the French Committee as the representative of the state interests of the French Republic. All attempts to reach a common formula failed. It was therefore decided that every government would itself determine

¹ *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 186.

² *Ibid.*, p. 185.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

its attitude towards the Committee and would send corresponding statements to de Gaulle and Giraud. The USSR was informed of this decision on August 26, 1943. The Soviet Government declared that it had decided "...to recognise the French Committee of National Liberation as the representative of the state interests of the French Republic, and leader of all French patriots fighting against Hitlerite tyranny, and to exchange with it plenipotentiary representatives".¹

Simultaneously the British Government sent a memorandum to the French Committee of National Liberation, and the US President published a declaration on the recognition of the Committee. However, the formulae of the two governments contained a number of reservations.

The English and American formulae emphasised that the French Committee of National Liberation was only a body acting within certain limits during the war and only on those French territories that "recognised its authority".² This formula gave the British and US governments every opportunity to stop French possessions of special interest to the English and American monopolies from joining the Fighting France movement.

The Soviet formula for the recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation differed essentially from the Anglo-American in that it recognised the Committee fully and unconditionally. Garraut, the representative of the French Committee in the USSR, thanked the Soviet Government for this friendly step and emphasised that "this recognition expressed in a clear and precise form has made an extraordinary impact on the French people".³

Among the other political issues discussed by Cordell Hull and Eden at Quebec was the future organisation of Germany. "The discussion indicated," Cordell Hull reminisced, "that the British, too, had been giving much thought to the possibility of bringing about, by natural forces, a separation of the German states..."⁴ During the discussions he showed Eden his draft for an international trusteeship of the colonial peoples, the adoption of which the British Government

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. I, p. 402.

² *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 190.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

⁴ *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II, p. 1234.

thought would weaken the British Empire. Eden obviously did not like the draft. "He said it was the word 'independence' that troubled him. He had to think of the British Empire system, which was built on the basis of Dominion and colonial status."¹

At the conference the American delegation submitted for consideration its draft of declaration on the establishment of an international organisation and on the responsibility of the Four Powers (the USA, Britain, the USSR and China) for the preservation of peace after the war against the fascist aggressors. The British approved the US draft and it was decided to discuss the adopted declaration with the Soviet Government.²

In connection with the then proceeding talks between the Anglo-American Command and the Badoglio Government, the Quebec Conference also discussed the conditions under which Italy would be allowed to withdraw from the fascist coalition and to join the Allies. It also elaborated problems of the government of countries liberated from Hitlerite occupation, the support to be given to émigré governments, and a number of other questions.

The ventilation of views on political issues at Quebec was of a preliminary nature. This was not because the participants were unable to reach agreement on them but simply because decisions taken without the participation of the Soviet Union would have had no practical sense. Only the active participation of the Soviet Union could guarantee a satisfactory solution of international issues.

The decisions on military matters constituted the principal significance of the Quebec Conference. The splendid victories of the Soviet Army in the summer of 1943 forced the US and British leaders to reconsider their plans.

Once again the Allies failed to take full advantage of the favourable conditions created by the Soviet Army's sweeping

¹ Ibid., p. 1237.

² Ibid., pp. 1238-39. McNeill characterised the position of the English on the question of the new international organisation as follows: "In accepting the American draft, Churchill in effect surrendered whatever hopes he had once had of pursuing an independent post-war policy. Instead of relying on Britain's own strength and the support of a friendly and consolidated Europe, Churchill decided to pin his hopes upon America. The United States, rather than a revived and reorganised Europe, would have to counterbalance Russian power." (W. H. McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 323.)

offensive. The airing of views at Quebec showed that the Western powers did not intend to give up their "minor operations" strategy, that they were still intent on dragging out the war. Operations in the Mediterranean and the Balkans once again held the most important place in the strategic plans of the two countries. The Overlord plan contained so many provisos that it was extremely doubtful whether it would be implemented at all. Yet, the Soviet military successes in 1943 made far-sighted statesmen in the capitalist countries realise that the Western powers would have to resort to active military operations, otherwise the Soviet armed forces would rout the enemy on their own and liberate not only the countries of Eastern but also of Western Europe. In a conversation with his son at the end of 1943 President Roosevelt said: "... by next spring, the way things are going in Russia now, may be a second front won't be necessary!"¹

* * *

Although the question of the relations between the USA and Britain with the Soviet Union did not stand on the agenda of the Quebec Conference, every problem discussed there had a definite bearing on inter-Allied relations in general.

The refusal to open a second front in Western Europe in 1943 could not but have an adverse effect on the relations of the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition. The position of the British and US governments on deliveries to the Soviet Union by the northern route also did nothing to improve inter-Allied relations.

In his message of March 30, 1943 Churchill informed the Soviet Government that London had decided to stop sending convoys by the northern route until September 1943. Churchill maintained that by way of compensation the British Government expected to increase the deliveries to the USSR via Iran and Vladivostok. Actually, however, the Soviet Union received much less than the volume stipulated in the protocol on deliveries. In this connection the Soviet Government informed London in the summer of 1943 that it was essential to resume the dispatch of convoys with cargoes destined for the Soviet Union's northern ports, since this was the shortest and quickest way of getting supplies to the front. In its memorandum of August 25, 1943 the Soviet Government

¹ Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, New York, 1946, p. 156.

noted that whereas the movement of convoys by the northern route was interrupted for three months last year, the most unfavourable year as regards their safeguarding, this year, when the Allies have achieved considerable successes in the struggle against the German naval forces, the interruption lasted six months, which could not but seriously affect the satisfaction of the requirements of the Soviet front.

In violation of its promises the British Government declared early in September that a resumption of convoys by the northern route would be impossible in September and that it was in no position to state when they would be resumed.

The British Government motivated its refusal to send the convoys by the northern route again by the danger they faced in the North Atlantic due to the attacks by German submarines and aircraft operating from bases in Norway.

This statement of the British Government, however, was not borne out by the facts and was contradicted even by the statements made in London and Washington. The message sent by the President and Prime Minister to Moscow from Quebec on August 19, 1943, for example, said that Britain had begun negotiations with Portugal regarding the use of a "life-belt" to fight German submarines. The message said: "The possession of the 'life-belt' is of great importance to the sea war. The U-boats had quitted the North Atlantic *where convoys have been running without loss since the middle of May* and have concentrated on the southern route [author's italics.—U.I.]"¹ Besides, on September 11, 1943, the US Office of War Information and the British Ministry of Information published a joint statement on naval losses in August 1943 which said inter alia: "It is significant that the enemy made virtually no attempt to attack North Atlantic shipping and opportunities for attacking the U-boats have been relatively few."²

The facts clearly show that already by May 1943 it was no longer dangerous for convoys to sail through the North Atlantic to the Soviet Union's northern ports. In any case, the conditions in the North Atlantic were much more favourable in 1943 than they had been in 1942. Besides, it was easier in 1943 to organise convoys since the Italian navy no longer posed a threat to shipping in the Mediterranean and British

¹ *Correspondence* . . . , Vol. II, p. 82.

² *The New York Times*, September 11, 1943, p. 5.

convoys therefore no longer needed to go round the Cape. This shortened the route to the Middle East substantially and thus freed escort vessels, which could be used to strengthen the convoys by the northern route.

The memorandum of September 20, 1943 sent by the Soviet Government to London said that the further delay in the dispatch of deliveries by the northern route, which was motivated by the danger of sailing in the North Atlantic, was completely unfounded. The need for the urgent dispatch of convoys to the USSR by this route was the more insistent since that year the conditions for the delivery of cargoes to the USSR by the northern route were more favourable than they had been the year before. The Soviet Union received by this route considerably less cargoes than it had in 1942. This can be seen from the following figures: in 1942 the Soviet Union received 764,337 tons of cargoes from Britain and the USA via the northern route, and in 1943 only 245,097 tons, that is, less than one-third of the 1942 volume.

Thus, the position of the British and US governments in the summer of 1943 on the question of deliveries, another key question in inter-Allied relations, also did nothing to promote the development and strengthening of co-operation between the three main anti-Hitler states.

The violation of Allied commitments by the British and US governments, which strained Soviet-Anglo-American relations, was a matter of grave concern to people everywhere. The British and American peoples continued to insist on active military operations by the Allies and the opening of a second front in Europe. In the summer of 1943 there was a new flood of meetings and demonstrations for the opening of the second front both in the USA and Britain. For example, 41 delegates, representing 38,425 of the British merchant seamen, assembled in Holburn Hall in London and adopted the decision to see the Prime Minister on the day of his return from Quebec in order to demand that he urgently convoke Parliament to consider the immediate organisation of the second front and the calling of a Three-Power conference.¹

A meeting held at that time by Metropolitan Vickers workers passed a resolution declaring:

"We demand... decisive action in Western Europe that will compel the Nazis to divert forces from the Eastern

¹ *Daily Worker*, September 4, 1943, p. 1.

front.”¹ Similar resolutions were adopted by many other organisations of British workers including the shop stewards’ committee of a Vickers Armstrong factory, the works committee of a North of England Royal Ordnance Factory and a Lancashire Steel Works Committee.

Many British and American newspapers, reflecting the concern felt by the British and American public over a possible deterioration of relations between the main Allies, demanded that a meeting of the three Heads of State be organised. Such wishes were expressed in the leaders of the British papers *Daily Herald* of August 13 and *Daily Telegraph* of August 14, 1943. The latter, for example, said that a meeting with the leaders of the Soviet Government was extremely necessary in order to strengthen the co-operation between the USSR, Britain and the USA and to co-ordinate their policies.

The British and American governments naturally could not disregard these public sentiments. At the beginning of August 1943 the British Government addressed a letter to Moscow proposing that a Three-Power conference be held in Scotland. In reply, the Soviet Government proposed that a conference of the foreign ministers of the three countries be organised at the earliest possible date. The Soviet proposal was accepted and the conference was scheduled for October 1943. It was also decided to convoke a conference of the Heads of the three Governments after the meeting of the foreign ministers.

¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER XIII

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE AND PROBLEMS OF THE POST-WAR ORDER OF THE WORLD

The victories of the Soviet Army in the summer and autumn of 1943, which marked a turning point in the history of the Second World War, and the successes of the Allies in the Mediterranean spelt doom for Germany and her vassals. The long-expected peace was slowly gathering shape on the political horizon.

International conferences and the various talks between the Soviet Union, the USA and Britain assigned increasing significance to questions of the post-war order of the world. The programme of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party on this matter given in Stalin's report on the 26th anniversary of the October Revolution provided for:

- 1) the liberation of the peoples of Europe from the fascist aggressors and assistance to them in the restoration of their national states;
- 2) the granting to the liberated people of the full right and liberty to decide the question of their state system themselves;
- 3) the severe punishment of those responsible for the war;
- 4) the creation of conditions preventing new aggression by Germany;
- 5) the ensurance of long-term economic, political and cultural co-operation between the European peoples.

The attitude of the Soviet Government was dictated by its desire to ensure a just and enduring peace. Soviet diplomacy defended the democratic principles of peace, ensuing from the socialist nature of the Soviet state, at the various talks, conferences and meetings held in 1943 and afterwards.

One of the key tasks facing the states of the anti-Hitler coalition in the Second World War was to abolish the consequences of fascist aggression, especially the territorial changes in Europe made on the eve and during the war by the

fascist powers. These territorial changes flagrantly violated the right of nations to self-determination, the sovereignty of national states and the most elementary democratic rights of the European peoples.

Germany, Japan and Italy had liquidated whole countries and had deprived many European and Asian peoples of their sovereignty. Albania and Austria had been wiped off the map as independent states; Yugoslavia, a state uniting the southern Slavs, had disappeared and the various puppet states set up on its ruins were ruled entirely by the Axis powers. Czechoslovakia, the state of the Western Slavs, had also ceased to exist. Bohemia had become part of the German empire and a puppet government of fascist agents had been set up in Slovakia. The Polish state had been annihilated and its people were suffering heavy trials. The Japanese militarists had seized enormous territories in China and enslaved many Asian peoples.

The position of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the question of territories and state frontiers was formulated by Lenin. In deciding territorial questions the USSR was guided first and foremost by the interests of the peoples themselves and those of the world democratic and socialist movement.

In establishing new borders the Soviet Union consistently strove to abolish the consequences of the fascist New Order. In the war-time talks with the US and British governments the Soviet Union attempted to revoke some of the unjust territorial decisions adopted after the First World War and particularly to right the historical wrong to the young Soviet state committed during the first years of its existence.

The Soviet Government insisted on international recognition of the changes made in the Soviet Union's western borders on the eve of the Soviet-German war. These changes were based on the right of nations to self-determination and took into account ethnic, economic and other factors. Finally, the Soviet Union strove to establish just borders which would create the most favourable conditions for friendly relations between neighbouring states.

Alongside with the resolution of territorial issues, the settlement of various material claims for war damages is one of the most important and complicated problems of peace-making. In history many forms were used to compensate for the expenditure and losses caused by war, including spoils,

contributions, ransom, restitutions, reparations, and so on. The form in which material claims are met is indissolubly linked with the causes and the nature of the war.

Since the Second World War was unleashed by the fascist states and was, as far as they were concerned, an aggressive, predatory war, and since they had flagrantly violated all norms of international law, the responsibility for all material damages inflicted by the war fell on the fascist powers. During the war the Soviet Government had repeatedly declared that Hitler Germany and her allies would be held fully responsible for all damages. The statement of the Soviet Government made on the day of Germany's treacherous attack against the USSR, on June 22, 1941, said: "All responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union falls fully and completely upon the German fascist rulers."¹ This proposition was given legal force by a special Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 2, 1942 on the formation of an Extraordinary State Commission, which read: "The criminal Hitlerite Government, the command of the German Army and their henchmen bear full criminal and material responsibility for all . . . monstrous crimes committed by the German fascist invaders and their accomplices, and for all the material damages caused by them to Soviet citizens, collective farms, co-operatives and other public organisations, state enterprises and institutions of the Soviet Union."²

The responsibility of the fascist invaders was also emphasised in the statements of the American and British governments, notably in the speeches of the President on August 21 and October 7, 1942, and of the British Prime Minister on September 8, 1942. Particularly important were the joint Anglo-Soviet-American declarations on this issue. Among them were the declaration of the United Nations of January 13, 1942 on the punishment of war crimes, the declaration of January 5, 1943 on the invalidity of all transactions with regard to the property, rights and interests of the United Nations made by the fascist powers, and some other documents.

Thus, the responsibility of the fascist powers for the dam-

¹ *Pravda*, June 23, 1941.

² *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. I, p. 323.

age and losses caused by the war ensued from the aggressive, predatory nature of the war they had unleashed.

Seeing that Germany and her satellites had unleashed a criminal war against the United Nations, the Soviet Union and the countries Allied with it were entitled by international law to demand full indemnity for all the damages they had suffered in the war. In its approach to this question the Soviet Government also took into account the fact that in some cases the damages inflicted by the fascist powers exceeded their national wealth. Therefore, the claim for full indemnity for war damages would have meant economic catastrophe for the vanquished countries and placed an exceedingly heavy burden on the shoulders of their peoples, and would have harmed international relations in general. In advancing claims for war indemnification, the Soviet Government therefore carefully took into account the economic possibilities and resources of the defeated countries.

The conference of the Foreign Ministers' of the Soviet Union, United States and Britain (Molotov, Cordell Hull and Eden), convoked on the initiative of the Soviet Government, was held between October 19 and 30, 1943 in Moscow. It discussed vital questions of the war and the post-war settlement.

At the request of the Soviet Union the conference first discussed the question of a speedy end to the war. In this connection the Soviet delegation proposed that the governments of Great Britain and the USA should take in 1943 such urgent measures as may be required to launch an invasion of northern France by the Anglo-American armies, which in conjunction with the powerful blows of the Soviet armies at the main forces of the German Army on the Soviet-German front would radically undermine Germany's military-strategic position and thereby decisively hasten the end of the war. The Soviet delegation demanded a clear-cut answer to whether the promise given by the Allies in June 1943 to open a second front in the spring of 1944 remained in force. The British delegation received a special instruction from London to answer the question asked by the Soviet side. The instruction greatly exaggerated the difficulties of a landing in northern France. In keeping with the above instruction, Hastings Ismay, a British general, gave a very vague reply to the question about the second front. The Soviet delegates at the conference once again emphasised that a second front

in Western Europe was urgently needed and that the Soviet Union was disinterested in any other operations which could in any way divert the attention and forces of the Allies from the implementation of the chief task—the cross-Channel landing.

The discussion of further military operations showed that despite the assurances given by the Allies the possibility that the opening of the second front would once again be postponed could not be discounted. The Soviet Government, therefore, decided to revive the question at the imminent meeting of the three Heads of Government. The Anglo-Soviet-American communiqué released on November 1, 1943 said that the governments of the Three Powers had recognised “in the first place . . . the importance of hastening the end of the war . . .”. At the Moscow Tripartite Conference the governments of the three Great Powers for the first time jointly confirmed the formula of the unconditional surrender of the fascist states as the only condition for ending the war. In the Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, which will be dealt with in greater detail below, the governments of the USSR, USA, Britain and China declared their resolve “. . . to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender”.¹

At the Moscow Conference the governments of the USSR, USA and Britain unanimously declared “. . . that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interest of all peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and co-operation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted”.²

In order to co-ordinate their policies on key problems of the post-war order of the world, and notably of problems connected with the withdrawal of individual members from the fascist coalition, the Moscow Conference decided to set up two international commissions—the Advisory Council for Italy and the European Advisory Commission. One of them—the European Advisory Commission—was charged with the

¹ *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. VI, pp. 227, 229.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 227-28.

task of studying European problems linked with the end of military operations, which the three governments will consider advisable to hand over to it, and to give joint advice to the three governments on these problems. The commission had its permanent seat in London. The members of this commission were to be given by their governments full information on political and military events affecting the work of these governments. "The governments of the Three Powers desire," the decision of the Moscow Conference read, "that the commission should as one of its first tasks work out as quickly as possible detailed advice on the terms of surrender that will be submitted to each of the European countries with which any of the Three Powers is at war, and also with respect to the mechanism required to ensure the fulfilment of these terms."¹

Some questions relating to Eastern Europe were also considered. The British and American representatives tried hard to obtain the consent of the USSR for their plans to set up various federations in that part of Europe. Besides, the US and British representatives hoped that they would be able to persuade the USSR to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Mikolajczyk's Polish Emigré Government.

The US and British governments raised this issue not because they wanted to improve Soviet-Polish relations but because they wanted to make sure that the London émigré cabinet would assume power in liberated Poland. The positions of the USA and Britain on Soviet-Polish relations were essentially the same as the anti-Soviet position of the Polish Emigré Government.

"In recent months the Soviet armies had advanced some two hundred miles on the central and southern sectors of the front. Once they were into Poland, our negotiating power, slender as it was anyway, would amount to very little," Eden noted in his memoirs.²

The British and US proposal was not supported by the Soviet side and no understanding was reached. The Soviet delegation stated that the USSR firmly supported the idea of an independent Poland and was interested in having a Polish Government that would pursue a policy of friendship towards the Soviet Union. The attempt of the British and

¹ *Soviet-French Relations*. . . , p. 525.

² *The Eden Memoirs, The Reckoning*, pp. 415-16.

American delegations to set up various federations, contradicting the interests of the East European countries, also failed.

The Soviet view on the proposed federations was based not on abstract theory but on concrete and realistic premises. The Soviet delegation said that it was dangerous, prematurely and artificially to incorporate the small countries into preconceived groupings, and that there should be no outside interference or pressure when the peoples of Europe would decide their fate after the war. The Soviet delegation pointed out that the attempts to set up federal governments which did not represent the genuine will of their peoples meant to impose on them decisions contrary to their wishes and aspirations. Finally, the Soviet point of view expressed at the conference decisively rejected all attempts to revive the hostile policy of a "cordon sanitaire", which was behind the federations proposed by the Western powers. The position of the USSR on the federation issue, which proceeded from the view that the liberation of the small countries and the re-establishment of their independence and sovereignty was one of the key tasks of the post-war settlement, fully coincided with the interests of the peoples of those countries and the interests of ensuring an enduring peace and security.

In discussing this question the Soviet Government also decisively opposed any division of Europe into spheres of influence.

The Foreign Ministers exchanged information on the peace feelers put out by the Axis satellites. Thus, Eden reported that the British Government had received from Rumania overtures suggesting a separate peace. Since such attempts might be repeated, the Allies decided that they would inform and consult each other on all sorts of peace feelers coming from governments, separate groupings or persons in countries with which they were respectively at war.

The Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers considered also other important political issues.

In particular, the members of the conference unanimously agreed on the need to set up an international organisation for securing peace after the war. In this connection a special declaration was drawn up at the conference by the USSR, USA, Britain and China on the question of general security. Since this was a document of importance to the entire anti-Hitler coalition, a representative of China was invited to sign

the adopted declaration. The document stated that after the war the Allies would direct their efforts at achieving peace and security, that an international organisation to ensure peace and security would be set up in the nearest future and that in their post-war policy the Allies would not use military means to solve controversial questions without preliminary mutual consultations. In this declaration the governments of the Four Powers solemnly declared that they would consult each other and co-operate among themselves and with other members of the United Nations in order to conclude an effective general agreement regulating armaments after the war.

This first joint declaration by the Great Powers on the need to set up an international organisation to safeguard peace and the security of the peoples reflected the big changes that had taken place in the international situation since the outbreak of the Second World War. The documents relating to the signing of the Atlantic Charter show that in the summer of 1941 the American Government intended after the war to set up "an international police force" as an instrument for safeguarding peace. This police force was to consist of the armed forces of the USA and Great Britain. At that time the US Government, supported by the British Government, essentially opposed the establishment of an international organisation of equal states. The victories of the Soviet Army in 1942 and 1943 and the growing international prestige of the USSR made the plans for an Anglo-American police force after the war unrealistic. The British and US governments were compelled to reject the idea of Anglo-American domination in the post-war security system and to agree to the plan of a broad international organisation.

The declaration adopted at the Moscow Conference was of historical importance—it proclaimed the basic principles of the future United Nations Organisation. The extensive system of international co-operation and security was to enlist the active participation of all peace-loving states, great and small.

In connection with the discussion of the future international organisation the Foreign Ministers also considered the colonial problem. The anti-imperialist liberation struggle of the Indian people did much to bring this question to the attention of the Foreign Ministers. Wishing to make political capital, the American delegation submitted to the conference

a proposal on the colonial problem, based on the declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942 and the Atlantic Charter. "I now brought up for discussion," Cordell Hull wrote later, "the proposed Declaration by the United Nations dealing with dependent peoples—the inhabitants of colonies and mandates—and proclaiming the necessity to lead them gradually to a condition of independence. This was the document we had prepared at the State Department and had given Eden at the time of his visit to the United States (in March)."¹

The American proposal on the colonial problem was essentially aimed at a redivision of the colonies and hence directed against the interests of Great Britain and France.

That is why Eden, as Hull reports, "said that he was not prepared to discuss the question, but he could state that his Government was not in agreement with the views set forth in my paper".²

The Foreign Ministers discussed Italy. This was because at the time of the conference part of Italy had already been liberated from fascist troops and the American and British authorities continued to pursue a separate, anti-democratic policy there. From the very beginning the actions of the Anglo-American occupation authorities in Italy came under fire from Italian democratic circles and world public opinion. In this connection the Soviet delegation asked for comprehensive information on how the armistice agreement with Italy was being observed and submitted proposals on measures to ensure the liquidation of fascism in Italy and to promote her democratic development.

The Declaration on Italy adopted on the initiative of the Soviet delegation emphasised that "the policy of the Allies with respect to Italy should be based on the basic principle: that fascism and all its baneful influence and consequences must be fully destroyed and that the Italian people must be given every opportunity to organise government and other institutions based on democratic principles". The practical measures outlined in the Declaration on Italy provided for the democratisation of the government by including in it representatives of the strata of the Italian people who had always opposed fascism; the reinstatement of all democratic free-

¹ *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* . . . , Vol. II, p. 1304.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1305.

doms of the Italian people; the liquidation of institutions and organisations set up by the fascist regime; the removal from public organisations and administrative organs of all fascists and fascist sympathisers; the liberation of all political prisoners of the fascist regime and the granting to them of a full amnesty; the setting up of democratic local government bodies and the arrest and the prosecution by law of all fascist leaders and other persons guilty of war crimes. The declaration stressed that "nothing limited the right of the Italian people to choose its own form of government subsequently".¹

The conference adopted the decision to reorganise the military-political commission into an Advisory Council for Italy. The latter was initially to be formed of representatives of the USSR, USA, Britain and the French Committee of National Liberation. In view of the special interests of Greece and Yugoslavia, resulting from the aggression against them by fascist Italy, representatives of these countries were to be included in the Council. The Council was to be extensively informed on current Italian affairs and would give advice to the relevant governments and the French Committee of National Liberation on questions relating to Italy, with the exception of such concerning military operations, the decision of the conference read. The Council was charged with checking the activity of the control mechanism which was implementing the capitulation terms in Italy. The Council, the decision continued, would give recommendation to the Allied commander-in-chief in his capacity of chairman of the Allied Control Commission on questions of general policy linked with the Commission's work. For that purpose it would maintain close contact with the Allied commander-in-chief, in his capacity of chairman of the control commission, and would be entitled to ask him for information or explanations on matters concerning the Council's work.

The decision to set up a European Advisory Commission and the Advisory Council for Italy were of great political importance. They showed first of all that the main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition were willing to co-operate on major political issues relating to the post-war settlement. Neither the European Advisory Commission nor the Advisory Council for Italy were competent to deal with questions relating to the conduct of the war. Both these bodies were to

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. I, p. 417.

co-ordinate the actions of the USSR, USA and Britain on various aspects of European politics. It should be particularly noted that the setting up of international bodies at the Moscow Conference was based on the Soviet proposal on the organisation of a military-political commission.

In addition to the establishment of Allied bodies the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, USA and Britain agreed at the Moscow Conference on a special diplomatic procedure for tripartite consultations to ensure constant co-operation on various political issues. Reporting on this procedure, Eden said: "We did at the Conference set on foot what is, I think, in diplomatic procedure something of a novelty, (that is to say,) we agreed that on occasions there might be problems which we should wish to submit to one of the capitals where the Foreign Secretary concerned and the two Ambassadors could meet together and discuss and advise upon it. Sometimes that might happen in London, sometimes in Washington, sometimes in Moscow. It would be something in the nature of an *ad hoc* tripartite conference..."¹

The conference of the Foreign Ministers adopted the Declaration on Austria proposed by the Soviet Government which said that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination, that the governments of the Three Powers regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938, as null and void. The declaration stressed that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria. It said that the Austrian people could ease their fate by active struggle against Hitler's fascism. This was one of the first documents in which the states of the anti-Hitler coalition declared null and void an act of aggression committed by Hitler on the eve of the war.

The conference also looked into a number of other problems.

At one of the meetings Cordell Hull proposed to bring about the political decentralisation of Germany. Soon the American delegation went even further and suggested to dismember Germany which, as the head of the US delegation said, "coincides with US interests". The British delegation expressed a similar viewpoint.

¹ *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, London, 1943, Vol. 393, col. 1327.

Eden said at the conference that Britain would like to see Germany divided into separate states, notably to have Prussia separated from the other parts of Germany. Therefore, he said, the British should encourage the separatist movements that may develop in Germany after the war. He said that it was difficult to foresee what means there would be to implement these aims and whether it would be possible to attain them by use of force. He said that he left the question open, but an implementation of these aims by use of force should not be discounted.

Cordell Hull noted that the "highest spheres" of the USA "are inclined to resort to the dismemberment of Germany" but that "it would be best in the meantime to adopt a wait-and-see attitude". The Soviet side said that the "matter was being studied".¹ The US delegation submitted several proposals relating to international economic links after the war. In these proposals, as in the Atlantic Charter earlier, the US Government endeavoured to establish such principles as "equal opportunities", "unrestricted trade". The proposals of the US delegation were considered but no decisions were adopted on them.

The British delegation submitted a document "Basic Scheme for the Administration of Liberated France". According to it the supreme power in liberated France was to belong to the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces, while the civilian administration was to be carried out by French citizens but under the control of the commander-in-chief, and was to be limited. In handling civilian affairs the commander-in-chief was to consult the French military mission at his headquarters.² Thus, this scheme to all intents and purposes debarred the French Committee of National Liberation from the administration of liberated France and envisaged an occupation regime on her territory. The British proposal was approved by the US side. Basically it expressed the principles with respect to France which the Americans had laid down in their memorandum to the British Government in September 1943. That memorandum said:

"The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces shall have all the rights of military occupation authorities resulting

¹ *The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1945*, Moscow, 1966, p. 407.

² *Soviet-French Relations...*, pp. 222-24.

from the state of war. In his actions he will be guided by the absence of a sovereign government in France.”¹ The French Committee of National Liberation was not acquainted with the British draft and since Eden was attempting to have it approved by the Moscow Conference, it was obvious that what he was really after was to obtain the consent of the Soviet Union to the unlimited power of the Anglo-American organs in France. The Soviet Government naturally could not agree to it and as a result the “basic scheme” was not approved. According to a decision of the conference the document was to be submitted to the European Advisory Commission for consideration.

On the initiative of the Soviet Government the conference published the Three-Power Declaration on German Atrocities. Throughout the war the Soviet Government had published documentary proof of atrocities committed by the German fascist invaders on Soviet territory and had emphasised that all responsibility for them lay with the Hitlerite leaders and those who perpetrated these crimes.

The Moscow Declaration of the Governments of the USSR, USA and Britain stated that information was coming in that the Hitlerite armed forces were continuing to perpetrate atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions in the occupied countries. In connection with the eviction of the Hitlerites from some of the territories they had occupied, the three Allied powers, on behalf of all the United Nations, solemnly warned that German officers, soldiers and members of the nazi Party responsible for these crimes would be handed over for trial to the countries where they had committed their crimes, and would be punished in accordance with the laws of those countries. “Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood,” the declaration read, “beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.”²

The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers was a political event of first-rank importance, particularly so because it showed that the USSR, USA and Britain were able to co-ordinate the most intricate questions pertaining not only to

¹ *Soviet-French Relations*. . . , p. 27.

² *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy*. . . , Vol. I, p. 419.

the war but also to the post-war settlement. The conference showed that co-operation between the three countries could ensure a successful solution of all international problems. This is what Eden had in mind when, on November 11, 1943, he said in the British Parliament: "As many Members will know, it is a common diplomatic experience to find that problems which seem to present insuperable difficulties when there is no confidence and no mutual trust can fall into a different perspective when once a real basis of good will has been established. Then perhaps you can get that reasonable compromise which in other conditions appears hopeless of realisation. I count it . . . as the major success of the Moscow Conference, not that we agreed these documents, not even that we set up this machinery, great though the importance which I attach to it, but that it did provide a basis of good will and confidence between us."¹

The conference solved a number of pressing questions connected with the conduct of the war and also worked out general principles for preparing the post-war co-operation between big and small states interested in ensuring national security and universal peace.

The positive results of the Moscow Conference were appreciated greatly by the people of the world for they set at rest all rumours about the deterioration of relations between the main states of the anti-Hitler coalition that had been abroad in the summer of 1943.

True, there were some in Washington and London who were dissatisfied with the results of the Moscow Conference, notably the anti-Soviet circles who wanted to establish a "cordon sanitaire" against the USSR in Eastern Europe. But they did not determine the political climate for the vast majority of people favoured the spirit of co-operation exhibited at the Moscow Conference.

* * *

Among the many problems discussed at the Moscow Conference was the question of the Soviet-Czechoslovakian treaty. It was placed on the conference agenda not because difficulties had arisen in Soviet-Czechoslovakian relations but because the British Government insisted on interfering.

¹ *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, Vol. 393, col. 1329.

During the war the relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were regulated and developed in accordance with the bilateral agreement of July 18, 1941. In this agreement the Soviet Union recognised Czechoslovakia and her government unreservedly. In June 1942 the Soviet Government reaffirmed its full recognition of Czechoslovakia's pre-Munich borders and its refusal to recognise any changes that had been made in Czechoslovakia's frontiers in 1938 and 1939.¹ The Soviet Union's firm stand on this question also helped to nullify the consequences of the Munich deal on an international scale.

In 1941-42 a number of agreements were signed between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to carry out the decisions on the formation of Czechoslovakian military units in the Soviet Union, including the military agreement (September 27, 1941), the agreement on Soviet loans to maintain Czechoslovakian units in the Soviet Union (January 22, 1942), the agreement on the granting by the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia of finance, materiel and services needed to maintain the Czechoslovakian units in the USSR (May 28, 1942).

The expanding co-operation between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was approved by the Czechoslovakian people who realised that the alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union guaranteed the re-establishment of the independence of democratic Czechoslovakia. In this connection the Czechoslovakian Government declared that it intended to pursue its policy aimed at the signing of a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.

Relevant negotiations were begun in the spring of 1943 between Benes and Bogomolov, the Soviet ambassador to the Allied governments in London. The Soviet Government gave an affirmative reply to Benes's question "whether the Soviet Government considered it possible to sign a treaty of mutual assistance with the Czechoslovakian Government before the end of this war". During the preliminary talks it appeared that there also existed a community of interests on

¹ While in London, Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had a talk with Benes on June 9, 1942 in which he told him that the Soviet Government had always opposed Munich and continued to do so, and that it definitely wanted to see Czechoslovakia restored with all the territories of which she had been robbed by Hitler. (See *Soviet-Czechoslovakian Relations*. . . , p. 55.)

a number of other problems, particularly on the question of the vigorous suppression of Germany's Drang nach Osten policy.

Benes informed London and Washington of his negotiations with the Soviet Government on a Soviet-Czechoslovakian treaty. In the summer of 1943, Benes prepared to go to Moscow but nothing came of it at the time.

Reports appearing in the British and American press at that time indicated that the British Government did not approve of Benes's intention to visit Moscow. The commentator of the British *New Statesman and Nation* wrote that the British Foreign Minister had played a role in Benes's postponement of his Moscow trip. *The New York Times* commented that the British Government had unexpectedly advised Benes to postpone his trip to Moscow although he had already obtained consent in the USA. The British *News Chronicle* wrote in this connection that from the British point of view the draft treaty between the USSR and Czechoslovakia should be postponed at least until the nature and date of the end of the war can be clearly surmised. The newspaper motivated this point of view by saying that in accordance with generally recognised principles it was not recommended to sign agreements between the Great and small European powers in wartime, which might have an adverse effect on the ultimate conclusion of peace.

The attitude of the British Government aroused such great concern of the British public that Eden had to explain the Government's stand in Parliament on September 22, 1943. Eden admitted that the British Government essentially objected to Benes's intended trip to Moscow with a view to signing a Soviet-Czechoslovakian treaty on friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation on grounds of an understanding supposedly reached by both governments (the British and the Soviet) during the Anglo-Soviet talks in 1942.¹

This statement was untrue. There was no agreement between the British and Soviet governments precluding the signing of agreements by the USSR or Britain with any small state. During the Anglo-Soviet talks in May-June 1942, Eden really had proposed that agreement be reached that neither the Soviet Union nor Britain would sign treaties with Euro-

¹ *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, Vol. 392, col. 174-75.

pean states whose governments had their seats outside their national borders, without first consulting each other and co-ordinating the question. Some time after those talks the Soviet Government informed the British Government that it agreed with Eden's proposal in principle and, at the same time, asked the British Government to submit concrete proposals. No such proposals were received from the British Government and the matter thus did not proceed beyond a preliminary exchange of views.

At the Moscow Conference the Soviet delegation drew the attention of the British side to the fact that there were no grounds for objection to the signing of a Soviet-Czechoslovakian treaty and its text (which was tentatively drafted between the Soviet and Czechoslovak governments) was shown to Eden and Cordell Hull. As a result the British Government had to withdraw its objection.¹ London's stand on the question of the Soviet-Czechoslovakian treaty was further proof that British imperialism wanted to dominate European international relations.

Benes arrived in Moscow in December 1943. Central among the wide range of questions discussed in Moscow were matters connected with the joint struggle against Germany and measures to prevent the possibility of a recurrence of German aggression in the future. Problems discussed included the deportation of German nazis from Czechoslovakia, the frontiers of Czechoslovakia, military and economic co-operation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, the punishment of war criminals and Poland.²

Views were also exchanged on the possibility of Czechoslovakia being liberated by the Soviet Army and the competence of the Soviet military authorities in Czechoslovakia. "Throughout the talks," Benes wrote from London to Jan Masaryk, the Foreign Minister, "our partners never missed an opportunity to stress that internal questions of Czechoslovakia were her own affair, that the Soviet military authorities would not interfere in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs."³

Czechoslovakia's borders, Benes said at the press conference in Moscow, were discussed only in vague outline. "The discussion of this problem," he said, "was based on the fact

¹ *Soviet-Czechoslovakian Relations*. . . , p. 124.

² *Ibid.*, p. 139.

³ Dr. Edvard Beneš. *Paměti. Od Mnichova k nové válce a k novému vítězství*, Prague, 1948, p. 396.

that the Soviet Union never recognised Munich and everything that happened to Czechoslovakia after Munich. Therefore, the question of Munich cannot play any role in the interrelations between the Soviet Union and us, whereas we had to discuss this question with England.”¹

The most important single result of the Soviet-Czechoslovakian talks was the signing on December 12, 1943 of the treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war co-operation between the two countries.

The signing of this treaty was a major achievement of Soviet foreign policy. It foiled the plan of restoring the anti-Soviet “cordon sanitaire”.

The signing of the Soviet-Czechoslovakian treaty also helped to consolidate the anti-fascist forces in Czechoslovakia. “The policy of co-operation with the Soviet Union, which found its expression in the signing of the Czechoslovakian-Soviet treaty,” Jan Kren, a Czechoslovak scholar, noted, “was undoubtedly useful for our own liberation movement and for the unity of its ranks. The signing of the treaty with the Soviet Union laid the foundation for the co-operation between the Benes Government and the Communists, which helped to avert the danger of a split and civil war. . . .”²

¹ *Izvestia*, December 23, 1943.

² *Utoraya mirovaya voina. Obshchiye problemy* (The Second World War. General Problems), Moscow, 1966, p. 189.

CHAPTER XIV

SUMMIT MEETINGS: TEHERAN AND CAIRO

In the autumn of 1943 the Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Britain resumed correspondence with a view to organising a summit conference, at which the three leaders were to consider and co-ordinate military operations in 1944, exchange views on the post-war world, and also remove some of the differences that had arisen in Anglo-Soviet-American relations.

The Heads of Government agreed that a summit conference was essential, however, disagreement arose as to the place of the meeting. After much correspondence Teheran was chosen.

The British Prime Minister was willing to go anywhere for the meeting, including Teheran, but insistently urged that the regular Anglo-American conference should precede the summit meeting. Churchill alleged that this was necessary because many questions had cropped up in connection with the planning of operation Overlord at Quebec. Roosevelt knew only too well what Churchill was after, namely, to focus attention on the operations in the Mediterranean. However, at that moment, the notorious "Balkan strategy" did not fall in with Washington's interests.

Besides, Roosevelt, who had proposed that bilateral talks be held between the Soviet Union and America as early as in the summer of 1943, considered it undesirable to hold preliminary Anglo-American conversations to avoid giving any impression that he was "ganging up" (as the President put it—*U.I.*) on the Russians.¹

Thus, proceeding from military and political considerations the US was not interested in a prior conference with the British. However, since the British continued to

¹ J. Ehrman, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

insist on it, Roosevelt decided to change the nature of the preliminary talks which were to be held at Cairo. He invited representatives of the Soviet Union (the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and military advisers) and Chiang-Kai-shek, the Head of the Chinese Kuomintang Government. Churchill was indignant about the President's move.

Churchill now asked the US Government to meet British representatives at Malta to discuss plans of military operations in the Mediterranean before the Cairo talks. This time, however, Churchill did not have his way and the meeting of the Heads of the Government of the USA and Britain took place in Cairo.

The Cairo Conference (Sextant) was held between November 22 and 26, 1943. From the first days, the conference was attended by a Kuomintang delegation headed by Chiang-Kai-shek. As early as November 12, 1943 the Soviet Government informed the US Government that the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs would not participate.¹ Under the circumstances this was a wise decision. There was no point in Soviet participation in the Cairo Conference which was held on the eve of the summit meeting as the USSR might have been committed by the decisions of a conference at which it was to act mainly as an observer, seeing that the questions discussed concerned the Far East, and also because the USSR would be represented by a Minister while all the other delegations were headed by Heads of Government. What is more, the participation of the USSR in the discussion of military operations in the Pacific might have had undesirable effects on Soviet-Japanese relations.

What tasks did the participants in the Cairo Conference set themselves? John Ehrman asserts that the USA considered it essential to discuss the situation in the Far East and quickly to adopt definite strategical plans concerning the Pacific theatre of operations. "The most urgent necessity here," Ehrman writes, "was to define the role of China in the approach to Japan, which in turn seemed likely to depend on British action in Southeast Asia. The Americans therefore wished to discuss operations in that theatre before going on to Teheran, leaving the main discussion on European operations . . . to the later conference."²

¹ *Correspondence* . . . , Vol. II, p. 106.

² J. Ehrman, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

The British Government pursued different aims. It endeavoured to concentrate the talks on the European theatre of operations and to amend the decisions adopted at Quebec. According to Ehrman: "The British therefore envisaged a full discussion with the Americans on the relation of 'Overlord' to the Mediterranean, unfettered by the presence of a Russian delegation or observer."¹

The presence at Cairo of the Chiang Kai-shek delegation foiled the British plan. From the start the Cairo Conference focussed its attention on Far Eastern problems.

Let us now take a look at the general situation at the end of 1943.

The defeat of the Germans on the Soviet-German front wrecked not only the German plans but also dealt a crushing blow to the hopes of the Japanese ruling circles. The victory of the Soviet Army shattered all hopes of the Japanese militarists that they would be able to "use the favourable situation" on the Soviet-German front for an attack against the USSR, seize her territories and then, together with Germany, carry out offensive operations against the United States and Britain. Having lost the initiative in the Pacific theatre because of the heavy concentration of Japanese armed forces in northeast China, Japan had to switch to defensive action in the southern direction and the Japanese launched no more offensives after the end of 1942.

Between August 1942 and February 1943 battles were in progress between the Japanese and Americans for the island of Guadalcanal, and in February 1943, having suffered heavy losses, the Japanese evacuated the island. Small Japanese forces still operated in New Guinea but there too the Americans took the offensive in September 1943. The liberation of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands was completed only in September 1944.

The United States landed troops on Gilbert Islands and launched offensive operations in the Central Pacific area.

Despite the weak activity of the Anglo-American and Chiang Kai-shek troops the Japanese realised early in 1943 that their strategic plans had miscarried. The temporary successes of the Japanese in their offensive in the first stages of the war did not bring victory any nearer, nor did it affect the world situation. Primarily as a result of the victories

¹ J. Ehrman, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

of the Soviet Army on the Soviet-German front a turning point had been reached in the Second World War, and gradually all the forces of the anti-fascist coalition switched from defensive to offensive operations.

The talks on Far Eastern strategy in Cairo yielded no positive results. Roosevelt promised Chiang Kai-shek that a landing would be made in Southeast Asia but, owing to Britain's negative attitude, it was postponed. "Yet in fact everything was still undecided," McNeill wrote. "No honest agreement on strategy against Japan had resulted from the tripartite meeting."¹

At the insistence of the British delegation the Cairo Conference discussed also some questions of Allied strategy in Europe. The point of view of the British Government on these questions was set forth in a number of documents adopted in the autumn of 1943. A study of these documents leaves no doubt as to the fact that the British ruling circles were once again endeavouring to have the opening of a second front in northern France postponed.

The Cairo Conference did not adopt any decisions on Allied strategy in Europe. This was due mainly to the fact that on the eve of the summit conference such a decision would be rightly regarded as an unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union.

At the Cairo Conference the American representatives proposed to set up a united Anglo-American Supreme Command to direct all Allied operations against Germany both from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The British representatives decisively rejected this proposal because they preferred to preserve regional commands. Churchill sent a special message to Roosevelt asking him to withdraw the proposal. The USA had to comply with his request.

An important result of the Cairo Conference was the adoption by the representatives of the USA, Britain and China of a declaration which to some degree has not lost its relevance today. It should be noted that the declaration was published only after its approval by the Soviet delegation at the Teheran Conference. It read: "The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose

¹ W. H. McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."¹

This document should be regarded as a statement of US and British war aims in the Far East. It solemnly declared that the aim of the two countries was to stop Japan's aggression and to eliminate its consequences. It only specified China and Korea though it should be borne in mind that the Japanese were to be evicted also from all other territories they had seized by force. Condemning Japanese aggression, the signatories of the declaration proclaimed that they did not strive for conquests and had no desire for territorial expansion. The fate of the territories liberated from the Japanese could be surmised from the part referring to the future of Korea.

This part of the declaration was apparently intended to show that the signatories to the declaration would create conditions enabling individual countries to win their freedom and independence in due time. True, this statement referred only to Korea, other countries on the Asian mainland were not mentioned in it, but the mentioning of the need to create conditions enabling Korea to win its freedom and independence in due time was highly significant.

What prompted the Allies to adopt the Cairo Declaration? The reason was that the Second World War had disclosed the weakness of the colonial system, it had further aggravated the tensions within it and had extended and strengthened the national liberation movement of the Asian peoples against the imperialist colonialists. The Second World War had also revealed the weak points of the colonial powers. The comparatively easy victories of the Japanese over the Western colonial powers had shown the Asian peoples that it was possible to fight the hated colonial oppression suc-

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conference at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, Washington, 1961, pp. 448-49.

cessfully. The further weakening of the colonial system, which began to disintegrate as a result of the Second World War, made it impossible for the colonial powers to continue their old policy. They had to proclaim a programme that would, to some degree, be consistent with the Asian peoples' aspirations for national liberation. The need for such a programme was insistent since Asia remembered only too well Churchill's statement that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Asia.

No doubt another factor that influenced the authors of the Cairo Declaration was their desire to weaken the position of Japan, their imperialist competitor in the Far East. In this Britain and the US saw eye to eye. As regards the future of the Far East, there were deep-rooted contradictions between the USA and Britain. The American imperialists had pretensions to a dominating position in the Far East after the war and they counted on the Kuomintang clique helping them to realise their plans. That explains why the Americans were willing to return to China some of her territories, including Taiwan. The British, whose main forces were tied down on the European theatre of operations, could not counter US policy in the Far East with an independent policy of their own and had to follow the American lead whether they liked it or not. They used every opportunity, including the Cairo Conference, to divert the attention of the US from Far Eastern problems and to delay the solution of military and wherever possible of political issues as well.

Finally, another important aspect of the Cairo Declaration was that for the first time during the war the British and US governments adopted concrete decisions on territorial issues. Let us in this context remember that from the very beginning of the war the Soviet Government had proposed that agreement be reached on some territorial problems, particularly that of the Soviet Union's western frontiers, and that all these proposals had invariably been rejected by references to the Atlantic Charter. This shows that US and British governments took a biased stand on that issue. It proved that the crux of the matter was not that the two governments did not wish to consider concrete territorial questions before the end of the war but that they took a negative view of the Soviet Union's just claims because they expected that the balance of power would change after the war in their favour and that they would be able to impose

on the Soviet Union decisions on territorial issues in keeping with the interests of the US and British ruling circles.

* * *

After they had completed the talks in Cairo, Roosevelt and Churchill went to Teheran where they met the Soviet delegation headed by Stalin.

From November 28 to December 1, 1943, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill exchanged views on key issues of war and peace. No agenda had been co-ordinated beforehand and each delegation had reserved the right to submit to the conference any questions of interest to it. The participants ventilated views not only at the joint plenary sessions but also during bilateral talks. This did much to conciliate their points of view and promoted the success of the conference. Stalin and Roosevelt met for the first time at Teheran.

The Soviet and British delegations agreed that the US President should preside at the first meeting. Opening the conference, Roosevelt greeted the Soviet delegates addressing them as "new members of the family circle" and assured them that "these conferences were always conducted as gatherings of friends with complete frankness on all sides".¹

Military matters were the main topic discussed at the conference. At the first plenary meeting the heads of the delegations detailed their views on the situation at the fronts and the further prospects of military operations. Although the situation on the Eastern Front had changed radically and in 1943 the Soviet Army was driving the German invaders from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government continued to demand that large-scale military operations be launched in Western Europe. It considered that the opening of a second front would hasten the end of the war and save many thousands of human lives.

Although it seemed that agreement on a landing in France in 1944 had been reached at the preceding Anglo-American meetings, the Moscow talks, and the correspondence between the Heads of Government of the time showed that the British Government was again attempting to change these plans. These apprehensions were once again confirmed at Teheran. Analysing the military situation on the fronts, the

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 778.

British Prime Minister made obvious preference to unfolding military operations in the Balkans and in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Churchill attached particular importance to Turkey's participation in the war.

Churchill used all his eloquence to make the opening of a second front in West Europe dependent on the success of the offensive in Southeast Europe.

Time and again he returned to his favourite subject. He spoke enthusiastically of operations in Italy, Yugoslavia, Rhodes and Turkey. The British Prime Minister was far less enthusiastic about the prospects of military operations in Western Europe.

Thus, the British delegation attached front-rank importance to operations in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. The true political reasons for the British strategy were not hard to see. The British plans were decisively opposed by the Soviet delegation.

The head of the Soviet delegation said that if the conference were prevailed upon to discuss military questions, the USSR regarded operation Overlord as the main and decisive question.¹ He noted that in his opinion, it would not be advisable to disperse forces on various operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and that the Soviet delegation persisted in demanding the carrying out of a massive attack against the Hitlerite forces in Western Europe. He further noted that, in his opinion, it would be better to make operation Overlord the basis of all Allied operations in 1944 and a landing in southern France at the same time as a diversion and supporting operation for Overlord.²

In the view of the Soviet delegation the conference was called upon to solve three questions: first, to set the date for the beginning of operation Overlord; then to adopt a decision on the simultaneous Allied landing in southern France and, finally, to decide the question of the commander-in-chief for operation Overlord. As regards the date for the beginning of Overlord, the Soviet delegation maintained that it should not be later than May 1944.³

The US Government did not share the British Prime Minister's views on operations in the Balkans either.

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, Moscow, 1969, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Churchill, however, insisted on his plan. Although he was unable to reject Overlord, he persisted in retaining his Balkan strategy and at one of the meetings even asked the conference to place on record that in no circumstances would he agree "to sacrifice the activities of the armies in the Mediterranean, which included twenty British and British-controlled divisions, merely in order to keep the exact date on May 1 for 'Overlord' ".¹

The intractability and stubbornness of the Prime Minister compelled the head of the Soviet delegation to question directly "whether the British believe in operation Overlord or simply speak of it to reassure the Russians?" In reply Churchill had to assure the conference that the British would have to transfer all their available forces against the Germans when operation Overlord was launched.² At the same time Churchill again attempted to make all sorts of reservations about the opening of a second front in 1944. In a conversation with the head of the Soviet delegation he said that operation Overlord would take place provided the enemy is unable to have more troops than the Anglo-Americans can have by that time. But Churchill did not think that the landing could be successful if, for instance, the Germans were able to transfer 30 or 40 divisions to France.³

During the talks between the military advisers Marshal Voroshilov, the Soviet representative, insistently demanded that the plan for military operations in West Europe for 1944 be confirmed and that all other plans which could weaken the main Allied blow against Germany be discarded.

Finally, the British plan for an invasion of the Balkans was rejected and the former decision to open a second front in Western Europe in May 1944 (Overlord) was confirmed. At one of the last plenary sessions of the conference Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke read to the participants the decision which had been unanimously adopted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It said that Overlord would take place in May and that it would be supported by an operation in southern France. The scale of the latter operation was to depend on the number of landing craft the Allies would have at their disposal by that time.

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. V, London, 1952, p. 315.

² *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 32.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

In order to aid operation Overlord the Soviet delegation declared that it would organise a major offensive against the Germans at the time of the landing to prevent the Germans from manoeuvring their reserves and transferring any sizable forces from the Eastern Front to the West.

The US and British governments undertook to employ 35 divisions in the invasion army.¹

The Heads of the Three Powers said in the declaration published after the Teheran Conference that they had co-ordinated plans to destroy the German armed forces and "had reached full agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south". "No power on earth," the declaration stated, "can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-Boats by sea, and their war plants from the air."²

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the decision on co-ordinated operations, the opening of a second front in West Europe and the rejection of Churchill's numerous "Balkan variants". Commenting on the military decisions of the Teheran Conference, *Izvestia* wrote on December 7, 1943: "This decision is a major triumph for the principle of employing a co-ordinated coalition strategy against the common enemy. The implementation of this principle has always been the most difficult of all the tasks facing the conduct of a common war. Now the military staffs of the Allies have worked out decisive operations, co-ordinated their scale and timing, and received the sanction of the leaders of the Three Powers, who have approved these plans."

The Teheran Conference discussed also post-war co-operation and ways to ensure a lasting peace.

The US President informed the participants in the conference of his views on the future international security organisation. In his talk with Stalin he outlined the structure of that organisation. According to the President it was to include three main bodies. One of them was to be the Assembly incorporating all United Nations, "... which would meet in various places at stated times for the discussion of world problems and the making of recommendations for their solution".³ The second body of the international organisation

¹ Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 312.

² *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 52.

³ Robert E. Sherwood, op. cit., p. 785.

was to be an Executive Committee incorporating the USSR, USA, Britain and China, two representatives of European countries, one from South America, one from the Middle East, one from the Far East and one from the British dominions. The Executive Committee was to deal with all non-military matters—economic, food, health, and so on. According to Sherwood, Roosevelt was unable to give a clear answer when asked about the nature of the decisions to be taken by this committee.¹ The third body of the future international organisation, called by the President the “policing committee”, was to consist of representatives of the USSR, USA, Britain and China. This body was to be a coercitive agency, which was to be authorised to take immediate action in the event of a threat to peace or other extraordinary circumstances. At the conference Roosevelt did not say anything definite about the procedure for the adoption of decisions by the Great Powers, the main participants in the future international organisation. In a talk with his son, however, he explained his position in greater detail. He said that “any peace would have to depend on these three nations acting in united fashion, to the point where—on an important question—negative action by only one of them would veto the entire proposition. Father said that this question of a single veto had yet to be discussed thoroughly, but indicated that he was, generally speaking, in favour of the principle, in view of the hard-rock necessity of the future and continuing unity of the Three.”²

Thus, the point of view on the future international organisation Roosevelt expressed at Teheran differed but little from what he had told Eden in March 1943. The Americans again refused to assign an active, leading role in the future international organisation to France. As in the spring of 1943 they relied on the joint action of the four Great Powers which were to bear the main responsibility for universal peace and security. At Teheran, however, the US proposal was concerned with “four policemen”, whereas in 1941 the USA thought that the main responsibility for world peace would rest with two powers—the United States and Britain.

The Soviet delegation spoke in favour of the establishment of an international organisation to safeguard peace and

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *op cit.*, p. 785.

² Elliott Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

security. It said that the co-operation of the Great Powers was one of the most important conditions to make such an organisation effective. The Soviet delegation attached special attention to the problem of preventing new aggression by Germany and Japan.

The Teheran Conference did not adopt special decisions on the future international organisation. The general idea of the organisation was, however, reflected in the final communiqué, which strongly stressed the need for the unity of action of the Great Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition. The three governments declared that they were fully aware of the responsibility they and all members of the United Nations bear for securing a peace that would have the approval of the majority of the peoples in the world, one that would remove the horrors of war.

"We shall seek," the declaration of the Three Powers read, "the co-operation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations."¹

The Heads of the Three Powers exchanged views on the future of Germany. This question held a special place in the Allied plans for the post-war settlement. As early as in January 1942 the President ordered the formation in the USA of the so-called Consultative Commission for Post-War Problems, whose main task was to be the working out of plans for the Germany's post-war administrative, political and economic structure. Together with the special "study group" of the State Department, this commission soon submitted for the consideration by the US Government plans which provided for splitting Germany into three, five and seven separate parts.²

The first concrete plan for the dismemberment of Germany appeared in January 1942. It became known as the Wallace Plan. It provided for three independent German states: the South German state incorporating Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hessen-Darmstadt, the Rhine and Saar regions; the West German state including Upper Hessen,

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 52.

² Europa Archiv, Fr. am/Main, 1950, H. 10, S. 3032.

Thuringia, Westphalen, Hannover, Oldenburg and Hamburg; and the East German state including Prussia (except East Prussia), Mecklenburg and Saxonia.¹

Germany's post-war structure was discussed at many Anglo-American conferences. Special attention was given to this question during Eden's talks at Washington in March 1943. At that time both the President and Eden agreed that, under any circumstances, Germany must be divided into several states.²

At the Quebec Conference in August 1943 the question of Germany's dismemberment was again discussed by the British and US Foreign Ministers. Eden told Cordell Hull that some members of the British Government favoured Germany's dismemberment. Thus, essentially the United States and Britain had identical plans for Germany.

Prior to his departure for Moscow, Cordell Hull conferred with the President on October 5. The President categorically stated that he favoured partitioning Germany into three or more states, to be joined by loose economic ties.³

The US and British plans for the destruction of Germany as a united state were clearly expressed also at the Teheran Conference. On the last day of the conference Roosevelt proposed that Germany be divided into five autonomous states: Prussia reduced in size; Hannover and the north-western regions of Germany; Saxony and the Leipzig area; Hessen Province, Darmstadt, Kassel and the areas to the south of the Rhine; and Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg. In addition, he proposed that the regions of the Kiel Canal and Hamburg and the Ruhr and the Saar be placed under international control.⁴ The American plan for Germany's post-war structure provided for the preservation and consolidation of the links between the US and German monopolies on terms favourable for the American finance oligarchy, which had profited enormously by the war.

The British Government also favoured Germany's dismemberment, only its variant provided not for American but for British domination of Germany. The British ruling

¹ *Pravda o politike zapadnykh derzhav v germanskom voprose (Istoricheskaya spravka)* (The Truth about the Policy of the Western Powers in the German Question, A Historical Reference). Moscow, p. 8.

² Robert E. Sherwood, op. cit., p. 711.

³ *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* . . . , Vol. II, p. 1265.

⁴ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 48.

circles hoped to gain full control of the Ruhr industry and with its help to dominate Europe. At the Teheran Conference the British Prime Minister suggested that to weaken Germany Prussia be isolated, that Bavaria and a number of other South German lands be torn away from Germany and united with some Central European countries into a Danube federation.¹

The Soviet Government's point of view on the German problem differed radically from the American and British plans. It was clearly expressed as early as in February 1942 in an order of the USSR People's Commissar for Defence. This order said: "...It would be ridiculous to identify the Hitler clique with the German people—with the German state. History shows that Hitlers come and go, but the German people, *the German state remain* [Author's italics]."²

From the first days of the war the Soviet Union had announced that its aim was not the destruction of Germany, the German state and the German people in general, but of the Hitlerite state and the Hitlerite Army and its leaders. The Soviet Union was ready to give every assistance to the German people in the struggle against fascism and to the transformation of Germany into a peace-loving, democratic state. It was no accident that it was in the Soviet Union that the National "Free Germany" Committee was formed by German anti-fascists in the summer of 1943.

The setting up of the National "Free Germany" Committee was soon followed by the formation in December 1943, also in the Soviet Union, of the Union of German Officers, which in its declaration recognised the programme of the "Free Germany" movement and joined it. None of the documents published by either the National "Free Germany" Committee or the Union of German Officers ever mentioned any division of Germany into separate states. The chief aim of these organisations was to transform Germany into a peace-loving, democratic state. The "Free Germany" radio station regularly broadcast information for the anti-fascist underground resistance movement in Germany. The broadcasts of this radio station and also the propaganda matter many soldiers took with them to Germany "prompted the anti-fascists in the country to extend the anti-Hitler front and to strengthen the links between separate resistance

¹ Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 354.

² *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy*. . . , Vol. I, p. 58.

groups", Walter Ulbricht wrote in his *On the History of the New Times*.¹

There never were any commissions or committees in the Soviet Union dealing with questions of Germany's dismemberment. The Soviet Government saw the solution of the German problem not in the liquidation of the German state but in the demilitarisation and democratisation of Germany.

In discussing the German problem at the Teheran Conference the Soviet delegation pointed out that decisive measures had to be taken to prevent a revival of German militarism and revenge seeking in future, and that war criminals had to be severely punished. As regards American and British plans for Germany, the head of the Soviet delegation said: "I do not like the plan for new associations of states [German states—*U.I.*]." ² In his speech at the conference he emphasised that he failed to perceive any essential distinctions between the populations of the various parts of Germany.³

The question of the future structure of Germany was not solved at Teheran. The discussion showed that there were two points of view: the Anglo-American—providing for the division of Germany, and the Soviet—providing for the setting up of a peace-loving, democratic German state. The conference decided to continue the discussion of the German problem in the European Advisory Committee.⁴

The representatives of the three Great Powers also discussed the war with Japan. Taking into account US and British desires and wishing to strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition and to eliminate the hotbed of fascism in the Far East, the Soviet delegation agreed that it would join in the war against militaristic Japan after the end of the war in Europe. At the same time the Soviet delegation expressed its views on the post-war settlement in the Far East.

The Heads of the Three Powers considered also some other political issues, including the Polish problem. It was obvious that the British and American governments disapproved of the break in diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the reactionary Polish Emigré Government, which had

¹ Walter Ulbricht, *Zur Geschichte der neuesten Zeit* (on the History of the New Times), Berlin, 1955, pp. 31-33.

² *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 49.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

been caused by the provocative anti-Soviet attitude of the Polish reactionaries in London. In the summer of 1943 Washington and London made a joint attempt to bring about the re-establishment of relations between the USSR and the Polish Government. On August 11, 1943 the Soviet Government received simultaneously a British and an American memorandums on the Polish question. They expressed regret over the break of diplomatic relations and offered their good services to help restore them. Both the British and American documents, however, glossed over the reasons that had compelled the Soviet Government to take that step. They dealt mainly with secondary matters, such as the departure of Polish citizens and their families from the USSR.

The Polish Government had not changed its anti-Soviet stand after the break in diplomatic relations. The émigré clique's hostility towards the Soviet Union was evidenced inter alia by the documents it handed to the British and American governments on the eve of the Teheran Conference. These documents, as their authors stated, were to serve as basic principles for Roosevelt and Churchill in defining their positions on the Polish problem at the Teheran Conference.

These principles stressed the need for "constant watchfulness concerning Soviet influence, which is becoming increasingly marked in Allied countries",¹ the unwillingness of the Polish Government to lead any discussion on the border problem, the preparation of a "political action against the USSR" in the event that Soviet-Polish relations are not resumed by the time Soviet troops enter Polish territory, and so on. In one of these documents the Polish Emigré Government informed London and Washington that an anti-fascist rising was planned in Poland. It was intended to start at a moment mutually agreed upon with the Allies, either prior to or at the very moment of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland.²

Despite this unconcealed anti-Soviet stand of the Polish émigrés, Roosevelt said, when the Polish question came up for discussion: "I wish to express the hope that the Soviet Government will be able to start talks and restore its relations with the Polish Government."³ Similar hopes were

¹ Edward J. Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland*, New York, London, 1958, pp. 154-59.

² Ibid., p. 158.

³ *The Tshran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 46.

expressed by the British delegation. In reply the Soviet delegation emphasised that the USSR was particularly interested in having friendly relations with Poland since this was connected with the security of the Soviet Union's western border. At the same time the Soviet delegation again pointed out that the Polish émigrés had adopted a position hostile to the Soviet Union, that Polish reactionaries were clandestinely engaging in subversive activity which was harming the Soviet Union and the liberation movement of the Polish people.

The Soviet Government reaffirmed that it wanted to see Poland an independent, democratic and strong state with whom it desired to develop friendly relations. It was, however, quite obvious that the policy of the Polish Emigré Government precluded such relations.

"I must say," Stalin said at the conference, "that Russia, no less than the other Powers, is interested in good relations with Poland, because Poland is Russia's neighbour. We stand for the restoration and strengthening of Poland. But we draw a line between Poland and the émigré Polish Government in London."¹

The discussions of the Polish problem at Teheran centred on the borders of Poland.

The position of the Soviet delegation in that question was that the Polish people should have borders that were just and historically justified, that they should be borders of peace with the neighbouring states. The task therefore was to give the Polish people borders that would take every account of historical, ethnic, economic and other factors.

"So clearly fair was the Soviet position," Carl Marzani, an American author, wrote, "that it was Churchill himself who, at Teheran, suggested as Polish borders the Curzon Line on the East and the Oder Line on the West."² Churchill said in this connection: "Personally I thought Poland might move westwards. . . ."³ The British Foreign Minister held similar views: "Eden said that what Poland lost in the east she might gain in the west."⁴

At a number of meetings during the conference, mainly

¹ Edward J. Rozek, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

² Carl Marzani, *We Can Be Friends. Origins of the Cold War*, New York, 1952, p. 191.

³ Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 319.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

between Soviet and British representatives, they jointly studied the map in connection with the "Curzon line" and "Oder line" problems. The Soviet delegation defended the interests of the Polish people and insisted that age-old Polish lands in the west be returned to her. The position of the British Government was prompted by very different motives. It consented to changes in Poland's borders because it felt sure that after the war the reactionary Polish Emigré Government would assume power in the country. Moreover, at the conference Churchill agreed in principle to hand over the town of Königsberg to the USSR. He made these concessions in view of his main aim—"to stop communism at the Curzon line"¹. At Teheran Churchill did not succeed in putting through his draft on the division of the world into spheres of influence, by means of which he wanted to restore British interests in East Europe. Subsequent events demonstrated that his plans were built on quicksands.

Since the President and the Prime Minister maintained that they did not possess the necessary authority the conference did not adopt any concrete decisions on the Polish borders. However, the proposals made by the Soviet Union were approved in principle.

The Teheran Conference adopted the Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran. The Heads of the Three Powers committed themselves to provide Iran with economic aid during the war and after it, taking into account the assistance given by Iran in transporting freight for the USSR through its territory. They also declared "their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran".²

The Soviet delegation informed its Allies of the peace feelers put out by the Finnish Government in the summer and autumn of 1943 and reaffirmed the point of view regarding a possible peaceful settlement with Finland it had expressed in the spring of 1943.

The leaders of the Three Powers exchanged views on many other world political issues, such as Turkey's position in the war and the handing over of part of the Italian navy to the Soviet Union. It cannot be said that the discussion of all

¹ Wolfgang Wagner, *Die Entstehung der Oder-Neisse-Linie in den diplomatischen Verhandlungen Während des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, Stuttgart, 1953, S. 84.

² *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 56.

issues went smoothly, sometimes there were sharp controversies, heated political debate, and some questions remained unsolved. Yet, the Teheran Conference was a significant positive event. It was the first conference of the Heads of Government of the three Great Powers—the USSR, USA and Britain—to consider a number of most important aspects of the post-war order in the world. It adopted the decision to deliver a co-ordinated and final blow to Germany, and the significance of this decision can hardly be overestimated.

This was the first time that the anti-Hitler coalition had co-ordinated a coalition strategy against the common enemy. The Teheran Conference showed that the Soviet and US governments had a definite community of views on the question of military operations in 1944. This promoted the adoption of co-ordinated decisions, most important among which was the approval of operation Overlord, i.e., the opening of a second front in Europe. This decision furthered the interests of the anti-Hitler coalition as a whole and was a triumph of the Soviet principle of waging a war against Germany on two fronts.

The decisions of the Teheran Conference were filled with optimism and faith in victory. This, in fact, was one of the most striking features of the Teheran Conference. The meeting in Teheran had a most positive effect on inter-Allied relations. The co-operation among the USSR, USA and Britain embraced many fields. In December 1943, for example, the Soviet and US governments reached an agreement on the exchange of information, which promoted the strengthening of political and cultural relations between the two states. Contacts between the military bodies of the Allied powers also extended.

The Teheran Conference was significant in that it blasted the hopes of fascist diplomacy to split the Allies.

* * *

After the Teheran Conference Roosevelt and Churchill again met in Cairo, where the British-American military negotiations continued. The Turkish leaders were also invited to Cairo to discuss Turkey's entry into the war on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition.

At the Anglo-American military talks it was also necessary to decide a number of questions linked with the implementa-

tion of the Teheran decisions. In particular, it was necessary to distribute landing craft for the various Allied operations planned for 1944, notably for operations Overlord and Anvil (the landing in South France). It was also necessary to appoint the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the operations on the future European theatre of war, and to solve some other questions.

Being unable to revise the Teheran decisions on the opening of a second front in Europe in May 1944, the British Prime Minister and his military advisers did not give up the thought of paralleling operation Overlord with a major landing operation in the Balkan area. That is why the English attached so much importance to the Rhodes operation. They linked Turkey's entry into the war, which was an important factor in their Balkan strategy, with the capture of that island.

At the second Cairo Conference the Western Allies selected the Supreme Commander for Overlord. The English and Americans had preliminarily agreed that an American general would be appointed. Up to the very last moment it was assumed that it would be General Marshall but at the Cairo Conference, Roosevelt gave preference to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, because he felt that he needed Marshall as Chief of Staff in Washington.

When the Cairo talks ended the Prime Minister and the President sent a message to Moscow to inform the Soviet Government of the results of the talks. The message read: "In the Conference just concluded in Cairo we have reached the following decisions regarding the conduct of the war against Germany in 1944 in addition to the agreements arrived at by the three of us at Teheran.

"With the purpose of dislocating the German military, economic and industrial system, destroying the German air combat strength, and paving the way for an operation across the Channel the highest strategic priority will be given to the bomber offensive against Germany.

"The operation scheduled for March in the Bay of Bengal has been reduced in scale in order to permit the reinforcement of amphibious craft for the operation against Southern France.

"We have directed the greatest effort be made to increase the production of landing craft in the United States and Great Britain to provide reinforcement of cross-Channel

operations. The diversion from the Pacific of certain landing craft has been ordered for the same purpose."¹

The question of Turkey's position in the war held an important place in the Cairo talks. A Turkish delegation, headed by the President İsmet İnönü, arrived in Cairo on December 4.

As we noted above, the question of Turkey's position in the war was discussed at many diplomatic talks. The British Government was particularly interested in it. The English ruling circles alleged that the Turks were maintaining a stand which on the whole favoured the Allies, and that they would definitely join the war on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition, maybe even as early as in the spring of 1943. Turkey, however, did not choose to join the Allies in the spring of 1943 and continued its policy of neutrality. Turkey did not join the Allies in the summer of 1943 either, although the radical turning point in the war had already been reached.

During the talks with the Turkish representatives in Cairo, held between December 4 and 7, the Turkish leaders took shelter in evasions and refused to make a definite statement with respect to Turkey's entry into the war. They hinted that the time was not yet ripe, that any action, including the setting up of Allied bases in Turkey or the use of Turkish territory in any other way, would unleash fierce German reprisals.

The long haggling with Turkey at Cairo furnished no results. It was decided to continue the talks between British and Turkish military representatives in Ankara and Cairo, and, in the event of their positive outcome, the Allies were to approach Turkey on February 15 with the request that Allied aircraft be stationed on Turkish aerodromes. According to the British Embassy in Moscow, immediately after the Cairo talks Turkey informed Britain that it would be difficult for her to create the conditions necessary for the implementation of the Allied military plans and that Turkey would not be able to join the war unless several preliminary conditions were fulfilled; she demanded that she be supplied with large deliveries of arms and war materiel, that substantial Allied air forces be sent to Turkey and that her main communications be guaranteed. This showed once again that the Turkish Government continued to use all sorts of subterfuges to evade

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 178.

participation in the war against Hitler Germany. At the same time the Turkish Government continued to maintain close diplomatic contacts with Germany, as can be seen from the Memoirs of Franz von Papen, the German ambassador to Turkey.¹

The talks with the Turkish leaders at the end of 1943 did not lead to Turkey's entry into the war. Churchill was also unable to obtain her consent to the use of Turkish territory for the implementation of his "Balkan strategy".

* * *

Thus, 1943, the year marking a radical turning point in the Second World War, was drawing to a close. The anti-fascist coalition had scored brilliant military successes—the historical victories of the Soviet Army on the Volga, at Kursk and Orel, the successful summer and autumn offensive of the Soviet troops, a few Allied successes in the Mediterranean area—all this tipped the scale in favour of the anti-Hitler coalition. The fascist bloc was unable to recover from the blows it had sustained in 1943. Its gradual destruction had begun.

¹ Franz von Papen. *Memoirs*, London, 1952, p. 507

CHAPTER XV

THE ALLIES ON THE EVE OF EUROPE'S LIBERATION

The great victories of the Soviet armed forces in 1943, marking the radical turning point in the Second World War, further raised the Soviet Union's international prestige and promoted an extension of links between the Soviet Union and other countries. The Moscow and Teheran conferences at which a wide range of political questions had been discussed and resolved, provided striking evidence of the effectiveness of the co-operation between the states of the anti-fascist coalition. The assertions of various anti-Soviet elements that co-operation with the USSR could be confined only to the war against the fascist bloc were also abundantly disproved by the facts.

Relations between the main Allies in the anti-Hitler coalition had continued to grow stronger up to the beginning of 1944. The co-ordinated decisions of the governments of the Three Powers adopted in 1943 were giving positive results. The hopes of the Hitlerites that the anti-Hitler coalition would split up collapsed because the coalition was based on the vital interests of the Allies, who had resolved to rout Hitler Germany and her accomplices in Europe. This community of vital interests strengthened the fighting alliance of the Soviet, British and American peoples in the war.

The personal contacts which had been established among the Heads of the Soviet, US and British governments at Teheran were highly effective. "I only wish we could meet once a week,"¹ the British Prime Minister wrote to the Head of the Soviet Government early in 1944. The increased co-operation between the USSR, USA and Britain was growing ever more popular. The new successes of the Soviet Army early in 1944 roused the enthusiasm of all freedom-loving peoples. Speaking of these successes, the British Prime

¹ *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. I. p. 180.

Minister wrote to Stalin: "If we were in Tehran again, I would now be saying to you across the table: 'Please let me know in plenty of time when we are to stop knocking down Berlin so as to leave sufficient billeting accommodation for the Soviet armies.'"¹ Emphasising the desirability and need for joint blows by the Allied troops at Hitler Germany and the Soviet Government's desire for a further development of co-operation with the Allies, the Head of the Soviet Government replied to the British Prime Minister in the following words: "By the time we all arrive in Berlin the Germans will have had a chance to rebuild certain premises that you and we here shall need."²

Positive views on the co-operation between the Great Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition were expressed early in 1944 in many declarations made by USSR, US and British spokesmen in the press and by the world public. A report of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in February 1944 noted: "For the first time since the existence of the Soviet state we have established not only friendly but also Allied relations with Great Britain. We have equally good relations with the United States of America. A powerful anti-Hitler coalition has been formed, headed by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America; its military and political importance for all democratic states is difficult to overrate."³

Early in 1944 leading US statesmen also made many public statements in favour of the friendly relations shaping between the three major Allies. In his message of greeting on the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the Soviet Army, President Roosevelt wrote: "As a result of the victorious offensive of the Red Army, millions of Soviet citizens have been freed from slavery and oppression. These achievements, along with the co-operation on which agreement was reached at Moscow and Teheran, ensure our eventual victory over the Nazi aggressors."⁴ Finally, an optimistic appraisal of the co-operation between the Great Powers during the war and after it was given by Churchill. Speaking in Parliament in April 1944, he said:

"I have never conceived that a fraternal association with

¹ Ibid., p. 184.

² Ibid.

³ *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union...*, Vol. II, p. 123.

⁴ *Correspondence...*, Vol. II p. 123.

the United States would militate in any way against the unity of the British Commonwealth and Empire, or breed ill-feeling with our great Russian Ally, to whom we are bound by the 20 years treaty. I do not think we need choose this or that. With wisdom, and patience, and vigour, and courage, we may get the best of both.”¹

Thus, early in 1944 the relations between the states of the anti-Hitler coalition were cordial. Despite the difficulties in the way of solving some political problems, the community of interests of the freedom-loving peoples in the struggle against fascism and the growing might and authority of the Soviet Union cemented the anti-Hitler coalition.

The victories of the Soviet armed forces in 1943 triggered off the disintegration of the fascist bloc, which at the time of Germany's invasion of the USSR included about ten states. Consolidating its initiative, the Soviet Army prepared for new large-scale offensive operations late in 1943 and early in 1944. The successful military operations of the Soviet Army which had brought about the radical turning point in the war had opened up the possibility of driving all fascist invaders from the Soviet land and restoring the USSR state border from the Black Sea to the Barents. The soldiers of the Soviet Army now faced not only the task of driving the enemy from the Soviet Union but also of freeing other European peoples from fascist slavery and of carrying the war into the territory of Germany and her satellites, and administering final defeat to the enemy.

The Hitlerites suffered extremely heavy losses on the Soviet-German front and were forced to give up their offensive strategy. They attempted to stabilise their front in the East at any cost and to draw out the war against the Soviet Union. As before, the Hitlerite command centred its attention on the Soviet-German front. At the beginning of 1944, 198 divisions and six brigades of the 315 divisions and ten brigades of the German fascist Army were on the Soviet-German front, as well as 38 divisions and 18 brigades of Germany's satellites; the Anglo-American troops in Italy were faced by only 19 German divisions and one brigade.

The new powerful offensive of the Soviet Army begun in the winter of 1944 smashed the Hitlerite command's plan to

¹ *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, London, 1944, col. 586.

wage a protracted defensive war in the East. Neither the powerful system of fortifications near Leningrad, nor the "Eastern dam" on the Dnieper and the frequent redistribution of troops could stem the Soviet Army.

In keeping with the Soviet command's strategic plan, the Soviet Army reached the state border of the USSR in the spring and summer of 1944.

When the Soviet troops reached the Rumanian border, the Soviet Government issued a statement on April 2, 1944, which reaffirmed the Soviet policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The statement read:

"The Red Army Supreme Command has issued orders to the Soviet units to persecute the enemy until he is routed and surrenders.

"At the same time the Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social system in that country, and that the entry of Soviet troops into Rumania is dictated exclusively by military necessity and the continuing resistance of the enemy."¹

The offensive of the Soviet Army in 1944 helped to create conditions in which the Soviet Union was able to carry out one of the most important tasks of the programme for the post-war reorganisation of the world which it had proclaimed at the beginning of the war. Liberating the peoples of Europe from the fascist invaders it gave them every assistance in restoring their national states, at the same time guaranteeing the liberated peoples the unrestricted right and liberty freely to choose their state system. Soviet foreign policy ensured the fulfilment of this responsible task.

The advance of the Soviet troops to the state borders of the USSR and the landing of the Allied troops in Italy confronted the main states of the anti-Hitler coalition—the USSR, USA and Britain—with the question of the fate of the countries liberated from fascism. What road would the people take after throwing off the fascist yoke? Would they be able to build a new, free life, or would the old bourgeois and landowner establishment be restored in their countries?

True, during the war the Allies had repeatedly declared that they would grant the liberated people every opportunity to assert their right of self-determination. But those were

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 105.

mere declarations. The question now was whether deeds would correspond to words. How would the Allies co-ordinate their policy in the event of repeated peace feelers by Germany's satellites? On what principles would the peaceful settlement with them be based? Finally, how would the co-ordinated policy in liberated Europe be realised? These were questions holding an important place in Soviet-Anglo-American relations.

* * *

The successful offensive of the Soviet armed forces hastened the hour of Poland's liberation.

This made the Polish problem a particularly important international issue in 1944. As before, the Soviet Government was for the setting up of a strong, independent, democratic Poland and for friendship between the USSR and the Polish state. On January 1944, the Soviet Government again declared "that it strives to establish friendship between the USSR and Poland on the basis of sound good-neighbourly relations and mutual respect and, if this should be desired by the Polish people, on the basis of an alliance of mutual assistance".¹ It emphasised that Poland's revival should be brought about not through the seizure of Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands, but through the return to the Polish state of age-old Polish lands, which had been formerly seized by the Germans. At the same time the Soviet Government did not consider Poland's eastern borders of 1939 immutable. It expected that these borders would be adjusted in favour of Poland and that the frontier between the USSR and Poland would in that case roughly follow the Curzon line. "The just striving of the Polish people for its full unification in a powerful and independent state," the statement of the Soviet Government read, "must be given recognition and support."²

The statement of the Soviet Government sharply condemned the anti-popular and anti-Soviet policy of the Polish Emigré Government. It pointed out that the London émigrés had proved unable to organise the active struggle against the German invaders in Poland itself and by their fallacious policy had often played into the hands of the German invaders. "At the same time the interests of Poland and the Soviet Union," the Soviet statement said in conclusion,

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 61.

"demand that firm friendly relations should be established between our countries and that the peoples of Poland and the Soviet Union should unite in the struggle against the common external enemy, as the common cause of all Allies demands."¹

The statement of the Soviet Government was real proof of its striving to set up firm friendly relations with Poland. This was widely admitted both in England and the USA. Even official commentaries of the British Ministry for Foreign Affairs noted that it was "a most important contribution towards the final settlement of the dispute".² The statement received a similar response in Washington.

The reply of the reactionary Polish Emigré Government to the Soviet statement, published on January 15, however, bypassed and ignored the main question—the recognition of the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish border. This could be construed only as a rejection. The note of the Polish Emigré Government also said that it "appeals to the British and American governments hoping that their mediation will lead to talks between the Polish and Soviet governments on all basic problems with the participation in them of the British and American governments".³

The attempt to enlist the mediation of Britain and the USA was aimed at ensuring the backing of the British and American governments at the proposed conference on Soviet-Polish relations.

The Soviet Union regarded the Polish note as further proof that the Polish Emigré Government did not wish to establish good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union.

The émigré Government in London, which had lost touch with the Polish people, did not stop its hostile actions against the USSR in the new conditions, when Poland's liberation by the Soviet troops was drawing close, and openly reaffirmed its claims to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands. The anti-Soviet nature of that government was so obvious that this was openly discussed in London and Washington official circles. Thus, Mr. Cocks, a British MP, said in September 1944 in the House of Commons: "The fact must be faced that there are certain elements associated with, or surrounding,

¹ Ibid.

² Edward I. Rozek, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

³ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy*, ..., Vol. II, p. 340.

the Polish Government in London which are violently hostile to the Soviet Government . . . the fact remains that these elements do exist, and they are at the present time centring round the personality of the Commander-in-Chief, General Sosnkowski, whose intemperate utterances recently have created great difficulties in the diplomatic field."¹ A similar point of view was expressed in May 1944 by Mr. Mander, MP.²

The hostility towards the USSR of the illegal Polish press in the occupied territories exceeded all bounds. For example, the illegal Polish publication in Vilnius slandered the USSR and to all intents and purposes incited the people to armed struggle against the Soviet troops. In February 1944 the Soviet Government handed a copy of such a slanderous sheet to US Ambassador Harriman, asking him to pass it on to the US Government for its information, since the latter often acted as the Polish London cabinet's advocate in international affairs.³

This anti-Soviet incitement was not the work of a few fanatical enemies of the Soviet Union, it was a result of the political line pursued by the Polish Emigré Government. The instructions of that government to its underground agents in Poland were summed up in the note of Mikolajczyk, the new Prime Minister of the Polish Emigré Government, addressed to Churchill on November 16, 1943. One of the paragraphs of that note read: "The entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory without previous resumption of Polish-Soviet relations would force the Polish Government to undertake political action against the violation of Polish sovereignty, while the Polish local administration and army in Poland would have to continue to work underground."⁴

As the Soviet troops drew closer to the Polish borders and ever new forces were drawn into the liberation struggle of the Polish people, it became obvious that the revival of an independent and strong Poland would take place without the participation of the émigré cabinet in London. This was a matter of grave concern to the English and American

¹ *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, Vol. 403, col. 588.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 400, col. 972.

³ H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*. . . , p. 296.

⁴ *Poland, Official Government Documents*, Vol. X, Doc. 39; Edward J. Rozek, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

governments. Churchill was particularly worried. Early in 1944 he attempted to act as mediator between the USSR and the Polish Emigré Government. Churchill understood very well that in the event of Poland's liberation by the Soviet troops and units of the Polish Army set up by the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR, the authority and influence of the London Emigré Government would decline even further and it would be left out in the cold. In that case a new democratic government would be formed of representatives of Polish progressive circles, a thing the British Government feared most of all.

In one of his messages to Moscow the British Prime Minister explained the British Government's position on the Polish question in detail. From this message it appeared that while Britain did not object to the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish border, it wanted to delay a decision on this question and to make it depend on various conditions. Churchill objected to the democratisation of the émigré government and to changes in its composition. He categorically rejected the right of the Polish people to set up a new government and made veiled threats about a break-up of the anti-Hitler coalition. "The creation in Warsaw of another Polish Government," he wrote to Moscow, "different from the one we have recognised up to the present, together with disturbances in Poland, would raise an issue in Great Britain and the United States detrimental to that close accord between the three Great Powers upon which the future of the world depends."¹

In its reply to London on February 4, 1944 the Soviet Government reaffirmed its standpoint both on the question of the Polish borders and of the nature of the émigré government. The removal from the composition of that government of "pro-fascist imperialist elements", the reply read, "and the inclusion of democratic-minded people would, one is entitled to hope, create the proper conditions for normal Soviet-Polish relations, for solving the problem of the Soviet-Polish frontier and, in general, for the rebirth of Poland as a strong, free and independent state. Those interested in improving the composition of the Polish Government along these lines are primarily the Poles themselves, the broad sections of the Polish people."²

¹ *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. I, p. 195.

² *Ibid.*, p. 197.

In January and February 1944 Churchill and Eden had a number of meetings with the Polish Emigré Government which were allegedly intended to draw together their viewpoints and to work out a compromise solution of the problem. Actually, however, Churchill himself departed from the viewpoint on various aspects of Soviet-Polish relations he had held at the Teheran Conference. Thus, in one of his messages Churchill qualified the defence and realisation of the Curzon Line as power politics.¹ "I must point out," Stalin told Churchill, "that at Teheran you, the President and myself were agreed that the Curzon Line was lawful. At that time you considered the Soviet Government's stand on the issue quite correct, and said it would be crazy for representatives of the Polish Emigré Government to reject the Curzon Line. But now you maintain something to the contrary."²

As regards the Polish Emigré Government it not only refused to recognise the Curzon Line but was also "anxious that the districts to be placed under Polish civil administration should include such places as Vilna and Lvov. . .".³

During his talks with Mikolajczyk on January 20, 1944, Churchill said straight out that the Polish Emigré Government regards the Riga line as a starting point for negotiations.⁴ The Polish Emigré Government also objected to the handing over to the Soviet Union of Königsberg, although this was none of its business.⁵ It also wanted some of the Soviet lands it considered controversial to be placed under foreign control.

Naturally, the Soviet Government would not even discuss these claims and considered the fact that such questions were posed at all an insult to the USSR.

¹ The Prime Minister suggested that the Polish Government accept the "Curzon Line . . . as a basis for negotiations concerning its eastern frontier. Second, Poland was to receive East Prussia, Danzig, and Upper Silesia as far as the Oder River. . . . Fourth, all Germans were to be removed from new Poland" (*The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II, p. 1438). Churchill's proposal was supported by the US Government (*ibid.*). The British Government's position on the western border was confirmed in Cadogan's letter to the Polish Government of February 2, 1944 (See B. Veviura, *The Polish-German Border and International Law*, pp. 46-48).

² *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. I, p. 212.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁴ Edward J. Rozek, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

The talks and correspondence between the Soviet Government and the Western powers on the Polish problem in the winter of 1944 did not leave even a shadow of doubt that the Polish Emigré Government was unable to normalise Soviet-Polish relations and to create an independent strong and free Poland.

"It will be seen from these facts," a letter of the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, addressed on January 23, 1944 to the US Secretary of State, said, "that the Polish Government in London has called on the US and British governments to mediate, not with a view to reaching agreement with the Soviet Government, but in order to aggravate the conflict and involve the Allies in it, for it is obvious that in the absence of a common basis for agreement negotiation and mediation are doomed to fail.

"The Soviet Government would not like the friendly mission of mediation to be exposed to the threat of inevitable failure.

"That is why I believe conditions are not yet ripe for negotiation and mediation."¹

A radical improvement of Soviet-Polish relations could be brought about only by the democratic, patriotic forces of the Polish people.

* * *

The heavy defeat of Germany and her allies in 1943 prompted the German satellites to put out feelers for chances to withdraw from the fascist bloc. However, in 1943 only Italy broke with the fascists and then declared war on Hitler Germany. The other participants in the fascist bloc continued their senseless resistance, although they constantly thought of how to get out of the quagmire into which the criminal war against the Soviet Union and other freedom-loving states had pushed them.

Peace feelers were made late in 1943 and early in 1944 by all members of the fascist bloc without exception, and each endeavoured to obtain peace terms which would ensure not only the continued existence of the capitalist system but would also keep the ruling fascist clique in power.

The Finnish rulers, for example, put out such feelers to Britain and the USA. The new powerful blows of the Soviet

¹ *Correspondence*. . . Vol. II. p. 292.

Army on the northwestern section of the Soviet-German front in the winter of 1944 compelled the Finnish Government to enter into direct talks with the Soviet Union.

In mid-February 1944 in Stockholm the mediation of a prominent Swedish industrialist helped to organise a meeting between A. M. Kollontai, the Soviet ambassador to Sweden, and J. Paasikivi, who represented the Finnish Government. During that meeting Paasikivi told Kollontai that he had been authorised by the Finnish Government to find out from the Soviet Government on what terms Finland would be allowed to cease all military action and to withdraw from the war. In reply the Soviet Government stated on February 16, 1944 that even though it had little grounds to trust the Finnish Government then in power, it was willing in the interests of peace to conduct negotiations on the cessation of military action. The Finnish representative received the Soviet terms for an armistice. These terms were published in the press on March 1, 1944, to refute rumours that the "Soviet Government had demanded of Finland that she surrender unconditionally and that she should agree to the occupation of Helsinki and other big Finnish towns by Soviet troops".¹

On his return from Stockholm, Paasikivi said that "the Soviet proposals were unexpectedly mild".² Nevertheless, after a study of the Soviet terms, the Finnish Government answered that many items in these terms were unclear to it. The Soviet Government then agreed to receive a Finnish delegation in Moscow. The Finnish delegation including Paasikivi and Enckell arrived in Moscow on March 26, 1944. During the talks the Finnish delegation was given greater details on the Soviet terms for a peaceful settlement with Finland.

The Soviet Government kept the USA and Britain informed about its talks with Finland and they approved of the Soviet Union's position. In a special telegram sent to Moscow on March 21, 1944, the British Prime Minister congratulated the Soviet Government on the Soviet Army's new victories and also on the extremely temperate way in which it had dealt with the Finns.³

¹ See *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 90.

² C. Leonard Lundin, *Finland in the Second World War*, Bloomington, 1957, p. 198.

³ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 211.

J. Paasikivi spoke forcefully in favour of accepting the terms but found no support from the cabinet.¹ The reactionary Finnish Government rejected the Soviet terms and continued its criminal war against the USSR.

After they had torpedoed the Soviet-Finnish peace talks in the spring of 1944, the Finnish rulers entered into even closer collaboration with Hitler Germany. At the end of April Erich Heinrichs, then Chief of the Finnish General Staff, was summoned by Keitel and Jodl and reprimanded for the peace feeler. At the end of June Ribbentrop came to Helsinki to strengthen the German-Finnish military alliance. At his request President Ryti made a statement on June 26, 1944, solemnly promising that he would not sign a separate peace without Germany's approval and on the next day it was announced that Finland had asked Germany for assistance and had decided to continue the war.

Even though it was obvious in the spring of 1944 that the fascist coalition was doomed, Finland's reactionary rulers rejected the Soviet peace offer and carried on the war for another six months, which involved additional sacrifices both by the Soviet Union and by Finland.

* * *

The military defeat of the fascist troops on the Soviet-German front caused confusion among the Rumanian fascist rulers too, who, early in 1944, also put out a peace feeler. Above all the Rumanian rulers wanted to make a separate deal with Britain and the USA on an anti-Soviet basis. The Antonescu clique and Maniu and Bratianu, the leaders of the so-called Opposition, agreed that steps should be taken to prevent Rumania's liberation by the Soviet Army and to ensure the entry into Rumania of Anglo-American troops. The closer the Soviet troops approached the Rumanian borders, the more feverishly did its fascist rulers try to find common language with the Western powers. On January 31, 1944, Antonescu instructed the Rumanian military attaché in a neutral country to contact the US military attaché and to state that Rumania's co-operation depended on political guarantees. He pointed out that Rumania was unable to follow the Italian example "since this would only lead to her occupation by German troops, who would be replaced by

¹ C. Leonard Lundin, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

Soviet troops. When the British and American armies approach the Danube, the Rumanian Army will stand at the Dniester and repel the attacks of the Red Army".¹ In February 1944 the Rumanian Government made one more attempt to come to terms with the Western powers. In view of the rapid advance of the Soviet troops, however, this plan of the Rumanian reactionaries was so unrealistic that neither Britain nor the USA could make a separate deal with Rumania. Besides, the British and US governments had committed themselves not to sign a separate peace or armistice with any participant in the fascist coalition.

Although Rumania was in a state of war with the USSR, USA and Britain, it had fought only against the Soviet Union. In this connection the Soviet Government was naturally particularly interested in a peaceful settlement with Rumania. This was recognised also by the British and US governments.

Although the attempt to obtain a separate peace from Britain and the USA had obviously failed and it was clear that Rumania would have to turn to all the three main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, notably to the USSR, the Antonescu clique, blinded by its hatred of the USSR, not only failed to contact the Soviet Government but actually rejected every real possibility of beginning talks on an armistice.

In February-March 1944 the Soviet troops launched a large-scale offensive in the district of the Bug River. As a result all of right bank Ukraine was liberated and in the beginning of April the Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR with Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Rapidly forcing a crossing over the Prut and Seret rivers, the Soviet Army engaged the enemy on Rumanian territory.

When the military-strategic situation had thus become hopeless for the Rumanian fascist clique, Antonescu tried to obtain peace terms which would ensure the preservation of the bourgeois-landowner system and the fascist establishment in Rumania. The Antonescu clique resorted to an original manoeuvre; it contacted Maniu and Bratianu and arranged with them to send a delegation to London, headed by Count Barbu Stirbey, the former Rumanian Prime Minister who had

¹ Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu. Die deutsch-rumänischen Beziehungen 1938-1944*. Wiesbaden, 1954. S. 179-80.

extensive connections in England, for secret talks. They were, however, unable to carry their plan into effect. Allied instructions directed the Stirbey group to Cairo, where in mid-March 1944 talks were begun between it and the representatives of the Soviet, US and British governments.

The Soviet Government had made a correct appraisal of the manoeuvre launched by Rumania's bourgeois rulers and therefore did not expect much of the Cairo talks.

But since it was willing to do everything possible to hasten the end of the war and to avoid further bloodshed, the Soviet Government declared that it was willing to submit its armistice terms to Rumania. On April 12 the Soviet representative, the Soviet minister to Cairo, handed to Stirbey armistice terms which had been previously co-ordinated with the British and US governments.

Upon receipt of the Soviet armistice terms, Antonescu and Maniu began to "study" them. Rumania's fascist dictator rejected the terms saying that he wished to continue the war on Germany's side. At the end of April the governments of the Three Powers sent the Antonescu and the Maniu group an ultimatum demanding the unconditional acceptance of the armistice terms submitted. The Allies also demanded clear proof that the Rumanian Government was willing to cease hostilities.

The Antonescu Government took no positive steps in this respect either but decisively refused to comply with the demands of the Allies. As regards the Maniu group, it continued the talks for some time in the hope that Rumania would be occupied by Anglo-American troops.

An analysis of the Maniu group's position made it quite clear that it was in direct collusion with Antonescu. In this connection the Allies, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, decided to break off the talks at Cairo. At a meeting on June 1, 1944, the representatives of the three Allied powers sent a joint telegram to the Rumanian delegates. It read: "In view of the situation created by the latest telegrams of Mr. Maniu, the delegates of the Three Powers deem it necessary to declare to the Rumanian delegates that further negotiations would serve no purpose and the negotiations are considered ended."¹

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1944.* Vol. IV, p. 181.

The situation in Hungary in the spring of 1944 differed somewhat from that in Finland and Rumania. When the German armies were defeated on the Volga and the Hungarian Army was routed near Voronezh in 1943, the leading figures of Horthy's Hungary also began to doubt that the Hitler coalition would win the war. In 1943 the Kallay Government repeatedly attempted to establish contacts with the Western powers, and finally succeeded. In September 1943 a preliminary agreement was reached on the terms for Hungary's capitulation, based on the premise that Hungary would be occupied by Anglo-American troops. This agreement, however, did not come into force, since Churchill's "Balkan strategy", upon which the agreement with Hungary had been built, miscarried and the Anglo-Americans never reached the Hungarian borders.

The hopes of the Hungarian rulers that the anti-Hitler coalition would split up were also shattered. The Teheran Conference had reaffirmed the resolve of the Great Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition to fight the fascist bloc jointly. At the very beginning of February 1944 the Hungarian representatives abroad—Barcza in Sweden and Bakach-Bessenyei in Switzerland—were informed by the Anglo-American representatives that "...when the Soviet Armies reached the Carpathians she should at once break with the Germans and sue for peace".¹ The Hungarian Government, however, did not take any steps to stop its criminal aggression against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states. On the contrary, the Hungarian ruling circles made preparations to continue the war. At the beginning of 1944 General Szombathelyi, the Hungarian Chief of Staff, was sent by Horthy and Kallay to Germany to obtain the consent of the Germans to withdraw the Hungarian troops to Hungary because Hungary "wished the defence of her frontiers to be entrusted solely to her own forces"....² Hitler and Keitel refused the request because they did not want to weaken the fascist troops on the Soviet-German front. At the end of February the Hungarian Prime Minister asked Berlin again to be allowed to withdraw all Hungarian troops to Hungary.

The relations between Hitler Germany and her satellite

¹ C. A. Macartney, *October, Fifteenth. A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945*, Part II, Edinburgh, 1957, p. 213.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 218-19.

were growing tense. Hitler decided to occupy Hungary in order to strengthen Germany's strategic position in Central Europe, to take up favourable geographic positions in the Carpathians before a possible advance by the Soviet Army, and also to rid the Hungarian Government of undesirable elements.

On March 18, 1944 Horthy was summoned to Salzburg for talks with Hitler. During the talks Hitler told Horthy that Hungary's position was becoming ever less reliable, accused him of attempting to make a deal behind Germany's back and said that there were people hostile to Germany in the Hungarian Government, and that he had therefore decided to occupy Hungary. After some hesitation Horthy accepted Hitler's suggestion that he (Horthy) should approve of the occupation "in the interests of the joint struggle against Bolshevism". He also agreed to the formation of a new government which was to be headed by Döme Sztojaj, a Hitlerite agent, the former Hungarian ambassador to Germany.

The March events made Horthy's Hungary lose the last shreds of independence and fall under the domination of the Hitlerites. This meant great suffering for the Hungarian people. The Soviet Government felt sympathy with the Hungarian people and in one of its notes addressed to the British Government in May 1944 it noted that "the solution of the question of Hungary's future should be left to the Hungarian people, which should be encouraged to unite and actively to resist the Germans and the present Hungarian Government".

* * *

The Bulgarian rulers also continued their criminal participation in the fascist bloc. True, they did not dare to declare war on the Soviet Union and had declared war only on the USA and Britain. In 1944, when Germany's military situation changed from bad to worse, the Bulgarian reactionaries, like the rulers of other German satellites, began to look for a way out of the war. They began to beat the drum about their alleged neutrality. Actually, however, the anti-popular Bulgarian Government continued to give every assistance to Hitler Germany. This compelled the Soviet Government in the spring of 1944 to warn Sofia of the grim consequences their criminal policy of co-operation with Hitler Germany

would incur. In a note dated April 17, 1944, the Soviet Government drew the attention of the Bulgarian Government to the fact that the transformation, in connection with Germany's deteriorating military position, of the Bulgarian ports of Varna and Burgas, and the Rumanian port of Constanza, into German bases, and the fact that German naval forces acting against the USSR in the Black Sea were concentrated at those ports and sheltered by the Bulgarian authorities, was incompatible with normal relations between the USSR and Bulgaria.¹ The Soviet Government asked that Bulgaria immediately put an end to the further use of Bulgarian territory and Bulgarian ports by the nazis for hostile action against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government also expressed the wish to re-open the Soviet consulate in Varna, which had been closed at the insistence of the Bulgarian Government, and also to open Soviet consulates in Burgas and Rusa.

In the correspondence between the Soviet and the Bulgarian governments, begun in the spring of 1944, the Bulgarian rulers denied the facts contained in the Soviet statement and linked the opening of consulates in Varna, Burgas and Rusa with the renewal of economic relations between the two countries, which had been broken off because of the war.

The position of the fascist rulers showed that under the guise of neutrality, Bulgaria was continuing to co-operate with Hitler Germany and was giving Germany considerable assistance in her military operations on the Balkans.

Persisting in their anti-Soviet policy, first Bozhilov's Government and then Bagryanov's which replaced it, resumed attempts to sign a separate peace with Britain and the USA. In July 1944 the US embassy in Moscow told the Commissar for Foreign Affairs that the Americans had been informed by official Bulgarian sources that the Bulgarian Government was ready to begin negotiations on a separate peace. This peace feeler, however, also did not lead to Bulgaria's withdrawal from the war.

Thus, the fascist rulers of Rumania, Finland, Hungary and Bulgaria did not avail themselves of the favourable conditions for a withdrawal from the fascist bloc created by the new offensive of the Soviet forces in the winter and spring of 1944 and continued the war on Germany's side.

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, pp. 185-86.

The only way in which Rumania, Hungary, Finland and Bulgaria could escape complete military destruction was to overthrow the fascist dictatorships and to break with Germany. This task could be carried out only by the people who were suffering from the consequences of the fascist rulers' policies. And this is exactly what happened. As soon as the Soviet armies smashed the armed forces of the fascist states, the people of Central and Southeast Europe took the opportunity to topple their fascist régimes.

The fascist coalition, which at the beginning of the war had incorporated about ten states, was on its last legs. The governments of the USSR, USA and Britain co-ordinated their responses to the peace feelers put out by the German satellites in the spring of 1944. The sound foundation on which the anti-Hitler coalition was built excluded the possibility of the enemy states taking advantage of differences within the coalition arising from the difference in their social systems. Although such differences did arise also over Allied policy towards the Axis satellites, they were not decisive. The three governments succeeded in working out a common policy on basic questions. Proof of this was contained in the declaration of May 12, 1944 by the American, British and Soviet governments regarding the four axis satellites, which read:

"Through the fateful policy of their leaders, the people of Hungary are suffering the humiliation of German occupation. Rumania is still bound to the Nazis in a war now bringing devastation to its own people. The governments of Bulgaria and Finland have placed their countries in the service of Germany and remain in the war at Germany's side."¹ The three governments declared that by their policy and stand the fascist rulers of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland were substantially strengthening the German war machine, but that it was still not too late for them to promote Allied victory, hasten the end of the war and decrease their own losses by stopping their fatal co-operation with Germany.²

* * *

The different approach of the main states of the anti-Hitler coalition to countries liberated from fascism and to

¹ Ibid., pp. 132-33.

² Ibid.

questions of peaceful settlement, became particularly clear in the spring of 1944 in the case of Italy.

By the autumn of 1943, Italy was divided into two parts—the northern, which was occupied by the Hitlerites and had a government headed by Mussolini, and the southern, which was occupied by the Allied forces, and was under the government of Badoglio, seated at Brindisi.

The Badoglio Government had no real power. All power was concentrated in the hands of the Anglo-American occupation authorities.

Although the functions of the Anglo-American authorities (AMGOT) were originally intended to extend only to the front-line zone, actually this administration acted throughout the liberated territory and interfered with the work of the Italian bodies. The policy of Britain and the USA in Italy was strongly disapproved of even by Italy's West-orientated statesmen. At the meeting of the Advisory Council for Italy on January 10, 1944, Badoglio complained about the narrow limits within which the Italian Government was allowed to act: "The Allied occupation, the harsh armistice terms, which are still almost fully in force, lead . . . to the creation everywhere of a second administrative apparatus, which passes laws, exercises control. . . ." Badoglio expressed the hope that in the near future "the administration of those national territories which can be returned to us" would be handed over to the Italian authorities.

Although Britain and the USA limited the power of the Badoglio Government, they supported it in every way, since the preservation of the monarchy and of a government in which Italy's main democratic forces were not represented, was in full accord with the plans of London and Washington.

The activity of the Anglo-American occupation authorities was guided mainly by the interests of the British and US imperialist monopolies, who wanted to liquidate their Italian competitor and to grab his foreign and domestic markets. Besides, Britain and the USA took a special interest in Italy because she occupied important strategic positions in the Mediterranean and with respect to the Balkans. Finally, from the very first days of the occupation, the Allied authorities in Italy strove to prevent the implementation of the radical democratic socio-economic changes, which the Italian working class and its vanguard—the Italian Communist Party—had proclaimed.

The importance US and British monopolies attached to the activity of the Allied occupation authorities in Italy can be seen from the fact that their representatives were appointed to leading positions in AMGOT. Thus, the finance department of AMGOT in Sicily was headed by Colonel Smith, who before the war had held a high position in the Bank of England as an expert on European finance problems. Captain Constantine Benson, another prominent member of AMGOT, had been a director of Lloyd's Bank and of Marks and Spencers, the big trading house, before the war, while Colonel Harris of AMGOT had been the managing director of the Great Southern and Western Railways. Charles Poletti, a US Colonel, working in AMGOT, attempted to make the Italian economy dependent on US raw materials for the metallurgical, chemical and textile industries and proposed to use the coal shortage in Italy in the interests of the US monopolies.

As soon as it began to operate AMGOT and the Allied Control Commission organised the systematic export from Italy of raw materials in short supply, of valuable industrial equipment and requisitioned enterprises that might in future compete with the production of US and British enterprises. The US and British monopolies used proxies to buy shares of enterprises profitable for US and British capital for a song. The Anglo-American authorities used food deliveries as a means of holding the mass of Italian working people at bay. Claude Wickard, US Secretary of Agriculture, frankly said in 1944 that food should be used to preclude the danger of revolutionary changes in Europe.

Although the function of the occupation authorities was carried out jointly by the USA and Britain, they differed sharply over the control of the Italian economy, both wishing to establish their individual supremacy. The battles against the nazis in Italy were still raging when a clash of interests arose between the US Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony Vacuum Oil Co., and Caltex Oil Co., on the one hand, and the British Shell Oil Co., on the other. Both groupings endeavoured to capitalise on the difficult position of the relevant Italian corporations and bought up shares through their people in AMGOT.

A no less bitter struggle went on between American and English monopolies in the spheres of commercial aviation, the textile and motor industries, and some others.

The fight between the USA and Britain for a dominant position in Italy grew gradually more and more intense. Britain endeavoured to ensure the rule of the British monopolies in Italy, while the USA wanted to subordinate the Italian economy to US capital.

The policy of the Anglo-American ruling circles did not fall in with the interests of the Italian people and the Italian state. It was directed at transforming Italy into a dependent, second-rate power.

* * *

In 1943 the Soviet, US and British governments had reached agreement on many matters connected with Italy's withdrawal from the fascist bloc. The Moscow Declaration on Italy held a major place among the co-ordinated documents on that issue. This declaration was approved by the democratic public in Italy and beyond her borders.

Expressing the opinion of the ordinary people of Italy, *Unita*, the central organ of the Italian Communist Party, wrote on November 3, 1943: "We support the decisions of the Moscow Conference, because we realise that the Italian people need them, because we realise that the Italian people will, on the basis of liberty and national independence, overcome the present horrible crisis and make their way out of the disaster into which they have been plunged by fascism." The National Committee for the Liberation of Italy also approved of the Moscow decision on Italy in a special resolution published on November 6.

The Advisory Council on Italy began its activity in November 1943 in accordance with the decision of the Moscow Conference.

Among the matters discussed at its first meeting, held on November 30, were the question of prisoners of war, the rights of Italy as a co-belligerent in the war, the use of the Italian armed forces, the position of Left parties and organisations, the purge of the administration and army of fascist elements.

In mid-December 1943 the Advisory Council decided to recommend that all occupied Italian territory to the south of the northern borders of the Province of Salerno-Potenza and Bari, including Sicily and Sardinia, should be placed under Italian administration as soon as possible.

The Advisory Council also considered a number of other

important matters and adopted decisions on them. In the second half of January 1944 the Council unanimously recommended that a Soviet representative should take part in the work of the Allied Control Commission in Italy and be assigned consultative functions. The Soviet and English delegations on the Advisory Council proposed that a representative of the French Committee of National Liberation should participate in the Allied Control Council. The US delegation, however, objected to this.

The Soviet representatives repeatedly raised important questions in the Advisory Council relating to Italy's political position. At the end of 1943 they received information that the Anglo-American authorities in Sicily were not fulfilling the decisions the Moscow Conference had adopted on Italy. For example, they had information that Britain was carrying on a campaign in Sicily with a view to separating the island from Italy. A separatist party, pursuing the aim of breaking away from Italy, had been set up in Sicily under British auspices. Other parties were prohibited, and the Communist Party had to work underground. Democratic freedoms had not been restored on the island and many anti-fascists were still languishing in gaol.

The Soviet representatives asked the Advisory Council to consider the situation in Sicily and to adopt a decision recommending that the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces give AMGOT in Sicily instructions to liberate all anti-fascists who had been arrested on political grounds immediately and not to permit their arrest for political activity in future.

While the Advisory Council on Italy was functioning, its members visited various populated centres in the liberated part of Italy, including Sardinia and Sicily. They were able to establish contacts with various officials and ordinary Italians and to obtain first-hand information on the state of affairs there. During their study trips through the liberated parts of Italy the Soviet representatives often met representatives of the Italian democrats and expressed to them the sympathy the Soviet Union had for the Italian people and its wish that their war-devastated economy might be quickly rehabilitated. They declared that Italy must once again begin to play its historic role in the Mediterranean area.

Even though the Advisory Council was functioning, the Western powers continued to conduct a separatist policy on

some key questions of Italy's political life. The British and US governments took actions which did not conform with the joint decisions of the three Allied powers. Late in 1943 and early in 1944 various official British and US representatives made numerous declarations that the then functioning Italian Government could not be replaced by any other government and that any revision of Italy's political life would have to wait until Rome was captured by the Allied troops. A special Anglo-American agreement was signed in this connection. Churchill reported on it to Parliament on February 22, 1944. Both the British and American statesmen said that this was not an appropriate time for discussing the further fate of the monarchy and King Victor Emmanuel's abdication. These issues so vitally important to the future of Italy had not been decided jointly by the Three Powers; they had not been discussed either at the Moscow Conference or by the Advisory Council on Italy, and there had been no exchange of views on them through the usual diplomatic channels.

The position was aggravated by the fact that there were many British and American military and civilian bodies in southern Italy who had numerous representatives in many Italian institutions, whereas the Soviet Union had no direct relations with the Italian Government and the very few representatives it had in Italy were connected only with the Advisory Council. Therefore, the Soviet Government expressed the wish to establish direct relations with Italy and said that it would give a positive reply to a corresponding request by the Italian Government. On March 7, 1944 the Italian Government asked the Soviet Government through Bogomolov, the new Soviet representative on the Advisory Committee on Italy, to establish direct relations and to exchange representatives. On March 11, 1944 the Soviet Government agreed to fulfil the Italian Government's request. A special Italian communiqué on this matter read: "In accordance with the request submitted by the Royal Government to the United Nations, Soviet Russia has extended us her hand, this despite the mistakes made by the old régime. Undoubtedly, this is a gesture which the Italian people will not soon forget, and one which was made at one of the most tragic moments in our history."¹

¹ Quoted according to N. Kovalevsky, *Italyanski narod protiv fashizma* (The Italian People Against Fascism), pp. 172-73.

The principal aim of the Soviet Union in establishing direct relations with the Italian Government was to help the Italian people in their struggle for the restoration of their national independence and state sovereignty, and to ensure their democratic freedoms.

The Soviet Government's step was indicative of the respect the Soviet Union had for the sovereignty of the Italian state, and as a result of the Soviet Union's diplomatic initiative, Britain and the USA also had to declare that they had established official diplomatic relations with the Italian Government. This was done on April 5, 1944.

While the Anglo-American administration attempted to discredit the Italian administration in every way, the establishment of direct Soviet-Italian relations helped to strengthen its prestige and authority and made it easier for the Soviet Government to ask the USA and Britain to consider "measures to unite all democratic and anti-fascist forces in liberated Italy on the basis of a corresponding improvement in the Badoglio Government by including into it representatives of the anti-fascist parties".¹ This Soviet initiative led the Advisory Council on Italy to adopt, early in April 1944, decisions recommending the expansion of the Badoglio Government by the inclusion of representatives of the anti-fascist parties. On April 22, 1944 the Badoglio Government was reorganised and representatives of six parties of the anti-fascist coalition, including members of the Italian Communist Party, entered the government. The Soviet Union's policy towards Italy, aimed at the defence of her independence and sovereignty, was greatly appreciated by the Italian public. Italian newspapers called the trip through Italy, made by the Soviet delegation in 1944, a triumphant march.

* * *

New problems assailed the USSR, USA and Britain every day. They were associated with drafting a co-ordinated policy towards the liberated countries and with the implementation of that policy (Italy). As a rule the three Great Powers succeeded in reaching agreement on principles underlying their joint policy on various concrete matters, but in other cases serious difficulties arose in connection with their implementation, as can be seen from the example of Italy.

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 108.

The US and British ruling circles distorted the democratic nature of the decisions adopted and made their policy serve the interests of the monopolies. They tried to restore and strengthen the position of the ruling exploiter classes. Although they did not as yet risk the open suppression of democratic, patriotic forces, they shrank at nothing to paralyse them. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, observing the letter and the spirit of the co-ordinated decisions, did all it could to ensure freedom and democracy for the masses, the working people of the liberated countries. It was becoming clear that it was not merely a question of adopting declarations but of actually translating these democratic declarations into practice.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SOVIET ARMY LIBERATES EASTERN EUROPE

In June-July 1944 the Soviet Army entered Poland and, advancing westward, reached the bank of the Vistula. Helm was the first Polish town to be liberated. Units of the Polish Army, formed in the USSR, entered Poland together with the Soviet armed forces.

Seeing that the liberation of Poland had begun, the National People's Council of Poland (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*) which had been set up by the democratic forces of the Polish people at the end of 1943, organised the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PCNL). This committee was a temporary executive body set up "to head the people's liberation struggle and to ensure the independence and the restoration of the Polish state". On July 22, 1944 the PCNL issued a manifesto to the Polish people in which it outlined the basic principles of its domestic and foreign policy. Speaking on Polish foreign policy, the PCNL called for a firm union with Poland's direct neighbours—the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia—and for the strengthening of friendship with Great Britain, the USA and other members of the United Nations.

"Poland's foreign policy," the manifesto read, "will be a democratic one and will rely on principles of collective security." As regards the Soviet-Polish frontier, the PCNL said, "this must be a line of good-neighbourly friendship, not a barrier between us and our neighbours; it must be regulated according to the principle: Polish lands to Poland, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian lands—to Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Byelorussia and Soviet Lithuania."¹

The establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation marked the unification of all patriotic, anti-fascist, democratic forces of the Polish people in the struggle against

¹ *Pravda*, July 26, 1944.

the fascist invaders and helped to strengthen the international positions of the Polish democrats. The Soviet Government approved of the setting up of a national committee made up of democratic forces on Polish soil and expressed the view that "...the formation of this Committee marks a good beginning for the unification of those Poles who are friendly towards Great Britain, the USSR and the United States, and for overcoming the resistance of those Polish elements who are incapable of uniting with the democratic forces".¹

The formation of the PCNL—the temporary provisional executive power of the coalition of democratic forces—attached special importance to the Soviet Government's statement of July 26, which defined the aims of Soviet policy towards Poland, aims evolving from the nature of the Soviet socialist state. This statement pointed out that the Soviet troops had entered Poland for the sole purpose of "smashing the hostile German armies and helping the Polish people by liberating her from the oppression of the German invaders and restoring an independent, strong and democratic Poland".²

The Soviet Government emphasised that "it considers the military actions of the Red Army on Polish territory as actions on the territory of a sovereign, friendly, Allied state".

On the same day, on July 26, the Soviet Government and the PCNL signed an agreement stipulating the relations between the Soviet commander-in-chief and the Polish administration after the entry of Soviet troops into Poland.³

This agreement ensured the fighting friendship of the Soviet and Polish peoples in the struggle against the common enemy, and at the same time provided for the immediate establishment of a Polish administration on the territory liberated from German occupation. "As soon as any part of Polish liberated territory stops being a zone of direct military operations," article 6 of the agreement read, "the Polish Committee of National Liberation shall assume full control of the civilian administration."

The statement of the Soviet Government and Soviet-Polish agreement of July 26, 1944 were a vivid proof of the Soviet Union's wish to give every assistance to the Polish people in their struggle for liberation from the Hitlerite yoke and for

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 246.

² *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 155.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-59.

the creation of a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland.

On July 27, 1944, commenting on the Soviet-Polish agreement, *Pravda* wrote: "The agreement signed at this historic moment is of special importance. It further strengthens the friendship between the peoples of the USSR and Poland which has been tempered in the fire of the liberation struggle. It must be remembered that the relations between the Soviet and the Polish peoples are now founded on a new basis. The conflicts of yore are being consigned to oblivion. The Polish people look upon the Soviet Union with very different eyes from those with which they saw tsarist Russia because they know that they have a faithful friend in the Soviet Union. At the same time Poland too has changed. In the grim and cruel struggle against the imperialism of the Hitlerite bandits a new Poland is being born, a Poland that is strong, free, democratic and friendly towards the Soviet Union, that regards the Red Army as a liberation army, an army of a fraternal people, which is linked with the Polish people by a common historic destiny."

Regular contacts were established between the Soviet Government and the Polish Committee of National Liberation. During these consultations and talks they discussed problems of Soviet-Polish relations and the international situation.

The Head of the Soviet Government informed the Allies that the liberation of Poland had commenced and of the turn Soviet-Polish relations had taken. In his message to the British Prime Minister of July 23, 1944, he wrote:

"Events on our front are going forward at a very rapid pace. Lublin, one of Poland's major towns, was taken today by our troops, who continue their advance.

"In this situation we find ourselves confronted with the practical problem of administration on Polish territory. We do not want to, nor shall we, set up our own administration on Polish soil, for we do not wish to interfere in Poland's internal affairs. That is for the Poles themselves to do. We have, therefore, seen fit to get in touch with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, recently set up by the National Council of Poland which was formed in Warsaw at the end of last year, and consisting of representatives of democratic parties and groups, as you must have been informed by your Ambassador in Moscow. The Polish Committee of National Liberation intends to set up an administration on Polish

territory, and I hope this will be done. We have not found in Poland other forces capable of establishing a Polish administration. The so-called underground organisations, led by the Polish Government in London, have turned out to be ephemeral and lacking influence. As to the Polish Committee, I cannot consider it a Polish Government, but it may be that later on it will constitute the core of a Provisional Polish Government made up of democratic forces.”¹

In his letter the Head of the Soviet Government expressed his willingness to receive Mikolajczyk, Prime Minister of the Polish Emigré Government. The British Government was consistently exerting efforts to bring such a meeting about because it still hoped that it would be able to mediate in Soviet-Polish relations.

Mikolajczyk arrived in Moscow at the end of July.

The first meeting between Mikolajczyk and Stalin was held on August 3. They discussed several aspects of Soviet-Polish relations and the Soviet Government expressed the opinion that all questions relating to the situation in Poland should be decided by the Poles themselves and that Mikolajczyk should discuss them with the Polish Committee of National Liberation. During the talks the Soviet side told Mikolajczyk of a series of subversive acts that had been perpetrated by underground detachments of the Polish émigrés in Poland against the Soviet Army. Various underground organisations disseminated anti-Soviet literature, incited to war against the Soviet Union, etc. In view of these undeniable facts Mikolajczyk had to admit that such organisations really did exist. He said: “It is quite possible that some irresponsible elements publish that sort of literature or express such views at public meetings. . . .” As regards the Soviet-Polish border, the Soviet side once again reaffirmed that in settling this issue it would invoke the right of nations to self-determination, and that Poles, Ukrainians and Byelorussians must live in firm friendship.

A few days after the meeting Stalin, Mikolajczyk and his colleagues had a talk with representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. The representatives of the PCNL proposed to amalgamate the Committee with the democratic representatives of the Polish émigrés in London. They also suggested that the 1921 Constitution be restored in

¹ *Correspondence. . .* Vol. I, pp. 241-42.

Poland. Mikolajczyk rejected these proposals of the PCNL and the talks produced no positive results.

On August 9 Mikolajczyk had another meeting with Soviet representatives, at which the latter reasserted that the Soviet Union wanted to see the Poles united, that Polish affairs should be decided by the Poles themselves, and that the Soviet Union would not interfere in Poland's internal affairs. The Soviet side also said that it wanted to build its relations with Poland on a basis of co-operation and an alliance of mutual assistance in order to obviate a possible repetition of German aggression.

The Soviet Government informed London of the progress made in the negotiations with the Poles. It noted that the talks with Mikolajczyk and his colleagues had shown that the Polish émigré functionaries were not informed about the state of affairs in Poland. The Soviet Government emphasised that it refused to impose its will on the Poles and expressed the hope that all questions relating to the future of Poland would be decided by the Poles themselves.

In conclusion the message said: "I regret to say the meetings [the talks between Mikolajczyk and the PCNL representatives—*U.I.*] have not yet yielded the desired results. Still, they were useful because they provided Mikolajczyk and Morawski, as well as Bierut who had just arrived from Warsaw, with the opportunity for an exchange of views and particularly for informing each other that both the Polish National Committee and Mikolajczyk are anxious to co-operate and to seek practical opportunities in that direction. That can be considered as the first stage in the relations between the Polish Committee and Mikolajczyk and his colleagues. Let us hope that things will improve."¹

After it had acquainted itself with the results of Mikolajczyk's talks in Moscow, the British Government gave a positive appraisal of them and noted that "Undoubtedly an advance has been made towards our common goal".²

Even though a certain understanding was reached during Mikolajczyk's talks at Moscow, the Polish reactionaries perpetrated a further political subversion; they made an attempt to carry out their plan of a "frontal attack", that is, to establish the power of the London Emigré Government in

¹ *Correspondence*... Vol. I, pp. 250-51.

² *Ibid.*, p. 251.

Poland's vital centres and in Warsaw before Polish and Soviet troops entered Poland.

On August 1, 1944, detachments of the Polish Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*) started the Warsaw uprising in accordance with instructions from the London Emigré Government. The organisers of the Warsaw uprising pursued purely political aims. They hoped that the coincidence of the uprising in Warsaw with Mikolajczyk's talks in Moscow would strengthen the position of the Polish Emigré Government.

The leaders of the uprising did not care whether the uprising was opportune from the viewpoint of the common military operations against the Germans. Numerous sources indicate that the main aim of the organisers of the Warsaw adventure was to fight the Soviet troops. In his telegram to Bor-Komorowski, the leader of the Warsaw uprising, K. Sosnkowski, the War Minister of the Polish Emigré Government, wrote at the end of July 1944: "It is necessary at the same time to concentrate all political, moral and physical forces against the annexationist plans of Moscow."¹ A certain part of the reactionary émigrés believed that it was inadvisable to start the uprising because it would disperse the forces they had prepared for anti-Soviet actions. In choosing the date for the uprising Bor-Komorowski was guided only by the wish to wrest the victory over the Hitlerites from the advancing Soviet troops. Naturally, the organisers of this adventure did not co-ordinate their plans with the Soviet command and had no intention of doing so.

At the same time the uprising could succeed only with the support of the Soviet troops. It was started when the Soviet Army was still a long way from Warsaw and unable to give the insurgents effective assistance. Besides, before it captured Praga (a Warsaw suburb), the Soviet command did not even know where the insurgents were located.

Not only did the organisers of the Warsaw uprising fail to co-ordinate their action with the Soviet command but they did not even inform the National People's Council of Poland (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*) and the command of the People's Army (set up by the *Krajowa Rada Narodowa*) of the uprising. Moreover, even the command of many units of the

¹ W. Anders, *An Army in Exile. The Story of the Second Polish Corps*, London, 1949, p. 201.

Polish Home Army was not informed of the plans made by the organisers of the uprising.

The Polish reactionaries succeeded in drawing a large part of the population of Warsaw into the uprising because the latter believed that this action had been co-ordinated with the Soviet command. The people of Warsaw who were groaning under nazi oppression and were passionately striving for freedom enthusiastically rallied to the call to arms. Under these circumstances the PCNL and the command of the partisan detachments did everything to assist the insurgents, even though it condemned the organisers of the uprising for their hasty action.

When the Soviet Government was belatedly informed that an uprising had broken out in Warsaw it gave Mikolajczyk, who was at that time in Moscow, detailed information on the position at the front and on the prospects of further military operations. In particular it pointed out that it would be very difficult for the Soviet troops to pursue their advance because the Germans had concentrated four tank and other divisions near Warsaw, and had fortified the Vistula bridgeheads. The Soviet command made attempts to take Warsaw in pincers from the north and south. Mikolajczyk himself admitted that he knew that the Soviet troops would begin the battle for Warsaw only after a certain operational pause.

As events developed the irresponsibility and criminal recklessness of the venture the Polish reactionaries had launched in Warsaw became ever more apparent. For the sake of their anti-Soviet intrigues, the organisers of the Warsaw adventure had decided to sacrifice the lives of tens of thousands of Polish patriots. Roosevelt and Churchill who supported the Mikolajczyk Government displayed their alarm only some time after the outbreak of the uprising, when it was obvious that the Tempest plan had miscarried. In a joint telegram to Moscow on August 20, 1944 they insisted that urgent measures should be taken to save the situation in the Polish capital. The Head of the Soviet Government replied to the telegram as follows:

"Sooner or later the truth about the handful of power-seeking criminals who launched the Warsaw adventure will out. Those elements, playing on the credulity of the inhabitants of Warsaw, exposed practically unarmed people to German guns, armour and aircraft. The result is a situation in which every day is used, not by the Poles for freeing Warsaw, but

by the Hitlerites, who are cruelly exterminating the civil population." Further in the message it was pointed out that from a military point of view the situation, which kept German attention riveted to Warsaw, was highly unfavourable both to the Red Army and to the Poles. Yet, in spite of everything the Soviet command did all it could to ward off the German counter-attacks and to start a powerful drive on Warsaw. "I can assure you," the message to the Allies concluded, "that the Red Army will stint no effort to crush the Germans at Warsaw and liberate it for the Poles. That will be the best, really effective, help to the anti-Nazi Poles."¹

The Soviet Government instructed the command of its armed forces to make an intensive arms drop in the Warsaw district and to accelerate the advance of the Soviet troops towards Warsaw. On September 14, 1944 the troops of the First Byelorussian front took the fortress of Praga. The Soviet command did everything it could to help the insurgents, but the days of the uprising were numbered. Even the leaders of the anti-Soviet Polish Government were compelled to admit that the Soviet troops had greatly helped the insurgent people of Warsaw. In his appeal to the insurgents, broadcast over the London radio on September 9, Mikolajczyk said: "To-day the Soviet air force is giving you air cover and A.A. artillery. The Russians are shelling enemy forces and are already dropping some arms and food, thus making it possible to continue the fight. On behalf of the Polish Government I acknowledge this help with gratitude. . . ."² In a report dated September 21, 1944, General Bor-Komorowski wrote: "'We again received arms and ammunition dropped by Russian aircraft.' As late as September 29, General Bor reported that supplies had been dropped during the night by Soviet planes."³

In his report to Parliament on September 26, 1944, Churchill also admitted that the Soviet command had helped the insurgents as soon as it had the chance to do so.

"The Soviet armies were at that time [August 1944—*U.I.*] engaged in heavy fighting with strong German forces to the east and northeast of Warsaw, but when their operational plans permitted and direct contact had been established with

¹ *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. II, p. 157.

² *The Times*, September 20, 1944, No. 49, 961, p. 3.

³ W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1943-50*, Vol. II, London, 1958, p. 39.

the Polish Commander-in-Chief in Warsaw, they sent supplies to the Polish forces and provided them with air cover and anti-aircraft support.”¹

However, neither the heroism of the Warsaw people nor the help the Soviet troops were able to give them could do anything to change the situation. The Germans threw enormous forces into battle against the Polish insurgents, and also a large number of tanks and aircraft. At Hitler's orders Warsaw was being methodically destroyed. The uprising was drowned in a bloodbath. About 250,000 participants in the uprising gave their lives for Poland's liberation from the fascists.

The Soviet troops helped many of the people of Warsaw to leave the besieged town. Under the cover of Soviet artillery thousands of Polish freedom fighters crossed the Vistula and reached the eastern bank, where they were immediately aided by the Soviet troops who received the heroes of Warsaw as brothers.

The Soviet Union gave the Polish people who had been victimised by the invaders every possible assistance. As early as in August 1944 medicines, food and other goods were sent to the liberated areas. In October 1944 the Soviet Union and Poland signed their first trade agreement under which the Soviet Union agreed to supply Poland with basic raw materials.

In September 1944, developing friendly relations with the neighbouring Soviet Republics—the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania—the Polish Committee of National Liberation concluded a treaty with them on the evacuation from these Republics of Polish citizens and of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian population from Poland to the relevant Soviet Republics. The signing of this agreement testified to the common striving of the Soviet Union and Poland to abolish all possible sources of friction between the two countries and to resolve all controversial issues peacefully, by negotiations.

* * *

Among the military operations which the Soviet armed forces carried out in the summer of 1944, the offensive in Southeast Europe was particularly important. These opera-

¹ *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, London, 1944, Vol. 403, col. 26.

tions were decisive in freeing the Southeast European countries from German-fascist occupation.

In an attempt to stop the Soviet troops from penetrating to the Balkans, the German command arrayed the Southern Ukraine army group, consisting of 50 divisions, including 25 German ones, to block the advance of the Soviet armies. The main forces of the Southern Ukraine army group were deployed in the Yassy and Kishinev directions.

As a result of fierce offensive between August 20 and 27, 1944 the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts routed the main forces of the Southern Ukraine army group and this created favourable conditions for an offensive against the German fascist troops in Rumania and Bulgaria.

The entry of the Soviet Army into Rumania gave a powerful impetus to the struggle of the Rumanian working people for ending the war and breaking with Germany. The people's resistance to Antonescu's fascist dictatorship began to assume the form of anti-government actions by Rumanian workers and peasants, and the progressive intellectuals. The Rumanian Communist Party launched preparations for an armed uprising and for Rumania's withdrawal from the fascist bloc.

The setting up on May 1, 1944 of the united workers' front by the Communist and Social-Democratic Parties was enormously important in expanding the anti-fascist liberation struggle in Rumania. This front became a centre around which all anti-fascist, patriotic forces in Rumania united.

Taking advantage of the favourable situation created by the victories of the Soviet Army, the patriotic forces headed by the Rumanian Communist Party overthrew Antonescu's fascist dictatorship on August 23, 1944 and Antonescu and his closest collaborators were arrested by detachments headed by Communists.

In the night of August 23 patriotic detachments and military units, headed by the Rumanian Communist Party, occupied the key institutions and strategic positions in the capital, including the Council of Ministers, Ministry of the Interior and the radio station.

The events in Rumania caused panic among the Hitlerites. On the day of the armed uprising in Rumania, Friesner, the commander of the Southern Ukraine army group, contacted Hitler and informed him of the overthrow of Antonescu's dictatorship. On hearing Friesner's report Hitler flew into a rage and ordered the immediate dispersal of the

government set up in Rumania as a result of the armed uprising and the formation of a new one of Hitlerite agents. The German generals in Rumania took steps to carry out Hitler's orders without delay.

To consolidate the success of the armed uprising it was essential to render the Hitlerite troops in Rumania harmless—to give them no chance to suppress the armed uprising. King Michael of Rumania believed the German Generals Hansen and Gerstenberg when they gave him their "word of honour" that they would order the German troops to lay down arms, and agreed to let these troops leave Rumania unobstructedly. Arriving in Banyas, where Hitler's main forces were concentrated, Gerstenberg arrested the Rumanian officers who had accompanied him, and in accordance with Hitler's orders began to organise the German troops for the capture of Bucharest, where he intended to form a new pro-Hitler government.

King Michael's consent to the unobstructed evacuation of the German troops from Rumania was retracted owing to the immediate, energetic intervention of the Rumanian Communist Party. The Rumanian Army turned its guns against the Germans and fought them together with all patriotic forces. The hope of the Hitlerites to restore fascism in Rumania was thus foiled.

On August 25, Alexander Cretzianu, the Rumanian envoy to Ankara, visited Vinogradov, the Soviet ambassador to Turkey, and handed him a note of the new Rumanian Government saying that it had decided to sign an armistice immediately and to put all the forces in the country to the task of clearing Rumania of all Hitlerite forces. A Rumanian Government delegation was invited to Moscow. On September 12, 1944 it signed an armistice agreement. The draft for the armistice agreement with Rumania, as similar documents for Finland, Bulgaria and Hungary, had been drawn up in close co-operation between the Soviet, US and British governments. The USSR played the main role in drawing up these drafts and this guaranteed their democratic nature and subsequently helped the peoples of those countries to fight fascist, reactionary elements.

At the initiative of the Rumanian Communist Party, which was supported by all democratic forces in the country, and in keeping with the relevant article in the armistice agreement, the Rumanian people actively participated in the war

against Hitler Germany and contributed to the rout of fascism. The armistice agreement obliged Rumania to participate in the war on the side of the United Nations and to field no less than 12 divisions. Actually, however, between August 23, 1944 and May 9, 1945, Rumania never had fewer than 15 divisions in the field. Under the leadership of the Soviet High Command, Rumanian troops fought for 200 days in Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and ended the war in the suburbs of Prague.

* * *

In June 1944 the Soviet Command launched a major offensive in the Karelian area. The troops of the Leningrad front broke through the Finnish defences on the Karelian Isthmus, liberated Terioki, Vyborg and other towns and threw the Finns back deep into Finland. Finland's military and political situation was becoming critical. Even Hitler's most faithful henchmen in Finland realised that further resistance was useless. Ryti, who several weeks before had signed the military agreement with Ribbentrop, resigned in August. Mannerheim, the commander-in-chief of the Finnish Army, who replaced him as President, refused to recognise that military agreement.

When the Germans heard that Finland intended to withdraw from the war they sent Field-Marshal Keitel, the Chief of Staff of the German Supreme Command, to Helsinki on August 17, 1944. He attempted to talk the Finnish Government into continuing the war against the Soviet Union, but despite Mannerheim's hatred of the Soviet Union and Keitel's threats and promises, the Finnish Government was compelled to sue for peace with the Soviet Union.

On August 25 Gripenberg, the Finnish envoy to Stockholm, handed to Kollontai, the Soviet ambassador, a request asking "Moscow to receive a Finnish Government delegation in order to come to terms on an armistice or peace agreement, or on both one and the other, between Finland and the Soviet Union".¹

In its reply of August 29 the Soviet Government said that it was willing to receive a Finnish delegation only if the Finns were willing to accept certain preliminary conditions, that is, "the Finnish Government must publicly declare that it breaks

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 177.

off relations with Germany and demands of her that she withdraw her armed forces from Finland within two weeks from the day of the Finnish acceptance of this proposal of the Soviet Government, and in any case not later than on September 15 of this year, and that, if Germany does not withdraw her armed forces by that date from Finland, the German armed forces will be disarmed and handed over to the Allies as POWs".¹ The Finnish Government was informed that the Soviet reply had been co-ordinated with the British Government and had met no objections from the US Government.

In the night of September 3, 1944 the Finnish Government declared that it had accepted the preliminary armistice terms of the Soviet Union and ceased all military action. Between September 14 and 19 talks were held in Moscow between Soviet and British representatives, acting on behalf of all the United Nations at war with Finland, on the one hand, and a Finnish Government delegation, on the other.

The talks ended on September 19, 1944 in the signing of an armistice with Finland. A special feature of that agreement was that it did not provide for the occupation of Finland. The geographic and strategic conditions were such that the operations of the Soviet Army against the Hitlerite troops did not make it necessary to occupy Finland. The preamble to the agreement said that the agreement included a number of articles of the future peace treaty.

Thus, one more ally of Hitler Germany had been knocked out of the war.

* * *

Inflicting heavy blows to the retreating fascist troops and liberating Rumania from the German invaders, the Soviet Army approached the Bulgarian borders in August 1944.

This made Bulgaria's posture extremely important. Under the guise of "neutrality" the Bulgarian Government allowed the retreating German fascist troops to take refuge in Bulgaria. Moreover, Bulgaria even allowed the Hitlerite bandits to carry out raids from her territory. Even though they had real possibilities of breaking with Germany, the Bulgarian reactionary rulers continued their pro-German policy and, in effect, continued to take part in the war against the Soviet Union.

¹ Ibid., pp. 177-78.

The Bulgarian working people sharply condemned the anti-popular policy of the ruling circles. In the summer of 1944 the guerilla movement headed by the Patriotic Front flared up all over the country. The partisan detachments had tens of thousands of fighters in their ranks. In the summer of 1944 the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (the Communists), the leadership of the partisan army and the National Committee of the Patriotic Front began to prepare for an armed uprising. The country was divided into 12 military-operational zones and headquarters were set up in them to take command of the detachments and brigades.

In July-August 1944 the partisan units began to set up people's self-government bodies in several districts. In addition to the partisan units there were sabotage and subversion groups in practically all towns and villages. In the summer of 1944 the participants in the anti-fascist national liberation movement began to prepare for decisive battles.

The Bulgarian rulers contacted the British and American authorities in an attempt to preserve the bourgeois and land-owner regime in Bulgaria. In August 1944, Moshanov was sent by the Bulgarian Government to Cairo to discuss the possibility of Bulgaria's withdrawal from the war with US and British representatives. Early in September 1944, that is, when the Soviet troops were approaching the Bulgarian border, a secret British mission arrived in Bulgaria. During an exchange of views between the head of the British mission and a representative of the Bulgarian Government it turned out that the British Government was planning to bring Turkish divisions into Bulgaria without delay. The British assured the Bulgarians that the Turkish troops would subsequently be replaced by British and American units.

The intention of the British and US governments to occupy Bulgaria can be seen also from the fact that the British and American drafts of the armistice agreement with Bulgaria, discussed in the European Advisory Committee in the spring and summer of 1944, contained articles providing for the occupation of Bulgaria by Anglo-American troops. Thus, article 3 of the American draft of that agreement read: "The Allied Governments, who have signed the document on the surrender, must have the right to occupy by any armed forces . . . any or all parts of Bulgaria's territory and be granted throughout the country the legal rights of an occupying power."

Because of the violent development of events in Bulgaria itself and the actions taken by the Soviet Government early in September 1944, the talks Moshanov and other Bulgarian representatives held with the Anglo-Americans furnished no results.

Seeing that the Bulgarian Government was continuing to co-operate with Hitler Germany and that there was a chance that the Bulgarian reactionaries might strike a deal with Western imperialist circles, in the summer of 1944 the Soviet Government demanded that the Bulgarian rulers make a clean break with Germany. Since the Bulgarian rulers did not comply with this demand but continued to use their "neutrality" as a cover while actually assisting the Hitlerites, the Soviet Government declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944, pointing out that the Bulgarian Government had actually fought against the Soviet Union ever since 1941. "...Bulgaria's ruling circles," the report of the Information Bureau of the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of September 7, 1944 read, "having embarked on military co-operation with Hitler Germany, in contravention of vital national interests, has drawn the Bulgarian people into war first against Britain and the USA and then against the Soviet Union, against the fraternal Russian people, who shed their blood for Bulgaria's liberation."¹

On September 8 the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front commanded by Marshal Tolbukhin crossed the Rumanian-Bulgarian border and began the liberation of Bulgaria. On the first day of the drive they liberated Rusa, Burgas, Varna and several other large centres in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian people welcomed the Soviet liberation army with great enthusiasm.

In the night of September 8, 1944, immediately after the entry of the Soviet Army into Bulgaria, a nation-wide armed uprising broke out. It was headed by the Communist Party. The Patriotic Front Government formed as a result of the uprising broke with Hitler and declared war on him.

The new Bulgarian Government asked the Allies for an armistice. The governments of the USSR, USA and Britain informed Bulgaria that as a precondition she would have to evacuate all her troops and civil servants from Greek and Yugoslavian territory. As soon as the Popular Front

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 199.

Government had carried out this requirement it sent a delegation to Moscow. The talks between the Soviet, US and British representatives and the Bulgarian Government delegation ended on October 28, 1944 in the signing of the armistice with Bulgaria.

At these talks serious controversy arose between the USSR, on the one hand, and Britain and the USA, on the other. The Soviet Government opposed the demand of Britain and the USA to occupy Bulgaria, since no such demands had been made in the case of Rumania and Finland. The Soviet Union's viewpoint prevailed and article 3 of the armistice agreement read: "The Bulgarian Government will afford to Soviet and other Allied forces freedom of movement over Bulgarian territory in any direction, if in the opinion of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, the military situation so requires. . . ."¹

The Soviet Government also objected to the demand of the British and US representatives that the military material, property, resources, means, and so on, belonging to Bulgaria, be handed over for the use of, or placed under the control of, the Allies. The stand taken by the Soviet Government prevented the Anglo-American representatives from including these demands in the armistice terms. No such terms were contained in the armistice agreements with Rumania and Finland.

During these talks the British and US governments attempted to place Bulgaria in a worse position than Hitler Germany's other ex-allies. Thus, for example, Britain insisted on including in the armistice agreement a special article on the freezing of Bulgarian assets. Furthermore, the British representatives insisted that the armistice agreement include a commitment by Bulgaria to carry out any demands of the Allies relating to the restoration of peace and security.

The Soviet Government refused to acquiesce to the imposition on Bulgaria of additional demands which would place her in a worse position than the other countries with whom similar agreements had been concluded.

"It would be wrong and unfounded to impose on Bulgaria commitments over and above those provided for in Article 9 [on reparations—*U.I.*] and which are not contained in the agreement with Rumania," the Soviet note read. At the

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy* . . . , Vol. II, p. 288.

insistence of the Soviet Government no mention was made of the British demands in the agreement.

There were also differences as to who should sign the armistice agreement with Bulgaria. Britain and the USA wanted it to be signed by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, the commander of the Allied forces on the Mediterranean theatre, on behalf of all the United Nations. In addition, the British and US governments wanted the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria to be a Three-Power body, one in which the Soviet Union, USA and Britain would equally share in all practical activity and responsibility. The situation that had by that time shaped in Bulgaria made these proposals unacceptable. Bulgaria had been freed from the German fascist invaders by the Soviet Army, by the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, commanded by Marshal Tolbukhin. In view of this the Soviet Government proposed that the armistice agreement be signed by Marshal Tolbukhin. The Soviet Government also objected to the structure of the Allied Control Commission suggested by the British and US governments. Following some discussion a decision was adopted that the armistice agreement would be signed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Tolbukhin and Lieutenant-General Jas. Gammel, as representative of the Allied command in the Mediterranean area, and it was decided that the Allied Control Commission would operate under the chairmanship of a representative of the Soviet High Command, with the participation of the representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom.¹ The armistice agreement thus reflected the actual conditions in Bulgaria and the decisive contribution made by the Soviet Union to the liberation of Bulgaria from the German fascist invaders.

One more serious disagreement which arose while the armistice agreement with Bulgaria was being drafted is worth considering. It related to Bulgaria's participation in the war against Germany. The Government of the Patriotic Front, wishing to contribute to the joint struggle of the freedom-loving peoples against fascism, had declared war on Germany. The Bulgarian people supported this decision and enthusiastically joined the people's war. Side by side with the Soviet troops, under the general leadership of the Soviet command, the Bulgarian Army inflicted serious blows on the

¹ Ibid., p. 291.

retreating German fascist troops. As part of the 3rd Ukrainian front it participated in the liberation of Yugoslavia and Hungary and in the fighting in Austria. By the end of the war Bulgarian troops held positions in the foothills of the Austrian Alps.

The British and US governments were not happy about Bulgaria's participation in the war against Hitler and objected to her co-belligerence being stated in the armistice agreement. They could not reconcile themselves to the idea that Bulgaria, by her participation in the war under general Soviet command, was winning the support of the Soviet Union in her struggle for the preservation of her territorial integrity and independence.

The main reasons for this hostile attitude of the British and US governments were the wide scale that the revolutionary movement of the Bulgarian people had assumed and the radical changes that had taken place in the country's political life.

The same differences arose also during the discussion of article 1 (the article on Bulgaria's withdrawal from the war), one of the most important in the armistice agreement. Owing to the stand taken by Britain and America, article 1 of the armistice with Bulgaria, as distinct from the corresponding articles in the armistice agreements with Rumania and Hungary, only stated that Bulgaria had broken off relations with Germany but did not state that she had declared war on Germany. Besides, the armistice agreement with Bulgaria did not specify the number of troops she was to put in the field against Germany; it only said that she assumes the commitment "to maintain and make available such land, naval and air forces as may be determined for service under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command".¹

As a result of long-drawn-out talks the text of the armistice agreement with Bulgaria was finally reached between the governments of the USSR, Britain and the USA. Many of the differences were ironed out at the Anglo-Soviet talks in Moscow in October 1944.

On the whole the armistice agreement with Bulgaria was one of moderation. The Soviet Government succeeded in protecting Bulgaria from the imposition of unjustly hard armistice terms by the British and US ruling circles.

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 287.

By the autumn of 1944, Hungary was Germany's last ally in Europe. In view of the sharp deterioration of Germany's position and the aggravation of the inner-political situation in Hungary, even Horthy and his henchmen were compelled to look for ways to stop the lost war.

Rapidly developing events brought the collapse of Hitler Germany ever closer and with it the fall of Horthy regime in Hungary. In September, after several days of fighting, the Hungarian invaders were driven from South Transylvania by the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

Instead of seeking contact with the Soviet Union, whose troops were approaching the Hungarian borders, the Horthy clique, nursing bitter hatred for the USSR, sent General Naday to the Naples area for talks on ending the war. In the company of an English colonel, Naday arrived at the Allied Headquarters where he met General Wilson, the commander of the Allied Forces on the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, and handed him a message addressed by Horthy to the Allied powers. The message said *inter alia*: "It would be desirable if the Entente could prevail on the Soviets not to cross our frontiers; then we could bring back all our forces and take decisive steps. Or let the Entente urgently land a few divisions in Fiume and come to West Hungary."¹ The participants in the talks, however, saw that it was senseless to conduct separate talks on an armistice with Hungary when Soviet troops were already entering Hungary, and Hungary's fascist rulers, therefore, finally decided to send a delegation to Moscow. Early in October Hungarian representatives, headed by General Farago, were allowed to cross the front and to proceed to Moscow, where talks on Hungary's withdrawal from the war started.

On October 11, 1944 the Hungarian delegation signed a preliminary armistice agreement, the first articles of which read: Hungary must evacuate all her troops and her civilian administration from the territory of Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia to within the borders of Hungary that existed on December 21, 1937; Hungary remains a sovereign, independent state, other states do not interfere in Hungary's internal affairs; the Hungarian Army will turn its weapons against the German troops.

¹ C. A. Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

The agreement was signed but it was not implemented. The Horthy clique still held strong sentiments in favour of continuing the war, and therefore played for time. When the Germans learned that Hungary wanted to end the war they removed Horthy and put Szalasy, another fascist, the leader of the Arrow Cross party, in his place.

The democratic forces within Hungary took it upon themselves to put an end to the criminal war against the Soviet Union.

At the end of September 1944 the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front commanded by Marshal Malinovsky entered Hungary and began to liberate the Hungarian people from the German invaders and their Horthy allies. Soviet troops took Bekéscaba, Orohaza, Sarkad, and several other towns in East Hungary and continued their westward drive.

The entry of the Soviet Army into Hungary in the autumn of 1944 gave an impetus to the anti-fascist liberation movement of the Hungarian people. On the territory liberated by the Soviet Army organs of the people's power were set up at the initiative and under the guidance of the Communist Party of Hungary. A Provisional National Assembly was set up in December 1944 in Debretsen. It comprised representatives of political parties and organisations which had opposed the Horthy regime. On December 22 the Provisional Assembly formed a national government, which declared war on Germany.

On January 20, 1945 representatives of the Provisional Hungarian Government signed an armistice agreement in Moscow. The agreement repeated in the main the armistice terms with Rumania, Finland and Bulgaria. It contained a number of articles directed at liquidating the results of the annexationist policy of the Horthy regime; it ensured the conditions necessary for Hungary's participation in the war against Hitler Germany in the final stages of the Second World War, created favourable prerequisites for the democratic development of the country, determined the nature of the interrelations between the Hungarian administration and the Allied authorities, and solved a number of other questions.

The armistice agreement provided for the establishment of an Allied Control Commission, whose functions were to include the regulation and control of the fulfilment of the agreement. It stated that a representative of the Soviet Union would be appointed Chairman of the Commission, while the

USA and Britain would be represented on it as members. The competency of the Commission and its relations with the Hungarian administration was stipulated in special sections of the armistice agreement.

On February 13, 1945 the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian front in conjunction with the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian front took Budapest after a siege of six weeks and thereby completed the rout of the enemy groupings which had been surrounded in Budapest. Continuing its offensive the Soviet Army cleared all of Hungary from the German invaders by April 4, 1945.

* * *

In the spring of 1944, when the Soviet armed forces were approaching the Soviet-Czechoslovakian border, the USSR signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia, which determined the relations between the Soviet commander-in-chief and the Czechoslovak state and public authorities in the liberated Czechoslovak territories in advance.

The Soviet Government had discussed this matter with Benes during his visit to Moscow in December 1943, and understanding had been reached that a corresponding Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement should be signed; at the suggestion of the Soviet side the drafting of the agreement was entrusted to the Czechoslovakian Government.¹ This was additional proof of the Soviet Union's respect for Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and a manifestation of friendship towards her people. By March 1944 the Benes Government, however, had drafted a general agreement with the governments of the USA, Britain and the USSR on the entry into Czechoslovakia of Allied forces and on the relations between the Czechoslovak administration and the Allied Supreme Commander. Moreover, according to Z. Fierlinger, the former Czechoslovak ambassador to Moscow, Benes told him of his intention to start negotiations with the British Government on the entry into Czechoslovakia of British troops.² Considering the conditions prevailing in the spring of 1944, the Soviet Government decisively objected to the signing of a multi-lateral agreement and proposed the signing of a treaty be-

¹ See S. Grachov, *The Assistance of the USSR to the Peoples of Czechoslovakia in their Struggle for Freedom and Independence*, p. 141.

² Z. Fierlinger, *Ve službach CSR*, dil. II, Prague, 1949, p. 246.

tween the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Government informed the governments of Britain and the USA of its views. The Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement, signed on May 8, 1944, stipulated that the Soviet Army would enter Czechoslovakia as an ally, friend and liberator. As soon as the liberated territory ceased to be a zone of military operations, it was to pass under the sovereign administration of Czechoslovakian Government and public bodies, while the formation, composition and nature of these bodies was to be a matter of the sole competency of the Czechoslovakian Government.¹

The Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement differed favourably from the agreements the US and British authorities had signed in May 1944 with governments of a number of West European states. In them, handing over power to local government bodies was postponed indefinitely. Some representatives of the Western countries have admitted this. For example, Garreau, the representative of the French Committee of National Liberation in the USSR, said during a talk at the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on April 11, 1944 that "the Czechoslovak Government is in a more favourable position than others, including France, since Czechoslovakia will be liberated by the Red Army and therefore the civilian administration will undoubtedly be organised on a more democratic basis". Garreau "expressed the hope that the example of Czechoslovakia would have a positive influence on the adoption by the Allies of a final decision on the question of the administration in France".²

On August 29, 1944 a popular uprising against the Hitlerite invaders and their henchmen flared up in Slovakia. Immediately after its outbreak the Czechoslovak representatives in Moscow asked the Soviet Government to give fighting Slovakia military assistance. The Czechoslovak notes of September 3 and 4, 1944 contained a detailed account of the uprising's political importance, force and aims. In keeping with Czechoslovakia's request the Soviet High Command changed its previous plans and instructed the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev to accelerate their offensive in the Duklin Pass district and to advance into Slovakia in order to help the fighting Slovak people.

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 121.

² *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 527.

The Duklin operation, launched on September 8, 1944 in conjunction with the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, was only a limited success but in its course the first Czechoslovak soldiers stepped on to their native soil and this gave a major impetus to the Czechoslovak people's national liberation struggle.

* * *

In the autumn of 1944 the Soviet Army entered Yugoslavia and together with the troops of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army destroyed the German garrison in Belgrade. After the liberation of Belgrade the Soviet Army and the Yugoslav National Liberation Army continued to rout the retreating Hitlerite troops.

Throughout the war the Soviet Union gave the Yugoslav people every kind of assistance. The Soviet Government consistently defended the international interests of the Yugoslav national liberation movement and its bodies at various diplomatic talks.

Study of some Anglo-Soviet negotiations concerning Yugoslavia shows how effective the Soviet Government's efforts were in boosting the international prestige of the national liberation struggle of the Yugoslav people and its organisations. During the war the Allies, and especially the Soviet and the British governments, repeatedly discussed the Yugoslav question.

As early as November 1941 the British Government proposed to the Soviet Government that they take joint action to prevent "the revolt [the anti-fascist struggle in Yugoslavia—*U.I.*] from degenerating into an internal struggle".¹ London proposed to subordinate the national liberation movement in Yugoslavia to Draza Mihajlovic, the War Minister of the Yugoslavian Emigré Government. But at that time it was already known that the chetniks, Mihajlovic's detachments, had begun to co-operate with the invaders, and that the partisan units led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were the only force in the country decisively opposing the German and Italian fascist invaders. During the struggle against the invaders, the ustashes of Ante Pavelic, the head of the Yugoslav fascists, and the chetniks of Mihajlovic, the

¹ The Memorandum of the Government of Great Britain to the Government of the USSR of March 9, 1943.

partisan units, united in the Yugoslav National Liberation Army.

Despite all this, in the autumn of 1941, Sir Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador, suggested on behalf of the British Government that "the Soviet Government might feel inclined to urge the communist elements in Yugoslavia to put themselves militarily at the disposal of General Mihajlovic".¹ Somewhat later the British Government suggested to M. Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to Britain, that "broadcasts to the partisans should be arranged from Moscow, urging them to co-operate with General Mihajlovic".²

Far from complying with this request, in November 1941 the Soviet Government helped the Yugoslav patriots to set up the radio station Free Yugoslavia because it wanted the world to hear the truth about the Yugoslav people's heroic struggle against fascism. Prominent members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia participated in this work. The radio reports helped to strengthen the international prestige of the Yugoslav national liberation movement.

The Soviet Government assumed an unambiguous stand in the question of the Yugoslav people's national liberation movement. The sympathies of the Soviet people were wholly and fully on the side of the Yugoslav partisans who fought heroically against the fascists and the Yugoslav quislings. Naturally, the Soviet Government could not satisfy the English request, which was to all intents and purposes an attempt to liquidate the anti-fascist movement in Yugoslavia.

In July 1942 Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to Great Britain, gave the following reply to the above British request: "The Soviet Government was not disposed to join with His Majesty's Government in attempting to curb the activities of the partisans. . . ."³ This refusal was motivated by the fact that General Mihajlovic was in contact with Nedic and therefore could not be trusted.

Subsequent events in Yugoslavia proved the Soviet Government right. While the national liberation movement of the Yugoslavian people continued to grow, the treasonous co-operation of Mihajlovic's chetniks with the German and

¹ The Memorandum. . . .

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

Italian invaders greatly harmed both the struggle of the Yugoslav peoples and the Allied cause.

The formation at the end of November 1942 of the Yugoslav Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation in Bihac, a town freed by the partisans, marked an important landmark in the development of Yugoslavia's national liberation movement. The formation of the Assembly pursued the aim of mobilising the forces of the nation for the struggle against the invaders and of strengthening the national liberation committees. The Assembly exposed the treacherous role of the reactionary elements in the Yugoslav Emigré Government, including that of War Minister Mihajlovic. Since Mihajlovic had discredited himself in the eyes of the world by his co-operation with the fascist invaders, the British Government, which had shown a great interest in Balkan affairs throughout the war, now began to seek contacts with the partisan units.

In May 1943, Deakin, an Englishman from the Cairo headquarters, was parachuted into Yugoslavia to try to set up a British mission at the Headquarters of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army, and a few months later the British Government sent a new group, headed by Fitzroy MacLean, to Tito's headquarters. In this way the British had missions both at the headquarters of General Mihajlovic, who co-operated with the invaders, and at the headquarters of the National Liberation Army.¹

The Soviet Union supported only the national liberation movement of the Yugoslav people, headed by Communists. This could be seen clearly from the statement made by the Soviet Government at the end of 1943 in connection with the formation of the Yugoslav National Liberation Committee. At the end of November 1943 the second session of the Assembly in Yaice decided to reconstitute itself into the supreme legislative and executive body of the country with the rights of a parliament. At the same time the Yugoslav National Liberation Committee was organised. It was headed by Marshal Tito and fulfilled the functions of a provisional government. The session also decided to prohibit the return of King Peter II and to strip the Emigré Government of all authority. It was decided that Yugoslavia would be organised

¹ The British Government informed the Soviet Government of its decision to establish contacts with the Yugoslav National Liberation Army in a Memorandum of March 9, 1943.

as a democratic federative state on the principle of full equality of all the peoples inhabiting the country.

"The Soviet Government regards these events in Yugoslavia...", a statement of the Information Bureau of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs read, "as positive facts promoting the further successful struggle of the Yugoslav peoples against Hitler Germany. They also testify to the great success the new leaders of Yugoslavia have made in uniting all national forces in Yugoslavia.

"The activity of General Mihajlovic's chetniks, which according to available information has up to now harmed rather than promoted the struggle of the Yugoslav people against the German invaders, is regarded in the Soviet Union from the same viewpoint and therefore could not but evoke a negative response in the USSR."¹ In that statement the Soviet Government also declared that it intended to direct a Soviet military mission to Yugoslavia, which arrived in the liberated part of Yugoslavia in February 1944.

"The leaders of the national liberation movement," General N. V. Korneyev, the head of the Soviet military mission, wrote, "gave us a fraternal welcome. The friendly relations that were established from the first days our mission began to function, reflected the common aims for which both the Red Army and the Yugoslav National Liberation Army fought."² It should be emphasised that the Soviet military mission was accredited to the Yugoslav National Liberation Committee while the British and Americans had missions at its headquarters. Thus, the Soviet mission was not only a military but also a political one.

Having established relations with the YNLC, the Soviet Government refused in December 1943 the offer of the émigré Government to sign a Soviet-Yugoslav agreement with it. "The proposal by Mr. Puric," the Soviet statement published in February 5, 1944 said, "could not but cause bewilderment in Soviet circles considering the situation in Yugoslavia, the pro-fascist role of General Mihajlovic, who up to now considers himself the Yugoslav War Minister, and his struggle against the Marshal Tito's National Liberation

¹ *Sovetskiye vooruzhenniye sily v borbe za osvobodzheniye narodov Yugoslavii* (The Soviet Armed Forces in the Struggle for the Liberation of the Yugoslav Peoples), Moscow, 1960, p. 202.

² *Pravda*, February 5, 1944.

Army, as well as the formation of the Yugoslav National Liberation Committee, which enjoys the support of the broad mass of the Yugoslav people."¹

The leadership of the YNLC regarded this statement as proof "that the Soviet Government takes a correct view of the treacherous role of the so-called Cairo Government and its agents".²

The decision of the Soviet Government to form a Yugoslav military unit on Soviet territory was further proof of the growing links between the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav national liberation movement. In mid-December 1943 a Yugoslav battalion was formed and in the winter of 1943-44 Soviet instructors trained it in the use of the equipment and arms it had received from the Soviet command.

In May 1944 the battalion was reorganised into a detached Yugoslav infantry brigade. In a message of greeting to the personnel of the Yugoslav military unit in the USSR, Marshal Tito wrote: "Comrade soldiers and commanders of the Yugoslav military unit in the USSR! You are the first military detachment of our peoples which is fighting for the freedom of our country on Soviet soil shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army. Tell the Soviet peoples and their heroic Army of our great love for them and how grateful we are to the Red Army for its vanguard role in the liberation of enslaved countries."³

The further consolidation of all anti-fascist forces around the YNLC and the growth of its prestige compelled the British Government to declare that it would no longer support Mihajlovic and would extend links with Tito. Early in 1944 Churchill began a correspondence with Tito and in one of his messages informed him that the British Government would give no further military support to Mihajlovic and would help only Tito.⁴ True, he made it clear that Britain would continue to give full support to Peter II and the Yugoslav Emigré Government.

What explains the British Government's decision to extend its links with the Yugoslav national liberation movement?

It will become clear if we consider the British Govern-

¹ Ibid.

² *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. I, p. 436.

³ Ibid., Vol. II, p. 85.

⁴ Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 416.

ment's general strategic conception, one of the principal aims of which was to make the Balkans a British sphere of influence.

If Britain had continued to support Mihajlovic openly she would have evoked the determined opposition of the YNLC. Churchill understood only too well that to back Mihajlovic was to back a lost cause.

The inexorable course of events in Yugoslavia therefore compelled Britain to establish contacts with the headquarters of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army.

The British Prime Minister was willing to co-operate with the Yugoslav National Liberation Committee to create the prerequisites for his "Balkan variant".

At the same time the British Government pursued another aim in Yugoslavia—it wanted to fetter the national liberation movement, to dilute it with all sorts of bourgeois elements and, if possible, to subordinate it to the Yugoslav Royal Government.

To make Britain politically influential in Yugoslavia, in the spring of 1944 the British Government decided to "reconcile" the command of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army with the Emigré Government in London. It advised King Peter II to "form a small administration composed of people not particularly obnoxious to Marshal Tito but still preserving a straightforward relation with the Serbian people".¹

Explaining the aim of this move, the British Prime Minister wrote to his Minister for Foreign Affairs that "thus we have a forlorn hope of making a bridge between them in the next five or six weeks".² Churchill instructed Eden to give top priority to the solution of the Yugoslav problem since he was very worried by the contacts between the Soviet Mission and Tito's Headquarters.³

The British Government wanted to ensure Soviet support for its plan to bring about a "reconciliation" between Tito

¹ Quoted from I. Zemskov, "On the so-called 'Division' of Yugoslavia into Spheres of Influence", *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1958, No. 8, p. 61.

² Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 422.

³ In the letter to Eden Churchill wrote: "Since we discussed these matters in Cairo we have seen the entry of a grandiose Russian Mission to Tito's headquarters, and there is little doubt that the Russians will drive straight ahead for a Communist Tito-governed Yugoslavia, and will denounce everything done to the contrary as 'undemocratic'."

and the royal Government. In this connection Churchill sent a letter to the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. On April 22, 1944, Moscow replied to the British note, saying that "changes in the Yugoslav Government would hardly be likely to bring any benefits unless they enjoyed the necessary support of Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav National Liberation Army. This question should be agreed upon with Marshal Tito whose forces in Yugoslavia were real. Such an agreement would be in the interests of the Allies, especially at that moment".¹

The YNLC was the only lawful representative of the Yugoslav people. It had a powerful army, which was undergoing training and would soon fight to liberate the country, controlled well-organised and smoothly-functioning bodies representing the people's power, and was supported by broad sections of the population. The Emigré Government, on the other hand, had completely discredited itself by its domestic and foreign policy, by the treacherous actions of Mihajlovic's detachments, and was supported only by some elements among the British and American government officials. It was therefore correct to recognise the YNLC as the sole representative of the Yugoslav people.

However, the conditions in the world had as yet not matured for such recognition by all participants in the anti-Hitler coalition. With this in mind, and seeking international recognition of the achievements of the liberation war and the revolution, the National Committee decided on a compromise. In June 1944 it signed an agreement with the new émigré Government headed by Subasic and then agreed to the formation of a single provisional government (March 1944). "The Tito-Subasic agreement," Pero Moraco, a Yugoslav researcher, wrote, "signed in June 1944, and the formation in March 1945 of the united provisional government were a concession, which in view of the then prevailing relation of internal forces did not involve a serious risk for the achievements of the revolution. This compromise intensified the disintegration in the ranks of the reactionary bourgeoisie, since under the agreement the new Emigré Government repudiated Mihajlovic and condemned all co-operation with the invaders; it recognised the National Liberation Army and Marshal Tito, its commander-in-chief, and agreed to subor-

¹ *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1958, No. 8, p. 61.

dinate its activity to the interests of the national liberation war."¹

The Soviet Union helped to bring the agreement about and supported it. On June 15, 1944, Subasic was informed that the Soviet Government favoured an amalgamation of all forces in Yugoslavia fighting Hitler Germany, her agents and traitors to the cause of the Yugoslav people—Pavelic, Nedic and Mihajlovic. "We are prepared on our part," the Soviet statement read, "to support a Yugoslav Government created with the above object in view on the basis of an agreement with Marshal Tito who has achieved considerable success in uniting the peoples of Yugoslavia and who is actually in possession of real forces within the country."²

The Yugoslav leaders fully appreciated the diplomatic support the Soviet Union was giving to the Yugoslav national liberation movement.

On July 5, 1944, for example, Josip Broz-Tito, in a letter addressed to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, thanked the Soviet Government for their "diplomatic support and material aid" and expressed hope and confidence that this aid would be continued in future, "For," said Tito, "in these decisive days it is more essential than ever."³

In the spring of 1944 the National Liberation Army found itself in a very difficult position and the Hitlerites were preparing to land paratroopers to destroy the leaders of the national liberation movement. Soviet pilots, defying adverse meteorological conditions, landed at night on a small landing strip in a mountainous district and evacuated the leaders of the High Command of the Yugoslav Liberation Army to Vas Island.

When the Soviet troops reached the Yugoslav borders in the autumn of 1944, Marshal Tito asked the Soviet Government through the head of the Soviet Military Mission in Yugoslavia to move Soviet troops into Yugoslavia since the National Liberation Army did not have the guns and the tanks to destroy all the German troops in the country and could not prevent their withdrawal from Greece to the north. Reporting this, Lieutenant-General Korneyev said: "The

¹ *The Second World War, General Problems*, Moscow, 1966, p. 135.

² *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1958, No. 8, pp. 61-62.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

Marshal expects that joint operations by the Red Army and the National Liberation Army will not only have a great military effect but will also substantially strengthen the national liberation movement.”¹ Proceeding from the imperatives of military operations against the enemy the Soviet Government agreed that its troops might enter Yugoslavia for the time being, but it declared that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Yugoslavia as soon as they had fulfilled their task. It was also agreed that the civil administration of the Yugoslav National Liberation Committee would function in the districts where Soviet military units were deployed.

These and other questions were co-ordinated during Marshal Tito's visit to Moscow in September 1944. During the talks the Soviet Government also agreed to grant the request of the Yugoslav side to arm, equip and supply a considerable number of divisions of the National Liberation Army, acting mainly in Central Serbia and in the Belgrade direction with all kinds of war materiel. The decision was quickly implemented.

The Soviet Union also rendered substantial assistance to the Yugoslav people after her liberation from the fascist invaders. In the autumn of 1944 the Soviet Government supplied Yugoslavia with almost 200,000 kg of wheat, rye, flour, peas and barley. Foodstuffs were sent urgently by all sorts of transport to the Yugoslav towns of Belgrade, Zemun, Panchevo, Petrovgrad, Velika Kikinda and Prakhovo. To ensure their continuous supply the Soviet Government set up a special commission.² The support of the Soviet Union was greatly appreciated by the Yugoslav people who had embarked on the building of a new life.

For the Western powers, including the British Government, events in the Balkans were taking an undesirable turn. The rapid advance of the Soviet armed forces on the southern section of the Soviet-German front spoiled the game of the authors of the “Balkan variant” of a second front. The Allied offensive in Italy, which had been designed to create the conditions for an Allied advance towards the Balkans, also developed unsuccessfully.

¹ *Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza* (The History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union), Vol. IV, p. 420.

² See *Soviet Armed Forces in the Struggle for the Liberation of the Yugoslav Peoples*, 1960, p. 61.

London and Washington were also extremely worried over the situation in Greece, Yugoslavia and other Southeast European countries. In this connection Churchill decided to visit Italy to "correct these situations" and "to talk with the men who could influence the turn of events".¹

In mid-August the British Prime Minister met some of the political leaders of the Southeast European countries. They discussed the situation shaping in that area. However, the talks did not give the results he had expected. He was unable to achieve his main aim—to influence events in Southeastern Europe and to take the initiative in them. The national liberation movement in these countries, headed by Communists, continued to grow and was close to achieving its aims. This was greatly promoted by the successful Soviet offensive in the summer and autumn of 1944.

German imperialism suffered new crushing military defeats on the Eastern Front in 1944. The advancing Soviet Army forced the Hitlerites to flee from the countries they had occupied in the early stages of the war. The hated fascist New Order in Europe which the Axis powers had imposed on the European peoples, collapsed like a house of cards. All Hitler Germany's European allies had been knocked out of the fascist bloc; they had broken with Germany and joined the anti-Hitler coalition.

The liberated peoples of the East European countries had every opportunity for democratic development.

While stormy events were unfolding in Eastern Europe in the summer and autumn of 1944, the Soviet Government discussed many questions concerning the East European countries with its Allies and signed several important agreements. At all these talks the Soviet Government staunchly defended the interests of democracy, the interests of the liberated peoples. Since it was the Soviet Army which played the decisive role in evicting the fascists from the East European countries the various Soviet international agreements with them were fair and democratic.

One of the most important political results of these agreements was the recognition by the governments of the United States and Britain of some of the Soviet Union's western borders, which had been violated by Hitler Germany's treacherous attack (notably in the armistice agreements with

¹ H. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

Rumania and Finland). London and Washington had stubbornly refused to recognise these borders in the beginning of the war but the course of events and the new alignment of forces that had emerged in the final stages of the war forced the US and British ruling circles to change their position and to sign documents confirming the legitimacy of the USSR's 1941 borders. This was an object lesson to those who did not believe in the strength of the USSR and who cherished the hope that by the end of the war London and Washington would be able to impose on the Soviet Union borders in keeping with the imperialist interests of the American and British pretenders to world domination.

CHAPTER XVII

OPENING OF THE SECOND FRONT. THE ALLIES AND LIBERATED FRANCE

After the Teheran Conference Britain and the USA, at long last, began to prepare for a large-scale landing operation in northwestern France. Although preparations for Overlord were in full swing early in 1944 and the "Balkan variant" of the second front had been rejected at Teheran, the British Government did not lose hope that it would be able to carry out its "Balkan strategy". Since it did not dare to oppose the Overlord operation openly, it did all it could to inflate the importance of the operations in the Mediterranean. In his letters to Roosevelt, Churchill insisted that operations in Italy should be stepped up and said that the failure of the Allies in the Apennines in the winter of 1943-44 called for new decisions on Allied strategy.¹ In accordance with his line the British Chiefs of Staff proposed that the southern France project, which was to be carried out simultaneously with Overlord, be cancelled, and that all the forces allocated to it be devoted to other operations in the Mediterranean area.²

In 1944 the international and military situation was such that a further delay in opening the second front would have meant that all of Europe would be liberated by the Soviet forces. The victories of the Soviet troops early in 1944 clearly showed that fascist Germany would inevitably be defeated on the Soviet-German front.

To meet the Soviet offensive the German command had to move new divisions to the Soviet-German front not only from Italy and Scandinavia but also from Western Europe. The Anglo-American command was well aware of this.³ "As the situation in the East grew more serious," Chester Wilmot

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. V, pp. 386-87.

² H. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 313.

wrote, "the Western Allies kept close watch on France for any sign of movement and in the last week of March it came. While Berlin Radio was insisting that 'the strategic conception of the German High Command has not been forced to undergo any decisive change as a result of the Russian advance', four of von Rundstedt's best divisions ... were heading East for Poland. This sudden switch of power and change of plan—on what the Germans then thought was the eve of invasion—revealed the extent of the disaster in the East and reinforced the British and American belief that Hitler had no central strategic reserve and no spare offensive divisions on any other front."¹ The winter offensive of the Soviet Army created favourable conditions for an Allied invasion of Europe and showed that fascist Germany would inevitably be defeated, even if no second front were opened. London and Washington, therefore, stepped up the preparations for the cross-Channel landing.

For several months British and American military contingents and equipment needed for the landing operation were concentrated in England. Early in April 1944 generals Deane and Burrows, the heads of the US and British military missions in Moscow, informed Marshal Vasilevsky, the Soviet Chief of Staff, that the British and US Supreme Command intended to effect the Channel-crossing on May 31, 1944, with a possible deviation of two or three days either way, depending on weather conditions and the tide. At the eleventh hour the Anglo-American command postponed the landing to the beginning of June because of adverse weather conditions.

To help the Allies carry out the landing in the north of France, the Soviet Army was preparing for a new major offensive on the Soviet-German front. In the spring of 1944 the Soviet Government informed the Allies that in accordance with the agreement reached at Teheran "the Red Army would launch a new offensive to give the utmost support to the Anglo-American operations".²

On June 6 and over the next few days a large body of British, US and Canadian troops landed in Normandy, on the northwestern coast of France. They were faced by limited German forces since all the crack divisions were on the

¹ Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*, London, 1953, pp. 196-97.

² *Correspondence*... , Vol. II, p. 138.

Soviet-German front. There were nine German infantry and one tank divisions in Normandy, of which only six were in the landing area. In all the German command had 59 divisions in Western Europe but it had to reckon with the possibility of an Allied landing anywhere on the west coast from Antwerp to the Bay of Biscay, as well as on the French Mediterranean coast, and this compelled it to scatter the weak German forces over a front extending for more than 2,000 kilometres. The Germans were also ill-equipped in the West. The Atlantic Wall was pure bluff.

After a few days the Germans succeeded in drawing their forces to the landing area and a fierce battle broke out on the fields of Normandy. Although the Anglo-American offensive developed comparatively slowly, the Allied landing in Normandy was a serious blow to the fascists. The opening of the second front in mid-1944 naturally did not affect the further course of the war as it would have done in 1942 or even in 1943. Yet, the landing of the Anglo-American troops in France compelled the Germans to divide their armed forces.

Before the landing of the Allies in western France the Germans had the advantage of having to fight in the main only on one front, the Soviet-German front. Now things had changed.

Politically, the opening of the second front in Europe demonstrated the growing unity of the states in the anti-Hitler coalition. The Allied landing in western France was carried out in accordance with the military decisions of the Teheran Conference. Also in strict keeping with the Teheran agreement, the Soviet Army launched an offensive on the Eastern Front almost simultaneously with the Allied landing in Normandy. On June 10, 1944 the troops of the Leningrad Front mounted an offensive as a result of which they broke through the defences on the Karelian Isthmus that had been built up by the Finns for a long time. In the summer of 1944 the Soviet High Command threw one army after another into battle. The enormous scale of the Soviet Army's operations on the Eastern Front contributed to the success of the Allied forces in the West.

As a result of the major military successes of the anti-Hitler coalition on the most important fronts of the Second World War, in the summer of 1944 negotiations were conducted in Moscow between representatives of the Soviet

Government and the US ambassador to the USSR on the establishment of wider contacts between the Staffs of the USSR, Britain and the USA. The Soviet Government, which had always championed effective military co-operation between the Big Three of the anti-Hitler coalition, including joint operations, once again took the initiative in expanding links between the armed forces of the USSR, USA and Britain.

Negotiations on this matter dragged out but finally, at the beginning of 1945, the Soviet proposal was accepted—contact was established between the Soviet High Command and the Allied command.

* * *

The Western powers wanted to take advantage of the expulsion of the nazi aggressors from France to set up an occupation regime. With this end in view the British and US governments objected to the active participation of the French Committee of National Liberation in the preparation of the second front in North France.

Many sources prove that the US Government was particularly anxious to postpone the solution of the question of the French Government and did everything possible to avoid any commitment to support de Gaulle and his committee. As Roosevelt said, he was determined not to give de Gaulle a "white horse" on which he could ride into France and make himself the master of a government there.¹ The President gave Eisenhower the right to decide with whom he would co-operate in France after her liberation.

Roosevelt did not endorse the proposal to recognise the French Committee of National Liberation as a provisional government for the administration of French territory.

The British Government's position on the French Committee differed little from that of the US. When press reports appeared in the spring of 1944 that the French Committee of National Liberation was drafting a law according to which it would assume the functions of the provisional government of France, Cadogan, the British permanent Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, said in a talk with Gusev, the Soviet ambassador to Britain: "... President Roosevelt has expressed the opinion that it will be impossible for the US Government to recognise the French Committee of National Liberation as

¹ H. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

the French Government in any form, and for the time being ... the position of the US Government remains unchanged." During this conversation Cadogan told Gusev that "the British Government also does not intend to recognise the French Committee of National Liberation as a French government".¹

The US and British governments maintained this attitude towards France at all their talks with representatives of the French Committee. Recalling his talks with Churchill early in 1944, de Gaulle wrote: "Hearing Churchill it immediately became clear (to those to whom this had not been clear before) that the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister consider France a domain where they can do as they please, and are dissatisfied with General de Gaulle mainly because he does not want to admit it."²

De Gaulle, the head of the French Committee of National Liberation, was not informed about the nature, details and dates of Overlord until the very last moment. He was summoned from North Africa to London only a day before Overlord and told of the proposed operation. During his interview with Churchill de Gaulle realised that the only purpose he had been asked to come to London was to induce him to appeal to the French people on invasion day to welcome these Allied forces as their liberators.³

From the very outset the US and British governments tried to concentrate all power in France's liberated territories in their own hands and to decide the question of the country's political organisation themselves.

The actions of the USA and Britain aroused protest on the part of the French Committee and broad sections of the French public.

During the Allied landing in North France the de facto administration of the liberated French territory was initially taken over by AMGOT, and in his appeal to the French people Eisenhower did not even mention the French Committee of National Liberation, which by the decree of June 2, 1944 had been renamed the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

¹ *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 270.

² Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de guerre. L'Unité, 1942-1944*, Paris, 1956, p. 215.

³ H. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

The British and Americans simply ignored de Gaulle's Provisional Government and treated the French people's liberation movement and its local bodies even worse. This could be seen during the preparations¹ for the invasion and especially after the landing. The Anglo-American command not only failed to establish contacts with the French Resistance to enlist its support but even attempted to disorganise it in every way and to disperse it as quickly as possible.

In rude violation of French sovereignty the American authorities issued a large amount of French money for the Allied Army. Early in 1944 the French representatives had held talks with the US Government on financial questions, which, however, did not lead to anything. The Committee learned that the Americans were printing banknotes to the value of 82,000 million francs. The Committee hoped that the US Government would not use them without the consent of the Committee, but the American authorities put them into circulation. "This seemed the more strange," said Garreau in a talk at the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, "that the French Committee of National Liberation had issued the American and English troops with the necessary amount of French francs during the landing of the Allied troops in North Africa." Garreau emphasised that the French Committee of National Liberation, naturally, would not refuse to issue the Allies with the necessary French francs "no matter how big that amount might be".² In this connection the French Provisional Government declared that it would not recognise the validity of banknotes put into circulation without its consent. "Therefore it declines any responsibility," the note of the French Provisional Government sent to representatives of the US and British governments on May 30, 1944, read, "for the financial, moral and political consequences the facts that have come to its knowledge may have [emission of banknotes—*U.I.*]." ³

* * *

¹ Even John Ehrman wrote: "Despite its potential significance in the Allied strategy, the French Resistance was not treated as important until in 1944, and at no time was it formally accorded the first priority among the resistance movements of Europe." (J. Ehrman, op. cit., p. 321.)

² *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 281.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

After the opening of the second front the attitude of the Soviet Government towards France and the Committee of National Liberation remained the same as it had been throughout the war. The Soviet Union was guided by the wish to restore the independence and sovereignty of France, to give every assistance to the French people in their struggle for the restoration of France as a Great Power, and to develop Soviet-French friendship. This was reaffirmed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in his talk with the representative of the French Committee of National Liberation in the USSR on June 9, 1944. In this talk Molotov said that the events in Western Europe and on the Soviet-German front were of historic importance to all European states and particularly to France. "It is important that these events," he said, "should give the most desirable result. Under these circumstances the co-ordination of the actions of the main Allies—the United States, Britain and the USSR—becomes exclusively important. We attached special importance to co-ordinating our position with our chief Allies. Our position cannot but depend to some degree on the position of these Allies, that is, the British and Americans. But the French should not doubt that the Soviet Union greatly values the renaissance of France, is deeply aware of the interests of the French people and has for them a feeling of the deepest sympathy."¹ In reply the French representative expressed his gratitude for the great help the French Committee of National Liberation had received from the Soviet Union during the previous three years. "Frenchmen know," he said, "that they are obliged first and foremost to the Soviet Union for everything they were able to achieve in political and military respects."²

The fighting co-operation between the Soviet and French people grew and extended during the war. At the Soviet-German front the French Normandie-Niemen fighter plane squadron fought shoulder to shoulder with Soviet fliers. Many pilots of the French squadron were awarded Soviet medals and Orders for meritorious fulfilment of their missions. On the other hand, many Soviet citizens who had been forcibly taken to France by the Germans, managed to escape and join the French people's heroic struggle against the German invaders. Many gave their lives for the freedom of France. Their names will live in the memory of the French people forever.

¹ *Soviet-French Relations*. . . , p. 276.

² *Ibid.*

Thus, there were all prerequisites for the further development and strengthening of Soviet-French relations and added impetus was given by the recognition by the Soviet Government of the French Provisional Government. This was done by the USSR after co-ordination with the Allies on October 23, 1944. The statement published in this connection emphasised the constant friendly attitude of the USSR towards democratic France. The recognition of the French Provisional Government was not only a serious factor promoting the further consolidation of the French people and the mobilisation of their forces for the further struggle against Hitler Germany but also an important contribution to strengthening France's prestige as a Great Power.

The expansion of Soviet-French relations and the strengthening of France's position clearly did not fall in with the plans of some American and British circles, at whose order some sections of the press unleashed a slanderous anti-Soviet campaign aimed at worsening the relations between the Soviet Union and France. In October 1944, for example, the *Chicago Sun* published a report alleging that the Soviet Union did not want France to participate in the military occupation of Germany and that the USSR had spoken against France being considered a Great Power. A special statement by TASS refuted this statement and branded it as an outright lie and in complete contradiction of the Soviet Government's position.

The attitude of the USSR towards France, on the one hand, and that of the USA and Britain, on the other, could be clearly seen from their respective attitudes to France's participation in the European Advisory Committee. When the European Advisory Committee was set up at the end of 1943 and the French representatives evinced great interest in participating in its work the Soviet Government proposed that France be invited to become a fourth permanent member of the EAC. This would have strengthened France's prestige as a Great Power and would also have helped her to defend her interests when they were discussed by the Committee.

At the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, USA and Britain (1943) the British and American delegates were against the proposal of the Soviet delegate to enlarge the EAC. Their position reflected the unwillingness of Britain and the USA to consider the national interests of the

French people and their wish to impose on France the position of a second-rate power that could be ignored.

Vigorously opposing France's participation in the EAC in the capacity of a permanent member, the British Government at the same time attempted to convince the French that it was the Soviet Government that objected to France's admission.

There was not one iota of truth in that. However, the French Committee, apparently, knew the true state of affairs. In his memoirs de Gaulle quotes a document showing that the final proposal to exclude France from participation in the EAC "was made by the English".¹

The true position of the Soviet Government on this matter can also be seen from the fact that in the autumn of 1944 it insistently supported the French Provisional Government's repeated request to participate in the work of the EAC.

At the end of 1944 General Charles de Gaulle, the head of the French Provisional Government, was invited to Moscow for talks to extend and develop Soviet-French co-operation. The French Government delegation arrived in Moscow on December 2. On the way to Moscow de Gaulle visited Stalin-grad and presented the hero city with a memorial plaque from the French people. "Never again will Germany take up arms against democratic countries," he said in his speech.²

A central place in the talks was held by the question of ensuring mutual assistance against any possible future German aggression. The participants in the talks frankly exchanged views on the best ways of ensuring the safety of the Soviet Union and France.

Analysing the causes of France's defeat in 1940, de Gaulle said that one of the most important factors was that "France was not with Russia, had no agreement with her, had no effective treaty".³ During his talks with Stalin de Gaulle repeatedly emphasised that there was no guarantee that German aggression might not be repeated in future. He thought that there were three ways of averting this danger: to place Germany within new borders, to disarm her or to set up alliances directed against her.

As regards Germany's border, the French delegation agreed with the Soviet Government's view that the German eastern border should run along the Oder-Neisse line.

¹ Charles de Gaulle, op. cit., p. 596.

² *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 313.

³ *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 340.

According to the French delegation Germany's western border should be formed by the Rhine. "It would be a good solution," de Gaulle said, "if the Rhine region were separated from Germany and incorporated into France."¹ The French proposed to place the Ruhr under international control. The Soviet delegation refused to adopt any decisions on Germany's western borders without preliminary co-ordination with Britain and the USA. It repeatedly emphasised that such important issues could not be solved without an attempt to reach a "general solution".² This showed that the USSR was interested in strengthening her co-operation with the Allies.

The second method of averting German aggression—the disarmament of Germany—was not studied thoroughly at the Moscow talks. The participants all agreed that Germany's disarmament would involve a number of economic and moral aspects.

The question of military and political alliances was debated in great detail. De Gaulle stressed the enormous importance of a radical improvement of Soviet-French relations in ensuring France's safety from German aggression. French policy, de Gaulle said, "makes the French wish first and foremost for a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union".³ The French delegation proposed to sign a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance between the USSR and France, taking into account the enormous popularity of Soviet-French friendship among the broad sections of the French public.

De Gaulle linked the signing of the Soviet-French pact with his post-war plans, which provided for the preservation of France's entire colonial empire, including also the former mandated territories such as Syria and the Lebanon, the continued French possession of Alsace and Lorraine and the handing over to her of the Rhine region, and France's participation in the solution of international problems in the capacity of a fourth Great Power. De Gaulle knew very well that these plans would not be approved by Washington and London. He hoped that by concluding a Soviet-French treaty he would win Moscow's support for them.

The Soviet Government took a positive view of a Soviet-French pact. During the Moscow talks it reaffirmed that the

¹ Ibid., p. 344.

² Ibid., p. 345.

³ Ibid., p. 377.

Soviet Union continued to stand for the revival of France as a Great Power. The Soviet delegation gave vivid proof of the Soviet Union's friendly attitude. "In the talks about the future security organisation, the Soviet Government spoke in favour of France's participation in it as a permanent member of the security organisation's council." Besides, Stalin noted that the Soviet Government "took the initiative in the question of having a permanent French representative appointed to the European Advisory Committee".¹

De Gaulle greatly appreciated the Soviet Union's efforts to strengthen France's international prestige. In particular, he thanked the Soviet Union for its initiative in the question of France's participation in the European Advisory Committee.

During the Soviet-French talks the Soviet Government kept the US and British governments informed on the course of the discussions.

The idea of a Franco-Soviet alliance caused considerable apprehension in London and Washington. The British Government looked askance at the development of Soviet-French co-operation fearing that it might become a powerful factor in European politics, and therefore attempted to weaken the effect of the bilateral Soviet-French treaty. In reply to a report on the course of the Soviet-French talks, Churchill wrote to Stalin: "...His Majesty's Government consider it desirable and an additional link between us all. Indeed it also occurs to us that it might be best of all if we were to conclude a tripartite treaty between the three of us which would embody our existing Anglo-Soviet Treaty with any improvements."² The Soviet Government took a positive view of the British proposal to conclude a tripartite treaty, proceeding, however, from entirely different motives. By signing a tripartite treaty the Soviet Union endeavoured to draw Britain into active participation in the alliance aimed at preventing the possibility of renewed German aggression. Thus, the Soviet-Anglo-French treaty could have become an important guarantee of European security.

De Gaulle decisively objected to the signing of a tripartite treaty. The French feared that France's participation in an Anglo-Soviet-French treaty would lower France's role in European affairs and that it would not fall in with the aims

¹ *Soviet-French Relations*. . . , pp. 349-50.

² *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. I, p. 281.

the French representatives wanted to achieve by signing a bilateral Soviet-French pact.

As a result of the Moscow talks, the Treaty on Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and France was signed on December 10, 1944. It said that the two sides would not hold any talks with the German invaders, and proclaimed the resolve of both states "jointly to take all necessary measures for the elimination of any new threats coming from Germany and to obstruct such actions as would make possible any new attempt at aggression on her part".¹

The agreement emphasised that in the event of one of the contracting Parties again being drawn into military action against Germany, the other side would immediately give her every possible help and support.

The two delegations also discussed some other international problems, such as the Polish problem.

In an attempt to strengthen the international prestige of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, which was supported by the Polish population, the Soviet Government asked the French to consider the possibility of establishing relations between the French Provisional Government and the Polish Committee. The Soviet Government did not propose that France should break off relations with the Polish Emigré Government in London, but only that she should exchange official representatives with the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

In one of his talks with the French the head of the Soviet delegation said that in the past France had been a "champion of Poland's independence" and that her policy on the Polish question "differed favourably from that of other powers", and that he therefore hoped "that France's present policy would in some respect differ favourably from the policy of the USA and Britain".²

In reply the French representatives said that they did not want to link the question of their relations with the Polish Committee of National Liberation with that of the Soviet-French treaty. Besides, they noted, France maintained relations with the London Emigré Government, although "possibly the French Government would later recognise a different Polish Government in co-ordination with the other Allies".³

¹ *Soviet-French Relations*. . . , p. 361.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 363.

However, during the concluding talk in the Kremlin General de Gaulle returned to the Polish question himself. He said that he understood the interest the Soviet Government was taking in that issue and recognised the great importance it was attaching to the Polish Committee of National Liberation. De Gaulle maintained that the French did not know enough about the Committee and were badly informed about the position in Poland. At the same time, to make some positive move towards the development of Franco-Polish relations, de Gaulle said that he had already asked the Polish Committee to send a representative to Paris and that he, in turn, was willing to send someone to Lublin. "Let us see what turn events will take," he said. "We must use every means to achieve the establishment of a united, democratic Poland, friendly towards Soviet Russia and France."¹

The signing of the Soviet-French agreement, as did the entire history of Soviet-French relations, provided vivid proof of the Soviet Union's friendly policy towards France, of its striving to help the French people liberate their country from the fascist invaders and their lackeys, and to help France occupy a befitting place in the family of freedom-loving nations.

¹ Ibid., p. 382.

CHAPTER XVIII

BIG-THREE TALKS AT THE END OF 1944: DUMBARTON OAKS, QUEBEC, MOSCOW

The sweeping military successes of the United Nations in 1944, which were the practical result of the plans the Heads of Government of the three main powers had co-ordinated at the Teheran Conference, evolved a number of new urgent political and military questions. These were questions of co-ordinated steps by the Allies in the liberated European countries, of fixing at least an approximate line of demarcation between the Soviet Army advancing from the East and the Allied troops advancing from the West, of the basic principles on which Allied policy towards Germany should be based and of the mechanism of the new international organisation which was to be the principal instrument for safeguarding peace and security after the war.

In conformity with the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers the governments of the USSR, USA and Britain had to take urgent steps to set up the new international organisation. The Soviet Union always championed the idea of setting up a system of collective security against aggressors (it signed the Soviet-Polish treaty in 1941, the Anglo-Soviet treaty in 1942, the Soviet-Czechoslovakian treaty in 1943, and so on). Now, too, it stood for the establishment of an effective international organisation based on the close co-operation of the powers in the anti-Hitler coalition. The Soviet Government therefore proposed that the minimum of armed forces needed to prevent aggression be put at the disposal of the new organisation. In addition it suggested that the organisation should be obliged to use these armed forces without delay to prevent or liquidate aggression and to punish those guilty of it.

The new organisation was not to duplicate the ill-fated League of Nations, which had had neither the right nor the means to avert aggression. The new organisation was to be

provided with everything needed to defend peace and to prevent new aggression.

The Soviet Government emphasised that the close co-operation between the main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition was the main condition for the new organisation's effectiveness.

The United States, too, favoured the setting up of an international organisation to safeguard peace and security. Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and their followers bent every effort carrying out preparatory work for the early formation of the United Nations Organisation.

American ruling circles were interested in setting up the international organisation mainly because they wanted it to help ensure the USA a leading place in world policy after the war. It was this that explained the initiative of the US Government and its efforts to set up the UNO.

In accordance with the decision of the Moscow Conference, in the summer of 1944 the USSR, USA and Britain exchanged a series of documents, stating their views on the future organisation. The US Government's views were contained in the "Tentative Proposals for a General International Organisation", which were submitted to the Soviet Union, Britain and China in mid-July 1944.¹ Simultaneously, the British Government submitted to the Allies five memorandums on the establishment of a United Nations Organisation. On August 12, the Soviet Government submitted its memorandum on the formation of an international security organisation.² All these documents were accepted as a basis for discussion at the international conference which was called to work out the initial draft Charter of the UNO at Dumbarton Oaks (Washington) on August 21. The conference which was attended by the USSR, USA and Britain, and in the final stages also by China, lasted till October 7, 1944.

Opening the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, spoke of the success that had been achieved in developing co-operation between the United Nations and emphasised that it was also necessary to strengthen relations between them in the post-war period. "The lessons of earlier disunity and weakness," he said, "should

¹ See *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation. 1939-1945*, Washington, 1949, pp. 582-91, 595-96.

² *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 299.

be indelibly stamped upon the minds and hearts of this generation and of generations to come. So should the lessons of unity and its resultant strength achieved by the United Nations in this war.

"Unity for common action toward common good and against common peril is the sole effective method by which, in time of peace, the nations which love peace can assure for themselves security and orderly progress, with freedom and justice."¹

Andrei Gromyko, the head of the Soviet delegation, reaffirmed the Soviet Union's desire to extend international co-operation and to set up an organisation for safeguarding peace and security, one possessing effective means to carry out this task.

At an unofficial meeting of the heads of the USSR, US and British delegations on the opening day of the conference, it was decided to "accept as a basis for the discussion the Soviet Memorandum and to discuss the questions in the sequence in which they are given in that Memorandum".²

The Dumbarton Oaks Conference adopted the "Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation", which subsequently became the basis for the UN Charter.

The organisation was to have the following aims: to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace, to achieve international co-operation in the solution of international economic, social and other important problems and to "afford a centre for harmonising the action of nations in the achievement of these common ends".³

Since at the time of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference the UN Declaration of January 1, 1942 had been accepted by comparatively few states, the participants in the conference were unable to agree fully on the initial membership of the future organisation. In addition to the United Nations proper, the US delegation initially proposed to include eight more states, including six South American countries. This proposal

¹ *Pravda*, August 23, 1944.

² *Soviet-French Relations*... , p. 530.

³ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy*... , Vol. II, p. 244.

was not accepted. The British delegation also made some proposals on the composition of the future organisation but they too were turned down. The question of the participation of the Soviet Union Republics in the organisation, submitted for discussion by the USSR, also did not find a solution. The other participants in the conference objected to that proposal, while the US President sent a special message to the Soviet Government in which he opposed the participation of the Soviet Union Republics in the UN. This question, as also the entire question of membership in the new organisation, remained open, however, the Soviet Government expressed the conviction that a positive solution could be found.

In accordance with the draft the principal responsibility for ensuring peace and security lay with the UN Security Council. After lengthy discussions the US, British and Chinese delegations accepted the Soviet proposals on the composition of the Security Council, on the Council's permanent members and on the inclusion, in future, alongside with the USSR, USA and Great Britain, also of France. The relevant section of the co-ordinated decision read: "The Security Council should consist of one representative of each of the eleven members of the Organisation. Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China, and, in due course, France, should have permanent seats."¹ The other six non-permanent members were to be elected for a term of two years.

Many important questions concerning the functions of the Security Council were successfully resolved at Dumbarton Oaks. The question of the voting procedure in the Security Council, however, was not.

Although in their preliminary proposals on the general international organisation submitted in July 1944 the US and British governments had themselves advanced the principle of unanimity of all the permanent members, they now insisted on a number of exceptions, the adoption of which could bring about a situation in which a definite group of powers would be able to dictate its will to one of the Security Council permanent members.

Speaking of the position of the Western powers, Hull wrote in his Memoirs: "... there was no question in our minds,

¹ *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 530.

however, that the vote of the permanent members of the Council should be unanimous on questions involving security. This was the so-called veto power. We were no less resolute than the Russians in adhering to this principle, with the exception of our view that the vote of a Security Council member involved in a dispute should not be counted."¹ Thus, there were differences of opinion as to whether a permanent member of the Council was to participate in the voting if he himself was involved in a dispute or not. The Soviet Union wanted the Charter to reflect the principle of full co-operation between all the states, notably the Great Powers, making no exception from the unanimity rule for the Council permanent members.

The Soviet Government stated its point of view on the prospects of the United Nations Organisation in a message addressed to the US Government soon after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. This document drew Roosevelt's attention to the fact that to ensure the success of the international organisation it was necessary to ensure a voting procedure in the Security Council that would guarantee its work on the basis of the principle of agreement and unanimity "between the four leading Powers on all matters, including those that directly concern one of these Powers".² The above Soviet message frankly expressed the fear that in the absence of the principle of agreement and unanimity between the leading Powers, forces hostile to the Soviet Union may attempt to use the UN for exerting pressure on the USSR. "As to the Soviet Union," the message read, "it cannot very well ignore the existence of certain absurd prejudices which often hamper a genuinely objective attitude to the USSR. Furthermore, other countries should likewise weigh the likely consequences of lack of unity among the leading Powers."³

An analysis of the Soviet Government's position shows that when the foundation of the UN was only being laid the Soviet Union already insisted on the principle of agreement and co-operation between the Great Powers.

In an attempt to settle all controversial issues the Soviet, American and English experts worked out at the conference a compromise formula on the voting procedure. "Under this

¹ *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1683.

² *Correspondence...*, Vol. II, p. 160.

³ *Ibid.*

formula," Hull wrote, "the Security Council would act on a dispute, without the vote of the parties to the dispute being counted, even if those parties were permanent members of the Council, so long as enforcement action was not involved. On the other hand, consideration of and decisions as to enforcement action of any kind would require the unanimous consent of all the permanent members of the Council, whether or not one of them were involved."¹ The US and British governments, however, rejected the compromise formula and the question of the voting procedure in the Security Council remained open. The participants in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference did, however, reach agreed decisions on a number of key questions concerning the General Assembly, the UN Social and Economic Council, etc. The question of the mandatory territories and of the dependent peoples in general was not discussed and the question of the procedure for the dissolution of the League of Nations, therefore, remained unsolved, too. The joint communiqué said "the talks were useful and did much to bring about agreement on recommendations concerning the question of a general plan for the organisation and, notably, for the mechanism needed to maintain peace and security."²

The idea of setting up an international security organisation was so popular, the demand of the peoples to strengthen the co-operation of the United Nations so insistent, and the hopes for a lasting and enduring peace so great, that it became possible to resolve many of the differences at the conference. The fact that the British and US ruling circles, notably the military leaders, were interested in continuing co-operation with the USSR because they wanted her to participate in the war in the Far East also contributed greatly to the success of the conference.

The results of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference were acclaimed by the world public. They were justly regarded as being indicative of the anti-Hitler coalition's strength.³ Typical of this conference, which did a large volume of work in a short time, was not that certain differences emerged, but that nine-tenths of the questions discussed were resolved in a spirit of complete unanimity.

¹ *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1701.

² *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 237.

³ See, for instance, *Izvestia*, October 10, 1944.

The governments of the USSR, USA and Britain settled many important military and political issues in the summer of 1944 through the usual diplomatic channels, others were preliminarily discussed on the ambassadorial level (Dunbarton Oaks, the European Advisory Committee), but there were still others that could be decided only at a new meeting of the Heads of Government.

Proposals to call a conference of the Heads of Government of the three powers were voiced again in the summer of 1944. The US Government suggested that such a meeting should be organised between September 10 and 15 in North Scotland. The Soviet Government was for it but considered the moment inopportune.¹ There was extensive correspondence in connection with this question but a solution that would be satisfactory to all participants in the proposed conference could not be reached. In the absence of such agreement bilateral talks were held in the autumn of 1944 between the Heads of Government of the USA and Britain in Quebec and between the Soviet Union and Britain in Moscow. Many of military and political questions were discussed at these conferences.

The second Quebec Conference held between September 11 and 19, 1944, dealt mainly with the final operations of the Anglo-American armed forces against Germany and Japan. An atmosphere of optimism and confidence in the imminent victory over the fascist bloc reigned at the conference.

In discussing the further operations of the Anglo-American troops in Europe, the American and British leaders proceeded from the assumption that Germany would be unable to continue resistance for long. Plans for Allied operations in the West and South were discussed at Quebec in detail. "The best opportunity to defeat the enemy in the West," the President and Prime Minister wrote to Moscow about the results of the Quebec talks, "is striking at the Ruhr and the Saar since the enemy will concentrate there the remainder of his available forces in the defence of these essential areas. The northern line of approach clearly has advantages over the southern and it is essential that before bad weather sets in we should open up the northern ports, particularly Rotterdam

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. II, p. 151.

and Antwerp. It is on the left flank, therefore, that our main effort will be exerted.”¹

The British Prime Minister also proposed to step up operations in Italy and to organise a landing on the Istria Peninsula, to occupy Trieste and Fiume and to develop the offensive to the north in order to capture Vienna before the Soviet troops got there. Essentially, this was a variant of his notorious “Balkan strategy”.

The proposal of the British delegation was approved in essence by the Americans, and the Allied command on the Mediterranean theatre of operations was ordered to organise the appropriate operation. Moreover, at the Quebec Conference the Americans approved the proposal made by the British as early as in the summer of 1944 on military actions in Central and Southeastern Europe in the event of Germany's sudden capitulation. Instructions were given to Wilson to use one division to establish control over the Venezia Giulia. John Ehrman wrote that as distinct from the preceding conferences, in Quebec Mediterranean problems “proved an uncontroversial topic, and occupied comparatively little of the conference's time”.²

True, Britain was unable to ensure the participation of large formations of Allied forces in the planned operation, since the USA thought it more expedient to use them in Western Europe. Many English authors maintain that this was responsible for the failure of this particular attempt at a “Balkan strategy”. Robert B. Lockhart, for example, believes that had Britain's plan been accepted, as a whole, the political outlook in Central Europe and the Balkans would have been different.³ Naturally, the historical changes in this part of Europe cannot be explained by differences between the USA and Britain. Life itself negated the political machinations linked with the “Balkan strategy”. Owing to the rapid advance of the Soviet troops in the Balkans and the new powerful upsurge of the national liberation movement in the Balkan countries, the fascist invaders were evicted before the operations planned at Quebec could be realised. Many peoples took the fate of their countries into their own hands and embarked on democratic development.

¹ *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. II, p. 161.

² J. Ehrman, *op. cit.*, p. 512.

³ Robert B. Lockhart, *The Marines Were There. The Story of the Royal Marines in the Second World War*, London, 1950, pp. 155-56.

The conference gave much time to questions connected with the Pacific war.

When the military situation in the Pacific was unfavourable to the United States, the US Government and its representatives in China demanded that Chiang Kai-shek put everything in the war against Japan. At that stage the US Government did not help the Kuomintang unleash a civil war or organise warfare against the parts liberated by the Chinese Communists. An intensification of the civil war would have played into the hands of the Japanese, since the attention of both the United States and China would have been diverted from the war against the Japanese aggressors.

When the United States had recovered from the series of blows she had received from Japan in the initial stages of the war and had, in 1944, broken through Japan's so-called inner defence line, US officials ceased their criticism of the Kuomintang Government's policy.

Yet, even though the decisive battles with the Japanese were still in the offing the US ruling circles discounted China as an active force in the war against Japan as early as the end of 1944. They no longer demanded that the Kuomintang take decisive actions against the Japanese and allowed Chiang Kai-shek to concentrate attention on domestic political problems, on the struggle against the Communists.

This stand of the United States was probably due also to the defeat Chiang Kai-shek's troops suffered in 1944 at the hands of the Japanese, which was further proof of the military weakness and inability of the Kuomintang regime.

The Quebec Conference also discussed the situation in Burma and on other Pacific fronts. After a detailed study of all these questions the US and British top military leaders arrived at the conclusion that the war against Japan would last for a considerable time after Germany's defeat.

During the discussion of proposed military operations in the Pacific the Americans were surprised to see how greatly interested the British were in a definition of their role in future actions against Japan. The British Prime Minister suggested that British naval and air forces should be used more extensively in that theatre of the war.

Britain's offer to assign a greater role to her naval and air forces was accepted by the conference. What explained this initiative of the British Government which had until then done everything to limit British participation in the war in

the Far East? It would seem that there were several reasons. First, Britain was afraid that because of her comparatively small participation she would be left out of the political game in the Far East after the war. Secondly, by intensifying her action in the Far East, Britain wanted the US to continue its Lend-Lease deliveries after the war had ended in Europe but while it still continued in the Pacific. Also, the British ruling circles wanted to strengthen Anglo-American co-operation, which by the end of the war, and especially in the post-war period, was becoming one of the pillars of British foreign policy. Last but not least, the British imperialists wanted to consolidate, perhaps even to expand, Britain's colonial possessions in the Far East and Southeast Asia.

In their consideration of the prospect of military operations in the Pacific, the US and British governments attached particular importance to Soviet participation in the war with Japan. This question had been ventilated at Teheran and the Soviet Union had consented to participate in military operations in the Pacific after the defeat of Hitler Germany. Despite this unambiguous formulation, the Western powers, particularly the USA, exerted great efforts in 1944 to persuade the USSR to join the war against Japan at an earlier date. The US ambassador to Moscow insistently reverted to this question even before the opening of a second front in Europe, when the Soviet armed forces were bearing the main brunt of the burden in the war against the fascist armies. It was quite clear that in the spring and summer of 1944 conditions for the Soviet Union's participation in the war against Japan had not yet matured; however, the US Government made attempts to co-ordinate plans for joint military operations in the Far East and to impose on the USSR obligations it refused to assume, the fulfilment of which would only have weakened the Soviet offensive on the Eastern Front.

When in the summer of 1944 the Soviet Government raised the question of closer contacts between the General Staffs of the armed forces of the USSR, Britain and the United States, the British Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference proposed the setting up of a combined Anglo-American-Soviet Chiefs of Staff in Moscow, which was to act as an advisory body at the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the General Staff of the Soviet Army on all questions requiring joint action. It was decided to submit the relevant proposals to the Soviet Government.

The Quebec Conference also considered the future of Germany. The discussion was based on the plan drafted at the President's request by the US Secretary for Finance Henry Morgenthau Jr., one of Roosevelt's closest assistants. It was approved on the eve of the Quebec conference by the Cabinet Committee on Germany, which had been set up at the beginning of the war.

The main idea of that plan was to eliminate Germany as a competitor of the Anglo-Saxon imperialist powers on the world markets.

In the main Roosevelt and Churchill approved Morgenthau's plan and at the conference endorsed a special agreement drafted by the British Government. Germany's metallurgical, chemical and electrotechnical industries were to be liquidated, the industries referred to in the Ruhr and the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the two districts should be put under some body of the world organisation which would supervise the dismantling of these industries and would make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge.

"This programme . . . is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character."¹

The world soon learned that Roosevelt and Churchill had approved the Morgenthau plan. The programme for the liquidation of Germany as a state and the transformation of the Germans into an enslaved people, outlined at Quebec, was sharply criticised by progressive circles the world over, including the USA and Britain.

The Morgenthau plan produced such a negative reaction that at the end of September President Roosevelt decided that the "plan had been a mistake". Because of the failure of the Morgenthau plan the President refused to consider other plans for Germany's dismemberment.

The discussion at Quebec of so vital a question as Germany's post-war fate without the participation of the Soviet Union was a flagrant violation of the spirit of the alliance. The enormous losses suffered by the Soviet Union during the Second World War entitled it to a major say in any solution of the German problem. Nevertheless, the US and British

¹ Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, 1948, p. 577.

governments not only discussed but even reached an agreement on Germany without the Soviet Union. It should be noted also that many other questions considered at Quebec had not been co-ordinated with the Soviet Government. The President and Prime Minister informed Moscow on some of the questions dealt with only after the conference was over.

* * *

Shortly after his meeting with Roosevelt, Churchill made a new trip to Moscow, where talks between British and Soviet representatives were held between October 9 and 18, 1944.

The British Prime Minister's decision to come to Moscow came as something of a surprise to the Soviet Government and it had received no advance information on the range of questions the British Government intended to discuss at these talks. Yet, being interested in developing Allied relations, the Soviet Government expressed its consent to conduct negotiations.

Although the Prime Minister had written to the US President that he intended to discuss mainly Far Eastern affairs at Moscow, actually he was far more interested in problems relating to Southeast and Eastern Europe.¹

During the Moscow talks agreement was reached on outstanding points of the armistice terms with Bulgaria—the setting up of an Allied control commission, the commission's functions and rights, the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops and administration from the territories of Greece and Yugoslavia, and so on. The two governments "agreed to pursue a joint policy in Yugoslavia designed to concentrate all energies against the retreating Germans and bring about a solution of Yugoslav internal difficulties by a union between the Royal Yugoslav Government and the National Liberation movement.

"The right of the Yugoslav people to settle their future Constitution for themselves after the war is of course recognised as inalienable,"² the communiqué stated.

During the talks Churchill revealed that there was a British

¹ "The British had two political matters which they hoped to be able to settle with Stalin. One was to define the limits of Russian influence in Balkan and Danubian Europe, the other was to bring a final quietus to the Polish problem." (W. H. McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 494.)

² *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 272.

plan to deprive Germany of the important economic districts of the Ruhr, Westphalia and the Saar and to place them under international control.¹ The Soviet Government was also told of the Anglo-American plans for the partitioning of Germany, which had been discussed at Quebec. However, the Western powers did not succeed in imposing their plans for a dismemberment of Germany on the Soviet Union. It was decided to discuss all aspects of the German problem at a new conference of the three Heads of Government.

The British delegation submitted to the Soviet Government two memorandums on France. In one of them the British Government expressed its views on the work of the European Advisory Committee in connection with problems of Germany's capitulation and the procedure for the participation on this committee of United Nations members then not represented on it. In particular, it concerned request made by the French Committee of National Liberation to participate in the European Advisory Committee. In another document, dated October 16, 1944, the British Government declared its willingness to recognise the French Provisional Government.²

The Polish question was in the centre of the discussions. A delegation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, headed by Bierut, and of the Polish Emigré Government in London, headed by Mikolajczyk, came to Moscow for the talks. The delegation of the PCNL said that it was ready to reach an agreement with the delegates who had arrived from London on the terms advanced in August 1944. It was ready to adopt the 1921 Constitution and to reject the one adopted in 1935.³ It further emphasised that it "had always considered it its main aim to unite the Polish people and that it was willing in keeping with this principle to assist all sincere strivings to bring this idea to fruition".⁴

Bierut reaffirmed the willingness of the committee to settle the question of the Soviet-Polish border in accordance with the ethnic principle and argued energetically for the return

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, pp. 282, 398.

² *Soviet-French Relations...*, p. 310. The replies of the Soviet Government to the above British documents, which reiterated the Soviet Union's desire to strengthen France's international prestige, were sent to the British Government after the Moscow talks (*ibid.*, p. 315).

³ The Constitution adopted in 1935 by the personal dictatorship of Pilsudsky was a fascist one; the 1921 Constitution proclaimed elementary democratic freedoms.

⁴ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, p. 273.

to Poland of her Western lands. To achieve unity among the Poles, the PCNL agreed that some posts in the new Polish Government should be offered to democratic Polish functionaries from London.

The London Emigré Government adopted a very different attitude. Its memorandum on the normalisation of Soviet-Polish relations completely ignored the PCNL and made no mention of the Curzon Line as a basis for the future frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland. The memorandum on this matter only said that "a final settlement of the Polish-Soviet frontier . . . will be made by the Constitutional Diet in accordance with democratic principles",¹ and that the 1921 border was to remain in force until then.

At the meeting on October 13 devoted to the Polish problem Mikolajczyk explained his memorandum in detail. He tried to convince the participants that the memorandum outlined realistic ways of resolving the so-called Polish problem and normalising Soviet-Polish relations.

The Soviet delegation in its turn noted that the memorandum of the Polish Emigré Government could not serve as a basis for a solution of the Polish problem because it proceeded not so much from a realistic appraisal of the situation in Poland as from the former, anti-Soviet conception of the Polish émigré circles.

The Soviet Government particularly stressed that the memorandum completely ignored the PCNL which, as noted in the Soviet message sent to London some time after the Moscow talks, "has made substantial progress in consolidating its national, democratic organisations on Polish soil, in implementing a land reform in favour of the peasants and in expanding its armed forces, and enjoys great prestige among the population".²

The refusal of Mikolajczyk's Government to recognise the Curzon Line as a basis for the Soviet-Polish border naturally evoked serious criticism on the part of the Soviet Government, which had repeatedly stated its point of view on that issue.

¹ Edward J. Rozek, op. cit., p. 266.

² *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 283. A leader in *Pravda* of October 21 outlined the Soviet Union's position on the Polish question as follows: "Naturally, the peoples of the Soviet Union are vitally interested in stopping future Poland as well as our other Western neighbours from serving as a corridor for any new German policy of aggression. Our neighbour must be a free, strong, democratic Poland, that has

The British Government's position on the Polish question was formulated at the conference as follows:

"1. Acceptance of the Curzon Line as the *de facto* eastern frontier of Poland with the right of a final discussion of the matter at the Peace Conference; and

"2. A friendly agreement with the Committee of National Liberation on the subject of forming a united Polish Government which in time could undergo such modifications as circumstances would require."¹

Developing his idea on Poland's future borders, Churchill said at the meeting on October 13:

"As regards the frontier problems, I must declare on behalf of the British Government that the sacrifices made by the Soviet Union in the course of the war against Germany and its effort toward liberating Poland entitle it, in our opinion, to a western frontier along the Curzon Line. . . .

"I also understand that the Allies will be continuing the struggle against Germany in order to obtain in return for the Polish concession in the East an equal balance . . . in the form of territories in the North and in the West, in East Prussia and in Silesia including a good seacoast, an excellent port in Danzig and valuable raw materials in Silesia."²

On October 16, however, the British Prime Minister submitted a draft which reflected only the views on Poland's western borders which had been co-ordinated earlier. As regards the eastern border, the draft only mentioned that "the Polish Government accepts the Curzon Line as the line of demarcation between the USSR and Poland".³

The views expressed by the Soviet and British delegations did not make Mikolajczyk change his position although he was compelled to admit that the criticism levelled by the Soviet side was fair. He noted, for example, that the Soviet statement that the memorandum ignores the existence of the

forever given up its annexationist claims on the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples. At the same time only a Poland in which the power is vested in the hands of people, who make it their aim to organise state life on the basis of democratic principles, will be able to free the Polish people from feudal oppression by big landowners and to give the land to the Polish peasants. A Poland like this will cease to be a hotbed of unrest and war danger on the western borders of our country and will be one of the pillars of enduring peace in Europe."

¹ Edward J. Rozek, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

² *Ibid.*, p. 271.

³ *History of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945*, Vol. IV, p. 667.

Committee of National Liberation was "to a certain extent" just. As regards the Curzon Line, he said that on that issue he disagreed both with the British and Soviet points of view.¹

Mikolajczyk's position testified to the political shortsightedness of the Polish Emigré Government and could only lead to it losing touch with events unfolding in Poland. The British understood this very well and therefore displayed bustling activity to bring about some "normalisation" of the Polish problem. Their main aim was to ensure key positions for the Emigré Government in Poland by making some concessions on the question of the Polish borders. This was an expression of British imperialism's aim to make Poland an outpost of the capitalist world's anti-Soviet policy.

At the meeting on October 16, 1944 Bierut, the Chairman of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa, and Mikolajczyk ventilated their views, and on October 18 Mikolajczyk met the Head of the Soviet Government. In the end Mikolajczyk showed a certain willingness to agree to the Curzon Line, but made several important reservations. For example, he demanded that Lvov and the Lvov region should go to Poland. In advancing this demand, Mikolajczyk referred to the statement the US Government had made during his June 1944 visit to Washington that it was willing to support this demand of the Polish Emigré Government. Furthermore, Mikolajczyk said that he wanted to co-ordinate his viewpoint with his colleagues in London and to obtain authority to continue the talks at an early date.

Mikolajczyk's provisos brought to naught all efforts of the Soviet Government and the PCNL to unite all democratic forces of the Polish people for the joint struggle against fascism and to remove the "Polish problem", artificially inflated by certain circles in London and Washington, from the agenda of international conferences.

At the same time some progress was made in Moscow towards the solution of the Polish problem: the governments of the USSR and Britain agreed in general outline on the future borders of Poland. The British Government had to admit that in view of the actual conditions in Poland the Soviet Government had adopted a correct position on the question of the Polish Emigré Government. Although London continued to cling to that government in every way, it could

¹ Edward J. Rozek, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-72.

not fail to see that it had lost all real chances of ever returning to Poland, since as regards its composition it completely failed to measure up to the political changes that had taken place in Poland. That is probably why the British agreed to reorganise the Polish Government in London.

"Important progress was made towards solution of the Polish question, which was closely discussed between the Soviet and British governments. . .", the concluding communiqué said.

"These discussions have notably narrowed differences and dispelled misconceptions. Conversations are continuing on outstanding points."¹

"The Moscow Conference considered the position on the fronts of the Second World War in great detail. Generals Antonov (USSR), Brooke (Britain), Deane (USA) reported on the military-strategic situation on the Soviet-German front, in Western Europe, Italy and the Pacific. The communiqué on the Anglo-Soviet talks noted that in view of recent events and the decisions of the Quebec Conference "the unfolding of military plans agreed upon at Teheran was comprehensively reviewed in the light of recent events and conclusions of the Quebec Conference on the war in Western Europe. Utmost confidence was expressed in the future progress of Allied operations on all fronts."²

The Anglo-Soviet talks in the autumn of 1944 were an important landmark in the development of Allied relations; they once again confirmed that it was possible to solve many intricate international problems, provided there was mutual interest and good-will. In a comparatively short time a solution was found for many questions connected with the signing of an armistice with Hitler Germany's former allies, military plans were co-ordinated, and there was a frank exchange of views on many other international problems. "I am very glad to inform the House," Churchill said in the House of Commons, "that our relations with Soviet Russia were never more close, intimate and cordial than they are at the present time. Never before have we been able to reach so high a degree of frank and friendly discussions of the most delicate and often potentially vexatious topics. . . ."³

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. II, pp. 271-72.

² *Ibid.*, p. 271.

³ *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report*, London, 1944, Vol. 404, col. 491.

In the Soviet Union, too, the talks were highly assessed and regarded as proof of a further consolidation of the United Nations. In connection with the closure of the talks a leader in *Pravda* of October 21, 1944 read: "Right are those who see in the Anglo-Soviet treaty, which is reinforced by the close co-operation between Britain and the Soviet Union with the United States, a cornerstone not only of the joint struggle against Hitler Germany but also of a future enduring peace in Europe. The Moscow Meeting was important because it was an expression of the Anglo-Soviet treaty in action. It revealed the growing understanding between the Allied powers and their ability to solve all emerging problems by co-ordinating their points of view."

What were the practical effects of the talks between the governments of the USSR, USA and Britain in the second half of 1944? They helped to co-ordinate the principles underlying Allied policy in the liberated countries, laid the foundation for the future international organisation for ensuring peace and security, and solved many other questions relating to the war and the post-war order of the world.

At these talks the Soviet Government acted in strict keeping with its policy of defending the principles of a democratic peace. At the same time, wishing to strengthen the coalition, it endeavoured to reach mutually acceptable solutions (the UN Charter, the Polish problem, and so on). As regards the Western powers, they were at that time interested in co-operating with the USSR and made compromises on some issues. The results of the Anglo-Soviet talks in Moscow should be regarded from this angle. The British Government hoped that the USSR would agree to divide Europe into spheres of influence, but its plans miscarried.

1944 was drawing to a close. The fascist bloc had disintegrated. Only Hitler Germany and militaristic Japan continued to fight a losing battle.

CHAPTER XIX

THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

In the beginning of 1945 the Hitlerites found themselves in desperate straits and pinned all their hopes on a deterioration of the relations within the anti-Hitler coalition. Germany's ruling circles hoped that they would be able to come to terms with reactionary, anti-Soviet circles in Britain and the USA and change the situation in their favour. The German command therefore tried to draw out the war, and continued to centre attention on the Soviet-German front.

At the beginning of 1945, of the total 313 divisions and 32 brigades the German fascist command had at its disposal, 185 divisions and 21 brigades operated on the Soviet-German front, 108 divisions and seven brigades on the Western Front and in Italy, and 31 divisions and four brigades carried out logistic duties in the occupied countries. The strongest enemy grouping in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Carpathians was charged with stopping the advance of the Soviet Army towards Berlin; another grouping was deployed south of the Carpathians to protect the road to Austria, Czechoslovakia and South Germany. In addition the Soviet troops blocked about 30 divisions in the Baltic states and held the German-Hungarian garrison of Budapest, numbering over 160,000, under siege.

The Anglo-American troops held 33 per cent of the German fascist troops at bay. Up to November 1944 military operations in the West developed comparatively successfully and the Allied armies reached Germany's western border and the Siegfried Line. The attempts of the Allies to take this defence line in their stride was unsuccessful and the Anglo-American troops had to stop and take up defensive positions.

Taking advantage of this the Hitlerite command mounted a major counter-offensive in the Ardennes region. Its purpose

was to put Germany in a bargaining position and to ensure the most favourable terms for a separate peace. The offensive began on December 16, 1944. The Hitlerite troops under the command of General von Rundstedt made a 60-kilometre wide break-through in the Anglo-American defence line and after a week of heavy fighting widened the gap to 100 kilometres and advanced up to 90 kilometres to the west. As a result the Anglo-American troops found themselves in a desperate position. The Hitlerites succeeded in splitting the British and American forces. The Germans were getting ready to seize Antwerp and the Allies were threatened with another Dunkirk.

This state of affairs aroused great anxiety with the US and British leadership. They hoped that a new offensive in the East would ease the pressure on the Allies in the West. The US President proposed to send a special emissary to Moscow to co-ordinate strategy and to learn the plans of the Soviet Command. "In order that all of us may have information essential to the co-ordination of our effort," he wrote to the Head of the Soviet Government at the end of December 1944, "I wish to direct General Eisenhower to send a fully qualified officer of his staff to Moscow to discuss with you Eisenhower's situation on the Western Front and its relation to the Eastern Front. We will maintain complete secrecy."¹

The mission was entrusted to Eisenhower's deputy, British Air Chief Marshal Tedder. However, even before his arrival in Moscow, Churchill, seeing the continuing deterioration of the situation in the West, asked Stalin on January 6, 1945 for help.

"The battle in the West," Churchill wrote, "is very heavy and, at any time, large decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command. You know yourself from your own experience how very anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after temporary loss of the initiative. It is General Eisenhower's great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, as this obviously affects all his and our major decisions. Our Envoy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was last night reported weather-bound in Cairo. His journey has been much delayed through no fault of ours. In case he has not reached you yet, I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. II, p. 177.

Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere, during January, with any other points you may care to mention. I shall not pass this most secret information to anyone except Field-Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only under conditions of the utmost secrecy. I regard the matter as urgent.”¹

The Head of the Soviet Government immediately replied to the Prime Minister as follows: “Your message of January 6 reached me in the evening of January 7.

“I am sorry to say that Air Marshal Tedder has not yet arrived in Moscow.

“It is extremely important to take advantage of our superiority over the Germans in guns and aircraft. What we need for the purpose is clear flying weather and the absence of low mists that prevent aimed artillery fire. We are mounting an offensive, but at the moment the weather is unfavourable. Still, *in view of our Allies' position on the Western Front, GHQ of the Supreme Command have decided to complete preparations at a rapid rate and, regardless of weather, to launch large-scale offensive operations along the entire Central Front not later than the second half of January. Rest assured we shall do all in our power to support the valiant forces of our Allies.*”² (My italics.—U.I.)

The decision of the Soviet Government to launch an offensive was received with enthusiasm and gratitude in the West. “I am most grateful to you for your thrilling message. I have sent it over to General Eisenhower for his eye only. May all good fortune rest upon your noble venture.

“The news you give me will be a great encouragement to General Eisenhower because it gives him the assurance that German reinforcements will have to be split between both our flaming fronts.”³

On January 12, 1945 the Soviet troops launched the new big offensive which was to continue to a victorious climax. One hundred and fifty Soviet divisions attacked the Hitlerites along the entire front extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Germans stopped their offensive in the West for they were compelled to shift urgently the 5th and 6th tank armies from the West to the East in order to strengthen

¹ Ibid., Vol. I, p. 294.

² Ibid., pp. 294-95.

³ Ibid., p. 295.

resistance against the Soviet troops. It should be noted that the 6th tank army had directly participated in smashing the Allied defence line in the Ardennes sector and had heavily defeated the 1st American army in December 1944. Thus, the Soviet troops rendered the Anglo-American armies in the West invaluable aid and once again proved their faithfulness to their Allied duties. It should also be noted that the Soviet Government had not assumed any commitments to act as it did; moreover, the decisions of the Teheran Conference did not provide for any winter offensive by the Soviet Army. The Soviet Government was not guided by any formal considerations but fulfilled its Allied duty, guided by the general interests of the anti-fascist coalition and the desire to put an end to bloodshed as quickly as possible.

In his memoirs Churchill admits that the decision of the Soviet Government to hasten the offensive in order to help the Anglo-American troops was a striking example of mutual Allied assistance.¹

The new victories of the Soviet Army over the Germans and the selfless help of the Soviet Union to the United States and Britain created the cordial atmosphere in which the new Three-Power conference in the Crimea was held.

* * *

The Yalta, or Crimea Conference of the three Heads of Government was one of the major international war-time conferences. It was held at a time particularly favourable for the United Nations, when the Hitlerite armed forces were compelled to retreat under the ever heavier blows of the Soviet armed forces, and of the US and British armies. The sweeping winter offensive of the Soviet Army developed successfully and Soviet troops were completing the rout of the Hitlerite army groupings on various sectors of the front.

The conference was held between February 4 and 11, 1945. Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill headed their delegations. They were accompanied by their Foreign Ministers and by military and other advisers. The participants in the conference exerted no small efforts to solve complex military and political problems in the shortest possible time. The conference worked from early morning to late at night.

Like the Teheran Conference before it, this meeting of the

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI, p. 214.

three Heads of Government did not have a fixed agenda—each delegation could raise any questions of interest.

The Yalta Conference began with a review of the military situation. The Chiefs of Staff dwelt on the situations in the relevant theatres of military operations against the Hitlerite troops. S. A. Antonov, the Soviet representative, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, informed the Allies that several German divisions, which had been moved from the Western and Southern (Italian) fronts, had appeared on the Soviet-German front.

Churchill expressed “profound admiration” for the operations of the Soviet armed forces. Stalin said that the “Red Army’s offensive, for which Churchill had expressed his gratitude, was in fulfilment of a comradely duty. . . .” He then recalled the correspondence between him and the British Prime Minister early in January 1945 about the chances of organising an offensive on the Soviet-German front. Stalin said that he appreciated Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s tact, who had not asked him outright to launch an offensive, but that he, as he had said at Yalta, “saw that such an offensive was essential for the Allies”. Stalin stressed that the Soviet Government had regarded the organisation of such an offensive “to be its duty, the duty of an ally, although it was under no formal obligation on this score”. He asked the “leaders of the Allied Powers to take into account that Soviet leaders did not merely fulfil their obligation but were also prepared to fulfil their moral duty as far as possible”.¹

During the discussion of military questions the Soviet representatives repeatedly emphasised the need for close military co-operation and stressed that they were prepared for it. At the first meeting of the conference Stalin spoke in detail about the experience of Soviet artillery on the Eastern Front and added “that the Soviet people, being the Allies’ comrades-in-arms, could exchange experience with them”.² Soviet representatives at the meetings of military advisers expressed similar views.

The American and British delegations made a number of requests of the Soviet Government. In particular the Americans asked for the earliest possible survey of targets bombed by the US Strategic Air Forces, which later had been occu-

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, pp. 62-63.

² *Ibid.*, p. 62.

pied during the offensive of the Soviet Army. In addition the Americans requested the provision of two airdromes in the Budapest area for use by United States air units.¹ The Soviet Government reacted favourably to both requests.²

Bilateral Soviet-American military talks held during the Yalta Conference dealt with the Soviet Union's imminent entry into the war against Japan. At these talks the American representatives put the following two questions to the Soviet Government: a) Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential for the Soviet Union that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia? and b) Would the Soviet Union allow the United States to base US air forces on Komsomolsk and Nikolayevsk?³

The Soviet side answered that a supply line through the Pacific would be of interest to the Soviet Union and gave an affirmative answer to the second question.⁴ The Soviet-American talks on the transfer of a definite number of ships to the Soviet Union were also fruitful.

N. G. Kuznetsov, a participant in the Yalta Conference, wrote that "at the military negotiations, where the Allies were mainly represented by the Americans, there was less disagreement. The American military leaders adopted a conciliatory attitude or looked for an alternative where the viewpoints of the Soviet and British representatives were diametrically opposed or difficult to reconcile."⁵

In the military field the Soviet Union requested the Allies to speed up the offensive on the Western Front to prevent the enemy from transferring his forces to the East from the Western Front, Norway and Italy, by air strikes against his communications; and, in particular, to paralyse the Berlin and Leipzig junctions and prevent the enemy from withdrawing his forces from Italy.⁶

On its part the Soviet delegation assured the Allies that the Soviet armed forces would continue their offensive with unrelenting energy. The conference also determined the course of the final operations against Germany. It was decided to maintain direct contacts between the staffs of the

¹ *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. II, p. 189.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Uoprosi Istorii* (Problems of History), No. 4, 1965, pp. 129-30.

⁶ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, pp. 57-58.

advancing Allied forces. The talks on military issues at the Crimea Conference helped to strengthen the military co-operation between the Allies and enabled the governments of the USSR, USA and Britain to exchange military information.

When strategic questions came up for discussion the British no longer advanced their notorious "Balkan variant", even though a possible Anglo-American occupation of some of the Central and Southeast European countries had been discussed by British and US representatives on the eve of the conference.

The Crimea Conference was held at a time when Hitler Germany's final collapse was imminent. It was clear that the utter rout of the Hitlerites and their unconditional surrender were close at hand. In these conditions the question of Germany's future organisation, of Allied policy on the German question, or, in other words, of their treatment of Germany, had assumed first-rank importance. The solution of these problems could still be postponed at Teheran but at Yalta it had become urgent. What would happen to Germany and along what lines would she develop? Would she be thrown back for many decades and turned into a conglomeration of dismembered German lands, or would she remain a centralised state in which fascism and militarism would be stamped out? It was this issue that explained the great attention given to the German problem at the Crimea Conference.

The US President addressed the plenary session of the conference on February 5. He said that "personally, as stated by him at Teheran . . . he was in favour of dismemberment of Germany. He recalled that forty years ago, when he had been in Germany, the concept of the Reich had not been really known then, and any community dealt with the provincial government. For example, if in Bavaria you dealt with the Bavarian government and if in Hesse-Darmstadt you dealt with that government. In the last twenty years, however, everything has become centralised in Berlin. He added that he still thought the division of Germany into five states or seven states was a good idea."¹

The British delegation reminded of its position at Teheran and proposed to divide Germany into two parts: North

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta. 1945*, Washington, 1955, p. 614.

Germany including Prussia, and South Germany including Austria.¹ It insisted particularly on Germany's fate being decided without German participation.

Here, as at Teheran, the Soviet delegation did not propose or defend any plans for the dismemberment of Germany.

At the proposal of the US President the word "dismemberment" was included into the initial text for the surrender terms prepared by the European Advisory Committee in the summer of 1944, as one of the measures that could be taken with respect to Germany. It should be noted that the text of the agreement on Germany's capitulation was later changed and neither it nor the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany contained the word "dismemberment".

The Crimea Conference adopted the decision to set up a special commission on Germany which was among other things to consider the question of Germany's dismemberment. On this commission were Eden (Chairman), Wynant and Gusev. In March 1945 the British representative on the commission submitted to his Soviet counterpart a draft directive which provided for the consideration of the question "... in what manner Germany should be divided, into what parts, with what boundaries, and with what inter-relationship among the parts...".² On March 26, 1945 the Soviet representative replied that the Soviet Union regards the plan for Germany's dismemberment only "as a possible perspective for pressure on Germany with the aim of rendering her harmless in the event of other means proving inadequate".³ Thus, at the initiative of the Soviet Government the question of Germany's dismemberment was struck off the agenda, although the Anglo-American ruling circles continued to advocate the liquidation of a single German state at Yalta.

The heads of the three delegations adopted a decision on the occupation of Germany and the establishment of control over her, agreed on common policy and on the plans for the coercive implementation of the terms of Hitler Germany's unconditional surrender. They outlined the basic principles of a co-ordinated policy towards Germany, which was to be based on principles of democratisation and demilitarisation. "It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism

¹ *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta...*, pp. 612-13.

² *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1955, No. 5, p. 42.

³ *Ibid.*

and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organisations, and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the community of nations."¹

The conference also decided that for a long time (no definite period was fixed at the conference) Germany would be occupied by the troops of the Three Powers, and also of France, if she should so desire; and that the troops of every one of the above powers would occupy a definite part, or zone, of Germany. It should be noted that initially it was intended that Germany would be occupied by three powers—the USSR, USA and Britain, and the European Advisory Committee submitted a draft on the division of Germany into three occupation zones as early as in September 1944.²

The Yalta Conference approved the protocol of the agreement between the governments of the USSR, USA and Britain on the occupation zones and on the administration of Great Berlin, prepared by the European Advisory Committee.

Later, when it was decided that France would participate in the occupation, Germany was divided into four instead of the three zones, the French zone being formed out of the British and American zones.

Throughout the war the USA opposed all moves intended

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, pp. 134-35.

² For the results of the EAC's work, see *Otchet o rabote EKK* (Report on the Work of the European Advisory Committee), Moscow, 1947.

to grant France equal rights with the other powers. Now at last the US Government agreed to it and this was to no small degree promoted by the signing of the Soviet-French treaty. On February 4, 1945, in a talk with Stalin in Livadia Palace, Roosevelt said that it was necessary to discuss at the present meeting the question of granting France an occupation zone in Germany. Naturally, Roosevelt added, it was only a question of doing the French a favour.¹ The President admitted that he "had previously been against France taking part in the Control Council for Germany, but he now favoured French participation in it."² Eden also said in his memoirs that before the Crimea Conference Roosevelt had objected to France's participation in the conference of the Heads of Government on the German question.³ At Yalta it was decided that the French Government would be asked to send a representative to the Control Council for Germany, which was initially called the Central Control Commission. Its main task was to work out a co-ordinated policy towards Germany during her occupation by the Allied powers.

The Central Control Commission, seated at Berlin, was to effect control and function as a co-ordinating administration.

Next the conference considered the question of Germany's reparations.

The amount of damages suffered by the USSR was determined by the Extraordinary State Commission, comprised of prominent Soviet public figures.

The Soviet Union sustained enormous human losses—about 20 million people.⁴ Never before in history had any country suffered such losses. The German fascists and their satellites completely or partially destroyed 1,710 towns and more than 70,000 villages; burned and demolished more than six million buildings and rendered about 25 million people homeless. They wrecked 31,850 industrial enterprises; destroyed 65,000 kilometres of railway track and 4,100 railway stations; ruined and looted 98,000 collective farms, 1,876 state farms and 2,890 machine-and-tractor stations, requisitioned and took to Germany seven million horses, 17

¹ *History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1945*, p. 431.

² *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1965, No. 8, p. 113.

³ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy, 1947*. Documents and Materials, Part I. Moscow, 1956, p. 416.

⁴ *Narodnoye khozyaistvo v 1961 godu* (The Soviet Economy in 1961), Statistical Yearbook, Moscow, 1962, p. 8.

million head of cattle, 20 million pigs, and 27 million sheep and goats.¹ The direct damage Germany and her allies inflicted to the Soviet Union on occupied territory totalled 128,000,000,000 dollars.² Including military expenditure and the loss of incomes from the economy of the occupied regions, the damage reached the astronomical figure of 2 billion 569,000 million rubles.³

The Soviet Government set up a special Reparations Commission as early as in 1943. Its task was to draw up the Soviet Union's claims for reparations from Germany and her allies and to substantiate them. In its work the Soviet Reparations Commission took into account the sad experience with the German reparations after the First World War and therefore refused to consider reparations in the form of money, insisting that these should be paid in kind, by a delivery of factories, various commodities, products, and so on. In determining the sum of reparations it took a realistic view and demanded from Germany only what, observing all the necessary strictness, could really be obtained from her.

At the conference the Soviet delegation submitted a detailed and well substantiated plan for reparations from Germany, which stipulated the sources, terms and amounts

¹ *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1947*, Vol. I, p. 416.

² *Ibid.*

³ See *Pravda* of September 24, 1958. According to data submitted in 1945 to the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency in Paris by the Agency's member-states, the damages inflicted by Germany and her allies in Europe to the 18 member-states of the commission amounted to 53,400 million dollars. These losses were distributed as follows (in millions of dollars):

France	21,143
Yugoslavia	9,145
Great Britain	6,383
Holland	4,472
Czechoslovakia	4,202
Greece	2,545
Belgium	2,278
USA	1,267
Norway	1,260
the other 9 countries (Albania, Luxemburg, Canada, Denmark, India, Egypt, New Zealand, Australia and the South African Republic)	679

The losses of Poland, who did not participate in the above Agency, since her reparation demands were satisfied out of the Soviet share of the German reparations, accounted for 38 per cent of her national wealth.

of the reparation payments Germany was to make to the United Nations. In particular, the Soviet proposals provided for reparations to be levied from Germany in two forms: a) one-time withdrawals from Germany's national wealth, both on the territory of Germany proper and outside (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock); it was emphasised that this phase would be chiefly for the purpose of destroying Germany's war potential, and b) annual deliveries of goods from current production. The Soviet Government proposed to exact a total of 20,000 million dollars as reparations, of which 50 per cent should go to the Soviet Union.

In demanding that Germany should partly compensate the enormous material losses suffered by the Soviet state, the Soviet Government at the same time strictly opposed the idea of Germany's economic enslavement, and in determining the amount and the form of the reparation payment reckoned not only with the Soviet Union's interests but considered also Germany's position and the interests of her people.

In its proposal for the distribution of reparations the Soviet Government believed that priority was to be based on two indicators: a) the size of the country's contribution to the victory over the enemy, and b) the amount of direct material losses suffered by that country. The Soviet Government felt that the sequence in which the states of the anti-fascist coalition would receive reparations should be fixed on that basis. A typical dialogue was held in this connection at the end of the conference's second meeting. Churchill said that he liked the principle: "to each according to his needs ..." whereupon Stalin replied that he preferred another principle: "to each according to his deserts".¹

After lengthy discussions the conference recognised that it was just to oblige Germany to compensate the losses she had inflicted in kind and to the greatest possible degree.

However, differences arose with regard to many of the questions raised.

For example, the British delegation objected strongly to any mention of figures saying that they should be left to the Reparations Committee to determine.² It said that the British Government did not know enough about Germany's economic position and possibilities and that without it figures

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 80.

² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

could not be determined. This view, however, was entirely unfounded. Although the British Government was hardly better informed on the economic position of other former enemy states than it was on Germany's, it had, in conjunction with the governments of the USSR and the USA, fixed the size of their reparation payments (in the armistice agreement with Rumania—300 million dollars, with Finland—300 million dollars and with Hungary—300 million dollars). The reason for Britain's position was not due to any "lack of information" but to her striving to have her hands free for the implementation of her own economic policy in Germany and her unwillingness to satisfy the Soviet Union's just claims.

On the whole, the American delegation supported the Soviet proposal. As regards the sum of reparations proposed by the Soviet delegation, Stettinius said that it was reasonable.¹

The British delegation proposed for consideration as a third form of reparation payment the use of German labour and transport services.

At the last meeting the Conference approved the Protocol on the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimea Conference on the German Reparations in Kind. The Heads of the three governments agreed as follows:

"1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. . . .

"2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

"a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany . . . from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory . . . these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

"b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production. . . .

"c) Use of German labour."²

To work out a detailed reparation plan on the basis of the above principles an Inter-Allied Reparation Commission was set up in Moscow. On it sat representatives of the USSR, USA and Great Britain.

As regards the sum total of reparations and also their distribution among the countries victimised by German

¹ *The Conferences of Malta and Yalta*. . . , p. 808.

² *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 143.

aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed on the following: "The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation . . . should be 20 billion dollars and that 50 per cent of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."¹ The British delegation at the Crimea Conference did not make any proposals on that matter. It only stated that the British Government reserved the right to return to the question of determining the sum of reparations while the Inter-Allied Reparation Commission was sitting.

Summing up, it may be said that on questions of Germany's military defeat and the urgent measures to be taken for her administration there were no serious differences between the participants in the conference, however, the question of future policy towards Germany as a whole and towards her development revealed fundamental differences. The Soviet Union was interested first and foremost in eradicating nazism and militarism in Germany, in transforming her into a peace-loving, democratic state, in severely punishing war criminals and in a just compensation of the damages inflicted by fascism to the peace-loving countries. The British and Americans, however, wanted to dismember and liquidate the German state, to enslave Germany economically and to use her for their selfish, imperialist purposes.

The question of the United Nations Organisation was of great importance to the post-war order of the world. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference great efforts had been exerted to draft the UN Charter but it had not been completed. Correspondence between the Heads of Government of the three main Allies had also failed to overcome the differences in views. The participants in the Crimea Conference had to decide many important questions in connection with the setting up of the UNO. What was to be the nature of that organisation? On what principle was its work to be based: was there to be co-operation between all its members, particularly the Great Powers, or domination of one grouping over the other? What states would be recognised as the founders of the organisation? Finally, when and where would the first constituent UNO conference be called?

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, pp. 143-44.

The question easiest to solve was to appoint the place and time for the constituent conference. It was decided that it would be convoked on April 25, 1945 in San Francisco and that it would draft the final text of the Charter. Agreement was also reached on the text of the invitation to be sent by the US Government on its own behalf and on behalf of the other powers to all UN members inviting them to send their delegates to San Francisco.

A question that was much more difficult to resolve was the voting procedure in the Security Council, the question which would determine the character of the entire United Nations Organisation.

In December 1944 the US Government submitted new proposals on this question to the Soviet Government. It proposed that

"1. One vote should be allotted to each member of the Security Council;

"2. On matters of procedure decisions of the Security Council be made by an affirmative vote of seven members;

"3. On all other matters decisions of the Security Council should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that a party to a dispute should abstain from voting in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under Paragraph One of Chapter VIII, Section C."¹

Commenting the US proposal, the President wrote to the Head of the Soviet Government that the US proposal provides for the unanimity of the permanent members on all decisions of the Council in determining the existence of a threat to peace as well as in the actions to remove such threat or to suppress aggression. "As a practical matter," he said, "I can see that this is necessary if action of this kind is to be feasible. I am consequently prepared to accept in this respect the view expressed by your Government in its memorandum presented at the Dumbarton Oaks meetings on an International Security Organisation."²

The US Government's position, its willingness to adopt the Soviet Government's view on the need for the unanimity of the Great Powers in the Security Council is explained by the importance the US ruling circles attached to the setting

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. II, p. 173.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74.

up of the UNO, in which the USA expected to play the leading role. President Roosevelt was also personally interested in the matter for he had repeatedly advocated the establishment of an international security organisation after the war. Therefore, at the Crimea Conference the US Government advocated the principle of unanimity among the Great Powers, on which the Soviet Government had always insisted.

At the Crimea Conference the Soviet Government proposed that invitations be sent to a number of Soviet Republics, notably the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics, in the capacity of constituent members of the United Nations Organisation.

The Soviet Government pointed out that the Ukraine and Byelorussia had a bigger population, greater political importance, and had contributed more to Hitler's defeat than some of the states who were included among the constituent members.

The British and American delegations objected to the Soviet proposal.

Owing to the Soviet Government's persistent efforts agreement was reached that the British and US governments would, at the forthcoming San Francisco Conference, support the proposal to invite the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics to the UN as initial constituent members.

The Crimea Conference also decided that the United Nations as composed on February 8, 1945, and also those associated nations who had declared war on the fascist powers not later than March 1, 1945, would take part in the conference. The term "associated nations" applied to Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Iceland, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and Turkey.

In the attempt to secure a majority of votes in the newly-created United Nations Organisation, the US Government exerted great efforts on the eve of the San Francisco Conference to include as many Latin American countries as possible into the number of the UNO constituents.

During the discussion of the UNO question differences arose between the British and the Americans. For example, Roosevelt's proposal to include an article on territorial trusteeship in the Charter was violently opposed by Churchill who feared that the territorial trusteeship system would lead to the loss by British imperialism of its colonies.

As a result of the discussion of the problem of non-self-governing territories, it was decided that the question of the international system of territorial trusteeship would be considered at the San Francisco Conference. Only general principles of the territorial trusteeship system were decided at Yalta.

It was agreed that "the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

"The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship."¹ It was also decided that the discussion of the preliminary consultations and the discussion of trusteeship at the San Francisco Conference would not touch on definite territories. These questions were to become a matter for subsequent international agreements.

The Crimea Conference adopted the Declaration on Liberated Europe, proposed by the US delegate. This declaration enumerated the concrete measures the Allies committed themselves to carry out to re-establish the independence of the peoples freed from German domination. In particular the Big Three undertook to assist the peoples in setting up interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people, and to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.²

* * *

Much of the discussions centred on the Polish problem.

The Soviet Government attached particular importance to the future of Poland and to Soviet-Polish relations. "The point was not only that Poland was a neighbouring country," the Soviet Head of the Delegation explained at Yalta. "That, of course, was important, but the essence of the problem lay much deeper. Throughout history, Poland had always been

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 142.

² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

a corridor for an enemy attacking Russia. Suffice it to recall only the previous 30 years: in that period, the Germans twice went across Poland to attack Russia. Why had the enemies crossed Poland so easily until then? Chiefly because Poland had been weak. The Polish corridor could not only be closed mechanically by Russian forces on the outside. It could be reliably locked only from the inside, by Poland's own forces. For that Poland must be strong. That was why the Soviet Union had a stake in creating a powerful, free and independent Poland. The question of Poland was a question of life and death for the Soviet state."¹

Where was the Polish border to pass? What government was to represent Poland's interests: the London Emigré Government or the government set up in Poland itself? These questions were in the centre of attention at Yalta. Before considering the discussion of these questions at the conference, a look should be taken at the development of the Polish question after the Anglo-Soviet talks in Moscow in the autumn of 1944.

At the end of those talks Mikolajczyk said that he was willing to reach agreement on controversial issues but that to do that he would first have to consult his colleagues in London. Later it became clear that Mikolajczyk essentially retained his former positions as regards the Soviet-Polish border and also the Polish Government. He even asked the President to send a special message to exert pressure on the Soviet Government in order to make it give up its position on the Soviet-Polish border issue. He expected that if the President were to send a personal message to the Head of the Soviet Government particularly emphasising Washington's interest "...the Polish question should be settled in such a way that the City of Lvov and the oilfield basin of East Galicia should be left in Poland,—such a demarche ... would have chances of being effective".²

Instead of looking for realistic ways of achieving a friendly solution of controversial issues with the Soviet Union, Mikolajczyk and his colleagues once again endeavoured to increase tensions, and played for time.

The Polish Emigré Government's statement of November 3, 1944 reaffirmed its anti-Soviet stand. It essentially nulli-

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, pp. 93-94.

² *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta...*, p. 208.

fied everything that had been achieved during Mikolajczyk's talks in Moscow. The statement said that the conditions discussed at Moscow were unacceptable.

The Polish émigré clique was torn by internal contradictions, intrigues and squabbles. As a result Mikolajczyk and his followers retired at the end of November 1944. The new government headed by Arciszewski was even more anti-Soviet than the preceding one.

Mikolajczyk's retirement caused dissatisfaction in London and Washington, where it was understood that the formation of Arciszewski's Government considerably lessened the chances of success of the tactics proposed by Churchill—to dilute the Polish Committee of National Liberation with bourgeois politicians, who had compromised themselves by their anti-Soviet activities less than the others. Nevertheless, the British and American governments did not lose hope that they would be able to ensure the return of Mikolajczyk and his followers to the Polish Government in the future and that this would make it possible to resume negotiations with the Polish Committee of National Liberation and to achieve a compromise favourable for the Western powers. In the meantime the British and US governments proposed to take no action on the Polish problem. For example, in his telegram to Moscow, dated December 3, commenting the changes in the Polish Emigré Government, Churchill, *inter alia*, expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would agree that "... our respective influence should be used with the Poles here and with those at Lublin to prevent any steps on either side which might increase the tension between them and so render more difficult Mr. Mikolajczyk's task when, as I hope, he takes it up again in the not far distant future".¹

The Head of the Soviet Government immediately replied to the British Prime Minister's letter. "It has become obvious since my last meeting with Mr. Mikolajczyk in Moscow that he is incapable of helping a Polish settlement. Indeed, his negative role has been revealed. It is now evident that his negotiations with the Polish National Committee are designed to cover up those who, behind his back, engaged in criminal terror acts against Soviet officers and Soviet people generally on Polish territory. We cannot tolerate this state of affairs. We cannot tolerate terrorists, instigated by the

¹ *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, pp. 279-80.

Polish émigrés, assassinating our people in Poland and waging a criminal struggle against the Soviet forces liberating Poland. We look on these people as Allies of our common enemy, and as to their radio correspondence with Mr. Mikolajczyk, which we found on émigré agents arrested on Polish territory, it not only exposes their treacherous designs, it also casts a shadow on Mr. Mikolajczyk and his men.

"Ministerial changes in the émigré Government no longer deserve serious attention. For these elements, who have lost touch with the national soil and have no contact with their people, are merely marking time."¹

In the new conditions the Polish Committee was acquiring ever greater importance. The further extension of the power of the PCNL to the liberated Polish territory and the growing authority the committee was enjoying with the Polish people were among the main factors which brought up the question of the need to reorganise the PCNL into a provisional government. This was so obvious that by the end of November 1944 even the British and US ruling circles were discussing the possibility of this reorganisation.²

However, instead of welcoming the inevitable establishment of a democratic power in Poland, the US and British governments made a desperate attempt to prevent the transformation of the PCNL into a provisional government. In mid-December the US President, with the consent of the British Premier,³ addressed a message to the Head of the Soviet Government: "I have seen indications," the message read, "that the Lublin Committee may be intending to give itself the status of a Provisional Government of Poland. I appreciate fully the desirability from your point of view of having a clarification of Polish authority before your armies move further into Poland. However, because of the great political implications which such a step would entail,

¹ *Correspondence*, Vol. I, pp. 282-83.

² See, for example, Stettinius's letter to Roosevelt of November 25, 1944 (*The Conferences at Malta and Yalta...*, p. 212).

³ On December 15, 1955 Roosevelt asked Churchill about what actions the two governments should take in the event the Lublin Committee should declare itself the provisional government of Poland, and Stalin should recognise it as such. In view of this possibility, he wrote, "I wonder if it would be helpful if I should send a message to Stalin suggesting that he postpone any positive action on the Polish question until the three of us can get together". (See *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 216.)

I very much hope that you would find it possible to refrain from recognising the Lublin Committee as a Government of Poland before we meet, which I hope will be immediately after my inauguration on January 20. Could you not continue to deal with the Committee in its present form until that date? I know that my views on this point are shared by Prime Minister Churchill.”¹

The Soviet Government sent an answer to the US President on December 27, 1944. It noted that in the conditions prevailing in Poland there was no reason for continuing the policy of support to the Polish Emigré Government, since the latter had lost the trust of the Polish population. Besides, the Soviet Government pointed out, support of the London émigré circles would pose the threat of civil war in the rear of the advancing Soviet Army, and this would endanger the common interests of the Allies in the struggle against the German fascist invaders. At the same time it pointed out that “. . . the National Committee has made notable progress in consolidating the Polish state and the machinery of state power on Polish soil, in expanding and strengthening the Polish Army, in implementing a number of important government measures, primarily the land reform in favour of the peasants. These developments have resulted in the consolidation of the democratic forces in Poland and in an appreciable increase in the prestige of the National Committee among the Polish people and large sections of the Poles abroad.”²

Further the Soviet Government explained that for the Soviet Union, which had borne the brunt of the struggle for Poland's liberation from the German invaders, the question of relations with Poland was a matter of everyday, close and friendly relations with a power set up by the Polish people on their own soil, one that had already grown strong and whose troops were fighting the Hitlerites together with the Soviet Army.

The Soviet Government frankly told the US Government that “in the event of the Polish Committee of National Liberation becoming a Provisional Polish Government, the Soviet Government will, in view of the foregoing, have no serious reasons for postponing its recognition. It should be

¹ *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. II, p. 175.

² *Ibid.*, p. 180.

borne in mind that the Soviet Union, more than any other power, has a stake in strengthening a pro-Ally and democratic Poland, not only because it is bearing the brunt of the struggle for Poland's liberation, but also because Poland borders on the Soviet Union and because the Polish problem is inseparable from that of the security of the Soviet Union." In conclusion the Soviet message advanced the thought that it would be just and useful for the common Allied cause if the Soviet, US and British governments immediately exchange representatives with the Committee with a view to its later recognition as the lawful government of Poland. . . .¹

The US President replied that he was disturbed and deeply disappointed by the Soviet Government's message of December 27 regarding Poland. He once again insisted that the Soviet Government should refrain from recognising the provisional government of Poland if the latter were to organise on the basis of the National Committee. Wishing to prevent a further strengthening of relations between the Soviet Government and the democratic forces of the Polish people, the President even went so far as to refer to the possible establishment of diplomatic relations with the Polish provisional government as to a step that would have unfavourable results on international relations in general. At the same time the US Government declared that it did not consider it possible to break off relations with the London Emigré Government and to establish relations with the PCNL.²

However, neither the diplomatic pressure of Washington and London, nor the continuing attempts of the Polish reactionaries to aggravate the position in Poland and to undermine the authority of the PCNL could stop the natural development of events in Poland.

The major democratic reforms carried out by the PCNL in the second half of 1944 and the growing political activity of the population made it necessary to stabilise the regime by transforming the PCNL into an authoritative government. In accordance with the will of the broad mass of the population of liberated Poland the Krajowa Rada Narodowa adopted on December 31, 1944 the decision to transform the Polish Committee of National Liberation into the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic. On January 1, 1945 the Provisional Government of Polish Republic was formed

¹ *Correspondence*. . . , Vol. II, p. 181.

² *Ibid.*

and on January 4, 1945 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared that in keeping with its policy of supporting and strengthening friendly relations with democratic Poland it had adopted the decision to recognise the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic and to exchange ambassadors with it.

The British and US governments did not follow the example of the Soviet Union and did not recognise the Provisional Government set up in Poland. They continued to support the Polish Emigré Government in London and attempted to bring about certain changes in it, endeavouring to reach a compromise on the Polish question favourable to the Western powers. In particular, the British and US governments considered it advisable to return Mikolajczyk and his followers to the government, believing that Mikolajczyk would be able to reach an agreement with the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw. Shortly before the Yalta Conference, Sir Alexander Cadogan asked Mikolajczyk if he would be willing to go to Poland and join the Lublin Government.¹

The British and Americans did not succeed in carrying out their manoeuvre by changing the composition of the Polish Emigré Government. Arciszewski's Government continued to stand on its arch-reactionary, anti-Soviet positions. On January 22, 1945 it addressed a new memorandum to Churchill and Roosevelt which, it alleged, was a basis for the normalisation of the Polish question. The fact that Arciszewski's clique proposed to set up an inter-Allied military mission, which in fact meant to occupy Poland, is indicative of the nature of the "normalisation" they suggested. The memorandum was so unacceptable that Churchill and Eden refused to even receive the representatives of the Polish Emigré Government who wanted to talk with the British leaders.

Before the Crimea Conference the position was such that the Soviet Government had recognised the Provisional Polish Government, which had scored major successes in democratising Poland and was receiving the ever increasing support of the Polish people, while Britain and the USA were continuing to maintain diplomatic relations with Arciszewski's

¹ E. J. Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland*, p. 336.

Emigré Government, which was completely isolated from the Polish people.

The discussions of the Polish problem at Yalta dealt mainly with two subjects: 1) that of determining Poland's borders and 2) that of recognising the Polish Government.

On February 7 the Soviet Government tabled the following proposal on the Polish question:

"1. To accept that Poland's border in the East should run along the Curzon Line with deviations at some points of five to six kilometres in favour of Poland.

"2. To accept that Poland's western border should run from the town of Stettin (for the Poles), southward along the Oder River, and then on along the Neisse River (Western).

"3. To recognise as desirable to enlarge the Provisional Polish Government through the inclusion of some democratic leaders from among the émigré Polish circles.

"4. To consider desirable that the Allied Governments should recognise the enlarged Provisional Polish Government.

"5. To recognise as desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged in the manner specified in Paragraph 3, should, within the shortest possible period, call on the population of Poland to take part in a general election to set up permanent organs of state administration in Poland.

"6. To authorise Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Kerr to discuss the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government together with representatives of the Provisional Polish Government and to submit their proposals for the consideration of the three Governments."¹

At the Crimea Conference, as also at all preceding stages of the discussion of that problem, the Soviet Government considered that Poland must be restored not through the seizure of Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian lands, but through the return to her of the indigenous Polish lands that had been torn from her by Germany.

Long before the Crimea Conference the Soviet Government had declared that in its opinion the Soviet-Polish border should pass somewhere along the Curzon Line, which was fixed in 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers as the border line between the two countries.

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, pp. 102-03.

Despite this consistent, firm and unambiguous position of the Soviet Government fresh attempts were made at the Crimea Conference, especially by the Americans, to reject the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern border.

To give new proof of its good-will towards the Polish people, the Soviet Government agreed to make certain changes in the Curzon Line in Poland's favour. As a result the Crimea Conference established that the border would be fixed in accordance with the national principle along the Curzon Line, with the exception of some districts, five-eight kilometres deep, which were to be ceded to Poland.

The proposal to extend Poland in the west did not evoke serious differences among the participants; it was only on the size of these additions that certain differences arose. The Soviet delegation proposed that Poland's western border be fixed along the Oder and the western bank of the Neisse. The British and American delegations objected to this.

In refusing to return indigenous Polish lands in the west and to establish the border along the Oder-Neisse line the US and British delegations argued that the Polish people would be unable to master the resources of these territories and that the addition of the western lands to Poland would lead to Germany's economic collapse.

The US and British governments wanted to use the differences about Poland's western border to strike the entire question of Poland's borders from the decisions. However, at the insistence of the Soviet delegation the agreement reached on this vital question was reflected in the decisions of the conference. As regards Poland's western border it was decided that Poland would receive considerable territories in the north and west, the size of which would be established later.

Major difficulties arose when the question of the Polish Government came up for discussion. A sharp political struggle raged around this issue. Early in the discussions the US and British delegations attempted to ignore the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw and proposed considering the Arciszewski group as Poland's sole representative. When they saw that this proposal was both ill-conceived and hopeless the US and British delegations were compelled to retreat. They then advanced a new proposal—to set up a government that would be based on the London Government.

Typical of the position of the Western Allies was that

they proposed the formation of a new Polish Government while completely ignoring the views of the Poles themselves.

The Soviet delegation took a pronounced negative attitude towards Arciszewski's Government and reaffirmed its support of the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw. "The Polish people," Stalin said, "did not like Arciszewski's men, because they did not see them in their midst in the arduous years of the occupation."¹ As in its earlier messages to the US and British governments, the Soviet Government again proposed that its Allies should recognise the Provisional Government as the only lawful representative of the Polish people. Besides, the Soviet delegation emphasised, it did not consider that any decision on the Polish question could be reached without the participation of the Poles themselves. At the same time it declared that it was willing to consider any proposal aimed at extending the existing Provisional Polish Government which, however, could be effected only after consultation and co-ordination with the representatives of the Warsaw (Lublin) Government.

After the Soviet delegation had explained its point of view on the Polish question, President Roosevelt addressed a personal message to Stalin in which he proposed several concrete steps to reorganise the supreme organs of power in Poland. In the Polish Government proposed by the USA the majority of seats was to belong to representatives of the Polish émigrés and to some Polish functionaries known for their anti-Soviet views.

The Soviet delegation reiterated that the Provisional Government in Poland was the only acceptable basis for an extended Polish Government. The US and British representatives had to agree with this view, since they understood that time was working for the people's power in Poland. The conference adopted the following decision on this question: "The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should (therefore) be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad."² Thus, the Western powers were compelled to recognise the Lublin Government *de facto*. On the other hand, the document made no mention of the London Emigré Government with whom

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 112.

² *Ibid.*, p. 138.

both the USA and Britain continued to maintain diplomatic relations. What is more, the decision made no mention of the fact that members of the émigré Government would join the new Polish Government, it only spoke of drawing in "Poles from abroad".

The conference set up a trilateral commission which was to consult the members of the Provisional Lublin Government and other democratic leaders in Poland and abroad with a view to reorganising the Lublin Government on the above basis. This formula which was adopted at the proposal of the Soviet delegation confirmed the authority of the Provisional Government.

The decisions on Poland further said that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity would adopt the commitment to hold free and unrestricted elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage. It should be noted that in the discussion of the election problem the British and US representatives wanted to include a formula saying that "the Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections".¹ The attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland made by the Western powers were rejected by the Soviet Government and the formula was not included in the decision on Poland.

Finally it was agreed that with the setting up of the new Polish Government, the Soviet Union, who was maintaining diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government, and also the USA and Britain, who were not, would establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. The above formula showed that the Polish Emigré Government in London was on its last legs.

Even though the decisions on Poland adopted at Yalta were a compromise it should be emphatically stressed that they were a major diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union and fully coincided with the interests of the Polish people, Soviet-Polish friendship, and the interests of peace and security in Europe. The strict fulfilment of these decisions ensured favourable conditions for the Polish people's demo-

¹ *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta...*, p. 816.

cratic development, for the flourishing of a strong, independent and democratic Poland.

* * *

Another important question discussed at Yalta were the prospects of Allied military operations in the Far East. The Allies, especially the Americans, were very interested in having the Soviet Union join in the war against Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff held the view that "Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations".¹ This point of view was based on a realistic assessment of the ability of the Japanese armed forces, especially the land armies, for prolonged resistance. The US military leaders doubted whether the operations being conducted against Japan would be able to bring her to her knees. "Even though the Japanese islands would be conquered," John R. Deane, the head of the US military mission in the Soviet Union wrote, "we could not be certain that the Kwantung Army, a powerful and almost completely self-sustained force, would not continue to fight, perhaps joining with Japanese forces in China in attempting to set up a new Japanese state. Victory would not be complete while this Army was still in existence..."² The tasks the Pentagon had assigned to the Soviet Armed Forces proceeded from the above. The quoted document of the US Chiefs of Staff noted that "the objective of Russia's military effort against Japan in the Far East should be the defeat of the Japanese forces in Manchuria".³ Thus, the US delegates attached enormous importance to the rout of the Kwantung Army and assigned this task to the Soviet Armed Forces.

Thus, the intense interest of the US and British governments in the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan was explained first and foremost by their striving to ensure the Soviet Union's military assistance. The British and American military experts did not believe that the war against Japan would be over soon. On February 9, 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Crimea Conference submitted to Roosevelt and Churchill a report which said

¹ *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta...*, p. 396.

² John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance. The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia*, New York, p. 225.

³ *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta...*, p. 396.

among other things: "We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany."¹ The Anglo-American leaders understood that the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan would greatly help to rout the Japanese armed forces and hasten Japan's capitulation. Some influential circles in the USA and Britain also held that participation in Far Eastern operations would divert the Soviet Union's attention from European affairs and weaken her militarily and economically.

At Yalta the agreement on Far Eastern problems was discussed mainly between the US and the Soviet delegations. The particular interest of the USA in this problem had several reasons. The American representatives considered the Pacific theatre of the Second World War their special domain. In fact, some British military leaders complained that their American colleagues refused to reckon with their views. The reason for this was that the US ruling circles wanted to establish undivided domination in the Far East after the war. This striving of the US monopolies dictated US policy towards hostile Japan as well as towards Allied China. At the same time the US Government realised that there could be no decision of Far Eastern problems without the Soviet Union. Another reason why the USA endeavoured to win the Soviet Union's support was that during the war US policy in the Far East, notably in China, had already suffered one defeat after another.

At Yalta the Soviet Government confirmed its Teheran statement that it was willing, in principle, to join the war against Japan and to hasten the end of the Second World War. As regards its relations with China, the Soviet Government insisted on direct Soviet-Chinese talks on the most important questions touching on the relations between the two countries during and after the war, and such talks were begun several months later. The Soviet delegation expressed its readiness at Yalta to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

The Yalta Conference discussed in detail the conditions of the agreement on the Soviet Union's entry into the war

¹ Ibid., p. 830.

against Japan. The Soviet conditions included the demand for the preservation of the existing status of the Mongolian People's Republic, the restoration of Russia's rights violated as a result of the 1904-05 war, including the return of Southern Sakhalin, the restoration of Soviet rights to lease Port Arthur and Dairen, the restoration of the USSR's right to operate certain vital railways in Northeast China and the handing over to the Soviet Union of the Kurile Islands. During the discussion of the Soviet conditions the Americans proposed to make Southern Sakhalin a protectorate and to establish international control over part of the Kurile Islands and to leave the other part to Japan, etc.

After a long discussion of that question the Agreement Between the Three Powers on Question of the Far East was signed on the basis of the Soviet proposals. Accordingly the Soviet Union was to "enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

"1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

"2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:

"a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;

"b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalised, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored;

"c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad shall be operated jointly with China;

"3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union."¹

Since questions directly concerning the interests of China demanded the consent of the Chinese Government it was agreed on the proposal of the Soviet delegation that the President should obtain this concurrence.²

The agreement on Far Eastern questions was of the greatest international importance. The conditions for the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan, recorded in the decisions of the conference, strengthened Soviet positions in the Far East and the Pacific.

The conference also adopted a decision on Yugoslavia.

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 145.

² *Ibid.*, p. 146.

The question of pursuing a co-ordinated policy in Yugoslavia with a view to uniting all Yugoslav forces in the struggle against the German aggressors and setting up a single Yugoslav Government was discussed as early as in October 1944 at the Anglo-Soviet talks in Moscow. Soon after these talks, in November 1944, an agreement was signed between Marshal Tito, the Chairman of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, and Subasic, the Prime Minister of the London Yugoslav Government in exile, on the co-operation and union of all Yugoslav forces fighting against fascist Germany. The agreement stipulated that the regent's council and the government would be subordinated to the supreme organ of power—the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ).

The Soviet Government supported these terms because they were aimed at the unification of all genuinely democratic forces in the fight against the common enemy and the setting up of a democratic federative Yugoslavia.

However, the reactionaries from the entourage of King Peter violently opposed these agreements and endeavoured to sabotage their implementation.

This attempt was condemned both by the Yugoslav democratic circles and by the Allies, who were interested in consolidating the anti-fascist forces.

At the Crimea Conference the Soviet Government proposed that the agreement reached between Tito and Subasic on November 1, 1944 should become operative without delay. The conference adopted the Soviet Government's view and decided to recommend to Tito and Subasic that they implement the agreement immediately and on its basis form a joint provisional government. The representatives of the USSR, USA and Britain, at the proposal of the British delegation, decided also to recommend that "as soon as the new government has been formed it should declare that:

"1) the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupština) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary parliament; and, 2) legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly."¹

¹ Ibid., p. 139.

The conference discussed also several other questions.

The Heads of the Three Governments agreed at Yalta on the setting up of permanent mechanism for consultations between the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, USA and Britain, who would meet "as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months".¹ It was also decided that the meetings would take place in the three capitals in rotation, the first to be held in London.

The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Three Powers published a proclamation entitled "Unity for Peace As for War". The proclamation emphasised the need to maintain and strengthen the unity of purpose and of action of the United Nations, on which the Soviet Union had always insisted. The Heads of the three Great Powers agreed to maintain and strengthen in the coming conditions of peace the co-operation that had been effected between the USSR, USA and Britain during the war.

The historical importance of the Crimea Conference consisted mainly in that it outlined a detailed programme for the post-war world and once again shattered Germany's hopes for a split among the Allies. The Crimea Conference showed clearly that the international prestige of the Soviet Union and its peaceful policy had grown perceptibly, and underlined the unity of the Big Three—the USSR, USA and Britain.

The Crimea Conference once again showed that fruitful co-operation between states with different social systems was possible. To promote the adoption of co-ordinated decisions and with a view to strengthening the relations between the main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Soviet delegation met many of the wishes expressed by the US and British delegations. The US proposal on the voting procedure in the Security Council, the US formula of the Declaration on Liberated Europe and some other proposals of Britain and the USA were thus adopted. While staunchly defending the principles of a democratic organisation of the world, Soviet diplomacy exhibited great flexibility in the solution of many questions. The Crimea Conference was an important landmark in the efforts of peace-loving mankind to end the war as quickly as possible and to bring about a democratic solution of post-war problems.

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 148.

CHAPTER XX

THE ALLIES AND THE LIBERATED COUNTRIES

The Second World War was drawing to a close. The war-weary peoples hoped that the spring of 1945 would finally bring long-expected peace to them. Many countries had already been fully liberated from the hated fascists. The victorious armies of the Soviet Union and the other United Nations were rapidly closing in on the lair of the fascist beast. Nothing on earth could save Hitler Germany.

In the countries freed from fascism life was gradually returning to normal. The peoples were clearing away the ruins and rubble left by the fascists and were beginning to rehabilitate their looted and devastated economy, to weed out fascist lackeys from government bodies and to build a new life based on the principles of freedom and democracy. Their successes in this did not only depend on their own energy and initiative, on the strength and organisation of the working class and on the relation of the political forces in each given country. A major impact was exerted also by the policies of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition, whose armed forces had liberated the given country from the fascist hordes. People's revolutions flared up in the liberated countries and People's Democracies were established, where bloody reprisals against democrats and the presence of large troops of the imperialist powers did not prevent a revolutionary upsurge.

The Soviet Government built its relations with the liberated countries on the Leninist principles which had always guided Soviet foreign policy. It consistently championed the national sovereignty and independence of the liberated countries and firmly insisted on non-interference in their internal affairs. At the same time the Soviet Union gave invaluable help and support to all liberated peoples in their

struggle against fascism and reaction. The Soviet Union objectively promoted the establishment and consolidation of People's Democracies in the European countries which its armies had liberated. The most reactionary forces in those countries, those who had co-operated with the fascists, had been routed and could not resist the people's revolutionary initiative. Yet even under these favourable conditions the People's Democracies would not have been able to assert themselves if there had been no objective prerequisites for the overthrow of the bourgeois dictatorship and if the Communist and Workers' Parties had not won the sympathies of the majority of the working class, the majority of the peasants and the entire working people by their selfless struggle, their example, their staunch defence of the working people's interests and their effective fight against the reactionaries.

Slanderers from the imperialist camp take great pains to prove that the Soviet Union "exported revolution" to the People's Democracies, that it interfered in the internal affairs of those countries. This baseless and absurd thesis has long since been refuted.

In his time Lenin exposed the falseness of such bourgeois inventions. He emphasised that the collapse of world capitalism and its replacement by socialism are inevitable, but that this would come about not as a result of the "export of revolution" from socialist to capitalist countries, but as a result of the operation of the objective laws of capitalism itself, which invariably exacerbate the irreconcilable class contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The People's Democracies were created by the people themselves. They only used the favourable conditions created by the victory of the Soviet Union in the Second World War to successfully complete the struggle they had waged for many decades against the exploiting classes.

The United States and Britain pursued an entirely different policy in the liberated countries. They backed the local monopoly circles, who endeavoured to subordinate the liberated countries to their economic and political domination and to prevent the further development, and wherever possible, to even extirpate all revolutionary, democratic movements. No wonder that representatives of the British and American monopolies were appointed to leading positions in the Allied Anglo-American occupation authorities (AMGOT), who organised the systematic shipment from

those countries of raw materials in short supply and valuable industrial equipment, and took various measures to undermine the operation of enterprises able to compete with British or American enterprises. The main aim of the imperialist powers was to strengthen the bourgeois and landowner establishment in the countries liberated from fascism and to deliver a blow to the revolutionary, democratic forces, whose activity had intensified during the Second World War.

Thus, the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the USA and Britain, on the other, were guided in their attitude towards the liberated peoples and countries by diametrically opposite aims. The closer the end of the war approached, the more evident became the differences in the approach of the Great Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition to the post-war problems.

The fundamental differences between the policies of the Soviet Union and those of Great Britain and the USA could be seen ever more clearly in their approach to concrete questions concerning the liberated countries. In the spring of 1945 they told with special force when the Polish question came up for solution.

The trilateral Soviet-Anglo-American Commission, established at the Crimea Conference, began its work soon after the conference was over. Its task was to hold consultations and talks with a view to reorganising the Provisional Polish Government in keeping with the principles agreed upon by the three Heads of Government. The talks, begun on February 23, immediately revealed divergences between the positions of the Soviet Union and those of the USA and Britain. The Soviet Government strictly adhered to the letter and the spirit of the Yalta decision on the Polish question and proceeded from the assumption that the people's power in Poland would form the nucleus of the reorganised government. The Western powers, however, in violation of the Yalta decisions, wanted the various Polish political parties to form an entirely new government in which bourgeois parties would have the decisive say.

For this reason the Soviet-Anglo-American talks on the Polish question made no progress. The Moscow Commission was unable to resolve the task it had been charged with and therefore the three Heads of Government resumed their correspondence on the Polish question in March and April

1945. The Soviet Government attributed the failure of the Moscow commission to the following basic reasons:

1. The unwillingness of the US and British ambassadors, who were members of the Moscow Commission, to reckon with the Provisional Polish Government, although the Yalta Conference had decided that it was precisely that government that was to become the nucleus of the new Polish Government of National Unity. Things took such a turn that Harriman, for example, declared in the Moscow Commission that it might be that not a single member of the Provisional Government would be included in the Polish Government of National Unity.

2. The refusal of the British and American representatives in the Moscow Commission to adhere to the decision adopted by the Yalta Conference that the Commission should invite five consultants from Poland and three from London, and not more, to solve the question of the new Polish Government. The US and British ambassadors to Moscow ignored this decision and insisted that each member of the Moscow Commission be entitled to invite an unlimited number from Poland and from London.

3. The endeavour of the US and British representatives on the Commission to invite Polish leaders for consultation and hence as participants in the new Polish Government, regardless of their attitude towards the Yalta decisions and to the Soviet Union.¹

The Soviet delegation at the Moscow Commission proceeded from the assumption that according to the spirit of the Yalta decision only such Polish leaders should be invited for consultations who recognised the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including that of the Curzon Line, and who strove in deed to establish friendly relations between Poland and the USSR. "The Soviet Government insists on this," the Soviet message to the US Government noted, "because the blood of Soviet soldiers, so freely shed in liberating Poland, and the fact that in the past 30 years the territory of Poland has twice been used by an enemy for invading Russia, oblige the Soviet Government to ensure friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Poland."²

In order to break the deadlock and reach an agreed deci-

¹ *Correspondence*... , Vol. II, p. 212.

² *Ibid.*

sion, the Soviet Government proposed that the Commission: Affirm that reconstruction of the Polish Provisional Government implies, not its abolition, but its reconstruction by enlarging it, it being understood that the Provisional Government shall form the core of the future Polish Government of National Unity;

Return to the provisions of the Crimea Conference and restrict the number of Polish leaders to be invited to eight persons, of whom five should be from Poland and three from London;

Affirm that the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government shall be consulted in all circumstances and in the first place, since the Provisional Government is much stronger in Poland compared with the individuals to be invited from London and Poland whose influence among the population in no way compares with the tremendous prestige of the Provisional Government;

Only those leaders should be summoned for consultation from Poland and from London who recognise the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland and who really want friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

As to the ratio of old and new Ministers in the Government of National Unity, it might be established more or less on the same lines as was done in the case of the Yugoslav Government.¹

The arguments and proposals of the Soviet Government were not accepted by London and Washington. In the correspondence on this matter conducted between the White House and Downing Street, Churchill insisted that the two Western Allies make a joint demarche to Moscow in order to achieve the adoption of the Anglo-American interpretation of the Yalta decisions. He also thought that it was essential to take urgent measures to prevent the implementation of socio-economic transformations in Poland so as to create a fertile ground for Polish reaction. Churchill proposed that Roosevelt exert pressure on the Soviet Government so that "pending the conclusion of the Commission's discussions, the Soviet Government should use its utmost influence to prevent the Warsaw Administration from taking any further legal or administrative action of a fundamental character affecting social, constitutional, eco-

¹ *Correspondence. . .*, Vol. II, p. 213.

nomic, or political conditions in Poland".¹ Roosevelt, however, understood that such a step could make the British and US governments appear as opponents of social reform. He replied that this would lay Britain and the US open to the accusation that they were against land reforms, and would enable the Lublin Poles to say that they, and they alone defend the peasants against the big landowners. He assured the British Prime Minister that as regards Poland their "aims coincided", that there were differences between them only in questions of tactics, and talked Churchill out of making a joint demarche.

On April 1, 1945, the US President sent a message to Moscow on the Polish question. He expounded his views on that question. At the same time the British Prime Minister also expounded his views.² The agreement for a joint demarche, which Churchill had been unable to gain from Roosevelt, he succeeded in obtaining from Harry S. Truman, the new US President. On April 18 Truman and Churchill sent a joint message to the Soviet Government which showed that they regarded the Provisional Polish Government not as the nucleus of the future Polish Government of National Unity but simply as a group of Poles similar to any other group.³ Besides, it became clear that the USA and Britain essentially opposed the establishment of friendly relations between Poland and the USSR. This was evidenced in the Anglo-American message and also by the protest of the two governments against the signing of a Soviet-Polish friendship pact.⁴

It should be mentioned that the use of a joint Anglo-American demarche on a question in which the USSR was more interested than the other Great Powers illustrated that London and Washington wanted to dictate to the Soviet Union their conditions and this could only impair the adoption of a co-ordinated decision on the Polish question. In its reply to London and Washington the Soviet Government expressed its complete disagreement with the British and US position.⁵

Obviously, the Soviet Government could not make the

¹ Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., Vol. VI, London, 1954, p. 372.

² *Correspondence...*, Vol. II, pp. 201-04, Vol. I, pp. 309-10.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 215-17.

⁴ A. Feis, op. cit., pp. 577-78.

⁵ *Correspondence...*, Vol. II, pp. 219-20.

success of Soviet-Polish relations depend solely on the fulfilment of the Yalta decisions and the work of the Moscow Commission, which was being torpedoed through no fault of the USSR. To strengthen and expand Soviet-Polish friendship and support the democratic forces of the Polish people, the Soviet Government, in accordance with an offer made by the Polish Government, signed with it on April 21, 1945 a Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Co-operation, which opened up a new chapter in the relations between the two countries.

The Soviet-Polish treaty was of great international importance. It set up a serious barrier to German imperialist aggression in the East and contributed greatly to strengthening European security.

The Soviet Union did all it could to satisfy the needs of the Polish people. The Soviet Government helped in every way to restore Warsaw, the Polish capital, which the German fascists had laid waste.

In fulfilment of the agreement of October 20, 1944 on the rendering of assistance to Poland, at the end of February 1945 the Soviet Union sent Poland 45,000 tons of coal, about 3,000 tons of kerosene, 280,000 tons of motor oil, 196,000 tons of cotton, more than 6,000 tons of salt and about 60 tons of tea. In mid-March the Silesian working people received a train-load of foodstuffs from the Soviet Union. The Soviet command also did everything in its power to give material assistance to the Polish population.

The position of the Polish People's Democratic Republic was growing stronger. The Soviet Union rendered the Polish working people a great service by foiling all attempts of the US and British ruling circles to subvert the people's power and to instal a government depending on bourgeois reactionary parties.

* * *

The Soviet Government also attached great value to developing friendly relations with other East and Southeast European countries freed from nazi occupation. The sympathies of the Soviet Union were invariably on the side of the peoples who after years of suffering and oppression by foreign imperialist invaders were out to create a new life. The years of war had shown that the bourgeois parties were corrupt and unable consistently and firmly to defend the

national interests of their countries, and the people therefore firmly rallied to the banners of various alliances of the anti-fascist parties and organisations, in which the working class and its vanguard—the Communist and Workers' Parties—were the decisive force. Many European peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe pinned their hopes for the future on these forces, who had shown themselves the most decisive and courageous fighters against fascism. The new political forces were coming to power in an extremely complex situation. They faced very difficult tasks. The Soviet Union gave the people's governments extensive and comprehensive assistance from the moment of their inception.

In the spring of 1945 the Soviet troops continued to drive the German fascists from Czechoslovakia. Between January and April 1945 the troops of the 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts liberated the most important centres in north, east and central Slovakia, including Bratislava, its capital, and entered Moravia early in June. In carrying out military operations in Moravia and Slovakia the Soviet troops did all they could to preserve the material values necessary for Czechoslovakia's economic rehabilitation. Units of the Czechoslovakian Army fought side by side with the Soviet troops liberating Czechoslovakia.

When the hour of Czechoslovakia's liberation was close at hand Benes and a large group of the members of the Czechoslovak Government arrived in Moscow. In the second half of March 1945 important negotiations were conducted in Moscow between the representatives of various Czechoslovak political parties. At the initiative of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the conference adopted the decision to set up a National Front of Czechs and Slovaks and to form a new government, and approved the government programme, which later became known as the Kosice programme. Simultaneously with these negotiations, talks were held between Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders which, as the Soviet-Czechoslovak communiqué noted, "discussed questions of the further development of friendly relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in accordance with the Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Co-operation signed on December 12, 1943 between the USSR and Czechoslovakia".

The leaders of the two countries also discussed questions connected with the liberation of Czechoslovak territory from

the German invaders and the establishment there of the power of the Czechoslovak Government, the assistance by the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia in strengthening and increasing the Czechoslovak Army and also in rendering help to the population in the Czechoslovak territory being liberated by the Soviet Army.

In the course of the talks the Soviet Government expressed its willingness to charge all the expenditure on the organisation and maintenance of Czechoslovak military units to the account of the Soviet Union's military expenditure and decided in future to equip the Czechoslovak units subordinated to the Soviet command with armaments, material and services at the expense of the Soviet state budget. All these decisions were reflected in the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement signed on March 31, 1945. At the same time a bilateral agreement was signed on the utilisation of military materials captured from the enemy in Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Government also undertook to deliver to Czechoslovakia foodstuffs, goods and industrial raw materials in short supply. Finally, an agreement was reached during the talks to satisfy the wish of the population of Transcarpathian Ukraine to join with the Ukrainian people and to become part of Soviet Ukraine.¹ The talks on that question were continued in Moscow in June of the same year and ended in the signing on June 29 of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty and a protocol which determined the procedure and conditions for the reunification of the people of Transcarpathian Ukraine in a single state of the whole Ukrainian people.

* * *

Soviet-Yugoslav relations also developed successfully. By the spring of 1945 the greater part of the Yugoslav territory had been liberated and the working people got down to rehabilitating the country's economy. On March 7 a new government was formed in Belgrade by Marshal Tito. In view of the enormous popularity of the Soviet Union among the Yugoslav working people, the new government pursued a course of strengthening co-operation with the USSR.

¹ On November 26, 1944, in Mukachevo, a congress was held of the representatives of the national committees of Transcarpathian Ukraine, which elected a National Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine and unanimously declared for rejoining the Soviet Ukraine.

On April 5, 1945 a Yugoslav Government delegation arrived in Moscow. Upon arrival in Moscow Tito said: "I am very happy to be here today, in the great capital of the great Soviet Union, and to be able to pass on warm greetings and deep gratitude to the Soviet Union for the enormous moral and material help it has given and continues to give to the Yugoslav people in the grim battle against the German invader and his quislings."¹

As a result a Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Co-operation was signed between the governments of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia on April 11. The treaty provided for the continued joint fight against Germany until final victory had been won and the rendering to each other of all possible help if one of the two contracting parties should be attacked by Germany or any other state, joining her in acts of aggression. In keeping with this treaty there was to be an extensive development and strengthening of political, economic and cultural links between the USSR and Yugoslavia.²

At that time the first steps were taken to develop friendly, good-neighbourly relations between the Soviet Union and Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. These countries honestly fulfilled the armistice agreements, and the Rumanian and Bulgarian Armies participated actively in the war against Hitler Germany. Hungary and Finland also declared themselves in a state of war with Germany.³ The Soviet Union gave these peoples every help in their struggle for the establishment of democratic regimes, for the rehabilitation of their national economy and the strengthening of their stature in world affairs.

Gradually new fraternal relations based on proletarian internationalism began to form between the Soviet Union and the countries who had embarked on socialist development.

* * *

Despite the widely advertised declarations of the British and US governments of their support for the anti-fascist and democratic forces in the liberated countries, they actually

¹ *Soviet Foreign Policy*. . . , Vol. III, pp. 165-66.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 175-78.

³ Finland declared on March 4, 1945 that a state of war had existed between Finland and Germany since September 19, 1944.

followed a policy which more often than not was in direct contradiction with these declarations. The actions of the Anglo-American administration in Italy and France have already been described. Another striking illustration of the true nature of British and US policies in the liberated countries were the events at the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945 in Greece.

In the autumn of 1944, when the Soviet Army smashing the Hitlerite aggressors entered the Balkans, the German troops in Greece were threatened with being cut off from Germany and hurriedly began to withdraw from the Balkan Peninsula. The Hitlerites were pursued by the Greek National Liberation Army (ELAS), which delivered heavy blows to the fascists: they attacked the Hitlerites, cut their communication lines, destroyed isolated German units and took thousands of prisoners. On October 12 units of ELAS liberated Athens and a few days later, the whole country. The role played by ELAS in driving the German fascist troops from Greece was universally acclaimed. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armed forces in the Mediterranean theatre of the war, the British General Wilson, addressed the following message to the National Liberation Army: "The Germans are fleeing from Greece, pursued day and night by the gallant partisans. The enormous contribution by the Greek partisans to the common cause of the Allies will never be forgotten."¹

It was only after Greece had been fully cleared of the Hitlerites by the partisans that British troops commanded by General Scoby landed in Greece. The Greek population gave the British soldiers a hearty welcome believing that they had landed to pursue the enemy retreating to the north. But it soon became evident that the British troops had landed in Greece for very different reasons. They intended to crush and disarm the ELAS in order to strengthen the positions of the reactionary, monarchist elements of the Papandreu Government and to prevent the democratic development of the country. The Royal Air Force distributed leaflets all over Greece categorically demanding the disarmament of all ELAS forces. At the same time the various royal Greek units consisting of carefully selected reactionary

¹ D. Chevrier et A. Marin, *Démocratie ou fascisme? Grèce 1946*, Paris, 1946, p. 28.

elements (such as the Mountain Brigade and the Holy Battalion) were to continue to function.

On December 3, 1944, in protest against Britain's flagrant intervention in Greek internal affairs and Papandreu's policy, the National Liberation Front (known by its initials in Greek as EAM¹) organised a peaceful demonstration in Athens. By order of Papandreu the demonstrators were fired at. The provocations of the Greek reactionaries aroused the wrath of the people who demanded that Papandreu, who had soiled his hands with the blood of the people, step down. On instructions from the British Government, General Scoby and Ambassador Leeper refused to permit any changes in the Government. Moreover, British Troops were used to defend the reactionaries; for several weeks they fought the Greek anti-fascists. The Greek capital was bombed from the air and shelled from the sea. Six thousand dead and heavy damage to Athens—such was the sad result of the December events in Greece.

The world public was indignant about the bloody events in Greece resulting from the British intervention in Greek internal affairs. Voices of protest against the Government's policy were heard even in the British Parliament.

The situation in Greece was aggravated to such an extent and the condemnation of British actions grew so emphatic that by the end of December 1944 Churchill and Eden rushed to Athens. However, the British leaders only used their stay there to find new means of strengthening the forces of the Greek reactionaries.

Since the British troops had been unable to smash the National Liberation Army in open battle, the English resorted to trickery. On February 12, 1945 the British representatives and the Athens Government, on the one hand, and representatives of EAM, on the other, signed the Varkiza Accord putting an end to the civil war. According to the agreement EAM, to avoid further bloodshed, consented to disarm ELAS on the condition that the government lifted the state of emergency, democratised the Army, freed the state apparatus of collaborationists, granted an amnesty to all political prisoners and guaranteed political freedoms.

¹ The EAM—the National Liberation Front—was set up in Greece on the initiative of the Communist Party of Greece to fight the Italo-German invaders.

However, the government, pushed on by the British, had no intention of fulfilling any of the commitments it had accepted under the Varkiza Accord. As soon as ELAS began to surrender its arms, various armed gangs began to destroy the patriotic Greek resistance fighters. Police terror was growing in Greece. With British political and military support the Greek reactionaries suppressed the democrats and consolidated their positions.

The course of the national liberation movement of the Greek people during the war and the alignment and balance of the political forces in the country at the time of Greece's liberation make it likely that without Britain's flagrant interference in Greek internal affairs the Greek people would have been able to take the democratic road, peace and quiet would have reigned in the country and the power would have belonged to the people. This did not happen because the British ruling circles helped the exploiter classes consolidate their power and, as a result, the monarchy was re-established.

The US and British ruling circles wanted the same thing to happen in the countries freed from the fascist aggressors by the Soviet Army. The policy London and Washington pursued in the Polish question has been described above. The American and British governments pursued a similar policy also in other East European countries.

The imperialist circles of the Western powers vainly endeavoured to prevent the inevitable revolutionary, democratic processes, reflecting the laws of the development of human society. The radical changes in the alignment of forces in the world resulting from the Second World War were gradually beginning to assert themselves in world politics.

CHAPTER XXI

HITLER GERMANY CAPITULATES

The decisions of the Yalta Conference on the final blows to be delivered to Hitler Germany had positive results in the spring of 1945. The vice gripping the nazis was closing on them. The troops of the Great Coalition were advancing from the east, west and south.

The spring of 1945 brought new big victories to the Soviet armed forces. In March 1945 the troops of the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian fronts swung forward, approached the Baltic Sea and entered Eastern Pomerania, which was soon occupied by the Soviet troops.

At the end of March 1945 Soviet troops entered Austria and on the 13th of April they occupied Vienna.

A few days before that, on April 9, the troops of the 3rd Byelorussian Front captured Königsberg, the biggest town in East Prussia. Together with the Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Rumanian troops the Soviet Army rid the East European countries of the fascist enslavers.

By mid-April the Soviet troops had fully occupied East Prussia, East Pomerania and Silesia, completed the liberation of Hungary from the Hitlerite and Salazist troops, freed a considerable part of Czechoslovakia and penetrated into Austria.

The offensive of the Soviet troops forced the Hitlerite command to throw all its reserves to the Eastern Front which naturally promoted the successful offensive of the Anglo-Americans in the south and west. The enormous supremacy over the enemy, especially in aircraft and tanks, enabled the Allies to inflict a decisive defeat on the Hitlerites.

By mid-March some Allied units reached the Rhine and in the night of the 23rd of March the Anglo-American troops, following long preparations, forced a crossing over the Rhine in many places. Early in April the Allies encircled

a large enemy grouping in the Ruhr district, numbering 21 divisions, 325,000 officers and men in all, and soon accepted their surrender. In effect, this meant a collapse of the Hitler's Western front.

The rapid deterioration of Hitler Germany's military position intensified the discord in her ruling elite. Some groups of fascist leaders strove to prevent the imminent catastrophe, which meant the liquidation not only of the Hitler regime but also of the militaristic German state as a whole. They pinned their hopes on a possible military clash between the Soviet Union and the Western powers in the immediate future when, they hoped, Germany would become the "natural ally" of the Western powers in the war against the Soviet Union. This idea was pushed, in particular, by Ribbentrop, Goering, Himmler and some others.

Why was it precisely on the eve of the final victory over the anti-Hitler coalition, when the unity of the freedom-loving peoples was demonstrating its invincible might, that the fascist leaders still nurtured the hope for a conflict in the Soviet-Anglo-American coalition? What grounds did they have for such hopes? In the early war years the hopes of the Hitlerites for a disintegration of the anti-Hitler coalition were built mainly on the traditional anti-Soviet policy of the Western powers; now the differences between the USSR and the Western powers on post-war matters added fresh fuel to their hopes.

The differences of the Big Three over the Polish question, Rumania, Greece and some other issues were becoming widely known and this raised the hopes of the overt and covert enemies of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Early in 1945 the Hitlerites even took some practical steps in an attempt to use the differences in the anti-Hitler coalition to their advantage. The mission of Hesse—Hitler's adviser on British affairs—was one example. According to an order of the Hitlerite leaders Hesse drew up a memorandum on the conditions of a separate peace with the Western powers. The gist of the proposals outlined in the memorandum was to stop military operations on the Western Front and to transfer all German armies to the East to "stem the Bolshevik tide".¹ Hitler approved the memorandum and told Ribbentrop to instruct the German ambassadors to the Vati-

¹ F. Hesse, *Hitler and the English*, London, 1954, p. 1.

can, Spain and Switzerland to begin negotiations with representatives of the Western powers on the basis of that memorandum. Since there was a delay in these talks it was decided to send Hesse, the author of the memorandum, on a secret mission to Sweden. The latter left for Stockholm on February 17, 1945. Upon arrival in Sweden Hesse established contacts with Vallenberg, a Swedish banker who was on friendly terms both with Churchill and Roosevelt, with Storch and Olesen, two functionaries of the international Zionist Movement, with the Swedish political functionary Allan Voug and several others.

Hesse's mission failed. An agreement with the Hitlerites would have been decisively rejected by all freedom-loving peoples. Neither London nor Washington could risk such an agreement. Then, separate commanders of the Hitlerite troops attempted to achieve what Hesse had been unable to do, namely to capitulate to the West. Offering a "local" capitulation they wanted to lay down arms before the armed forces of England and America in order to continue the battles on the Eastern Front with renewed force.

On April 12, 1945 the news of a distressful event flashed over the world—Franklin Delano Roosevelt had suddenly died in Warm Springs. The death of the US President was a great grief to all friends of the peace and international co-operation, of which Roosevelt had been such a staunch defender. The Soviet people extended their sincere condolences to the American people in their heavy loss and expressed the conviction that Soviet-American co-operation to which the late President had contributed so much would continue to develop.

Many important chapters in the history of Soviet-American relations in the thirties and early forties were linked with Roosevelt's name: the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USA and USSR; the joint struggle in the anti-Hitler coalition against the common enemy; the historical conferences in Teheran and Yalta, which ensured the co-ordinated actions of the Big Three, and the laying of the foundations for the United Nations Organisation.

Roosevelt believed that the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the United States forged in the war would be cemented in peace.

President Roosevelt's death raised the hopes of the "hard-liners", the enemies of Soviet-American co-operation in the

USA, who became very active in the final stages of the war. By the end of 1944 part of the American ruling elite began to demand that US policy towards the Soviet Union be reconsidered. Among them were Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg, John Foster Dulles, James A. Forrestal, the Secretary for the Navy, and others.

Harry S. Truman, the new US President who had won notoriety for saying at the beginning of the war that the best thing that could happen was for the USSR and Germany to destroy each other, proved from the first days of his Presidency an opponent of Soviet-American co-operation. On April 23 he convoked a special conference in the White House to discuss US policy towards the Soviet Union. It was attended by many responsible Washington leaders, including Secretary of State Stettinius, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary for the Navy Forrestal, Admirals King and Leahy, Generals Marshall and Deane, Ambassador Harriman, and also Bohlen and Dann, two high-ranking State Department officials.

The new President asked of the members of his government for their opinion on the prospects of Soviet-American relations in the light of the differences on a number of issues of world policy between the governments of the two countries (notably, on the Polish question). Secretary of War Stimson said that "... he hoped we would go slowly and avoid any open break.... The Russians had carried out their military engagement quite faithfully and [he] was sorry to see this one incident project a breach between the two countries".¹ James Forrestal, however, who emphasised the differences between the Soviet Union and the USA, wanted the US to rethink its policy towards the Soviet Union. Harriman supported Forrestal, while Leahy expressed views similar to those held by Stimson. In the end Truman spoke of his decision to adopt a "firm position" towards the USSR. He even hinted that he was willing to recede from the Yalta agreements.

Anti-Soviet tendencies grew stronger also among the British ruling circles. Winston Churchill was the main proponent of a "hard line" towards the Soviet Union. As he was forced to give up his hopes that the Soviet Union would

¹ *The Forrestal Diaries*, Edited by Walter Millis, New York, 1951, p. 49.

grow weaker as a result of the war, and as the prospect of the Soviet Union's final victory over the fascist aggressors drew closer, the more worried did the British Prime Minister become about the character of future Soviet-Anglo-American relations. The destruction of Germany's military might has brought with it radical changes in the relations between communist Russia and the Western powers, Churchill noted glumly in his memoirs.

Churchill decided to "reappraise" the international situation and to define the "practical questions of strategy and policy", by which, in his view, Britain and the USA should be guided. Here are the "new" principles, containing a profusion of slanders against the Soviet Union:

"First, that Soviet Russia had become a mortal danger to the free world.

"Secondly, that a new front must be immediately created against her onward sweep.

"Thirdly, that this front in Europe should be as far east as possible.

"Fourthly, that Berlin was the prime and true objective of the Anglo-American armies.

"Fifthly, that the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry into Prague of American troops was of high consequence.

"Sixthly, that Vienna, and indeed Austria, must be regulated by the Western Powers, at least upon an equality with Russian Soviets. . . .

"Finally, and above all, that a settlement must be reached on all major issues between the West and the East in Europe before the armies of democracy melted, or the Western Allies yielded any part of the German territories they had conquered, or, as it could soon be written, liberated from totalitarian tyranny."¹

This obviously anti-Soviet "new" programme calls for no comment.

Churchill attempted to impose his programme on President Roosevelt too. But the President, who took a much more sober view of the importance of Soviet-Anglo-American co-operation in the post-war world, exhibited great reserve. When Truman took over the Administration after Roosevelt's death and Churchill was told of the new President's

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 400.

decision to adopt a "hard line" towards the Soviet Union, his joy knew no bounds. When he was informed about the conference of the US leaders, Churchill expressed his full solidarity with the decision adopted by it and said: "Seeking as I do a lasting friendship with the Russian people, I am sure this can be founded upon their recognition of Anglo-American strength."¹

The British Prime Minister attempted to persuade Washington that it was necessary to adopt his military plans. Since he had been unable to invoke his "Balkan variant" to prevent the liberation of Europe by the Soviet Army, no time should be lost now to occupy as much of Europe as possible. Churchill insisted that all Allied plans for further military operations be guided by anti-Soviet considerations. For this purpose he thought it best to avoid clashes with the enemy and to use every opportunity for an eastward advance.

The Prime Minister instructed Montgomery, the Commander of the British forces in Europe, to follow this policy. After the Anglo-American forcing of the Rhine, Montgomery, in a talk with Eisenhower, accordingly emphasised the need to win the war not only "strategically but also politically". These considerations determined his view on the immediate strategic tasks, which, in keeping with political motives, he understood as an all-out effort to occupy Vienna, Prague and Berlin before the Soviet troops were able to get there.

* * *

President Roosevelt's death reawakened the hopes of the Hitlerites. In the cellar of his Imperial Chancellery, where he had taken refuge, Hitler regarded this event as an omen from above, as a sign that Germany would be saved. The Hitlerites believed that now that Roosevelt, a champion of co-operation with the Soviet Union, had died, a clash within the anti-Hitler coalition had become unavoidable.

In the attempt to use this "God-sent" chance, the Hitlerites made a final attempt to come to terms with the Western powers. Hitler's closest associates decided to save their own skins at the expense of their Führer. All the Nazi leaders agreed that Hitler was the main obstacle and that he must be removed at any price. On April 23 Goering, then in South Germany, cabled Hitler demanding that he resign

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 429

and pass on his powers as head of state and commander-in-chief to him. He said that he would wait for Hitler's answer till 10 p.m. of the same day. On the next day, that is, on April 24, Goering intended to take a plane to Eisenhower's headquarters to discuss plans for a cease-fire in the West with the General.

In reply to Goering's telegram Hitler issued an order to expel Goering from the party and to arrest him and his collaborators. Himmler, who was an enemy of Goering's and who considered that he himself was the Führer's most suitable successor, displayed considerable activity at that time. Himmler renewed the contacts he had first established in 1943 with Count Bernadotte of the Swedish Red Cross, who was a member of the royal family and had influential connections in Britain. On April 23 in Lübeck, during the talk with Bernadotte, Himmler said that Hitler was already a "political corpse" and hinted that he could also be destroyed physically without special trouble. He said:

"We Germans have to declare ourselves defeated by the Western Powers; and I beg you to transmit this to General Eisenhower through the Swedish Government, so that we all may be spared further unnecessary bloodshed. It is not possible for us Germans, and especially it is not possible for me, to capitulate to the Russians. Against them we will fight on until the front of the Western Powers replaces the German fighting front."¹ It would be difficult to express the hope for an imminent conflict between the Western powers and the USSR in less ambiguous terms. Bernadotte informed the British and US Ministers in Stockholm of his talk with Himmler and they sent the news on to London and Washington. The British and American governments did not consider it possible to negotiate with Himmler and immediately informed Moscow of Himmler's offer. To explain the view held by his government, Churchill wrote in connection with the Himmler-Bernadotte talks: "There can be no question as far as His Majesty's Government is concerned of anything less than unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three major Powers."² The stand of the British and Americans was fully approved by Moscow. In view of the machinations of the Hitlerites, which were aimed

¹ *The Labyrinth. Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg*, New York, 1956. p. 399.

² *Correspondence...*, Vol. I, p. 332.

at splitting the anti-Hitler coalition, the Soviet Government considered that to foil all these plans of the reactionary circles it was necessary to rout the German armed forces quickly and decisively and thereby to frustrate anti-Soviet plans irrespective of their sources.

Himmler's failure was due not only to the odiousness of his person, which excluded talks with him by any government anxious to preserve its prestige. The British and US public would have strongly condemned any separate deal with Germany behind the Soviet Union's back. The White House and Downing Street were well aware of this.

Besides, the West feared that a deal with the Hitlerite clique might lead to a grave conflict with the USSR, possibly even a military one, in which the Western powers would have been the weaker side. Hesse, for example, believed that the results of his talks in Sweden might have been influenced by the opinion Eisenhower expressed in his secret correspondence with Roosevelt in the spring of 1945, namely, that the Soviet armed forces were far superior to the Western armies and that under such conditions it was inadvisable to conclude a separate peace.¹

Montgomery also held identical views. He knew that the British people were war-weary and would never have been persuaded to fight the Russians in 1945.² The position of the USA on this question was determined also by the fact that as a Pacific power it was even more interested than Britain in the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan. The Americans were therefore afraid of violating the jointly adopted principle of unconditional surrender, for such a violation would naturally have freed the USSR from its commitments.

Last and most important, a separate deal with the Hitlerites in the concrete military and political situation prevailing in Germany at the end of April was becoming impossible. No power on earth could save the Hitlerite clique from utter defeat. On May 2 the Soviet Army completed the rout of the German fascist troops and captured Berlin. The fall of Berlin showed that it was a question of days before the war would end.

¹ F. Hesse, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

² *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery*, London, 1958, p. 380.

A few days before the end of the war in Europe Hitler, who was fully demoralised and had lost all hope for salvation, committed suicide in the air raid shelter of the Imperial Chancellery. Before his end Hitler appointed Admiral von Dönitz as his successor. The Admiral known as a faithful nazi who had unflinchingly carried out all orders of the Führer, believed in continuing the war literally to the last soldier, and had become notorious as the organiser of the merciless submarine warfare. In appointing Dönitz as his successor, Hitler believed that he would continue the war at any price, but some German industrialists and military men considered Dönitz's candidacy acceptable for the opposite reason, namely, because they hoped that the Admiral would be able to establish contacts with the West, since he, in their opinion, was less compromised than the ex-Führer's other associates. These expectations of the German industrialists and military were to some extent realised. Dönitz formed a "government" in Flensburg, broadcast an address to the German nation and published an order to the Army, which inter alia said: "In assuming the supreme command over all units of the German Wehrmacht, I am filled with the resolve to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks until the military units and hundreds of thousands of families in the East of Germany are saved from enslavement or destruction. I am forced to fight the English and Americans insofar as they hinder my struggle against the Bolsheviks."¹ Soon after that Dönitz's representatives established contacts with Montgomery, the commander of the British armies, with a view to stopping military operations in the West gradually, as it were, unit after unit. On May 4 an agreement was signed on the capitulation of the Northern grouping of the German troops.

On May 4 Dönitz sent Friedeburg and later Jodl as his representatives to Eisenhower's headquarters with instructions to sign a document on the cessation of military operations on the entire Western Front. Dönitz's "Government", however, was unable to accomplish this plan, and on May 7 a preliminary protocol on the capitulation of Germany's military units was signed with the representatives of the military commands of the USA, Britain and the Soviet Union

¹ J. Schulz, *Die letzten 30 Tage. Aus dem Kriegstagebuch des OKW*, 1951, S. 62-63.

at the headquarters of the Anglo-American command in Rheims.

On May 8 in Karlshorst, a Berlin suburb, Keitel, the former Chief of Staff of the High Command of Hitler's armed forces, one of the chief war criminals, signed the final act on Germany's unconditional surrender in the presence of representatives of the USSR, USA, Britain and France. The Soviet Union and its Allies in the anti-Hitler coalition had won an epoch-making victory over Hitler Germany and her satellites.

Germany's capitulation was the paramount event in the history of the Second World War. It meant that the main hotbed of fascism and aggression had been destroyed, that the strongest and most dangerous participant in the fascist bloc had been defeated. It brought long-awaited peace to Europe's tortured peoples.

* * *

The hopes and aspirations of the freedom-loving peoples who had joined in the common struggle against Hitlerite Germany had come true. The Soviet, British and American people and all progressive mankind with them celebrated VE day. All the fighters against world fascism and its reactionary creed heartily congratulated each other with the end of the war in Europe and wished for a firm and stable and enduring peace.

The leading role of the Soviet Union in winning the victory over Hitler Germany was universally recognised. People all over the world admired the heroism of the Soviet people. The American *Christian Science Monitor*, for example, wrote that to measure the debt of gratitude the United States owes the Soviet Union it was only necessary to imagine what would have been the outcome of the war if the USSR had not taken part in it.¹ The recognition of the Soviet Union's outstanding services to mankind in the war against Hitler Germany was contained also in the official congratulatory messages sent by the British and American governments to Moscow on the occasion of Germany's capitulation. The Soviet embassies in London and Washington received an endless stream of congratulatory telegrams.

In giving due recognition to the Soviet Union's role in

¹ *Christian Science Monitor*, May 11, 1945.

the anti-Hitler coalition the British and American peoples decisively demanded even wider co-operation with the USSR. American and British newspapers printed many articles emphasising the need for a continued friendly policy towards the Soviet Union after the war. Many political and public leaders in Britain and the USA soberly appraised the role of the USSR in the post-war world. "We need Russia both in war and in peace"—this thought was the leitmotiv of their speeches.

The great coalition had won. The support given to the Soviet Union by the British and American peoples and the enormous popularity and authority enjoyed by the USSR as a result of its heroic efforts in the war thwarted the anti-Soviet plans that had been hatched in the final stages of the war.

CHAPTER XXII

AT THE CROSSROADS

The war in Europe was over. Hitler Germany was totally defeated. Although the other important hotbed of war—in the Far East—had not yet been extinguished, the final victory over world fascism was in sight. How would the relations between the Great Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition develop in the post-war period? Would the USSR, USA and Britain be able to continue their co-operation and act in accord, once the last guns of the Second World War had fallen silent? Would the long-expected peace now drawing closer be a stable and enduring one, or would it only be a short breathing spell before a new world holocaust broke out? These questions were worrying the world public.

There were good reasons for such apprehensions. The nearer the end of the bloodiest war in human history, the more vociferous did the enemies of peace become about a new world holocaust. Under these conditions hundreds of millions of people on all continents were supporting the idea that it was essential to create effective guarantees against a new war. They believed that an international security organisation would provide such a guarantee.

The war showed that if the idea of collective security, which had been strongly championed by the USSR, had triumphed in the thirties, the Hitler clique would not have been able to unleash aggression.

The majority of the people in the world and most newspapers of various political trends warmly hailed the idea of setting up such an organisation. The idea was also supported by the international working-class movement. The world conference of trade unions held in February 1945 pledged solidarity with the decision of the Great Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition to set up a new international security organ-

isation and expressed the wish that representatives of the trade unions should take part in drafting its Charter.

From the moment it opened, the eyes of the world were focussed on the San Francisco Conference.

The conference opened on April 25, on the historical day when the Soviet and Anglo-American troops met in Germany. Some commentators regarded the coincidence of these two important events as a symbol of the Great Powers' firm resolve not only to win the war but also to co-operate in the organisation of the post-war world.

The San Francisco Conference was one of the greatest international conferences in diplomatic history. Its main aim was to set up a new international organisation for securing peace.

After the First World War the victors had pushed questions of international security into the background and dealt mainly with the peace treaty with Germany. The fact that the San Francisco Conference was called before the end of the war with Germany indicated that the leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition—the USSR, USA and Britain—had reached agreement on the basic questions of the new international security organisation.

The conference in San Francisco was held in a relatively complicated situation. Alongside natural controversies due to differences in the interests of the individual states, which had various government, social and political systems, there were also many obstacles raised by opponents of international co-operation, the champions of a "hard line" towards the USSR.

Although full agreement on the international organisation had been reached between the governments of the USSR, USA and Britain at preliminary talks, at the conference it immediately became clear that a "hard line" propounded by various anti-Soviet elements in the USA and Britain had been adopted.

From the first days of the conference these elements, often using democratic slogans as a guise, strove to poison the atmosphere and to cast doubt on the chances of its success. The enemies of international co-operation regarded the discussion of every complicated issue as an "insuperable crisis" and openly strove to provoke a conflict between the Allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. Among them were such influential members of the US delegation as Senators Van-

denberg and John Foster Dulles. *The Private Papers of Senator A. Vandenberg*,¹ as also Dulles's book *War or Peace*, show that both opposed co-operation with the Soviet delegation. In the discussion on many questions the two senators insisted that the US delegation assume an intransigent position. They had a major influence on the attitude of the US delegation and therefore the conference had to cope with many additional difficulties.

Conversely, despite the serious difficulties and the differences between the participants in the conference, the Soviet delegation took pains to reconcile the different points of view and to establish international co-operation.

All the states who had signed the Declaration by the United Nations on January 1, 1942 and those who had subscribed to it later and declared war on the fascist powers, participated in the San Francisco Conference. Of the 42 states invited by the Big Four, 19 were Latin American countries and five were British dominions. This guaranteed the USA and Britain a majority in the United Nations Organisation.

Also invited were the so-called neutral countries (Eire, Iceland, Portugal and Sweden) and those who were still under fascist occupation at the time—Denmark (the Danish Government was invited after Denmark's liberation), Austria and Siam. Owing to the irreconcilable position of the British and American governments some countries which were not recognised by the USA and Britain (Albania, Poland, the Mongolian People's Republic) were not allowed to participate in the conference. As regards the Soviet Government it strove to ensure the broadest possible participation in the new international organisation and, being guided by the wish to resolve all questions connected with the conference with the other sponsoring governments, it did not object to the presence at the conference of all 42 states, irrespective of whether these countries maintained diplomatic relations with all the host states or not. Germany and Japan and also the former enemy states—Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland—were not invited to the conference.

On April 26 general discussions began. Molotov, the head of the Soviet delegation, reminded the participants of the responsibility borne by the governments for the future

¹ *The Private Papers of Senator A. Vandenberg*, Boston, 1952.

destiny of the peace-loving peoples. From the high forum of the San Francisco Conference the Soviet Government reiterated that it was a sincere and staunch champion of the setting up of a strong international security organisation. "We shall fully co-operate in the implementation of this great task with all other governments genuinely dedicated to this noble cause."

The statement of the Soviet Government drew particular attention to the fact that the success of the proposed international organisation would largely depend on the ability and willingness of the Great Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition to continue their co-operation. The Soviet Government considered that the co-ordinated efforts of the leading anti-fascist states would be the most reliable safeguard of peace and security. Thus, the Soviet Government stood most decisively for the preservation and further development of Allied relations between the main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition. The success of the new international organisation, the Soviet Government said, also depended greatly on how willing the other peace-loving countries would be to set up an effective international security organisation. The Soviet Government was well aware of the difficulties facing the formation of the new organisation but it was greatly interested in it and ready to bend every effort to make a success of the San Francisco Conference, called to inaugurate the United Nations Organisation.

The idea of the unity of the United Nations and of collective action to counter aggression was so popular that it was stressed in the speeches made by the heads of all delegations at the conference.

Before passing on to the discussion of the UN draft Charter the conference discussed several organisational matters. On the initiative of the Soviet delegation the heads of the delegations of the four sponsor powers—the USSR, USA, Britain and China—were elected to the chair of the conference. The Soviet delegation's proposal to immediately invite representatives of the Ukraine and Byelorussia to the conference was accepted but the proposal to invite representatives of democratic Poland was turned down by a majority vote.

Although no Polish delegation was invited to the San Francisco Conference, Poland was regarded as a founder state of the UN Organisation.

The conference discussed the proposal to invite Argentina tabled by a number of Latin American countries and supported by the USA. The Soviet delegation objected on the ground that Argentina's Government had during the war supported the enemy states. The Soviet delegation proposed that a decision of that question be postponed because a hasty decision could only mar the prestige of the conference.

Despite these well-founded arguments, Argentina was hurriedly summoned to the conference on April 30 at the insistence of the USA and the states supporting it.¹ Even though the question of Argentina's participation in the conference was not a particularly important one, yet the position taken by the USA during its consideration was vivid proof of the "hard line" the Truman Administration intended to follow in its relations towards the USSR. In Yalta Roosevelt had repeatedly said that the admittance of new UN members shall require the agreement of the Great Powers. At the San Francisco Conference, however, the US Government, in violation of Roosevelt's commitments, engineered a solution desired by the USA.

After the consideration of various procedural and organisational questions, the participants turned to the discussion of the UN Charter. The delegations put up many amendments to the proposals drafted at Dumbarton Oaks.

These amendments can be divided into several groups. The first concerned an extension of the rights of the General Assembly. The second provided for a limitation of the rights of the Security Council and its permanent members and also for an increase in the number of members on the Council. The third group of amendments had to do with the extension of the rights of the International Court of Justice. Finally, the last group of amendments referred to the wording and were of a purely technical nature.

Attention was naturally focussed on the first two groups. The general idea at the back of those proposals was to give the General Assembly all the rights vested in the Security Council and to subordinate the latter to the General Assembly—the supreme organ of the United Nations Organisation. The hottest issue discussed at San Francisco was that of

¹ In addition to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics and Argentina, the conference invited also Denmark, thus bringing the total of participants to 50.

the Security Council and the voting procedure in it. The principle of unanimity between the Great Powers in the adoption of decisions on all questions, except procedural ones, was sharply criticised by a number of delegations, mainly from the Latin American countries. Setting off the Great Powers—the permanent Security Council members—against the other UN members and resorting to a deluge of demagoguery, the critics of the Yalta decisions wanted to curtail the unanimity principle as much as possible.

As well as direct attacks against the principle of unanimity among the Great Powers, various manoeuvres were used in the attempt to lessen the importance of the Security Council and thereby decrease the competency of the permanent Security Council members. One example was the proposal to place international conflicts, relating to the competency of various regional organisations, outside the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Some American states demanded that the regional pact should be regarded as the supreme body in deciding all controversies emerging on the American continent.

As a result of lengthy discussion several amendments were made to the draft adopted at Dumbarton Oaks. Thus, article 33 of the Charter dealing with means for the peaceful settlement of international controversies was supplemented and now provided for the possibility of "turning to regional bodies or agreements". In one of the items of article 52 of the Charter a proviso was included on the obligation of members of regional agreements to resolve local controversies peacefully with the help of regional agreements or regional bodies before these controversies were submitted to the Security Council.

The attempt to revise the basic principles of the UN organisation, which had been co-ordinated among the Great Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, failed. History had convincingly demonstrated that the security of small nations depends directly on the relations between the Great Powers. The experience of the Second World War demonstrated the grim fate which overtakes small countries when there is no unity on key problems of world policy.

To promote international co-operation the Soviet delegation consistently defended the principle of Great Powers' unanimity. The US and British delegations, whose hands were tied by the Yalta decisions, could not openly support

the critics of this principle and the San Francisco Conference confirmed that it was to be the foundation of the work of the Security Council.

Lengthy discussions also centred on the question of international territorial trusteeship. The decision was particularly important in view of the new upsurge of the national liberation movement in the colonial and dependent countries.

The position adopted by the Soviet Union towards the colonial and dependent countries sprang from the basic tenets of the socialist state, which is guided by Lenin's principle of the right of every nation to self-determination and to the achievement of full national independence, and the respect for the rights and independence of all peoples. In keeping with these principles, the Soviet delegation immediately submitted two amendments to the chapter "Purposes" of the UN Charter, which spoke of the need to respect the principle of the equality and self-determination of peoples and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, irrespective of race, language, religion and sex.

The Soviet draft of the article in the Charter on the setting up of trusteeships over non-self-governing territories said that the preparation of non-self-governing peoples "with the active participation of the population of that territory, for self-government and self-determination, having the aim to accelerate the achievement by them of full independence" was one of the basic aims of the UN. Despite the fact that the clear and unambiguous formula of the main aim of the territorial trusteeship system proposed by the Soviet Union fully coincided with the UN Charter, it was opposed by the Western powers, who tabled their own alternatives.

During the debates the Charter was supplemented by several chapters on the territorial trusteeship system. The conference adopted a compromise which said that the trusteeship system would "promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned..." (article 76).

Even though the compromise formula was a step backwards in comparison with the initial Soviet formula, the

recognition of the fact that the achievement of independence by the trust countries was one of the main tasks of the territorial trusteeship, reflected the universal growth of the national liberation, anti-imperialist movement.

The conference inaugurated the International Court of Justice and resolved several other questions connected with the setting up of the new international organisation.

On June 26, 1945 the conference concluded its work with the adoption of the UN Charter.

The UN Charter adopted at San Francisco begins with the words that the peoples of the United Nations are determined "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. . .".

Attaching enormous importance to the implementation of human rights and to the granting of basic freedoms to all, irrespective of race, language, sex and religion, the first conference of the United Nations proclaimed that the basic principles of its organisation were the equality and self-determination of the peoples; international co-operation and the non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states; the resolution of international controversies by peaceful means; the abstention from the threat to use force in international affairs. These principles are vivid proof that the UN Charter contains the firm recognition of the principle of coexistence and co-operation between states with different socio-economic systems.

Thus, the foundation was laid for a new international organisation upon which the peoples of the world fastened high hopes for the preservation of peace and security. Despite the fact that the discussion of the UN Charter had revealed some serious differences between the participants in the San Francisco Conference, the craving for peace was so strong that all governments represented at the conference adopted the Charter. The success of the conference was considerably promoted by the fact that on basic questions the three main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition stood out for a co-ordinated draft. At the San Francisco Conference too the Soviet Union showed its good-will and in order to promote co-operation met the wishes of its Allies in connection with some controversial problems; it did not object to the invitation to the conference of those states with whom it did not have diplomatic relations; it agreed to the US

interpretation of the article on the voting procedure in the Security Council, and so on.

The San Francisco Conference testified to the existence of Allied relations between the states of the anti-Hitler coalition. It can be said without exaggeration that the setting up of the UNO, on which the peoples of the world pinned such high hopes, was one of the most important political results of the co-operation of the USSR, USA and Britain during the Second World War.

* * *

At the same time, the San Francisco Conference presented disquieting symptoms. Although the USSR, USA and Britain supported the co-ordinated UN Charter, serious differences emerged between them on questions of world policy. The world public knew of some of the differences between the Big Three even before the conference opened. At San Francisco, however, these differences became patently evident. The Polish question, the participation of Argentina in the UN, the interpretations of the voting formula—these were some of main questions on which differences arose. But there was more to it than that. It was no longer so much a question of the differences as such, as one of approach. At this conference the tendency towards diktat replaced the method of seeking compromises, which had proved its worth during the war for the first time. An illustration of this new approach was the invitation of Argentina to the conference, when the US delegation used its automatic majority vote to impose its will on the other participants in the conference.

All these manifest differences reflected the anti-Soviet sentiments of the US and British ruling circles at that time only to a minor degree. While the peoples of the world were celebrating victory over Hitler's tyranny and giving to the Soviet Union its due in the achievement of this victory, the politicians in London and Washington were considering how to exert pressure on the Soviet Union not only through the "voting machine" but also by the threat to use force.

Here is one such example. During the military operations in April-May 1945 the Anglo-American forces advanced beyond the line which, in accordance with the agreement between the governments of the USSR, USA and Britain, had been fixed as a Soviet zone of occupation, and occupied

part of that zone (the districts of Leipzig, Erfurt, Plauen, Magdeburg). This was necessitated by the military operations against the enemy. The Soviet High Command had issued instructions that in the event of Soviet troops meeting British and US forces the Soviet command should immediately establish contacts with the command of the Allied forces to enable them in agreement to determine the temporary tactical demarcation line and take measures to suppress within the limits of its line any resistance of the German troops.

The British Government, however, attempted to use the advance of the Allied troops beyond the initially determined line of demarcation, which was justified from a military point of view, for its political anti-Soviet purposes. After the capitulation of Germany, when tactical demarcation lines became unnecessary, the British Government exerted insistent efforts to keep the English and American troops within the bounds of the Soviet zone of occupation.

In his time Churchill's Government did not succeed in implementing the notorious "Balkan variant" of the second front, and its plan to seize Berlin, Prague and Vienna also miscarried.

Now, in the conditions created as a result of the Soviet offensive, Churchill proposed not to withdraw Anglo-American troops and to use them as a threat in the talks with the Soviet Government. "We have," he said, "several powerful bargaining counters on our side, the use of which might make for a peaceful agreement. First, the Allies ought not to retreat from their present positions to the occupational line until we are satisfied about Poland, and also about the temporary character of the Russian occupation of Germany, and the conditions to be established in the Russianised or Russian-controlled countries in the Danube valley, particularly Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans. Secondly, we may be able to please them about the exits from the Black Sea and the Baltic as part of a general statement."¹

Churchill outlined this point of view also to President Truman. "Meanwhile we should hold firmly to the existing position obtained or being obtained by our armies in Yugoslavia, in Austria, in Czechoslovakia on the main central

¹ Winston S. Churchill. *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 439.

United States front, and on the British front, reaching up to Lübeck, including Denmark,"¹ he wrote on May 6. At the same time Churchill instructed General Ismay to insist in the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Allied commander in Europe be given instructions not to withdraw the Anglo American troops.

Churchill did not confine himself to abstract talk about the "hard line" he proposed to pursue towards the Soviet Union or to mere demands to prepare for a war against the USSR. He also took a number of practical steps in this direction. While the Allied armies were smashing the last remnants of the Hitlerite troops and inflicting mortal blows to German militarism from all sides, creating the conditions for a stable and enduring peace in Europe, the British Prime Minister, according to his own admission, "sent Montgomery a telegram telling him thoroughly to accumulate German arms and to store them so that it should be easy to distribute them among German soldiers, with whom we shall have to co-operate if the Soviet offensive continues".² In the main the US ruling circles shared Churchill's point of view.

Early in May 1945 Truman's Government committed a new hostile act towards the Soviet Union; without preliminary warning and despite the Soviet Union's imminent entry into the war against Japan, the USA stopped its Lend-Lease deliveries. In this context it is instructive to remember a few facts from the history of Soviet-American economic relations during the Second World War. In adopting the decision to send materials to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease Act, the US Government was guided first and foremost by its own interests. Although it officially extended the Lend-Lease Act to the USSR in November 1941, the US Government was very slow in making it effective. Up to March 1942 American deliveries to the Soviet Union were insignificant. According to numerous US sources the bulk of US deliveries to the Soviet Union was dispatched in 1943. It will be remembered that by the spring of 1943 the Soviet armed forces had already turned the tide in the war.

The total US assistance given to all participants in the anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War was

¹ Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 437.

² *Pravda*, November 25, 1954.

decidedly inferior to the contribution the Soviet Union made to the cause of the common victory over the fascist power. According to US sources the value of the arms and commodities delivered by the USA during the war under the Lend-Lease Act totalled 46,728 million dollars (from March 11, 1941, to June 30, 1945 the total was 31,400 million dollars, of which 9,100 million went to the USSR).¹ However, the total returns from the United Nations (deliveries and services) were valued at 8,173 million dollars.² Between 1941 and 1945 Lend-Lease deliveries accounted for an average 15 per cent of the sum total of military expenditure and for over 50 per cent of US exports. As regards the USSR, the total Anglo-American deliveries "in relation to home production during the entire period of the war-time economy accounted for only about four per cent".³ In the last year of the Soviet-German war imported goods, received by the USSR, accounted for less than three per cent of domestic production. It may be interesting to compare the volume of Soviet war production with some US military deliveries. Thus, according to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, from October 1941 to April 30, 1944, the US deliveries to the Soviet Union included 6,430 aircraft, 3,734 tanks, 206,771 lorries and 3,168 anti-aircraft guns.⁴

During the last war years Soviet military industry annual production reached 40,000 aircraft, more than 30,000 tanks, self-propelled guns and armoured cars, up to 150,000 guns of all callibres, and other materiel. Even in his report to Congress on Lend-Lease transactions Truman admitted that the Soviet Army was equipped mainly with products from Soviet enterprises.⁵

Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., the Lend-Lease Administrator, who in November 1944 replaced Cordell Hull as Secretary of State, answered the question: "Have we got our money's worth?" as follows: "I think that we have in more than double measure ... the Russians have

¹ H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 648.

² William A. Brown, Jr. and Redvers Opie, *American Foreign Assistance*, Washington, 1953, p. 82.

³ N. Voznesenski, *Soyennaya ekonomika SSSR v period otechestvennoi voyny* (Soviet Economy During the Soviet-German War), Vol. II, Gosyurizdat, 1958, p. 74.

⁴ *Soviet Foreign Policy*... , Vol. II, p. 144.

⁵ *Pravda*, May 24, 1945.

already made a return far beyond any measurement in dollars or tons. It is in the form of millions of Nazi soldiers dead or in Russian prison camps, of Nazi tanks reduced to scrap on the battlefields, of Nazi guns and trucks left behind by the retreating German armies. . . . The war will be much the shorter for it."¹

The Lend-Lease deliveries, which the USA made in its own interests mainly, were part of America's contribution to the common fight against world fascism. Naturally, they could not decide the nature and the prospects of Soviet-American economic relations after the war. That is why this question was repeatedly discussed during Soviet-American war-time discussions. Talks on future Soviet-American economic relations were held as early as in October 1943, during the stay in Moscow of Donald Marr Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board. The Soviet Government expressed its willingness to develop such relations. Nelson, on his part, said that after the war the USA would have great possibilities of delivering large amounts of capital equipment and various machines to the USSR. This question was also discussed in general outline at the Moscow and Teheran conferences in 1943.

During the preliminary exchange of views it became clear that extensive trade between the USSR and the USA was possible only if the USA were willing to grant credits to the Soviet Union. Roosevelt then instructed Hopkins and Harriman to draft proposals on this question.

Although the Soviet Government advanced concrete proposals on Soviet-American trade and credits as early as in February 1944, the Americans delayed a solution. The State Department told Harriman that in his talks with Soviet representatives he should not go into detail about future Soviet-American trade relations, referring to the Johnson Act,² which, it said, prohibited the granting of credits to the Soviet Union. Early in 1945 the Soviet Government posed

¹ Roger W. Shugg and H. A. DeWeerd, *World War II. A Concise History*, Washington, 1947, pp. 98-99.

² The Johnson Act, adopted on April 13, 1934, prohibited the granting of US Government credits to governments who had not paid their debts to the USA. Although the author of the act (Senator Johnson) had himself said that that act was not applicable to the USSR, it was applied in the thirties by the enemies of Soviet-American co-operation against the Soviet Union.

the question again but once more received an evasive reply from Washington.

The more obvious it became that the Soviet Union had brilliantly stood the test of war and that all the talk about it growing weak militarily and politically after the war was sheer nonsense, the greater hopes did the US ruling circles pin on "economic levers" in their relations with the USSR. In one of his telegrams to Washington early in 1945, Averell Harriman insistently recommended that the question of credits be used in the diplomatic talks with the Soviet Union and that the Russians be given to understand "that our willingness to co-operate wholeheartedly with them in their vast reconstruction problems will depend upon their behaviour in international matters".¹

Thus, the cessation of Lend-Lease deliveries and the position of the US Government on questions of Soviet-American trade after the war were interlinked and subordinated to the anti-Soviet foreign course and the aim of establishing US world domination.

Although the Truman Government fully shared Churchill's anti-democratic, anti-Soviet views, it did not agree to his proposal to use the Anglo-American troops who had entered the Soviet occupation zone as a factor in international politics. It insisted that these troops should be withdrawn to their zones and this was done in the summer of 1945. Many bourgeois authors interpret this as a gesture of good-will by the Truman Government towards the USSR, as a peaceful step of the US Government. Is this really so? No, it is not. Actually Washington was guided in this question by very different motives.

The US ruling circles considered it politically inadvisable to use the fact that Anglo-American troops were in the Soviet zone of Germany to exert pressure on the USSR. First, world public opinion, including the American, would not have supported such a step and would have condemned this attempt to blackmail and to intimidate its valiant ally, covered with glory by its victories over Hitler Germany; secondly, in connection with the end of the war in Europe the Americans were preparing to transfer part of their armed forces to the Pacific theatre, while Churchill's anti-Soviet demonstration would have required their further pres-

¹ H. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 646.

ence in Europe, and last and most important, Washington apparently understood how great a risk Churchill's plan involved. Would the American and British troops have been able to hold their positions if the Soviet Government categorically demanded that they be withdrawn to the zones stipulated in the trilateral agreement? Many authoritative US military experts thought this very unlikely. And in the resultant situation the position of London and Washington would have been a very dubious one.

Taking the decision to withdraw the Allied forces to their zones, the US Government hoped that other "levers" would enable it to pursue a "hard line" towards the USSR. We already mentioned one of them—the economic; the other was the "atomic lever", on which the Americans pinned high hopes. In the summer of 1945 the USA completed work on the atom bomb. According to Louis Morton, a US military historian, the new Secretary of State, James Francis Byrnes, speaking in June 1945 with US nuclear scientists who objected to the dropping of US atom bombs on Japan, admitted that Japan could be routed without this measure. Yet Byrnes insisted on the decision saying that the bomb "should be dropped to 'make Russia more manageable in Europe'".¹ One can fully agree with the British Professor Blackett that the atomic blasts in Japan were "not so much the last military act of the Second World War, as the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia...".²

The Truman Government thus took the path followed by Churchill and his supporters, the path leading to the break-off of Allied relations with the USSR and to the "cold war". The American ruling circles used their own methods and levers in their anti-Soviet policy, while the British used others.

* * *

"Murder will out," the saying goes. Rumours about the crazy plans for a third world war spread like wildfire among the British and US public. Some criminal war-mongers went so far as to say that the sooner that war began, the better.

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, January 1957, Vol. 35, No. 2, p. 347.

² P. M. S. Blackett, *Fear, War, and the Bomb. Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*, New York-Toronto, 1949, p. 139.

Some reactionary newspapers in England and America called for the establishment of a powerful Anglo-American bloc to "make" the Soviet Union "retreat".

The irresponsible sabre-rattling of the enemies of peace was severely condemned by the British and American people, who saw in the strengthening of friendly relations with the USSR a guarantee of enduring and stable peace. Various political conferences and meetings, held in the spring and the summer of 1945 in the USA and Britain, clearly demonstrated that the British and American people did not share these anti-Soviet views. With an eye to the British public the Conservative and Labour parties included Anglo-Soviet relations as a central issue in their pre-election programmes.

Both the Labourists and Conservatives took great pains to prove that it would be precisely their party that would ensure the closest co-operation with the Soviet Union.

In the United States the tendency towards the development of co-operation and friendship with the USSR was also dominant in the broadest circles of the American population. "... There had been overwhelming sympathy among the American people for the Soviet Union and complete support for President Roosevelt's policies," Hopkins said during his last visit to Moscow in May 1945. "This sympathy and support came primarily because of the brilliant achievements of the Soviet Union in the war and partly from President Roosevelt's leadership and the magnificent way in which our two countries had worked together to bring about the defeat of Germany."¹

Hopkins's mission in the spring of 1945 was in some ways an expression of these friendly tendencies in the USA towards the Soviet Union. The certain deterioration in Soviet-American relations that had set in because of some actions of the Truman Administration evoked the deep concern of the American population. Truman was afraid that this might undermine his authority, which was none too great anyway, and he therefore decided to send Hopkins, who justly enjoyed the reputation of a champion of Soviet-American co-operation, to Moscow.

After Roosevelt's death Hopkins decided to leave govern-

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins. An Intimate History*, New York, 1948, p. 888.

ment service. This was not only because the late President's closest assistant suffered from ill health but also because he understood that his views on foreign affairs did not coincide with those held by the new President and his supporters. He did not believe that he would be needed by the new people in the White House and was surprised when he heard that Truman had decided to entrust the important mission to Moscow to him. Disregarding his illness, Hopkins accepted Truman's offer because he himself was considerably worried about the state into which Soviet-American relations had fallen. He arrived in Moscow late on May 25 and the next day was received by the Head of the Soviet Government.

Hopkins immediately told Stalin that the negotiations would touch upon fundamental problems in the relations between the USA and the USSR. He admitted that there was "a small group" in America, the Hearst-MacCormic group, which opposed co-operation with the Soviet Union but emphasised that the majority of Americans believed that "... despite different political and economic ideology of the two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union could work together after the war in order to bring about a secure peace for humanity".¹ Hopkins wanted to discuss with the Soviet Government the following concrete questions: the regular summit meeting, the setting up of the Control Council for Germany, the war in the Pacific and the "future relations of the United States and Soviet Union to China" and, finally, the Polish question.

In the course of his talks with Stalin, Hopkins was given the Soviet point of view on vital international questions. He was told that it was the impression of the Soviet Government that "the American attitude towards the Soviet Union had perceptibly cooled once it became obvious that Germany was defeated, and that it was as though the Americans were saying that the Russians were no longer needed".² Further, illustrations were given of the Truman Administration's anti-Soviet action (the case of Argentina, the stoppage of Lend-Lease deliveries and the position on the Polish question). The Soviet Government agreed to a new summit meeting and proposed to hold it in Berlin in the middle of July. It also informed Hopkins that it favoured the setting

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 889.

² *Ibid.*, p. 893.

up of a Control Council at the earliest possible date, and that it had already appointed G. K. Zhukov as its representative to the Council; it confirmed that the Soviet Union was ready to fulfil the commitments it had assumed in Yalta as regards its participation in the war against Japan, and explained to the American representative that its policy in China was based on complete respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Chinese state; finally, it reiterated the Soviet position on the Polish question and advanced a number of concrete proposals with a view to facilitating the work of the Moscow Commission.

Without going into details on Hopkins's talks in Moscow we should mention that the course and results of the talks demonstrated that the concrete questions posed by the Americans, which in their opinion created special difficulties in Soviet-American relations, were quickly and comparatively easily resolved. This shows that these questions were not the chief obstacle. The Soviet Government once again demonstrated that it was willing to seek acceptable compromises and that it was interested in co-operation with the USA. The real trouble was that the Truman Government was breaking with the Allied policy based on mutual trust and the will to reach agreement. Therefore, every question, even the smallest, immediately assumed the nature of a conflict.

One of the most important political results of Hopkins's mission was that it showed that when the American Government adopted a realistic approach to Soviet-American relations, when it endeavoured to come to terms with the Soviet Government, the success of the talks could be ensured. Hopkins's mission encouraged all champions of Soviet-American friendship; there was new hope that the two biggest states on the planet—the USSR and the USA—would live in peace and friendship.

The result of Hopkins's mission to Moscow was an agreement to hold a new conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain in the summer of 1945. This conference was intended not only to solve a number of concrete international questions but also to outline the prospects of Soviet-Anglo-American relations after the war.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE BERLIN CONFERENCE. VICTORY

The Potsdam, or Berlin, Conference was the longest of all conferences of the three Heads of Government: it lasted two weeks—from July 17 to August 2, 1945. The Soviet delegation was headed by Stalin, the American by Truman, the British by Churchill and later by Attlee, the new British Prime Minister.

In the afternoon of July 17 the first session of the Potsdam Conference was opened in Cecilienhof, the castle of the former German Crown Prince Wilhelm. It was chaired by the US President who proposed the following agenda: the setting up of a Council of Foreign Ministers to prepare peace treaties with former enemy states; the principles of Allied policy in Germany; the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; easier armistice terms for Italy and her acceptance to the United Nations Organisation.

The Soviet delegation, on its part, proposed to exchange views on the question of German reparations; the division of the German navy; the resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany's former satellites; the Franco regime in Spain; the question of Syria and the Lebanon, and a number of others.¹ The British delegation expressed the wish to consider the Polish and Yugoslavian questions. Veritable diplomatic battles raged at the conference in connection with all these questions.

Among the questions considered at the very beginning of the conference was the American proposal on the setting up of a Council of Foreign Ministers. In connection with the end of military operations in Europe and the imminent end of the Second World War there emerged the pressing

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 152.

need for peace settlements with the former enemy states. The experience of the co-operation in the anti-Hitler coalition during the war showed that important international agreements, including of course also peace treaties, required considerable preparatory work. In this connection the Potsdam Conference reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers "to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements and to take up other matters which from time to time may be referred to the Council by agreement of the Governments participating in the Council".¹ The Council consisted of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, USA, Britain, China and France. At first, London was chosen for its permanent seat, but later it was decided that it would hold its meetings in turn in the capitals of the Big Four.

As an immediate task the Council was authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Besides, the Council was to be utilised "for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established".²

The Potsdam Conference determined the working procedure of the Council of Foreign Ministers. In considering a peace treaty, the decisions of the Potsdam Conference said, the Council should be composed of "members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy States concerned".³ A special stipulation was made with regard to France's participation in the preparation of peace treaties. It was decided that in discussing the peaceful settlement with Italy, France would be considered a signatory of Italy's terms of surrender. Thus, in accordance with the Potsdam decisions the preparations for a draft peace treaty with Italy were to be made by the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, USA, Britain and France, for the draft peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary by the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, USA and Britain, and for the peace treaty with Finland by the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and Britain.

¹ Ibid., p. 318.

² Ibid., pp. 318-19.

³ Ibid.

The formation of the Council of Foreign Ministers greatly helped to resolve the pressing problems of the post-war settlement.

In connection with the setting up of the Council of Foreign Ministers the work of the European Advisory Committee was reviewed. From January 1944 (when it was set up) to August 1945 the EAC had drafted 12 agreements and submitted recommendations on Germany's unconditional surrender, on the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, on the inter-Allied control mechanism in these countries and on a number of other questions. In addition, the constant contact between the representatives of the USSR, Britain, the USA and France in the committee had enabled them to consider a much wider range of problems than that embraced by the agreements, and to acquaint their governments with the views of other governments on many international problems, such as the problem of restitution, and the protection of United Nations' citizens in Germany. The report submitted by the European Advisory Committee to the Heads of Government noted that the mutual trust of the members of the committee, established in the course of many months of frank discussions, has helped to overcome difficulties which would without such trust have impeded the full co-operation between the Allies.¹

The Heads of the Three Governments noted the positive results achieved by the European Advisory Committee with satisfaction and decided that the further co-ordination of Allied policy in the control of Germany and Austria would fall to the competence of the Control Council in Berlin and the Allied Commission in Vienna. In this connection it was decided to dissolve the European Advisory Committee.

* *

The German problem was one of the central questions discussed at Potsdam. Its discussion was the finale of the numerous talks held during the war between the governments of the USSR, USA and Britain regarding the future of Germany and a co-ordinated Allied policy towards the German state.

In accordance with the decisions of the Yalta Conference, immediately after the end of the war in Europe the USSR

¹ *Report on the Activities of the EAC*, p. 9.

began to campaign for the unification of Germany and for the implementation of a joint administration of Germany by the Four Powers.

It will be remembered that the Yalta decisions outlined only the basic principles of Allied policy towards Germany after her unconditional surrender. The act of military surrender signed on May 8, 1945 contained only a few items and stipulated only the time for the cessation of military operations and the procedure for the capitulation of Germany's land, sea and air forces. The act of military surrender provided for the suppression of that act by "any general instrument of surrender imposed by or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to Germany and the German forces as a whole".¹

Thus, none of the above documents contained detailed statements on the mechanism of Germany's administration, on the relations between the occupation zones, on such matters as the further fate of the German armed forces and their effectives. Obviously, it was necessary to elaborate these questions. For this purpose, on June 5, 1945, in Berlin, the representatives of the Soviet Union, USA, Great Britain and France signed a number of important documents concerning the administration of Germany, namely, the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic; the Statement on Control Machinery in Germany and the Statement on Zones of Occupation in Germany.²

These agreements stipulated that the governments of the Four Powers assume supreme authority in Germany, including all the authority that was exercised by the German Government, the Supreme Command and any other regional, municipal or local government or body. At the same time the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany stressed that the assumption by the Allies of such authority was not an annexation of Germany. In connection with the assumption of supreme authority, the four representatives of the Allies proclaimed their main demands, relating principally to the

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. III, p. 262.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 272-85.

disbandment of all German armed forces, the transfer to the Allies of the entire navy and air force, the immediate release of Allied POWs, the apprehension of war criminals, and so on.

The Statement on the Control Machinery in Germany stipulated that the supreme authority in Germany would, during the fulfilment by her of the main terms of the unconditional surrender, be exercised by the Soviet, American, British and French Commanders-in-Chief, each in his zone, in accordance with instructions from their relevant governments, whereas with regard to questions concerning Germany as a whole joint decisions would be adopted. It was also decided to set up an Allied Control Council and its working procedure was laid down.

The Statement on Zones of Occupation in Germany demarcated the Soviet and the Western zones. The statement also provided for the withdrawal of Anglo-American troops from the Soviet zone of occupation. It was decided that Berlin and its suburbs would be occupied by the forces of the Four Powers and that the administration of that zone would be effected by the Inter-Allied Command, composed of the four Commandants. Four-Power administration was established in Berlin, which is situated on East German territory (now the German Democratic Republic), and American, British and French troops were stationed in its Western sectors because Berlin was chosen as the seat for the Control Council, the supreme organ of power for the whole of Germany, which was to ensure the implementation of a single co-ordinated policy on a country-wide scale throughout the period of occupation in accordance with the Potsdam decisions. The singling out of Berlin for the seat of the Control Council naturally did not make Berlin a special occupation zone.

The agreements signed in Berlin created a machinery that could ensure favourable conditions for Germany's democratic development and for strengthening European and universal peace.

While the Potsdam Conference was in sitting, another very important document on Germany was prepared—the Agreement on Some Additional Demands on Germany,¹ which was submitted by the European Advisory Committee.

¹ See *Report on the Activities of the EAC*, pp. 81-95.

This agreement provided for the implementation by the Allies of a series of measures to ensure Germany's demilitarisation and democratisation. In particular, at the insistence of the Soviet Union the agreement included a number of items providing for the disbandment of all Hitlerite armed forces, the SS, SA, SD and the Gestapo with all their organisations, headquarters and institutions, including the General Staff, officer corps, corps of reservists and military schools.

The agreement drafted by the European Advisory Committee greatly facilitated the discussion of the German problem at Potsdam. The American delegation once again arrived at the conference with plans for partitioning Germany into three states: South Germany with the capital in Vienna, North Germany with the capital in Berlin and West Germany incorporating the Ruhr and the Saar. "It was the President's [Truman's—*U. I.*] opinion," Admiral Leahy, who participated in the Potsdam Conference, said, "that the Rhineland, including the Ruhr and the Saar, should be placed under the international control (of Great Britain, the Soviet Republics, the United States, and France), with the announced intention of granting it independence and sovereignty as a separate state. . . ."¹ However, the decisions adopted at Potsdam on the German question were based on the idea of Germany's unity and not of her dismemberment. The declaration of the Soviet Government that the USSR did not intend either to dismember or to destroy Germany, which was highly approved by the world public and especially by the German people, predetermined the failure of all imperialist plans for the liquidation of the German state.

As a result of the discussions of the German problem the Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Britain agreed on principles which provided for the preservation and development of Germany as a single, democratic and peace-loving state. "German militarism and nazism will be eradicated," the final communiqué read, "and the Allies will in mutual agreement, now and in future, take such other measures as may be required to ensure that Germany should never again threaten her neighbours or the preservation of peace throughout the world."

¹ William D. Leahy, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

A special document—The Political and Economic Principles by Which the Attitude Towards Germany Should Be Guided in the Initial Control Period—was signed to ensure the implementation of a common policy. These principles provided, first, for the complete disarmament of Germany and the liquidation of all German industries that could be used for war production, that is, the demilitarisation of Germany. They provided also for the destruction of the National-Socialist Party, its branches and the organisations under its control, the disbandment of all nazi institutions and steps to be taken to ensure that they should not revive in any form whatever. In addition, the decisions of the conference said that all democratic political parties throughout Germany must be permitted, encouraged and granted the right of calling meetings and public discussions. These decisions emphasised the need for Germany's democratisation.

The Soviet Union tabled a proposal at the Potsdam Conference which, if accepted, would have ensured the co-ordination of the activity of all German organs of power and the uniformity of economic and political measures on all German territory. The Soviet proposal was not accepted because of objections by the USA and Britain.¹

The governments of the Three Powers agreed that some essentially important central German administrative departments would be set up, which would be headed by State Secretaries. They were to be in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. These important principles provided for the creation of prerequisites for the unification of Germany.

The decisions of the conference also said that "in the practically achievable shortest period Germany's economy must be decentralised in order to destroy the excessive concentration of economic power, represented particularly in the form of cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopoly agreements".

In addition to the agreements on the main economic and political principles for Germany, the participants in the conference discussed a number of questions relating to reparations. As at the Yalta Conference earlier, the reparations problem aroused sharp controversy at Potsdam. The US

¹ *The History of Soviet Foreign Policy*. . . , p. 445.

and British governments raised all sorts of obstructions to a definition of the amount of reparations. Although the American delegation had accepted in principle the Soviet Government's proposal that the total amount of reparations should be 20,000 million dollars and that 50 per cent of that amount should go to the USSR, at Yalta, at Potsdam it retreated from its original stand. The determination of the sum total of reparations was of major importance to the Allies and also to Germany. Yet, owing to the negative stand of the Western powers, who wanted to have their hands free in Germany, it was not possible to reach a positive decision of the question at Potsdam.

The US delegation expressed the view that no concrete figures for the reparations be set for each state and that reparations should be levied according to zones of occupation, when each of the Four Powers occupying Germany would be allowed to remove or permit the removal from its zone of occupation capital equipment, current production, and stocks of goods.¹ This did not take into account the extent of destruction in Eastern Germany nor the fact that during the period of the temporary occupation of the Soviet zone by British and American troops a considerable amount of equipment and other property had been removed to the West. At the Potsdam Conference the Soviet delegation submitted a list enumerating the value of the items the Allies had removed from the Soviet zone.

The Soviet delegation had to exert tremendous efforts to achieve a just satisfaction of the Soviet Union's reparation claims. It was decided that the reparation claims of the Soviet Union would be satisfied by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the USSR and also from the corresponding German investments (assets) abroad (in Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Finland and East Austria). The reparation claims of the USA, Britain and other countries who had a right to reparations were to be satisfied by removals from the Western zones and Germany's corresponding investments abroad; besides, the Western powers had at their disposal the stock of gold they had captured in Germany, while the USSR waived its claims for that gold.

Since the material damages inflicted by Hitler Germany

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, Washington, 1960, Vol. II. pp. 868-69.

to the USSR vastly exceeded those the other countries had suffered, the Soviet Government raised the question of additional reparation deliveries from the Western zones. The US and British delegations objected to the Soviet proposal. Ernest Bevin, the new Labour Foreign Minister, adopted a particularly adamant position on this question. Only after repeated discussion did the Soviet delegation finally succeed in bringing about a satisfactory solution. It was decided that the Soviet Union would receive additional reparations from the Western zones of occupation comprising 15 per cent of the industrial equipment in exchange for food and other products from the Soviet zone of occupation and 10 per cent of the capital industrial equipment without payment or corresponding compensation. These deliveries were calculated as a percentage of the total volume of capital equipment to be confiscated, the amount of which was to be determined "not later than six months from the day of the opening of the conference", that is, before February 1946.

In another section it was laid down that the equipment would be delivered within two years. As regards advance deliveries, these were to begin before an inventory was made, that is, before February 1946. It was also decided that the Soviet Union was to satisfy Polish reparation claims out of its share.

In connection with the discussion of German economic problems, especially the reparations problem, views were exchanged on the further fate of the Ruhr, Germany's most important industrial and economic area. With a view to carrying out the quickest possible democratisation and demilitarisation of the Ruhr and also to preventing its utilisation for imperialist purposes, the Soviet Government proposed to establish joint control by the Four Powers over that area. This proposal was not accepted by the USA and Britain who placed particularly high hopes on the Ruhr as the military and industrial base of a West European consortium, which could be used for launching new anti-Soviet adventures. It is interesting to note in this context that on the eve of the Potsdam Conference a draft on the establishment of a Four-Power administration in the Ruhr (internationalisation of the Ruhr) was considered at Washington.¹ The

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, Vol. I, pp. 595-96.

notorious Morgenthau Plan also proceeded from the need to subject the Ruhr to international control by the Security Council. At the Potsdam Conference, however, the USA, supported by Britain, refused to allow Soviet participation in control over the Ruhr. This position was another manifestation of the "hard line".

At the proposal of the Soviet delegation the conference discussed the fate of the German navy and adopted a relevant decision. The entire German surface navy and merchant fleet were to be divided in equal shares between the USSR, Britain and the USA. As regards the submarine fleet, the British proposal to scuttle its bulk, and to divide the remainder equally, was adopted. A three-power commission was set up to draft recommendations on the distribution of German vessels. The transfer of the ships to the relevant countries "will take place", the minutes of the Potsdam Conference read, "as soon as it is practically possible after the end of the war against Japan", but not later than on February 15, 1946.

Also of great importance was the decision on prosecution of the chief war criminals, whose crimes did not relate to a definite geographical area. The Three Governments reaffirmed their resolve that these criminals would be committed to a rapid and just war crimes court. It was announced that the first list of accused would be published before September 1, 1945.

Finally, there was the question of Königsberg. The conference agreed to the Soviet Government's proposal that Königsberg and its vicinity (East Prussia) be handed over to the USSR. The US President and British Prime Minister said that they would support this proposal at the coming peace conference.

Thus, at the Potsdam Conference the Heads of the Three Governments discussed all the important aspects of the German problem. The principle of the democratisation and demilitarisation of Germany was proclaimed as the basis of Allied policy in the German problem. The Potsdam agreement summed up the historical experience of the peoples' struggle to avert German imperialist aggression. The agreement was aimed at creating conditions which would exclude the possibility of new German aggression against peace-loving states and at helping her, once she had broken with her aggressive policy forever, to firmly embark on the road

to peaceful development. The governments of the USA and Britain were compelled to support this agreement in view of the radical change in the alignment of political forces after the Second World War and also because of the large scale the anti-fascist democratic movement had assumed in Germany herself. At the same time in some questions such as reparations and the Ruhr, the US and British governments endeavoured to create conditions for subordinating West Germany to the interests of reactionary, anti-Soviet policy. The Soviet Union was always guided in its policy towards Germany by the democratisation and demilitarisation principles proclaimed at Potsdam.

*

Much time was taken up at Potsdam by the discussion of the position in the East European countries. The discussion of this question was imposed on the conference by the US delegation. It must be said that both Washington and London did not like what was happening in the countries which had firmly embarked on the road of democratic development. The revolutionary-democratic changes in 1945 in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary and Yugoslavia, which seriously undermined the positions of the landowners and capitalists, had simultaneously weakened the influence of the Western Powers in those countries and wrecked the imperialist plans for the establishment of the notorious "cordon sanitaire" in Eastern Europe.

The positions of the Western countries in Eastern Europe had weakened, but the authority and popularity of the Soviet Union had grown enormously. The peoples of these countries regarded the USSR not only as their liberator from the fascist yoke but also as a friend and a comrade in the struggle for democracy. The Soviet Union's political, economic and cultural links with the countries of Eastern Europe grew from day to day. On July 7, 1945, for example, Poland and the USSR signed a trade agreement and also an agreement on the mutual delivery of goods, which laid the foundation of the close economic links between them.

On May 8, 1945, the first trade agreement was signed between the USSR and Rumania. Also in 1945, close economic links began to form between the Soviet Union and other East European countries who had embarked on democratic, socialist development: on March 14 the Soviet-

Bulgarian trade agreement was signed, on April 13—the Soviet-Yugoslavian agreement on mutual goods deliveries for 1945, on August 27—the Soviet-Hungarian agreement on economic co-operation and mutual deliveries, and there were a number of others.

As the new socio-economic system was consolidating in the East European countries, their friendly links with the Soviet Union grew ever stronger and gradually fraternal co-operation was established between them. This co-operation was based on the Leninist principle of proletarian internationalism, evolving from the vital interests of the proletariat and expressing the community of interests of the mass of the people.

The revolutionary processes in the East European countries and the establishment of new international relations inflicted a heavy blow to world imperialism. That is why the US and British governments tried to impede these processes in every way. The USA even sent an official protest against the economic agreements signed between the USSR and some East European countries. The American and British monopolies were particularly worried about the revolutionary transformations in the economy of those countries.

The stand of the US and British delegations at the Potsdam Conference was an endeavour to prevent the democratic, socialist development of the East European countries. In following their "hard line" towards the Soviet Union and in attempting to maintain a "firm position" on the question of Eastern Europe, the US ruling circles decided on blatant interference in the internal affairs of the small Central and East European countries. The USA chose the governments of Bulgaria and Rumania as the targets for its unfounded attacks. The American delegation submitted the following resolution to the conference:

"1. The Three Allied governments should agree on necessity of the immediate reorganisation of the present governments in Rumania and Bulgaria. . . .

"2. That there be immediate consultation to work out any procedures which may be necessary for the reorganisation of these governments. (Diplomatic recognition shall be accorded and peace treaties concluded with those countries as soon as such reorganisation has taken place.)

"3. . . . the Three Governments consider how best to assist any interim governments in the holding of free and unfet-

tered elections.”¹ Wishing to exert pressure on the countries which had taken the road of democratic development, the US Government declared that diplomatic recognition would be accorded to them and peace treaties concluded only after the proposed reorganisation had taken place.

The British delegation took an identical stand and declared that Britain would not establish diplomatic relations with the East European countries before the conclusion of a peace treaty.²

In advancing these proposals the US and Britain repeatedly referred to the Declaration on Liberated Europe adopted at the Yalta Conference. In this connection it is necessary to return to that document.

What commitments did the Declaration on Liberated Europe impose on the participants of the Yalta Conference—the USSR, USA and Britain? The Three Governments declared their mutual agreement to concert their policies “in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems”.³ Further the declaration named the final aim pursued by the reorganisation of the political and economic life in the liberated country. This reorganisation, it said, “must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create the democratic institutions of their own choice”. Seeing that this would involve no little difficulties, the members of the Yalta Conference agreed that where “in their judgement *conditions require*” (*author’s italics—U.I.*) the governments of the Three Powers would help the liberated peoples “to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people; and to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections”.⁴

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, Washington, 1960, Vol. II, p. 644.

² *Ibid.*

³ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 136.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.

It did not follow, however, from the Yalta Declaration that the governments of the USSR, USA and Britain had committed themselves to participate in the setting up of interim governments in all liberated countries. On the contrary, the decisions of the Yalta Conference stipulated that such action by the governments of the Three Powers was warranted only in the presence of special conditions; these decisions did not curb the initiative of the liberated peoples who, given favourable conditions, could themselves decide the most important questions of the democratic reorganisation of their countries. The US delegation decided to ignore this crucial proviso in the Declaration on Liberated Europe and to make it appear as though the US Government was entitled, in accordance with the Yalta decisions, to interfere in all questions of the East European countries' internal life. In Potsdam, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes repeatedly referred to the Yalta Declaration but always slurred over this important proviso, and thereby distorted the very essence of that declaration. What were the circumstances which would have obliged the Three Governments jointly to assist the liberated peoples? From the text and the spirit of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe it was clear that such assistance was to be rendered only in cases where there emerged the danger that some people would for one reason or another be unable to destroy the vestiges of fascism and set up democratic institutions of their own choice. Otherwise such actions would have no justification and would be tantamount to blatant interference in the internal affairs of the liberated peoples and a violation of the principles solemnly declared by the Allies during the war.

To return to the essence of the question, that is, to the state of affairs in Rumania and Bulgaria in 1945, it must be stressed that no conditions prevailed in those countries which called for joint action by the Three Powers to form interim governments. The formation of the Patriotic Front Government in Bulgaria in September 1944 and the democratic government headed by P. Groza in Rumania in March 1945, delivered a decisive blow to the vestiges of fascist reaction in those countries. The governments of Bulgaria and Rumania were broad coalitions of all the biggest democratic parties and organisations who had participated in the struggle against the reactionary dictatorships of

Antonescu and King Boris. From the first days of their existence they implemented a series of important democratic transformations, including land reform and nationalisation of the biggest branches of industry; they cleared the state apparatus of fascists and collaborators and took other progressive measures. Rumania and Bulgaria fulfilled their armistice agreement honestly and faithfully.

Thus, the US Government had neither practical nor formal grounds for demanding that the question of Rumanian and Bulgarian governments be placed on the agenda. Moreover, this demand torpedoed one of the main principles of the Yalta Declaration—the requirement to establish conditions of internal peace (item *a* of the Declaration). Recollecting the tension inside Rumania during the last weeks of General Radescu's Government (February 1945), when bloody civil war could flare up at any moment, it was easy to see that adoption of the American proposal could only have aggravated the domestic political situation.

The Soviet delegation resolutely rejected the American proposal. The attempt made by the US delegation at the Potsdam Conference to re-establish the bourgeois-landowner rule in the East European countries, to overthrow the people's democratic system and to achieve their economic and political enslavement by the imperialist states, failed ingloriously. An attempt made by the US and British governments when the question of the former property and interests of the British and American monopolies in the Rumanian oil industry was discussed, suffered a similar fate. The decision adopted by the conference on this question spoke only of the necessity to set up mixed commissions of experts "to study facts and documents as a basis for the resolution of questions emerging from the confiscation of oil equipment in Rumania".

The Soviet Government, on the other hand, considered that since law and order prevailed in Rumania and Bulgaria (as also in Hungary and Finland), and since they had lawful governments which were trusted and obeyed by the population, the time was ripe to re-establish diplomatic relations with these states. It should be remembered that at the time of the Potsdam Conference the Big Three of the anti-Hitler coalition had fully resumed diplomatic relations with several interim governments, including the Italian. Therefore the Soviet Government had good grounds to pose the ques-

tion of diplomatic recognition of the governments of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and the moment for it was opportune. A champion of the independence and sovereignty of these countries, the Soviet Government saw no reason for any supervision of the parliamentary elections in these countries. The USA, supported by Britain, however, insisted on it, even though this would have been interpreted by the young democracies as a lack of confidence in them.

The American proposal to amend the armistice terms with Italy was linked with the US and British policy towards the East European countries. The US delegation supported by the British, wanted to counterpose Italy to the other former satellites. By singling her out from among the former enemy states, the authors of that proposal endeavoured to picture Italy, where the British and American occupation forces were then holding the reins, as an example of democracy to be copied by other states.

"One gets the impression," the Head of the Soviet delegation said at one of the sessions, "of an artificial division; on the one hand, Italy, whose position is eased, and on the other, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, whose position is not to be eased. There will be a danger of our decision being discredited; in what way is Italy more deserving than the other countries?"¹

After a lengthy discussion of the whole range of questions a compromise decision was adopted—Conclusion of Peace Treaties and the Admission to the United Nations Organisation. The decision said that it was necessary to sign a peace treaty with Italy and admitted that she had made certain strides in democratic development, but at the same time also confirmed that peace treaties should be signed also with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. "The Three Governments agree to examine," the report on the Potsdam Conference noted, "each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries." Thus, the US Government had to retract its ultimatum for a reorganisation of the governments in the People's Democracies.

¹ *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 244.

Soon after the Potsdam Conference the Soviet Government announced that it had decided to re-establish diplomatic relations with Rumania (August 6), Bulgaria (August 14) and Hungary (September 25).¹ The Soviet Government's decision to re-establish diplomatic relations with the countries freed from fascist enslavement was of enormous importance to their democratic development. After it had liberated the Central and East European countries, the Soviet Union extended a friendly hand to their peoples and helped them break through their diplomatic isolation.

The Soviet Union did much to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of these countries by establishing diplomatic relations with them.

* * *

The hostile attitude of the Anglo-American ruling circles to the new people's democratic governments in the East European countries became patently evident also during the discussion of the Polish question. It will be remembered that a final decision on the Soviet-Polish border was adopted at Yalta. It was organically linked with the agreement that "Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west". Poland's eastern border was demarcated in strict compliance with the decisions of the Yalta Conference.² This involved a number of problems which were vitally important to Poland (economic and military, and problems connected with transfer of the population, and so on). It was therefore urgently necessary to decide the question of Poland's western border. Moved by friendly feelings towards People's Democratic Poland and wishing to help her in resolving these crucial problems, the Soviet Government handed over to the Polish authorities territories which had at one time belonged to Poland, and which had been the subject of discussion at the Yalta Conference. This friendly gesture by the USSR towards Allied Poland evoked violent indignation among the American and English delegations at the Potsdam Conference. Truman and Byrnes, Churchill and Eden, as also Attlee and Bevin, who replaced them, endeavoured in every way possible to change the

¹ Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland were restored on August 6, 1945.

² The treaty between the USSR and Poland on the Soviet-Polish state border was signed on August 16, 1945.

status quo in western Poland. Despite the convincing arguments in favour of an immediate decision of the question of Poland's western border advanced by the Polish delegation, which had been invited to the conference, the USA and Britain continued to sabotage the adoption of a decision on this crucial question.

As a result of the firm stand taken by the Soviet delegation, the British and American representatives had to give in. They agreed that the . . . "former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the Western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State. . .".¹

The US draft agreement proposed the establishment of the border east of the Neisse River, while Churchill in his memoirs confirms that if the Tories had won the elections "neither I nor Mr. Eden would ever have agreed to the Western Neisse being the frontier line".²

True, the decision co-ordinated at Potsdam contained the proviso that a final demarcation of Poland's western border would be postponed until the peace conference. But if we take into account that in defining Poland's western borders the conference simultaneously adopted a decision on the transfer to Germany of the German population from the territories to be handed over to Poland, it is obvious that it was not a temporary but a final decision, and that it was merely to be ratified at the conference on the peace treaty with Germany.³

The Potsdam Conference noted that a new Polish Government had been set up in accordance with the decisions of the Yalta Conference. From June 17 to 21, 1945, a number of sessions were held in Moscow between members of the Provisional Polish Government and some other democratic

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin*, Vol. II, pp. 1491-92.

² Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 581.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 682.

functionaries from Poland, and Poles from abroad, who had come for this purpose to the Soviet capital. The agreement reached as a result of the exchange of opinions was submitted to the Moscow Commission of the Representatives of the USSR, USA and Britain. The agreement said that the participants in the talks, "being convinced that the national dignity and sovereignty of the Polish state demands that Polish affairs be settled by Poles themselves, have reached full agreement on the reorganisation of the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic".¹ The Commission of the Three Powers noted with pleasure that this agreement had been reached. The Provisional Polish Government of National Unity was formed on June 28, 1945, and on July 5 it was recognised by the governments of Britain, the USA and China. The London Emigré Government was thus deprived of diplomatic recognition by its English and American patrons.

In recognising the new Polish Government, London and Washington hoped that Poland would not take the socialist road.

The Soviet Union gave further proof of its friendship towards the new Poland by insisting at the Potsdam Conference that all Polish assets, values and property under control of the émigré clique be handed over to the new Polish Government. In addition, the Soviet delegation demanded that all Polish armed forces including the navy and merchant marine be subordinated to the Polish Government of National Unity.² Churchill attempted to torpedo the adoption of the Soviet proposal. As a result of the discussions a declaration on the Polish question was issued which said specifically that the British and United States governments "have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Government of National Unity, as the recognised Government of the Polish state with respect to the property belonging to the Polish state which is on their territories and under their control, irrespective of the form of that property". In addition, guarantees were given that the Polish Government would be given all proper facilities to exercise the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish state which may have been wrongfully alienated.

¹ *The Soviet Union's Foreign Policy...*, Vol. III, pp. 301-03.

² *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences*, p. 174.

As regards the Polish armed forces outside Poland, the declaration contained a promise by the Three Governments to help the new Polish Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces and the merchant marine.

These were the chief results of the discussion of the Polish question at the Potsdam Conference. If we look back at the perennial discussion of that question at various Soviet-Anglo-American conferences and talks during the war, we must inevitably draw the conclusion that the principles staunchly defended by the Soviet Union had prevailed; a popular government had come to power and just borders had been fixed for Poland. The decisions on Poland, as also decisions on other questions connected with Eastern Europe, were a major success of Soviet foreign policy. The attempts of the Americans and English to prevent the democratic development of the East European countries had failed completely. Those countries, supported by the USSR, continued their development along the socialist road in accordance with the wishes of their peoples.

* * *

At the Potsdam Conference the US and British delegations once again posed the question of the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan. At a meeting of the military delegations of the USSR, USA and Britain views were exchanged on future military operations against Japan.

The participants also expressed their views on some other problems of world policy. The Black Sea Straits, the transfer of the German population, the international zone of Tangiers, the Soviet proposal on extending the competence of the interim Austrian Government to the whole of Austria, the Soviet proposal to recommend that all United Nations break off relations with the Franco regime, and a number of other questions came up for discussion. Some of them were resolved and this was reflected in the final communiqué.

The Potsdam Conference holds a special place in the history of international relations. On the whole, the decisions showed that democratic principles had prevailed in the post-war organisation of the world. The decisions on Germany and Poland, on the procedure for preparing peace treaties and on a number of other matters laid the foundation for

a stable and enduring peace. As before, at the Potsdam Conference, too, the Soviet Government showed that it stood for co-operation with the USA and Britain, which had proved so worthwhile during the war. It expressed its willingness to seek decisions on international questions which would be acceptable to all participants. Thus, the Soviet Government adopted the proposal of the USA to set up a Council of Foreign Ministers, agreed to the collection of reparations from Germany from the relevant zones of occupation, adopted a number of proposals of the Western powers on the German and Polish questions, and others. At the same time it cut short all attempts by the Western powers to employ an imperialist policy towards the USSR and other states. This firm stand was the reason why some of the US delegation's proposals were rejected; had they been accepted, they would have led to the restoration of capitalism in the East European countries.

The influence of the "hard line" champions, one of the most convinced supporters of whom was President Truman himself, on the position of the US delegation was becoming ever more obvious.

The British delegation's position at the conference differed little from the American. The change in the leadership of the British delegation did nothing to alter the position. As a result of the defeat in the elections of the Conservative Party, the British delegation was, from July 28, headed by Attlee, the new British Prime Minister, and by Bevin, the new Foreign Minister. The participation of the Labour leaders in the conference did not contribute to mutual understanding between the participants.

The Right Labour leaders—Attlee and Bevin—adopted an openly anti-Soviet stand at Potsdam. Bevin's biographer considers that Bevin made there his first contribution to post-war diplomacy by expressing his strong opposition to the changes in the boundary lines of Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union.¹

The reaction of the American and British leaders to the news about the successful test of the atom bomb illustrates the position of the US and British governments towards the USSR. Truman and Churchill were happy in the belief that this terrible weapon would ensure the supremacy of the

¹ Francis Williams, *Ernest Bevin*, London, 1952, p. 240.

Western powers in world affairs. Churchill unambiguously hints in his memoirs in this connection that "a far happier prospect in Europe" had thus been created.¹ Although the report on the test of the atom bomb did not have the expected effect on the Soviet delegation at the Potsdam Conference, yet atomic blackmail became an important weapon in the diplomatic arsenal of the US and British "hard-liners".

This all makes short work of McNeill's assertion that "Truman and Byrnes quite genuinely wished to keep on tolerably good terms with the Russians".² Many sources, including Truman's and Byrnes's memoirs, warrant a different conclusion.

In that case, what explains the relatively successful conclusion of the conference and the consent of the delegations of the Western powers to the adoption of a number of important democratic decisions? First of all this was due to the new stature of the USSR in world affairs. The Soviet Union played so great a role in the rout of Hitler Germany, and the upsurge of the democratic movement was so momentous, that the US ruling circles could not risk an open break.

Another important factor that decided the position of the US and British governments at Potsdam was that they were extremely anxious that the Soviet Union enter the war against Japan. The official American collection *United States Relations with China* says that "it thus became a primary concern of the American Government to see to it that the Soviet Union enter the war against Japan at the earliest possible date in order that the Japanese Army in Manchuria might not be returned to the homeland at the critical moment."³

Finally, there is Truman's admission which leaves no doubt that this factor played an extremely important role in determining the position of the American delegation. In his memoirs he writes that there were many reasons for his going to Potsdam but that the most urgent was to get from the Soviet Government a reaffirmation of the Soviet Union's entry in the war against Japan, a matter which US military

¹ Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 553.

² W. H. McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia*, p. 614.

³ *United States Relations with China. With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*, 1949, p. VIII.

chiefs were most anxious to clinch. Truman admits that he was able to get this reaffirmation in the very first days of the conference.¹

The facts give the lie to Churchill's statement that at the Potsdam Conference the British and US governments felt that they no longer needed the Soviet Union's aid to conquer Japan.²

And, last but not least, the Potsdam Conference, as it were, summed up the Soviet-Anglo-American war-time co-operation. Its decisions reflected the inter-Allied relations that had shaped between the USSR, USA and Britain in the course of the war. The London and Washington ruling circles, even though they had chosen to adopt a "hard line" in their relations with the USSR, were compelled to adopt many democratic decisions at the conference together with the Soviet Union because these decisions reflected the liberating anti-fascist character of the war the peoples of the world, including the British and American peoples, had waged for so many years. The Potsdam decisions outlined a programme for post-war reconstruction which evolved from the tasks proclaimed by the anti-Hitler coalition during the war and which coincided with the lofty ideals of the freedom-loving peoples united in struggle against fascism.

Despite all the difficulties at the conference resulting from the position of the "hard-liners" and the controversies between its participants, the Potsdam summit meeting by right belongs to the most important international conferences and once again confirmed that co-ordinated decisions on many international issues can be reached by socialist and capitalist states.

* * *

This history of Soviet-Anglo-American relations during the Second World War is drawing to a close. Inspired by the common aim—to destroy world fascism—the Soviet, British, American and other freedom-loving peoples smashed Hitlerite Germany. After Germany's unconditional surrender the Soviet Union withdrew from the Second World War. The Soviet Union's Allies—the United States and Great Britain—continued the war against Japan, the last participant of the fascist bloc. The Anglo-American command

¹ *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Vol. I, New York, 1965, p. 454.

² Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 554.

planned to unfold major operations against Japan in the second half of 1945 and in 1946. Thus, in accordance with operation Olympic planned by the Allies, Anglo-American troops were to land on Kyushu Island on November 1, 1945 and on Honshu Island not earlier than in the spring of 1946.

Only the entry of the USSR into the war with Japan could decisively tip the scale in favour of the anti-fascist states. Here too the Soviet Union came to the help of its Allies—the USA and Britain. The Soviet Government considered it necessary to join the war in the Far East in order to ensure the state interests of the Soviet Union, to hasten the rout of the last stronghold of world fascism, and to prevent the further suffering of the peoples participating in the Pacific war.

Even before the end of the European war, on April 5, 1945, the Soviet Government denounced the Soviet-Japanese pact on neutrality concluded in April 1941, thus preparing to fulfil the Allied commitments it had assumed at the Yalta Conference. Conditions had changed since this treaty had been concluded; Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, and Japan, Germany's ally, helped her in the war against the USSR. "Under these conditions," the Soviet Government's statement noted, "the neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR has lost all sense and the prolongation of the pact has become impossible."¹

The Soviet Government's statement made in April 1945 was a serious warning to imperialist Japan and a heavy blow to the Japanese aggressors.

Tokyo, however, did not draw the necessary conclusions from the denunciation of the Soviet-Japanese pact. Then, on August 8, 1945, in strict compliance with the decisions of the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Government sent a new note to the Japanese Government in which it said that after the rout and capitulation of Germany Japan was the only power standing for the continuation of the war. Therefore, desiring to hasten the end of the war, decrease the number of victims and accelerate the advent of universal peace, the USSR on August 9 declared war on Japan.

On that day the Soviet troops unfolded an offensive along the entire Far Eastern Front and soon broke down the resistance of the enemy.

¹ *Soviet Foreign Policy* . . , Vol. III, p. 166.

On September 2, 1945, Japan's capitulation was signed on board the US battleship *Missouri*, anchored in Tokyo Bay.

The rout of imperialist Japan meant that the long-expected end of the Second World War had finally come. There were two hotbeds of war and aggression on the eve of the war: Hitler Germany in the heart of Europe, and militaristic Japan in the Far East. With the connivance and support of world reaction the aggressors had unleashed the Second World War for which mankind had to pay a toll of millions of lives.

Now German fascist and Japanese militarist tyranny had been vanquished on the fields of battle. The Soviet people, who had borne the main burden in the rout of fascism, together with the English, French, American, Chinese and other peoples defeated the enemy. In the trenches and at factories, by sweat and blood, deprivations and sufferings, they had forged this difficult victory. They had to pay a heavy price for the policy of "conciliation" which London, Paris and Washington had adopted and for the refusal of the British, French and American ruling circles to co-operate with the Soviet Union when it was still possible to check the aggressor. It was owing to their will and to their efforts that favourable conditions for a firm and enduring peace had been created in the course of the war.

Freedom-loving mankind had stood the acid test imposed on it by the fascist aggressors and their imperialist supporters during the Second World War. It had stood these trials with a great hope and faith that the lessons of the war would not go unheeded and that aggressors would never again succeed in plunging mankind into a new world holocaust.

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